No More Learning

A tax on rent, as rent is constituted, would discourage cultivation,
because it would be a tax on the profits of the landlord. The term rent
of land, as I have elsewhere observed, is applied to the whole amount of
the value paid by the farmer to his landlord, a part only of which is
strictly rent. The buildings and fixtures, and other expenses paid for
by the landlord, form strictly a part of the stock of the farm, and must
have been furnished by the tenant, if not provided by the landlord. Rent
is the sum paid to the landlord for the use of the land, and for the use
of the land only. The further sum that is paid to him under the name of
rent, is for the use of the buildings, &c. , and is really the profits of
the landlord's stock. In taxing rent, as no distinction would be made
between that part paid for the use of the land, and that paid for the
use of the landlord's stock, a portion of the tax would fall on the
landlord's profits, and would therefore discourage cultivation, unless
the price of raw produce rose. On that land, for the use of which no
rent was paid, a compensation under that name might be given to the
landlord for the use of his buildings. These buildings would not be
erected, nor would raw produce be grown on such land, till the price at
which it sold would not only pay for all the usual outgoings, but also
for this additional one of the tax. This part of the tax does not fall
on the landlord, nor on the farmer, but on the consumer of raw produce.

There can be little doubt, but that if a tax were laid on rent,
landlords would soon find a way to discriminate between that which was
paid to them for the use of the land, and that which was paid for the
use of the buildings, and the improvements which were made by the
landlord's stock. The latter would either be called the rent of house
and buildings, or in all new land taken into cultivation such buildings
and improvements would be made by the tenant, and not by the landlord.
The landlord's capital might indeed be really employed for that purpose;
it might be nominally expended by the tenant, the landlord furnishing
him with the means, either in the shape of a loan, or in the purchase of
an annuity for the duration of the lease. Whether distinguished or not,
there is a real difference between the nature of the compensations which
the landlord receives for these different objects; and it is quite
certain, that a tax on the real rent of land falls wholly on the
landlord, but that a tax on that remuneration which the landlord
receives for the use of his stock expended on the farm, falls on the
consumer of raw produce. If a tax were laid on rent, and no means of
separating the remuneration now paid by the tenant to the landlord under
the name of rent were adopted, the tax, as far as it regarded the rent
on the buildings and other fixtures, would never fall for any length of
time on the landlord, but on the consumer. The capital expended on these
buildings, &c. , must afford the usual profits of stock; but it would
cease to afford this profit on the land last cultivated, if the expenses
of those buildings, &c. did not fall on the tenant; and if they did, the
tenant would then cease to make his usual profits of stock, unless he
could charge them on the consumer.




CHAPTER IX.

TITHES.


Tithes are a tax on the gross produce of the land, and, like taxes on
raw produce, fall wholly on the consumer. They differ from a tax on
rent, inasmuch as they affect land which such a tax would not reach; and
raise the price of raw produce, which that tax e of raw produce, which
that tax would not alter. Lands of the worst quality, as well as of the
best, pay tithes, and exactly in proportion to the quantity of produce
obtained from them; tithes are therefore an equal tax.

If land of the last quality, or that which pays no rent, and which
regulates the price of corn, yield a sufficient quantity to give the
farmer the usual profits of stock, when the price of wheat is 4_l. _ per
quarter, the price must rise to 4_l. _ 8_s. _ before the same profits can
be obtained after the tithes are imposed, because for every quarter of
wheat the cultivator must pay eight shillings to the church.

The only difference between tithes and taxes on raw produce, is, that
one is a variable money tax, the other a fixed money tax. In a
stationary state of society, where there is neither increased nor
diminished facility of producing corn, they will be precisely the same
in their effects; for in such a state corn will be at an invariable
price, and the tax will therefore be also invariable. In either a
retrograde state, or in a state in which great improvements are made in
agriculture, and where consequently raw produce will fall in value
comparatively with other things, tithes will be a lighter tax than a
permanent money tax; for if the price of corn should fall from 4_l. _ to
3_l. _, the tax would fall from eight to six shillings. In a progressive
state of society, yet without any marked improvements in agriculture,
the price of corn would rise, and tithes would be a heavier tax than a
permanent money tax. If corn rose from 4_l. _ to 5_l. _, the tithes on
the same land would advance from eight to ten shillings.

