No More Learning

At these signal instances of Akbar's incapacity the emperor trans-
ferred him to Marwar, and gave the Chitor command to Prince
A'zam. The plan of war adopted now was to penetrate into the
Mewar hills in three columns : from the eastern or Chitor side by
way of the Deobari pass and Udaipur under A'zam; from the north
by way of lake Rajsamudra under Mu'azzam, and from the western
or Marwar side through the Deosuri pass under Akbar. The first
two of these generals failed to achieve their tasks.
Prince Akbar took post at Sojat in Marwar on 28 July, but could
not repress the Rathor bands that spread over the country, closing
the roads to trade and disturbing every weak post. His instructions
were to occupy Nadol, the chief town of the Godwar district, and


## p. 250 (#284) ############################################

250
AURANGZIB (1658-1681)
from this new base penetrate eastwards into Mewar by the Deosuri
pass and invade the Kumbhalgarh region, where the Maharana and
many Rathors had taken refuge. Akbar reached Nadol at the end
of September, but for nearly two months did nothing. At last the
emperor in wrath sent the imperial paymaster to his camp to enforce
a forward movement. It was only then that Akbar advanced to.
Deosuri and, sending his lieutenant Tahavvur Khan ahead, forced
the Jhilwara pass (2 December). The next step would have been to
push on eight miles southwards to Kumbhalgarh and drive the
Maharana out of his last refuge. But it was not done. There followed
a lull of inactivity for five weeks, during which the prince's trea-
sonable plot was fully hatched, and at last on 11 January, 1681, he
united with the Rathor and Sisodia contingents and proclaimed
himself emperor of India !
Smarting under repeated censure from his father for his failure
in war and seeing no means of defeating the Rajputs, Akbar had
early lent a ready ear to the tempting invitation of the Rajputs to
seize the Delhi throne with their help. Tahavvur Khan was the
intermediary of these treasonable negotiations. The Maharana Raj
Singh and Durga Das told the prince how his father's bigoted attempt
to “root the Rajputs out” was threatening the stability of the Mughul
empire, and urged him to seize the throne and restore the wise
policy of his forefathers if he wished to save his heritage from
destruction. They promised to back him with the armed strength
of the two greatest Rajput clans, the Sisodias and the Rathors. The
death of Raj Singh (1 November) and the succession of his son Jay
Singh interposed a month's delay in the execution of this plot. But
when Tahavvur reached Jhilwara, the negotiations were resumed
and quickly concluded. The new Maharana promised to send half
his army under his brother for the attack on Aurangzib, and 12
January, 1681, was fixed for the march on Ajmer. Two days before
that date Akbar wrote a deceptive letter to his father saying that
two Mewar princes and the Rathor leaders had come to him begging
him to secure the emperor's pardon and peace for them, to present
them to the emperor and personally to intercede with him for them,
and that with this object he was marching on Ajmer. Then Akbar
threw off his mask. Four theologians in his pay issued a decree under
their seals, declaring that Aurangzib had forfeited his throne by his
violation of the Quranic law! Akbar crowned himself emperor
(11 January, 1681) and next day started for Ajmer with his new
Mewar and Marwar allies, dragging most of the imperial officers
in his camp with him in this act of rebellion.
At this time Aurangzib at Ajmer was very slenderly protected :
his faithful sons were far away and even the imperial guard had been
detached on a distant expedition. His immediate retinue consisted
of a few thousands of unserviceable soldiers, personal attendants,


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PRINCE AKBAR'S REBELLION
251
clerks and eunuchs. He had loved Akbar above all his other sons,
and now in the bitterness of disillusionment he cried out, "I am now
defenceless. The young hero has got a splendid opportunity. Why,
then, is he delaying his attack? ” But Akbar was not the man to
seize this opportunity by a rapid dash on the imperial camp; he
began to spend his days in pleasure and took a fortnight to arrive
near Ajmer. Every day told in Aurangzib's favour. Loyal officers
from far and near strained every nerve to reach him by forced
marches, and on the day of Akbar's arrival in his neighbourhood,
prince Mu'azzam joined the emperor, doubling his strength. In the
meantime, Aurangzib, with wise audacity, had refused to shut him-
self up within the walls of Ajmer, but advanced into the open, and
taken up his position at Doraha, ten miles south of that city.
Despair and defection now reigned in the camp of Akbar. As he
came nearer, increasing numbers of Mughul officers began to escape
from his army to the imperial camp: only the 30,000 Rajputs re-
mained true to him. Arrived within three miles of Doraha (25 Jan-
uary), he halted for the night, after fixing the next morning for the
decisive battle. But during that night, Aurangzib's cunning diplomacy
secured the completest victory for him without any resort to arms.
Tahavvur Khan was the vazir and life and soul of Akbar's govern-
ment, that prince being a vain sluggard. Tahavvur's father-in-law
'Inayat Khan, then in the imperial camp, was made by Aurangzib
to write him a letter, urging him to come to the emperor, with a
promise of pardon for the past, otherwise his wives and sons, held by
Aurangzib as hostages, would be ruined. In the darkness Tahavvur
stole away alone from his tent without informing either Akbar or
Durga Das, arrived at the imperial camp about midnight, and was
killed by the emperor's attendants in a wrangle when he wanted to
enter the presence without being disarmed.
Meanwhile, Aurangzib had written a false letter to Akbar, praising
him for having so successfully carried out the emperor's stratagem
of luring all the Rajput fighters within his reach, and now instructing
him to place these Rajputs in his van in next morning's battle so
that they might be easily crushed between the imperial forces and
Akbar's own troops. As contrived by the emperor, this letter fell
into Durga Das's hands, who read it and in surprise went to Akbar's
tent for an'explanation. That prince was reported to be asleep and
his eunuchs refused to wake him. Durga Das next sent some men to
call Tahavvur, when it was discovered that the soul of the whole
enterprise had secretly gone over to the emperor some hours before.
The prince's sleep was taken to be a ruse. The intercepted letter
was believed to have been verified by these facts. The Rajputs
promptly arranged to save themselves. Three hourse before dawn they
took horse, robbed what they could of Akbar's property, and galloped
off to Mewar. Profiting by this confusion, the remaining imperial


## p. 252 (#286) ############################################

252
AURANGZIB (1658-1681)
troopers whom Akbar had forced to accompany him escaped towards
Aurangzib's camp. Tahavvur Khan was the connecting link between
the Rajputs and Akbar; he had been the new emperor's commander-
in-chief and prime minister in one, and his flight at once dissolved
the confederacy. In the morning Akbar awoke to find himself
deserted by all, save a faithful band of 350 horse. He hurriedly rode
away for life in the track of his Rajput allies, taking only some of
his wives and children and a little treasure with him. The rest of
his property and his deserted family-one wife, two sons and three
daughters—were seized by the emperor. Relentless punishment was
meted out to his followers, especially the four Mullas; his ally, the
princess Zib-un-Nisa, was deprived of her property and confined in
the Salimgarh fortress.
During the second night after Akbar's flight, Durga Das, having
discovered the fraud played by Aurangzib, turned back and took
the luckless prince under his protection. Rajput honour demanded
that the refugee should be defended at all cost. After evading the
pursuing Mughul columns and fleeing through Rajputana and
Khandesh, Durga Das boldly and skilfully conducted Akbar to the
court of Shambhuji, the only power in India that could defy
Aurangzib (11 June, 1681).
Akbar's rebellion, however, had the effect of saving Mewar, by
wrecking the Mughul plan of war at a time when the Maharana
was about to be completely surrounded, and it also forced Aurangzib
to transfer himself and his best troops to the Deccan to watch the
rebel and his new patron. Mewar was ravaged by war, so that the
Maharana was as eager as Aurangzib to make peace. He visited
prince A‘zam (24 June) and through his mediation was reconciled
with the emperor on the following terms:
1. The Maharana ceded to the empire the parganas of Mandal,
Pur and Bednor in lieu of the jizya demanded from his kingdom.
2. The Mughul army withdrew from Mewar, which was restored
to Jay Singh with the title of Rana and a command of 5000.
Thus Mewar regained peace and freedom, but Marwar continued
a scene of war and devastation for twenty-nine years more, which
will be described in chapter x. In the height of political unwisdom,
Aurangzib wantonly provoked rebellion among the loyal Rajputs,
while the frontier Afghans were still far from being subdued. With
the two leading Rajput clans openly hostile to him, his army lost its
finest and most loyal native recruits. The trouble spread by contagion
from the Rathors and Sisodias to the Hara and Gaur clans, and the
lawlessness here set moving overflowed into Malwa and heartened
every opponent of the imperial government throughout India.
During the first half of Aurangzib's reign affairs in the Deccan did
not assume engrossing importance; the emperor's personal attention
was engaged elsewhere and he felt that he could safely leave the


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RELATIONS WITH STATES IN DECCAN
253
south to his viceroys, because Bijapur and Golconda were hopelessly
decadent and the full significance of the rise of the Maratha people
under Shivaji was not realised till near the close of the hero's career
(1680). Qutb Shah remained throughout a quiescent vassal, except
for armed assistance rendered to 'Adil Shah against Mughul attacks
in 1666 and 1679; but these acts of disloyalty to his suzerain were
compounded for by the payment of fines. A vigorous forward policy
was pursued by the imperialists against Bijapur only under Jay Singh
(1666), Bahadur Khan (1676-77) and Dilir Khan (1679-80). Military
operations against Shivaji were actively carried on by Shayista Khan
(1660-62), Jay Singh (1665), Mahabat Khan
(1665), Mahabat Khan (1671-72), Bahadur
Khan (1673-75), and by Dilir Khan for a short while in 1678-79,
though a state of war continued languidly between the two powers
for the entire period, except the four years of peace 1666-69.
Only a few clear successes but no decisive result was achieved by
Mughul arms in the Deccan during the first twenty-four years of the
reign, because Shah Alam, who was viceroy for nearly one-half of
this period, was a timid and unenterprising prince, and was further
thwarted by the open hostility of his chief officer, Dilir Khan; the
Hindu officers in the Mughul camp secretly fraternised with the
Maratha defender of their faith, while the Muslim generals were glad
to bribe him to let them live in peace. The annexation of the Deccan
was impossible except by a much more powerful army than any
provincial viceroy's and a chief with the relentless vigour and deter-
mination of Aurangzib.
Golconda may be left out of our account. 'Abdullah Qutb Shah
(reigned 1626-72) was throughout his life indolent and almost
imbecile, and his narrow escape from assassination by Aurangzib's
son in 1656 gave him such a fright that he "lost all mental energy
and ceased to hold the reigns of government, or even to appear outside
the walls of the fortress of Golconda" ever afterwards. All his time
was given to ingenious forms of sensuality, while his mother and after-
wards his son-in-law conducted the actual administration through-
out his reign. His successor, Abu-'l-Hasan surnamed Tana Shah, was
equally indolent and pleasure-loving, though possessed of a more
delicate and artistic taste; under him his Brahman ministers Madanna
and Akkanna freely misgoverned the realm, following the traditional
foreign policy of outward loyalty to the Mughuls with the addition
of a secret defensive alliance with Shivaji in return for a subsidy
of 500,000 rupees a year.
With Bijapur Mughul relations were more complicated. Briefly
put, the grouping of powers in the Deccan was this: the dread of
imperial aggression drove the Sultan of Golconda whole-heartedly,
and that of Bijapur distrustfully and intermittently, into the arms
of Shivaji. Bijapur's leagues with Shivaji were formed only when
Mughul invasion was an insistent fact and the situation of 'Adil Shah


## p. 254 (#288) ############################################

254
AURANGZIB (1658-1681)
was hopeless, and these leagues were soon dissolved by the growing
fear that the Maratha coming in as a friend would treacherously
seize 'Adil Shahi forts and lands. During Shayista Khan's campaign
against Shivaji (1660), the Bijapuris did, indeed, render useful
co-operation to the Mughuls, but such aid to the imperial power
ceased after the ministers of Bijapur had formed a secret pact with
Shivaji (about 1662) on condition of his sparing the heart of the
kingdom, i. e. the royal territories proper, while he was left free to
rob the semi-independent nobles whose grants lay in the outlying
provinces.
Aurangzib, when freed from the anxieties of the war of succession,
determined to punish 'Adil Shah for his evasion of the promises
made in the treaty of August, 1657, and his covert aid to Shivaji.
He sent Jay Singh to the Deccan early in 1665 "to punish both these
rebels”. That general's first task was to humble Shivaji, which he
effected in less than three months by his masterly campaign of
Purandar (concluded in June, 1665). In the ensuing cold weather
he set out for the invasion of Bijapur, at the head of 40,000 imperial
troops and 9000 Maratha auxiliaries under Shivaji himself and his
lieutenant Netaji Palkar. The 'Adil Shahi forts on the way fell to
him without a blow, and he had his first encounter with the Bijapur
army on 3 January, 1666, when a small detachment was cut off.
The Deccani horsemen tried to envelop the Mughuls, evading their
charges and breaking into several loose bodies which harassed the
heavy cavalry of the north by practising their familiar "cossack"
tactics. After a long contest the Mughuls, by repeated charges,
drove the enemy back, but as soon as they began their return march
the elusive Deccanis reappeared and galled them from both wings
and the rear.
After two severe battles of this kind, he forced his way to within
12 miles of Bijapur fort (7 January). But meantime the 'Adil Shahi
capital had been rendered impregnable by strengthening its garrison,
devastating the country around for 6 miles, draining all the tanks,
filling up all the wells and cutting down every tree in its environs.
At the same time a picked force under Sharza Khan and Sidi Mas'ud
made a diversion by raiding the Mughul territories in the rear of the
invaders. Jay Singh's sole chance of success lay in his taking Bijapur
by surprise, as he had bribed most of its nobles and his rapid march
was expected to give the Bijapuri forces no time to adopt measures
of defence. He had, therefore, brought with him no heavy artillery
or siege material. The hope of capturing Bijapur by a coup de main
having vanished, the baffled Mughul general decided on retreat
(15 January), which he could do only after fighting two severe
battles besides almost daily skirmishes. Netaji Palkar deserted to
'Adil Shah; Shivaji failed with heavy loss in an assault on Panhala
and Qutb Shah sent a large force to the rescue of his brother