Neither tithes nor a money tax will affect the money rent of landlords,
but both will materially affect corn rents. We have already observed how
a money tax operates on corn rents, and it is equally evident that a
similar effect would be produced by tithes. If the lands, No. 1, 2, 3,
respectively produced 180, 170, and 160 quarters, the rents might be on
No. 1, twenty quarters, and on No. 2, ten quarters; but they would no
longer preserve that proportion after the payment of tithes: for if a
tenth be taken from each, the remaining produce will be 162, 153, 144,
and consequently the corn rent of No. 1 will be reduced to eighteen, and
that of No. 2 to nine quarters. But the price of corn would rise from
4_l. _ to 4_l. _ 8_s. _ 10-2/3_d. _; for nine quarters are to 4_l. _ as ten
quarters to 4_l. _ 8_s. _ 10-2/3_d. _, and consequently the money rent
would continue unaltered; for on No. 1 it would be 80_l. _, and on No. 2,
40_l. _

The chief objection against tithes is, that they are not a permanent and
fixed tax, but increase in value, in proportion as the difficulty of
producing corn increases. If those difficulties should make the price of
corn 4_l. _ the tax is 8_s. _, if they should increase it to 5_l. _, the
tax is 10_s. _, and at 6_l. _, it is 12_s. _ They not only rise in value,
but they increase in amount: thus, when No. 1 was cultivated, the tax
was only levied on 180 quarters; when No. 2 was cultivated, it was
levied on 180 + 170, or 350 quarters; and when No. 3 was cultivated, on
180 + 170 + 160 = 510 quarters. Not only is the amount of the tax
increased from 100,000 quarters, to 200,000 quarters, when the produce
is increased from one to two millions of quarters; but, owing to the
increased labour necessary to produce the second million, the relative
value of raw produce is so advanced, that the 200,000 quarters may be,
though only twice in quantity, yet in value three times that of the
100,000 quarters which were paid before.

If an equal value were raised for the church by any other means,
increasing in the same manner as tithes increase, proportionably with
the difficulty of cultivation, the effect would be the same. The church
would be constantly obtaining an increased portion of the net produce
of the land and labour of the country. In an improving state of society,
the net produce of land is always diminishing in proportion to its gross
produce; but it is from the net income of a country that all taxes are
ultimately paid, either in a progressive or in a stationary country. A
tax increasing with the gross income, and falling on the net income,
must necessarily be a very burdensome, and a very intolerable tax.
Tithes are a tenth of the gross, and not of the net produce of the land,
and therefore as society improves in wealth, they must, though the same
proportion of the gross produce, become a larger and larger portion of
the net produce.

Tithes however may be considered as injurious to landlords, inasmuch as
they act as a bounty on importation, by taxing the growth of home corn,
while the importation of foreign corn remains unfettered. And if in
order to relieve the landlords from the effects of the diminished demand
for land, which such a bounty must encourage, imported corn were also
taxed one tenth, and the produce paid to the state, no measure could be
more fair and equitable; since whatever were paid to the state by this
tax, would go to diminish the other taxes which the expenses of
government make necessary: but if such a tax were devoted only to
increase the fund paid to the church, it might indeed on the whole
increase the general mass of production, but it would diminish the
portion of that mass allotted to the productive classes.