## p. 255 (#289) ############################################

MUGHUL INVASION OF BIJAPUR
256
Sultan. After moving about in the Sultanpur-Dharur-Bhum-Bhir
region, constantly harassed by the enemy and often suffering heavy
losses to his detachments, without being able to effect anything
decisive, Jay Singh returned to his headquarters (Aurangabad)
on 6 December, after complete failure, incurring the severest
financial loss. The Bijapuris now retired to their own country. The
unlucky general was censured and recalled by his master and died,
broken-hearted from disgrace and disappointment, on the way at
Burhanpur (12 July, 1667).
After this war 'Ali 'Adil Shah II gave himself up to the pleasures
of the harem and the wine-cup, which prostrated him by a stroke
of paralysis. His able and experienced minister 'Abdul-Muhammad,
however, continued to carry on the administration with honesty and
success; but with the accession of Sikandar 'Adil Shah, a boy of
four (4 December, 1672), and the seizure of the post of minister by
Khavass Khan, civil war broke out between the Afghan and Deccani
cum Abyssinian factions among the nobles, and the rapid decline and
dismemberment of the kingdom began. Henceforth the history of
Bijapur became the history of its successive ministers : Khavass
Khan the Abyssinian (1672-75), Buhlul the Afghan (1675-77),
Mas'ud the Abyssinian (1678-83) and Aqa Khusrav (1684). The
Sultan remained all his life a helpless prisoner; the provincial
governors became independent of the central authority; and assassi-
nations and faction fights destroyed the nobility in the capital
itself.
Solicited by the Deccani party then out of power, the Mughul
viceroy Bahadur Khan invaded Bijapur in 1676, but met with a
crushing defeat near Indi, Islam Khan Rumi (the governor of Malwa)
being slain (23 June). But soon afterwards he cowed the minister
into allowing the Mughuls to annex certain 'Adil Shahi forts, such
as Naldrug and Gulbarga (1677). Aurangzib, being dissatisfied with
this result and suspecting Bahadur of collusion with the Deccani
powers, recalled him. His successor Dilir Khan, in alliance with
Buhlul the Afghan vazir of Bijapur, invaded Qutb Shah's territory
at Malkhed in September, 1677. Here they fought for two months,
being put to the severest distress by the cutting off of their pro-
visions, and were finally forced to make a disastrous retreat to
Gulbarga, abandoning all their baggage.
On the death of Buhlul (2 January, 1678), Sidi Mas'ud made
himself minister of Bijapur with the support of Dilir Khan, agreeing
to make himself virtually a servant of the Mughuls and to send the
Sultan's sister Shahr Banu (Padishah Bibi) to the Delhi court for
marriage with a son of Aurangzib (A'zam). These humiliating terms
made him universally unpopular. The treasury was empty, and the
unpaid soldiery broke out in lawless fury, plundering and torturing
the rich, while the minister hid himself in fear and impotence. Many


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256
AURANGZIB (1658-1681)
people began to emigrate from the doomed capital. In the provinces
the regent's authority was openly flouted.
Then Mas'ud made a secret pact with Shivaji, on hearing of which
Dilir Khan marched out to Akluj (October, 1678), threatening to
invade Bijapur. The Maratha allies who came to Mas'ud's aid
began treacherously to plunder the realm and even plotted to seize
the capital by surprise. Mas'ud then sought the protection of Dilir
Khan, who sent a relieving force to Bijapur and captured Bhupalgarh
(12 April, 1679), which was the most important Maratha stronghold
in that quarter.
But the 'Adil Shahi government was now practically dissolved,
there was utter anarchy in the country and the capital in consequence
of the feud between Mas'ud and Sharza Khan, the only defenders
of Bijapur fort were some three thousand starving men, "and even
these hankered for Mughul pay". The greed of the imperialists was
insatiable. Dilir Khan now demanded that Mas'ud should resign
his post as minister in favour of a creature of the Mughuls. On meeting
with refusal he invaded the 'Adil Shahi kingdom (September, 1679).
This campaign was a complete failure, because of Dilir Khan's
utter lack of money, the open opposition of his chief Shah Alam
(newly returned to the Deccan as viceroy) and the very prompt
and effective aid which Shivaji in person gave to Mas'ud. Dilir only
bombarded Bijapur fort fruitlessly for some days and then marched
through the country around it like a mad dog, plundering and
burning the villages, selling the harmless villagers into slavery with
fiendish cruelty, and turning rich cities like Athni and the fertile
valley of the Don and the Krishna into a desert. Finally, he invaded
the Berad country (modern Shorapur), east of Bijapur, in the fork
between the Krishna and the Bhima. Here, his attack on Gogi
(1 March, 1680) failed with heavy loss, his soldiers refused to follow
him, and he was recalled in disgrace.
The Maratha people created an independent state and became an
important element in the politics of the Mughul empire only under
Shivaji
, late in the seventeenth century. His father was Shahji
Bhonsle, who rose from the position of a small assignee under the
Sultans of Ahmadnagar to that of a kingmaker, and finally, after
his defeat by Shah Jahan (1636) and forced migration from Maha-
rashtra, became one of the leading Hindu generals of the 'Adil
Shahi government. His petty holdings in the Poona district, with
.
a rent-roll of only 40,000 huns, were given by him to his son Shivaji
(born in 1627), while his later acquisitions, in Mysore and the Arcot
district, were inherited by Vyankaji (also called Ekoji), his son by
another wife.
Shivaji and his mother were practically discarded by Shahji, with
the result that Shivaji became his own master at the age of twenty
when his guardian Dadaji Kond-dev died (1647). He gained many
forts from their hereditary owners or the local officers of Bijapur,


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EARLY CAREER OF SHIVAJI
267
sometimes by force but more often by treachery and sowing dissen-
sion; and he was able to do so the more easily because the Poona
district, having originally belonged to the fallen Nizam-Shahi dynasty,
was a recent and imperfectly subdued acquisition of Bijapur and
that monarchy at this time entered on a rapid course of decline owing
to the prolonged illness of Muhammad Adil Shah (1646-56), the
succession of minor princes and the rule of selfish regents.
This was Shivaji's opportunity. By his conquest of forts and
annexation of Javli (25 January, 1656), he more than doubled the
extent and revenue of his heritage. His first encounter with the
Mughuls was in 1657, when, taking advantage of Aurangzib's invasion
of Bijapur and the diversion of the Mughul forces to the Bidar-Kaliani
region, he raided the Ahmednagar and Junnar districts (April) and
even looted the rich city of Junnar (10 May). But Aurangzib
promptly reinforced his local officers in that region and Nasiri Khan
by forced marches surprised and routed Shivaji (14 June). The im-
perialists then ravaged the Maratha villages and guarded their own
frontier watchfully by turns. When 'Adil Shah made peace with the
Mughuls (September), Shivaji too submitted. But Aurangzib, though
pardoning him for the time being, never really trusted him and
merely deferred his punishment till after the war of succession.
Shivaji next entered the north Konkan, seized Kalyan, Bhiwandi
and Mahuli and advanced as far south as Mahad. A grand Bijapur
expedition against him led by 'Abdullah Bhatari (entitled Afzal
Khan) failed. Shivaji slew Afzal at an interview and surprised and
plundered his army (20 November, 1659). He then penetrated into
the south Konkan and the Kolhapur district. Next year, in the south
a Bijapur force under Sidi Jauhar invested Shivaji in Panhala fort
and forced him to evacuate it (23 July, 1660), and at the same time
in the north a Mughul army under Shayista Khan occupied Poona
(19 Mav) and took Chakan fort by mining after a fifty-four days'
siege (25 August). Thereafter the Mughul viceroy rested in Poona
for many months. A force sent by him into the north Konkan was
defeated, and Shivaji rapidly extended his conquests down the
coast-strip up to Kharepatan, though he lost Kalyan to the Mughuls
in May, 1661.
Some desultory fighting and fruitless chase of the Maratha light
raiders by the Mughuls occupied the next two years, and then on
15 April, 1663, Shivaji with masterly cunning and secrecy penetrated
into Shayista Khan's harem in Poona at midnight with a small band
of followers and took him so completely by surprise that the Mughul
yiceroy was wounded, one of his sons, one captain, forty attendants
an:1 six women of his harem were killed and two other sons and eight
other women were wounded, while the Marathas lost only six men
killed and forty wounded and escaped from the camp without the
least hindrance. This result was due to the connivance, or at least
the slothfulness, of Jasvant Singh, the first officer of Shayista Khan.
17