If the trade of cloth were left perfectly free, our manufacturers might
be able to sell cloth cheaper than we could import it. If a tax were
laid on the home manufacturer, and not on the importer of cloth, capital
might be injuriously driven from the manufacture of cloth to the
manufacture of some other commodity, as it might then be imported
cheaper than it could be made at home. If imported cloth should also be
taxed, cloth would again be manufactured at home. The consumer first
bought cloth at home, because it was cheaper than foreign cloth; he then
bought foreign cloth, because it was cheaper untaxed than home cloth
taxed: he lastly bought it again at home, because it was cheaper when
both home and foreign cloth were taxed. It is in the last case that he
pays the greatest price for his cloth, but all his additional payment is
gained by the state. In the second case, he pays more than in the first,
but all he pays in addition is not received by the state, it is an
increased price caused by difficulty of production, which is incurred,
because the easiest means of production are taken away from us, by being
fettered with a tax.




CHAPTER X.

LAND-TAX.


A land-tax, levied in proportion to the rent of land, and varying with
every variation of rent, is in effect a tax on rent; and as such a tax
will not apply to that land which yields no rent, nor to the produce of
that capital which is employed on the land with a view to profit merely,
and which never pays rent, it will not in any way affect the price of
raw produce, but will fall wholly on the landlords. In no respect would
such a tax differ from a tax on rent. But if a land-tax be imposed on
all cultivated land, however moderate that tax may be, it will be a tax
on produce, and will therefore raise the price of produce. If No. 3 be
the land last cultivated, although it should pay no rent, it cannot,
after the tax, be cultivated, and afford the general rate of profit,
unless the price of produce rise to meet the tax. Either capital will be
withheld from that employment until the price of corn shall have risen,
in consequence of demand, sufficiently to afford the usual profit; or if
already employed on such land, it will quit it, to seek a more
advantageous employment. The tax cannot be removed to the landlord, for
by the supposition he receives no rent. Such a tax may be proportioned
to the quality of the land and the abundance of its produce, and then it
differs in no respect from tithes; or it may be a fixed tax per acre on
all land cultivated, whatever its quality may be.

A land-tax of this latter description would be a very unequal tax, and
would be contrary to one of the four maxims with regard to taxes in
general, to which, according to Adam Smith, all taxes should conform.
The four maxims are as follow:

1. "The subjects of every state ought to contribute
towards the support of the Government, as nearly as
possible in proportion to their respective abilities.

2. "The tax which each individual is bound to pay ought
to be certain and not arbitrary.

3. "Every tax ought to be levied at the time, or in the
manner in which it is most likely to be convenient for
the contributor to pay it.

4. "Every tax ought to be so contrived as both to take
out and to keep out of the pockets of the people as
little as possible, over and above what it brings into
the public treasury of the state. "

An equal land-tax, imposed indiscriminately and without any regard to
the distinction of its quality, on all land cultivated, will raise the
price of corn in proportion to the tax paid by the cultivator of the
land of the worst quality. Lands of different quality, with the
employment of the same capital, will yield very different quantities of
raw produce. If on the land which yields a thousand quarters of corn
with a given capital, a tax of 100_l. _ be laid, corn will rise 2_s. _ per
quarter to compensate the farmer for the tax. But with the same capital
on land of a better quality, 2,000 quarters may be produced, which at
2_s. _ a quarter advance, would give 200_l. _; the tax, however, bearing
equally on both lands will be 100_l. _ on the better as well as on the
inferior, and consequently the consumer of corn will be taxed, not only
to pay the exigencies of the state, but also to give to the cultivator
of the better land, 100_l. _ per annum. during the period of his lease,
and afterwards to raise the rent of the landlord to that amount. A tax
of this description then would be contrary to the fourth maxim of Adam
Smith, it would take out and keep out of the pockets of the people, more
than what it brought into the treasury of the state. The taille in
France before the Revolution, was a tax of this description; those lands
only were taxed, which were held by an ignoble tenure, the price of raw
produce rose in proportion to the tax, and therefore they whose lands
were not taxed, were benefited by the increase of their rent. Taxes on
raw produce as well as tithes are free from this objection: they raise
the price of raw produce, but they take from each quality of land a
contribution in proportion to its actual produce, and not in proportion
to the produce of that which is the least productive.

From the peculiar view which Adam Smith took of rent, from his not
having observed that much capital is expended in every country, on the
land for which no rent is paid, he concluded that all taxes on the land,
whether they were laid on the land itself in the form of land-tax or
tithes, or on the produce of the land, or were taken from the profits of
the farmer, were all invariably paid by the landlord, and that he was in
all cases the real contributor, although the tax was in general,
nominally advanced by the tenant. "Taxes upon the produce of the land,"
he says, "are in reality taxes upon the rent; and though they may be
originally advanced by the farmer, are finally paid by the landlord.
When a certain portion of the produce is to be paid away for a tax, the
farmer computes as well as he can, what the value of this portion is,
one year with another, likely to amount to, and he makes a
proportionable abatement in the rent which he agrees to pay to the
landlord. There is no farmer who does not compute before hand what the
church tithe, which is a land-tax of this kind, is, one year with
another, likely to amount to. " It is undoubtedly true, that the farmer
does calculate his probable outgoings of all descriptions, when
agreeing with his landlord concerning the rent of his farm; and if for
the tithe paid to the church, or for the tax on the produce of the land,
he were not compensated by a rise in the relative value of the produce
of his farm, he would naturally deduct them from his rent. But this is
precisely the question in dispute: whether he will eventually deduct
them from his rent, or be compensated by a higher price of produce. For
the reasons which have been already given, I cannot have the least doubt
but that they would raise the price of produce, and consequently that
Adam Smith has taken an incorrect view of this important question.

Dr. Smith's view of this subject is probably the reason why he has
described "the tithe, and every other land-tax of this kind, under the
appearance of perfect equality, as very unequal taxes; a certain portion
of the produce being in different situations, equivalent to a very
different portion of the rent. " I have endeavoured to shew that such
taxes do not fall with unequal weight on the different classes of
farmers or landlords, as they are both compensated by the rise of raw
produce, and only contribute to the tax in proportion as they are
consumers of raw produce. Inasmuch indeed as wages, and through wages,
the rate of profits are affected, landlords, instead of contributing
their full share to such a tax, are the class peculiarly exempted. It is
the profits of stock, from which that portion of the tax is derived
which falls on those labourers, who from the insufficiency of their
funds, are incapable of paying taxes; this portion is exclusively borne
by all those whose income is derived from the employment of stock, and
therefore it in no degree affects landlords.

It is not to be inferred from this view of tithes, and taxes on the land
and its produce, that they do not discourage cultivation. Every thing
which raises the exchangeable value of commodities of any kind, which
are in very general demand, tends to discourage both cultivation and
production; but this is an evil inseparable from all taxation, and is
not confined to the particular taxes of which we are now speaking.

This may be considered indeed as the unavoidable disadvantage attending
all taxes received and expended by the state. Every new tax becomes a
new charge on production, and raises natural price. A portion of the
labour of the country which was before at the disposal of the
contributor to the tax, is placed at the disposal of the state. This
portion may become so large, that sufficient surplus produce may not be
left to stimulate the exertions of those who usually augment by their
savings the capital of the state. Taxation has happily never yet in any
free country been carried so far as constantly from year to year to
diminish its capital. Such a state of taxation could not be long
endured; or if endured, it would be constantly absorbing so much of the
annual produce of the country as to occasion the most extensive scene of
misery, famine, and depopulation.

"A land-tax," says Adam Smith, "which like that of Great Britain, is
assessed upon each district according to a certain invariable canon,
though it should be equal at the time of its first establishment,
necessarily becomes unequal in process of time, according to the unequal
degrees of improvement or neglect in the cultivation of the different
parts of the country. In England the valuation according to which the
different counties and parishes were assessed to the land-tax by the
4th. William and Mary, was very unequal, even at its first
establishment. This tax, therefore, so far offends against the first of
the four maxims above mentioned. It is perfectly agreeable to the other
three. It is perfectly certain. The time of payment for the tax being
the same as that for the rent, is as convenient as it can be to the
contributor. Though the landlord is in all cases the real contributor,
the tax is commonly advanced by the tenant, to whom the landlord is
obliged to allow it in the payment of the rent. "