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258
AURANGZIB (1658-1681)
Next, from 16 to 20 January, 1664, Shivaji sacked the rich city of
Surat unchecked, its cowardly governor having fled away without
any attempt at resistance, though the English, Dutch and French
factories successfully defended themselves. Nearly two-thirds of the
town were destroyed by fire and the plunder exceeded ten million
rupees in value.
Aurangzib removed Shayista Khan from the viceroyalty and sent
Jay Singh of Amber to the Deccan to punish Shivaji (1665). This
raja by marvellously skilful diplomacy raised a complete ring of
enemies round Shivaji and laid siege to the fort of Purandar, in
which the families of the Maratha officers had taken shelter. In two
weeks he wrested the fortified hill of Vajragarh (Rudramal) which
commands the main terrace of Purandar, and advanced along the
connecting the two forts, while a strong flying column burnt
and sacked the villages of Maharashtra. At last, finding the fort
doomed, Shivaji personally visited Jay Singh and made with him
the treaty of Purandar (22 June) by which he ceded to the emperor
twenty-three forts (with lands yielding 400,000 huns), and retained
for himself only twelve forts (with territory worth 100,000 huns a
year), acknowledged himself a vassal of the emperor and promised
to send a contingent of 5000 horse to serve the Mughul ranks in
the Deccan. In the invasion of Bijapur that soon followed, he served
the imperial cause with complete loyalty.
Shivaji next, under the persuasion of Jay Singh, paid a visit to
Aurangzib's court at Agra (22 May, 1666). But this purely country-
bred warrior felt humiliated at being ranked as a noble commanding
5000 men and left unnoticed after his presentation. He created a scene,
accused the emperor of breach of faith, and swooned away in vexation
of spirit. At this display of unfriendly feeling, he was ordered to be
kept under police surveillance and forbidden the court. His appeals
to the emperor and his ministers for leave to return home were
fruitless, and after three months of captivity he slipped out of Agra
(29 August) with his son, deceiving his guards by lying concealed in
two large baskets of sweetmeats which were preceded and followed
by baskets of real sweets. Then, following a roundabout route, via
Muttra, Allahabad, Benares, Gaya and Telingana, he reached home
on 30 November, 1666.
For three years after this, he left the Mughul government un-
molested and even made peace with it through the mediation of
Jasvant Singh and prince Shah 'Alam. The emperor recognised his
title of Raja and made a grant to his son Shambhuji. In January,
1670, Shivaji broke with the Mughuls again, and by rapid strokes
recovered nearly all the forts ceded by him in 1665. He plundered
imperial territory in the Deccan right and left. A bitter quarrel.
between the viceroy Shah 'Alam and his lieutenant Dilir Khan made
it impossible for the imperialists to chastise or even to check the
Maratha chief, and he looted Surat a second time (13-15 October,


## p. 259 (#293) ############################################

1
FULL GROWTH OF SHIVAJI'S POWER
259
1670), carrying away large booty in cash and kind and thoroughly
ruining the trade of the greatest port of India. Then followed a
period of the most daring and far-ranging raids into Mughul pro-
vinces-Baglan, Khandesh and Berar besides Aurangabad-and the
capture of his forts in the Chandor range as well as Salher. Mughul
generals were repeatedly defeated by him in open fights, especially
at Dindori (27 October, 1670) and below Salher (February, 1671).
After the failure of Mahabat and Dilir (1671-72) against the Mara-
thas, Aurangzib sent Bahadur Khan 1 again as governor to the Deccan,
which he ruled for the next five years but without being able to
cope with Shivaji. This was the full tide of the Maratha hero's
power; he made annexations and levied blackmail (popularly called
chauth or one-fourth of the land revenue, in Marathi khandani) in
the east and west, north and south, and permanently occupied the
Koli country (Ramnagar and Jawhar) south of Surat. The death
of 'Ali `Adil Shah II (4 December, 1672) opened a wide door to
Shivaji's acquisitions at the expense of Bijapur, while the rising of
the Khyber Afghans (1674) detained the main imperial forces on
the north-western frontier. The desultory warfare carried on against
him by Mughul captains from 1672 to 1678 was barren of result.
Taking advantage of these circumstances, Shivaji crowned himself
king of kings (Chhatrapati) at Raigarh on 16 June, 1674, and spent
one year (1677) in conquering a vast realm in the Madras Carnatic
and the Mysore plateau, estimated to cover "sixty leagues by forty
and to yield 20 lakhs of huns a year, with a hundred forts".
In 1678 the new Bijapuri regent Sidi Mas'ud made a pact with
Shivaji for armed assistance in the event of a Mughul attack, and
such assistance was most effectively given during the campaign
against Bijapur opened by Dilir Khan October, 1679. Shivaji, with
a view to causing a diversion in Dilir Khan's rear, formed his men
into two parallel divisions of nine to ten thousand horsemen each,
and poured like a flood northwards from Selgur through the districts
of Mughul Deccan, burning and plundering. But between Jalna
and Aurangabad he was attacked by an enterprising officer, Ranmast
Khan, and forced to fight a rear-guard action, which detained him
for three days, while reinforcements hastened up from Aurangabad
to complete the circle round the Marathas (c. 25 November). In
the third night Shivaji, after losing 4000 men killed and abandoning
all his booty and many horses, slipped out by an obscure path under
the guidance of his head spy, and escaped to his own dominion by
incessant marching for three more days and nights. Evidently these
privations weakened his health, and on 2 April, 1680, he was seized
with fever and blood dysentery, of which he died on the 14th, at the
age of fifty-three.
1 Known as Khan Jahan from about 1674.
2 Sne chap. IX, p. 275.
3 See chap. IX, p. 276.


## p. 260 (#294) ############################################

CHAPTER
DX
THE KINGDOMS OF THE DECCAN DURING
THE REIGNS OF JAHANGIR, SHAHJAHAN
AND AURANGZIB, AND THE RISE OF
THE MARATHA POWER
To
O complete the history of Muhammadan India during the reigns
of Jahangir, Shah Jahan and Aurangzib narrated in separate chapters
it is necessary to consider briefly the relation of the southern kingdoms
with each.
At Akbar's death the shrunken kingdom of Ahmadnagar remained
nominally in the hands of Murtaza II, the representative of the
Nizam Shahs, and actually controlled by Malik Ambar the capable
African minister. The two greater kingdoms of Bijapur and Gol-
conda and the small state of Bidar remained intact, but Bidar was
annexed by Bijapur in 1620.
In September, 1609, Parviz, Jahangir's second son, who had been
appointed to the viceroyalty of Khandesh and the Deccan, left Agra
for Burhanpur; and expecting invasion Ibrahim 'Adil Shah asked
that a resident envoy from the emperor might be accredited to his
court.
Malik 'Ambar also sought alliance with Ibrahim 'Adil Shah and
obtained from him the fortress of Kandhar as a base of operations
situated at a safe distance from the frontier of the imperial province
of Ahmadnagar.
In 1610 prince Parviz, against the advice of the Khan Khanan,
attempted to invade Murtaza's territories by the eastern route, which
was little known and difficult. His supplies were cut off by Maratha
auxiliaries and he suffered a disastrous defeat. His enemies, judging
it imprudent to proceed to extremities against the emperor's son,
permitted a retreat to Burhanpur, but pursued the Mughul army
through Berar, plundering its baggage and otherwise harassing it,
while
even Ahmadnagar fell into the hands of Malik ‘Ambar's troops.
Jahangir most unjustly blamed the Khan Khanan for these disasters
and recalled him from the Deecan, but other generals had no better
success.
In 1616 Parviz, whose sloth and incompetence unfitted him for
active employment on the frontier, was transferred from the Deccan
to Allahabad and in the same year Khurram, the most active and
capable of Jahangir's sons, was appointed viceroy of Khandesh and
the Deccan. On 11 November Jahangir himself set out from Ajmer
for the Deccan in the English coach which had been presented to him
by Sir Thomas Roè.