If the tax be shifted by the tenant not on the landlord but on the
consumer, then if it be not unequal at first, it can never become so;
for the price of produce has been at once raised in proportion to the
tax, and will afterwards vary no more on that account. It may offend if
unequal, as I have attempted to shew that it will, against the fourth
maxim above mentioned, but it will not offend against the first. It may
take more out of the pockets of the people than it brings into the
public treasury of the state, but it will not fall unequally on any
particular class of contributors. M. Say appears to me to have mistaken
the nature and effects of the English land-tax, when he says, "Many
persons attribute to this fixed valuation, the great prosperity of
English agriculture. That it has very much contributed to it there can
be no doubt. But what should we say to a Government, which, addressing
itself to a small trader, should hold this language: 'With a small
capital you are carrying on a limited trade, and your direct
contribution is in consequence very small. Borrow, and accumulate
capital; extend your trade, so that it may procure you immense profits;
yet you shall never pay a greater contribution. Moreover, when your
successors shall inherit your profits, and shall have further increased
them, they shall not be valued higher to them than they are to you; and
your successors shall not bear a greater portion of the public burdens. '

"Without doubt this would be a great encouragement given to manufactures
and trade; but would it be just? Could not their advancement be
obtained at any other price? In England itself, has not manufacturing
and commercial industry made even greater progress, since the same
period, without being distinguished with so much partiality? A landlord
by his assiduity, economy, and skill, increases his annual revenue by
5000 francs. If the state claim of him the fifth part of his augmented
income, will there not remain 4000 francs of increase to stimulate his
further exertions? "

If Mr. Say's suggestion were followed, and the state were to claim the
fifth part of the augmented income of the farmer, it would be a partial
tax, acting on the farmer's profits, and not affecting the profits of
other employments. The tax would be paid by all lands, by those which
yielded scantily as well as by those which yielded abundantly; and on
some lands there could be no compensation for it by deduction from rent,
for no rent is paid. A partial tax on profits never falls on the trade
on which it is laid, for the trader will either quit his employment, or
remunerate himself for the tax. Now those who pay no rent could be
recompensed only by a rise in the price of produce, and thus would M.
Say's proposed tax fall on the consumer, and not either on the landlord
or farmer.

If the proposed tax were increased in proportion to the increased
quantity, or value, of the gross produce obtained from the land, it
would differ in nothing from tithes, and would equally be transferred to
the consumer. Whether then it fell on the gross or on the net produce of
land, it would be equally a tax on consumption, and would only affect
the landlord and farmer in the same way as other taxes on raw produce.

If no tax whatever had been laid on the land, and the same sum had been
raised by any other means, agriculture would have flourished at least as
well as it has done; for it is impossible that any tax on land can be an
encouragement to agriculture; a moderate tax may not, and probably does
not, greatly prevent, but it cannot encourage production. The English
Government has held no such language as M. Say has supposed. It did not
promise to exempt the agricultural class and their successors from all
future taxation, and to raise the further supplies which the state
might require, from the other classes of society; it said only, "in this
mode we will no further burthen the land; but we retain to ourselves the
most perfect liberty of making you pay, under some other form, your full
quota to the future exigencies of the state. "

Speaking of taxes in kind, or a tax of a certain proportion of the
produce, which is precisely the same as tithes, M. Say says, "This mode
of taxation appears to be the most equitable; there is however none
which is less so: it totally leaves out of consideration the advances
made by the producer; it is proportioned to the gross, and not to the
net revenue. Two agriculturists cultivate different kinds of raw
produce: one cultivates corn on middling land, his expenses amounting
annually on an average to 8000 francs; the raw produce from his lands
sells for 12,000 francs; he has then a net revenue of 4000 francs.

"His neighbour has pasture or wood land, which brings in every year a
like sum of 12,000 francs, but his expenses amount only to 2000 francs.
He has therefore on an average a net revenue of 10,000 francs.

"A law ordains that a twelfth of the produce of all the fruits of the
earth be levied in kind, whatever they may be. From the first is taken
in consequence of this law, corn of the value of 1000 francs; and from
the second, hay, cattle, or wood, of the same value of 1000 francs. What
has happened? From the one, a quarter of his net income, 4000 francs,
has been taken; from the other, whose income was 10,000 francs, a tenth
only has been taken. Income is the net profit which remains after
replacing the capital exactly in its former state. Has a merchant an
income equal to all the sales which he makes in the course of a year?
certainly not; his income only amounts to the excess of his sales above
his advances, and it is on this excess only that taxes on income should
fall. "

M. Say's error in the above passage lies in supposing that because the
value of the produce of one of these two farms, after re-instating the
capital, is greater than the value of the produce of the other, on that
account the net income of the cultivators will differ by the same
amount. M. Say has wholly omitted the consideration of the different
amount of rent, which these cultivators would have to pay. There cannot
be two rates of profit in the same employment, and therefore when
produce is in different proportions to capital, it is the rent which
will differ, and not the profit. Upon what pretence would one man with a
capital of 2000 francs, be allowed to obtain a net profit of 10,000
francs from its employment, whilst another with a capital of 8000 francs
would only obtain 4000 francs? Let M. Say make a due allowance for rent;
let him further allow for the effect which such a tax would have on the
prices of these different kinds of raw produce, and he will then
perceive that it is not an unequal tax, and further that the producers
themselves will not otherwise contribute to it, than any other class of
consumers.




CHAPTER XI.

TAXES ON GOLD.


The rise in the price of commodities, in consequence of taxation or of
difficulty of production, will in all cases ultimately ensue; but the
duration of the interval, before the market price of commodities
conforms to their natural price, must depend on the nature of the
commodity, and on the facility with which it can be reduced in quantity.
If the quantity of the commodity taxed could not be diminished, if the
capital of the farmer or of the hatter for instance, could not be
withdrawn to other employments, it would be of no consequence that their
profits were reduced below the general level by means of a tax; unless
the demand for their commodities should increase, they would never be
able to elevate the market price of corn and hats up to the increased
natural price. Their threats to leave their employments, and remove
their capitals to more favoured trades, would be treated as an idle
menace which could not be carried into effect; and consequently the
price would not be raised by diminished production. Commodities however
of all descriptions can be reduced in quantity, and capital can be
removed from trades which are less profitable to those which are more
so, but with different degrees of rapidity. In proportion as the supply
of a particular commodity can be more easily reduced, the price of it
will more quickly rise after the difficulty of its production has been
increased by taxation, or by any other means. Corn being a commodity
indispensably necessary to every one, little effect will be produced on
the demand for it in consequence of a tax, and therefore the supply
could not be long excessive, even if the producers had great difficulty
in removing their capitals from the land; the price of corn therefore,
will speedily be raised by taxation, and the farmer will be enabled to
transfer the tax from himself to the consumer.

If the mines which supply us with gold were in this country, and if
gold were taxed, it could not rise in relative value to other things
till its quantity were reduced. This would be more particularly the
case, if gold were exclusively used for money. It is true that the least
productive mines, those which paid no rent, could no longer be worked,
as they could not afford the general rate of profits till the relative
value of gold rose, by a sum equal to the tax. The quantity of gold, and
therefore the quantity of money would be slowly reduced; it would be a
little diminished in one year, a little more in another, and finally its
value would be raised in proportion to the tax; but in the interval, the
proprietors or holders, as they would pay the tax, would be the
sufferers, and not those who used money.
If out of every 1000 quarters
of wheat in the country, and every 1000 produced in future, government
should exact 100 quarters as a tax, the remaining 900 quarters would
exchange for the same quantity of other commodities that 1000 did
before; but if the same thing took place with respect to gold, if of
every 1000_l. _ money now in the country, or in future to be brought into
it, government could exact 100_l. _ as a tax, the remaining 900_l. _
would purchase very little more than 900_l. _ purchased before. The tax
would fall upon him, whose property consisted of money, and would
continue to do so till its quantity were reduced in proportion to the
increased cost of its production caused by the tax.