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SHAH JAHAN'S CONTESTS WITH MALIK 'AMBAR 261
Khurram recovered Ahmadnagar and some other fortresses which
had passed into the hands of Malik 'Ambar, and opening negotiations
wiin Ibrahim 'Adil Shah accepted from him valuable gifts. The
prince was received with high honours on his return, promoted to
the command of 30,000 horse, and entitled Shah Jahan. What he had
in fact effected was the re-establishment of the arrangement origi-
nated by the Khan Khanan, which need never have been disturbed,
and a delusive alliance with Ibrahim 'Adil Shah which was construed
at the Mughul court into the acquisition of a new vassal. Ibrahim
himself regarded his action as an adroit bargain which for the time
averted danger both from himself and from his ally.
Muhammad Quli Qutb Shah of Golconda had died on 24 January,
1612, and had been succeeded by his nephew Muhammad Qutb
Shah, who had married his uncle's daughter, Hayat Bakhsh Begam.
Neither of these two monarchs concerned himself much with the
important struggle in the north-west of the Deccan otherwise than
by supporting Malik 'Ambar by pecuniary contributions. Muhammad
Quli Qutb Shah was occupied with the Carnatic, with Orissa and
Bastar, and with intrigues between the Foreigners 1 and the Deccanis,
the latter of whom gained the upper hand in the closing years of
his reign, and Muhammad Qutb Shah continued the policy of inter-
ference in Bastar, occupied himself with building and had not
sufficiently robust health to indulge in other pursuits. He died on
11 February, 1626, and was succeeded by his thirteen-year old son,
'Abdullah Qutb Shah.
In 1620 Malik 'Ambar took advantage of the emperor's absence
from the Deccan to attack imperial posts on his northern frontier.
Ahmadnagar was besieged, and though the Mughul officer in com-
mand of the Deccan claimed a victory he found it necessary, owing
to the scarcity of supplies, to withdraw his troops to Berar, followed
by the enemy, who ventured to attack him even there, but were
repulsed. The scarcity of supplies was again due to the tactics of the
Maratha auxiliaries of Malik 'Ambar, who was now in possession
of the whole kingdom of Ahmadnagar and of the southern districts
of Berar, with an army of 60,000 horse. Many of the imperial troops
deserted, and their commander had to retreat to Burhanpur and was
besieged there. Jahangir, infuriated by reports of this retirement,
sent Shah Jahan again to the Deccan with a large army, and himself
returned to Agra. Before Shah Jahan reached Ujjain a force of Malik
'Ambar's troops had advanced and plundered villages under the walls
of Mandu. The marauders fled across the Narbada before his
advanced guard but were pursued and many were slain.
Shah Jahan then compelled Malik 'Ambar to raise the siege of
Burhanpur but was obliged to halt there for nine days to refresh the
exhausted garrison.
* See vol m, pp. 403-4.


## p. 262 (#296) ############################################

262
THE KINGDOMS OF THE DECCAN
Malik Ambar had now established Khirki (called later Auranga-
bad) as the capital of the Nizam Shah's kingdom. To ensure his
safety he carried Murtaza into the strong fortress of Daulatabad, only
ten miles distant. Shah Jahan marched to Khirki and "so devastated
a city which had taken twenty years in the building that it was
doubtful whether another twenty years would suffice to restore it to
its pristine splendour".
The beleaguered garrison of Ahmadnagar was relieved and Shah
Jahan reached Paithan on the Godavari, where he received emissaries
from Malik 'Ambar, who expressed contrition.
Shah Jahan now experienced a foretaste of the Maratha warfare
which brought his son to the grave. He had driven before him like
chaff before the wind an enemy who dared not withstand him in the
field; he had confined his principal antagonist within the walls of
a fortress, but his own troops were starving. By all the rules of war
he was the victor. In fact he was as helpless as his adversary, and
was obliged to come to terms, which, however, were honourable to
the empire.
Malik 'Ambar was soon relieved of the anxiety which Shah Jahan's
propinquity caused him; for early in 1622 the prince was recalled to
the capital to aid his father in meeting an attack on Qandahar by
Shah 'Abbas I of Persia, and his rebellion later in the year dissipated
for a time all apprehensions of imperial aggression in the Deccan.
When Malik 'Ambar's apprehensions had been thus removed he
marched to the frontiers of Golconda to demand payment of his
subsidy, which was two years in arrears, and having received the
sum due and a renewal of Muhammad Qutb Shah's promise to pay
it regularly in future, he attacked Bidar, expelled Ibrahim 'Adil
Shah's garrison, and plundered the town and district, the annexation
of which by Bijapur during his preoccupation with the imperial
troops he regarded as an act of bad faith. He then retired to Daulata-
bad, but in the following year returned with fifty or sixty thousand
men and besieged Bijapur.
Ibrahim 'Adil Shah had continued to act with conciliation towards
the empire and had attached a force to the Mughul garrison of
Burhanpur. He recalled these troops in his extremity to Bijapur and
begged further assistance. His appeal met with a generous response.
Burhanpur was nearly denuded of troops and the Mughul governors
of Ahmadnagar and Bir marched with many other officers to the
relief of Bijapur. Malik 'Ambar vehemently protested, claiming to
be, equally with Ibrahim, the emperor's vassal, and that the quarrel
between them related to part of the ancient territory of Ahmadnagar,
wrongfully occupied by Bijapur. His protests were unheeded, and
he raised the siege of Bijapur and retired towards his own dominions.
Meeting the army which was marching to the relief of Bijapur he
I See chap vi, p. 169.


## p. 263 (#297) ############################################

DEATH OF MALIK 'AMBAR
263
suddenly fell upon it, routed it and captured many imperial officers.
He then attacked Ahmadnagar but, discovering that a protracted
siege would be necessary, left a force to blockade it and marched
to Sholapur, the possession of which had been contested between
Bijapur and Ahmadnagar ever since the two kingdoms had been
founded. Sholapur fell and Malik 'Ambar sent a force to besiege
Burhanpur.
This was joined by the rebel Shah Jahan who, retreating before
his father's troops, arrived at Burhanpur. The strangely assorted
allies took the town and were engaged in the siege of the citadel when
the news of the approach of Sultan Parviz and the Khan Khanan,
who were pursuing the rebel, put the prince to flight and compelled
the troops to retire to Daulatabad.
In 1626 Malik 'Ambar died, in the eightieth year of his age.
Jahangir, in his memoirs, seldom mentions him without abuse, but
his secretary, Mirza Muhammad Hadi, who continued the memoirs,
thus did justice to his memory. “'Ambar, whether as a commander
or a strategist, was without an equal in the military art. He kept the
rabble of that country (the Deccan) in perfect order and to the end
of his days lived in honour. There is no record elsewhere in history of
an African slave attaining to such a position as was held by him. ”
In the same year Fath Khan, Malik 'Ambar's son, submitted at
Jalna to a Mughul commander. This accession to the imperial cause
was welcomed and rewarded, but it was short-lived. Fath Khan
invaded Berar with the troops of Murtaza Nizam Shah II and Khan
Jahan was sent by the emperor to defend Burhanpur.
Murtaza now appointed as his minister Hamid Khan, another
African, and fell completely under his influence. He served his master
well by inducing Khan Jahan to surrender, in consideration of a large
gift in money, Ahmadnagar and the southern table-land of Berar.
The treachery of "that faithless Afghan”, as his master termed him,
was partly neutralised by the refusal of the commandant to
surrender Ahmadnagar, which he held successfully against Murtaza's
troops.
Hamid Khan's wife, the daughter of a foreigner, was a woman of
great ability and unbounded energy. She obtained access to the
harem of Murtaza Nizam Shah II and soon became the recognised
means of communication between the effeminate and slothful king
and his subjects.
The death of Malik 'Ambar induced Ibrahim 'Adil Shah to avenge
aggressions, and he sent an army to invade Murtaza's kingdom. As
it approached Daulatabad the wife of Hamid Khan solicited and
obtained for herself the command of the army, by suggesting that if
she were victorious the enemy would hide his head for shame, while
if she failed he could only boast that he had defeated a woman. She
cajoled the officers and distributed largesse to the soldiers and in the


## p. 264 (#298) ############################################

264
THE KINGDOMS OF THE DECCAN
end she drove away the army of Bijapur and captured all its elephants
and artillery.
Ibrahim 'Adil Shah II died in September, 1627, and was succeeded
by his son Muhammad 'Adil Shah. Ibrahim, unlike most of his
house, was a Sunni but in the later years of his reign he associated
much with Hindus, who gave him the title of Jagad-Guru, or "Spiri-
tual Guide of the World”. His Muslim subjects murmured that their
king had become an infidel, like Akbar, but a historian asserts that
he never wavered in devotion to the orthodox faith and that the
tendency to associate with Hindus was due only to love of music,
admitting at the same time that he imitated some of the superstitious
invocations of Saraswati employed by Hindu musicians.
Early in the reign of Muhammad 'Adil Shah, Hamid Khan invaded
his territories with an army, but was defeated near Bijapur and com-
pelled to retreat to Daulatabad.
On 7 November, 1627, Jahangir died, and was succeeded by his
son Shah Jahan, early in whose reign the whole of the southern
table-land of Berar was recovered by the imperial officers.
Shah Jahan had learnt something of strategy and politics in the
Deccan and clearly perceived that the key to it was the possession
of the strong fortress of Daulatabad. He had learnt also that the
canker-worm of treason and corruption which eventually destroyed
the efficiency of the imperial armies flourished in the Deccan, so
that the capture of Daulatabad required the sovereign's personal
attention. At the end of 1629 he set out for Burhanpur, and many of
the officers of Murtaza's army, learning that the emperor proposed
to command in person, ensured their future prosperity by deserting
their master.
Early in 1630 Shah Jahan sent an army to invade Murtaza's domi-
nions and Fath Khan, doubtful of his influence over Murtaza Nizam
Shah II, put him to death and proclaimed his young son, Husain
Nizam Shah III. The imperial army drove Fath Khan and Husain
III into Daulatabad but was, as often before, compelled by scarcity
of provisions to retreat.
Early in 1632 Fath Khan purchased a respite for Daulatabad by
sending his son, 'Abdur-Rasul, to the imperial court with gifts.
Muhammad Adil Shah's failure on his accession to send a com-
plimentary offering to Shah Jahan induced the emperor to invade
his dominions. The commander marched through Bidar, captured
the fortress of Bhalki, and on reaching Gulbarga occupied the city
but refrained from attacking the citadel. He continued his march,
appeared before Bijapur with 30,000 horse, and encamped by the
Ramling Tank.
The city was not regularly besieged, but combats between the two
armies, in which victory according to the historian of Bijapur rested
with Muhammad Shah's troops, were of frequent occurrence. The


## p. 265 (#299) ############################################

EXTINCTION OF THE NIZAM SHAHI DYNASTY 265
real policy of Muhammad was, however, not to defeat but to starve
the enemy. Negotiations were prolonged, while supplies were inter-
cepted and the Mughul army was reduced to such distress that it
was compelled to retire. It moved first to the fertile districts of Miraj
and Raybag on the Krishna, where it obtained supplies by plundering
the country and thence retired, by way of Sholapur, to the territory
held by the imperial troops in the former kingdom of Ahmadnagar.
Muhammad 'Adil Shah, as a precaution against future attacks on
Bijapur, transported the great gun Malik-i-Maidan, or "Lord of the
Plain", from Parenda to his capital, where, on 1 September 1632,
it was placed in the position which it still occupies.
Shah Jahan professed to be satisfied with this expedition, the first
to advance so far south as Bijapur, but there can be little doubt that
he was in fact disappointed by his discomfiture. Mahabat Khan,
the Khan Khanan, governor of the Punjab, was therefore appointed
viceroy of Khandesh and the Deccan.
Shahji, the father of Shivaji, who had been annoyed by Shah
Jahan's action in transferring to Fath Khan, in return for the gifts
which he had sent to court by his son 'Abdur-Rasul, some assign-
ments which Shahji had held in the former kingdom of Ahmadnagar,
had fled to Bijapur and persuaded Muhammad 'Adil Shah to send
an army to recover his lands and to capture Daulatabad. Khan
Jahan found this army in the neighbourhood of Khirki on his arrival
at that town and at once attacked and defeated it. He anticipated
no difficulty in occupying Daulatabad, for Fath Khan had promised
to surrender the fortress to him, but a common danger once more
united the southerners. The officers of Bijapur suggested that Fath
Khan should join them against the imperial troops and promised to
provide supplies for Daulatabad. A force from Bijapur which at-
tempted to bring up food and forage was driven off, but Fath Khan
refused to fulfil his promise to surrender the fortress. Mahabat Khan
now arrived and opened the siege, which lasted for more than four
months. The imperial troops were much hampered by the army of
Bijapur, under Randola Khan an African and Shahji the Maratha,
which, though unable to convey supplies to the garrison, succeeded
in cutting off those of the besiegers.
Mahabat Khan carried the outer defences of Daulatabad one by
one until he reached Balakot, the upper citadel, which was impreg-
nable by assault and impervious to such artillery as then existed.
Famine had, however, done its work, and on 28 June, 1633, Fath
Khan, who had succeeded in obtaining most generous terms, led
Husain Nizam Shah III out, and the imperial troops occupied the
citadel.
The Nizam Shahi dynasty was at an end and its dominions were
added to the empire, which now extended to the northern frontiers
of the kingdoms of Bijapur and Golconda.