This perhaps would be more particularly the case with respect to a metal
used for money, than any other commodity, because the demand for money
is not for a definite quantity, as is the demand for clothes, or for
food. The demand for money is regulated entirely by its value, and its
value by its quantity. If gold were of double the value, half the
quantity would perform the same functions in circulation, and if it were
of half the value, double the quantity would be required. If the market
value of corn be increased one tenth by taxation, or by difficulty of
production, it is doubtful, whether any effect whatever would be
produced on the quantity consumed, because every man's want is for a
definite quantity, and, therefore, if he has the means of purchasing, he
will continue to consume as before; but for money, the demand is
exactly proportioned to its value. No man could consume twice the
quantity of corn, which is usually necessary for his support, but every
man purchasing and selling only the same quantity of goods, may be
obliged to employ twice, thrice, or any number of times the same
quantity of money.

The argument which I have just been using, applies only to those states
of society in which the precious metals are used for money, and where
paper credit is not established. The metal gold like all other
commodities has its value in the market ultimately regulated by the
comparative facility or difficulty of producing it; and although from
its durable nature, and from the difficulty of reducing its quantity, it
does not readily bend to variations in its market value, yet that
difficulty is much increased from the circumstance of its being used as
money. If the quantity of gold in the market for the purpose of commerce
only, were 10,000 ounces, and the consumption in our manufactures were
2000 ounces annually, it might be raised one fourth, or 25 per cent. in
its value, in one year, by withholding the annual supply; but if in
consequence of its being used as money, the quantity employed were
100,000 ounces, it would not be raised one fourth in value in less than
ten years. As money made of paper may be readily reduced in quantity,
its value, though its standard were gold, would be increased as rapidly
as that of the metal itself would be increased if it had no connexion
whatever with money.

If gold were the produce of one country only, and it were used
universally for money, a very considerable tax might be imposed on it,
which would not fall on any country, except in proportion as they used
it in manufactures, and for utensils; upon that portion which was used
for money, though a large tax might be received, nobody would pay it.
This is a quality peculiar to money. All other commodities of which
there exists a limited quantity, and which cannot be increased by
competition, are dependant for their value, on the tastes, the caprice,
and the power of purchasers; but money is a commodity which no country
has any wish or necessity to increase: no more advantage results from
using twenty millions, than from using ten millions of currency. A
country might have a monopoly of silk, or of wine, and yet the prices of
silks and wine might fall, because from caprice or fashion, or taste,
cloth and brandy might be preferred, and substituted; the same effect
might in a degree take place with gold, as far as its use is confined to
manufactures: but while money is the general medium of exchange, the
demand for it is never a matter of choice, but always of necessity; you
must take it in exchange for your goods, and therefore there are no
limits to the quantity which may be forced on you by foreign trade, if
it fall in value; and no reduction to which you must not submit, if it
rise. You may indeed substitute paper money, but by this you do not, and
cannot lessen the quantity of money; it is only by the rise of the price
of commodities, that you can prevent them from being exported from a
country where they are purchased with little money, to a country where
they can be sold for more, and this rise can only be effected by an
importation of metallic money from abroad, or by the creation or
addition of paper money at home. If then the King of Spain, supposing
him to be in exclusive possession of the mines, and gold alone to be
used for money, were to lay a considerable tax on gold, he would very
much raise its natural value; and as its market value in Europe is
ultimately regulated by its natural value in Spanish America, more
commodities would be given by Europe for a given quantity of gold. But
the same quantity of gold would not be produced in America, as its value
would only be increased in proportion to the diminution of quantity
consequent on its increased cost of production. No more goods then would
be obtained in America, in exchange for all their gold exported, than
before; and it may be asked, where then would be the benefit to Spain
and her colonies? The benefit would be this, that if less gold were
produced, less capital would be employed in producing it; the same value
of goods from Europe would be imported by the employment of the smaller
capital, that was before obtained by the employment of the larger; and
therefore all the productions obtained by the employment of the capital
withdrawn from the mines, would be a benefit which Spain would derive
from the imposition of the tax, and which she could not obtain in such
abundance, or with such certainty, by possessing the monopoly of any
other commodity whatever. From such a tax, as far as money was
concerned, the nations of Europe would suffer no injury whatever; they
would have the same quantity of goods, and consequently the same means
of enjoyment as before, but these goods would be circulated with a less
quantity of money.