## p. 266 (#300) ############################################

286
THE KINGDOMS OF THE DECCAN
Mahabat Khan, leaving Khan Dauran with a small force in Daulat-
abad, set out for Burhanpur, but the army of Bijapur besieged Khan
Dauran in the fortress and might have obliged him to surrender,
as he was ill-supplied with provisions. They fled, however, on hearing
that Mahabat Khan was returning and he, after victualling the
fortress, resumed his march to Burhanpur.
At the end of August Shah Jahan appointed his second son, Shah
Shuja', viceroy of the Deccan, and shortly afterwards addressed
arrogant letters to Muhammad 'Adil Shah and 'Abdullah Qutb Shah,
criticising their use of the royal title, asserting a claim to sovereignty
over them, and ordering them to cause the khutba to be recited and
money to be coined in his name in their dominions. Muhammad
replied in insolent terms, but concluded by saying that he would
continue to pay the stipulated tribute.
The use of the royal title by the kings of the Deccan was always
resented by the Mughul emperors, who wrote of them usually as
"rulers” or “governors” of their dominions and addressed them as
""Adil Khan" and "Qutb-ul-Mulk". A skilful retort was made by
Abu-'l-Hasan Qutb Shah to Aurangzib's envoy to Golconda in 1685,
who rudely told Abu-'l-Hasan that he had no right to the royal title.
"Your are wrong," replied the king, “for if I am not a king how can
your master call himself the king of kings? ”
'Abdullah Qutb Shah took no overt action to relieve Daulatabad,
but he and Muhammad 'Adil Shah entered into an alliance against
the emperor.
Although Daulatabad had fallen, much remained to be done
towards the complete establishment of imperial rule in the dominions
of Ahmadnagar. In the west, towards the Konkan, Shahji Bhonsle
held much territory and resided at the fort of Pemgarh. In the
fortress of Jalodhan, sixteen miles from Junnar, some scions of the
Nizam Shahi line still remained imprisoned. Shahji obtained
possession of the person of one of these, a child, and entitled him
Murtaza Nizam Shah III.
The commander of the strong fortress of Parenda, formerly included
in the Nizam Shahi dominions, had some time before this made his
submission to Muhammad Adil Shah, on whose behalf the fortress
was now held. Shah Shuja' and Mahabat Khan were ordered to
capture it and unsuccessfully besieged it for some months in 1634
owing to the activity of the army of Bijapur, and they retired to
Burhanpur. Mahabat Khan was blamed for the failure of the enter-
prise and both he and the prince were recalled to court.
The viceroyalty of the Deccan was now divided into two govern-
ments, the Balaghat, comprising the former dominions of Ahmad-
nagar and the southern table-land of Berar, and the Payanghat,
consisting of the rest of Berar and Khandesh; and Khan Zaman was
appointed to the government of the former and Khan Dauran to
1


## p. 267 (#301) ############################################

TERMS OF PEACE WITH BIJAPUR
267
that of the latter. Of the rebels the most formidable was Shahji
Bhonsle, who held the forts of Trimbak, Kondhanaand Shivner
above the Ghats, besides many in the Konkan, and enjoyed the
support and protection of Muhammad 'Adil Shah.
Khan Zaman and Khan Dauran vigorously prosecuted hostilities.
The former pursued the Maratha into the rich districts of the Bijapur
kingdom on the banks of the upper Krishna, captured Kolhapur,
Miraj and Raybag, carried off their inhabitants into slavery and
devastated the country, and the latter captured Parenda, Bidar, Gul-
barga and Sholapur, and marched to the gates of Bijapur devastating
the country in all directions.
Shah Jahan visited Daulatabad in 1636 and Muhammad 'Adil Shah
was compelled to sue for peace. The emperor, who had no designs
against the two remaining kingdoms of the Deccan and sincerely
desired peace, granted him terms more favourable than he had a
right to expect. Parenda, Bidar, Gulbarga and Sholapur were
restored to him, he was allowed to retain possession of Naldrug and
eastern Kalyani, and the Konkan, as far north as Kalyan, and the
tract between the Nira and Bhima rivers, as far north as Chakan,
which had formerly belonged to Ahmadnagar, were ceded to him.
In return for these concessions he promised to pay an annual tribute
of two millions of huns, equivalent to eight millions of rupees.
Shahji's remaining forts were now reduced by Khan Zaman, who
captured and sent to Gwalior Murtaza Nizam Shah III, and the
Maratha tendered his submission and begged that he might be received
into the imperial service, but was informed that he might enter that
of Bijapur, and he was received by Muhammad 'Adil Shah.
Goiconda had suffered in no way from the hostilities between the
imperial troops and Bijapur, and had been free to wage "holy wars"
against the Hindus of Orissa, Bastar and the Carnatic-chiefly against
those of the last-named region, in which 'Abdullah Qutb Shah now
held much territory.
Muhammad 'Adil Shah, though not personally warlike, now imitated
his neighbour and for some years despatched expeditions into the
Carnatic. These undertakings, usually successful owing to the dis-
sensions between the petty rajas of the peninsula, were dignified with
the name of holy wars, but Shahji and other Hindu officers and troops
were freely employed in them and they were in fact plundering ex-
cursions. Shahji, who was second in command under Randola Khan,
obtained extensive and valuable assignments in the Carnatic.
In 1637 the two governments were again amalgamated to form the
viceroyalty of the Deccan, under Aurangzib, Shah Jahan's third son,
who was only nineteen years of age. Aurangzib's intentions and
policy towards the two independent Muhammadan kingdoms differed
widely, as his subsequent conduct showed, from his father's, but he
1 Now Sinhgarh.


## p. 268 (#302) ############################################

288
THE KINGDOMS OF THE DECCAN
did not molest them during his first tenure of the viceroyalty. He
had, however, succeeded in obtaining from his father permission to
annex Baglan, the principality of the Rathor Bairam Baharji. The
attack on Bairam was an act of purposeless aggression. Bairam
received the command of 3000 horse in the imperial army and an
assignment of the district of Sultanpur, adjoining his late principality.
The remaining period of Aurangzib's first viceroyalty was unevent-
ful until June, 1664, when in one of his real or feigned fits of religious
enthusiasm he expressed his intention of retiring from the world
and living a life of devotion, and Khan Dauran was appointed to
succeed him.
Shivaji," the son of Shahji Bhonsle who now began to rise into
prominence, had hitherto lived at Poona. His first feat, in 1646, was
to persuade the commander of the hill fort of Torna, probably by
corrupt means, to surrender the fort to him. He sent agents to
Muhammad 'Adil Shah to explain that he had taken this important
stronghold in the interests of Bijapur, but his overtures received
no reply. A buried treasure discovered at Torna enabled him to
build, in the following year, the fort of Rajgarh, 3 miles from Torna.
The Bijapur government called his father to account and he was
censured, but merely temporised.
Shivaji then assumed the management of his father's estates, and
retained the revenues, representing the expenses of their administra-
tion to be so high as to leave no margin of profit. He obtained posses-
sion of the fort and district of Chakan and of the stronger fort of
Kondhana, which he induced the Muslim commander to surrender
to him in consideration of a bribe. He changed the name of Kondhana
to Sinhgarh, "the Lion's Fort", and made it his chief stronghold. He
then expelled his father's agents from Supa, persuaded the revenue
agents of Baramati and Indapur to recognise his authority, and
possessed himself by treachery of the strong hill fort of Purandar.
Thus did Shivaji obtain possession of the tract between Chakan and the Nira :
and the manner in which he established himself, watching and crouching like
the wily tiger of his own mountain valleys, until he had stolen into a situation
from whence he could spring on his prey, accounts for the difficulty found in trac-
ing his early rise, and the astonishing rapidity with which he extended his power
when his progress had attracted notice and longer concealment was impossible. ”
Shivaji soon passed beyond the stage of concealment. The plunder
of a convoy of government treasure destined to Bijapur, the capture
of ten more forts, and above all the arrest of the Muslim governor
of Kalyan, the seizure of that place and of all forts in its neighbour-
hood, and the appointment of a Brahman governor showed him in
his true colours and involved his father in suffering and disgrace.
Shahji, now governor of the Bijapur Carnatic, was suspected of com-
plicity in his son's rebellion. He was arrested by an artifice and con-
veyed to Bijapur, where he was confined in a dungeon by Muhammad
1 See chap. vm, p. 256.
Grant Duff, 1, 114.


## p. 269 (#303) ############################################

AURANGZIB ATTACKS GOLCONDA
269
'Adil Shah, who refused to believe his protestations of innocence and
threatened him with a lingering death. His peril suggested to Shivaji
a device which he afterwards employed with great dexterity—the
pitting of the northern against the southern Muslim—and he appealed
to Shah Jahan on behalf of his father. It was largely owing to the
emperor's influence that Shahji was released from his dungeon, but
he was detained at Bijapur for four years as a prisoner at large.
Aurangzib was reappointed in 1651 to the viceroyalty of the Deccan
and selected as his residence Khirki, which he extended, embellished
and renamed Aurangabad. He had at first no dealings with Shivaji,
who had hitherto studiously refrained from molesting the imperial
dominions and whose depredations in Bijapur territory were in no
way opposed either to Aurangzib's interests or inclinations.
During the period of his father's detention Shivaji had refrained
almost entirely from acts of aggression, but on Shahji's return to the
Carnatic, which had fallen, during his absence, into such disorder as
to demand the whole attention of the government of Bijapur, he
renewed his activity, murdering Chandra Rao, Raja of Javli, annexing
his possessions, and building the strong fort of Partabgarh, near the
source of the Krishna.
In 1655 events in Golconda gave Aurangzib an opportunity, which
he eagerly welcomed, of interfering in the affairs of that kingdom.
The most powerful of the nobles of Golconda was a Sayyid of
Ardistan, Mir Muhammad Sa'id, who had received the title of Mir
Jumla (prime minister) and very extensive assignments in the Gol-
conda Carnatic. He had originally been a diamond merchant, and
the experience which he had thus acquired enabled him to dispose,
to the best advantage, of the produce of the diamond mines which
his assignments contained. His wealth and his power were great,
and he maintained at his own expense a force of 5000 horse. The
dissolute and arrogant conduct of Muhammad Amin, Mir Jumla's
son, who resided at court, produced the first open breach between
the servant and his master. His offences culminated in his coming
drunk to the royal palace, throwing himself down to sleep, in the
king's absence, on the royal throne and vomiting over its rich
coverings. He was imprisoned and his father appealed to Shah Jahan
for protection. The appeal received the strongest support from
Aurangzib, and Shah Jahan directed 'Abdullah Qutb Shah to release
Muhammad Amin and to send both father and son to the imperial
court. 'Abdullah resented this attempt to interfere between him and
his servants and punished Mir Jumla by the confiscation of his
property.
Aurangzib induced his father to sanction offensive action and sent
his eldest son, Muhammad Sultan, at the head of a considerable force
towards Golconda, announcing that the prince was on his way to
Bengal to espouse his cousin, the daughter of Shuja'. The device
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270
THE KINGDOMS OF THE DECCAN
succeeded, and the prince encamped within a few miles of Hyderabad,
before 'Abdullah understood his hostile intent. Muhammad acting
under his father's instructions neglected no means of provoking
'Abdullah to hostile action. The unfortified city of Hyderabad was
sacked, some quarters were burnt, and neither the royal palace nor
the dwellings of the nobles and the wealthier merchants escaped
pillage. The king was in the fortress of Golconda and could not
restrain his troops, some of whom slew some of the ruffians of the
Mughul army. Aurangzib was stealthily following Muhammad Sultan
with the remainder of his army. Those who had attempted to stay
the marauders were put to flight and Aurangzib joined his son.
'Abdullah was now in an agony of terror. He had already promised
to obey the imperial commands by surrendering Mir Jumla and his
son, and he sent one envoy after another, with gifts and promises,
to Aurangzib's camp, but it was discovered that he had, in this
extremity, summoned to his aid the troops serving in other districts
of his kingdom. This was made a pretext for opening the siege of
Golconda, which was carried on though negotiations were also in
train. Offerings tendered by 'Abdullah's envoys were insultingly
rejected, but instead of being returned were thriftily retained pending
the conclusion of a treaty.
Aurangzib, to his intense chagrin, received a letter from his father
directing him to inform 'Abdullah that his submission had been
accepted and to retire to Aurangabad. He dishonestly concealed
this order until he had compelled his victim to submit to his own
terms. 'Abdullah, who had no son, was reduced to the necessity of
sending his mother to Aurangzib's camp to arrange for the marriage
of his daughter to Muhammad Sultan, who was to receive, as her
dowry, the district of Ramgir and his recognition as heir to the throne
of Golconda. All arrears of the exorbitant tribute demanded by
Shah Jahan were to be paid and Mir Jumla and his son were surren-
dered to Aurangzib.
The prince contented himself with a substantial instalment on
account of the tribute due to his father, but extorted many valuable
gifts for both himself and his son, and on 27 May, 1656 retired, after
the celebration of the marriage, to Aurangabad.
Few of Aurangzib's many acts of duplicity, both before and after
his ascent of the throne, are more deserving of reprobation than his
treatment of 'Abdullah Qutb Shah, but his behaviour on this occasion
obtained for him the services of Mir Jumla, a devoted adherent,
who never grudged either wealth or abilities to the advancement of
his cause.
Aurangzib was soon again favoured by fortune. Muhammad 'Adil
Shah of Bijapur died on 16 November of this year, and was succeeded
by his son 'Ali 'Adil Shah II, a youth of eighteen. Aurangzib affected
to, regard the kings of Bijapur and Golconda as mere assignees of the


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INVASION OF BIJAPUR
271
empire, whose succession to their assignments was a question to be
decided by the emperor. They had, in fact, been independent kings
for a century and a half, having acquired that status before Babur
invaded India, and the imperial prerogative had never been suggested,
much less asserted, in the case of either kingdom. Aurangzib,
apparently conscious of the weakness of his case, invented another
pretext for attacking Bijapur and asserted that 'Ali II was not the
son of Muhammad 'Adil Shah, and that the kingdom had lapsed to
the empire.
For this slander, which is repeated, of course on Mughul authority,
by Fryer, Tavernier, Bernier and Manucci, there is not a scrap of
evidence. 'Ali II was accepted without hesitation in Bijapur as the
son of Muhammad and is so described both in the annals of the
kingdom, where his birth, and the principal events of his childhood
in the royal palace are circumstantially recorded, and in Marathi
manuscripts. Nor was there any necessity for raising to the throne
a supposititious child of Muhammad, for Aurangzib, when he cap-
tured Bijapur in 1686, found there sixteen male scions of the house
of Yusuf 'Adil Shah. The fiction was invented to inflame the wrath
of Shah Jahan, who declared war on Bijapur.
Dara Shukoh, the eldest son of Shah Jahan, dreading the un-
scrupulous ambition of his younger brother, had caused the issue of
the orders for the conclusion of peace with Golconda, and attempted
to frustrate his schemes by appointing Mir Jumla to the chief com-
mand of the army sent to invade Bijapur, but the device failed owing
to the perfect understanding which existed between Aurangzib and
Mir Jumla.