If in consequence of the tax, only one tenth of the present quantity of
gold were obtained from the mines, that tenth would be of equal value
with the ten tenths now produced. But the King of Spain is not
exclusively in possession of the mines of the precious metals; and if he
were, his advantage from their possession, and the power of taxation,
would be very much reduced by the limitation of demand and consumption
in Europe, in consequence of the universal substitution, in a greater or
less degree, of paper money. The agreement of the market and natural
prices of all commodities, depends at all times on the facility with
which the supply can be increased or diminished. In the case of gold,
houses, and labour, as well as many other things, this effect cannot,
under some circumstances, be speedily produced. But it is different with
those commodities which are consumed and reproduced from year to year,
such as hats, shoes, corn, and cloth; they may be reduced if necessary,
and the interval cannot be long before the supply is contracted in
proportion to the increased charge of producing them.

A tax on raw produce from the surface of the earth, will, as we have
seen, fall on the consumer, and will in no way affect rent; unless, by
diminishing the funds for the maintenance of labour, it lowers wages,
reduces the population, and diminishes the demand for corn. But a tax on
the produce of gold mines must, by enhancing the value of that metal,
necessarily reduce the demand for it, and must therefore necessarily
displace capital from the employment to which it was applied.
Notwithstanding then, that Spain would derive all the benefits which I
have stated from a tax on gold, the proprietors of mines from which
capital was withdrawn would lose all their rent. This would be a loss
to individuals, but not a national loss; rent being not a creation, but
merely a transfer of wealth: the King of Spain, and the proprietors of
the mines which continued to be worked, would together receive not only
all that the liberated capital produced, but all that the other
proprietors lost.

Suppose the mines of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd quality to be worked, and to
produce respectively 100, 80, and 70 pounds weight of gold, and
therefore the rent of No. 1 to be thirty pounds, and that of No. 2 ten
pounds. Suppose now the tax to be seventy pounds of gold per annum on
each mine worked; and consequently that No. 1 alone could be profitably
worked; it is evident that all rent would immediately disappear. Before
the imposition of the tax, out of the 100 pounds produced on No. 1, a
rent was paid of thirty pounds, and the worker of the mine retained
seventy, a sum equal to the produce of the least productive mine. The
value then of what remains to the capitalist of the mine No. 1 must be
the same as before, or he would not obtain the common profits of stock;
and consequently, after paying seventy out of his 100 pounds for tax,
the value of the remaining thirty must be as great as seventy were
before, and therefore the value of the whole hundred as great as 233
pounds before. Its value might be higher, but it could not be lower, or
even this mine would cease to be worked. Being a monopolised commodity,
it could exceed its natural value, and then it would pay a rent equal to
that excess; but no funds would be employed in the mine, if it were
below this value. In return for one-third of the labour and capital
employed in the mines, Spain would obtain as much gold as would exchange
for the same, or very nearly the same, quantity of commodities as
before. She would be richer by the produce of the two thirds liberated
from the mines. If the value of the 100 pounds of gold should be equal
to that of the 250 pounds extracted before; the king of Spain's portion,
his seventy pounds, would be equal to 175 at the former value: a small
part of the king's tax only would fall on his own subjects, the greater
part being obtained by the better distribution of capital.

The account of Spain would stand thus:

_Formerly produced_:

Gold 250 pounds, of the value of (suppose) 10,000 yards of
cloth.
_Now produced_:

By the two capitalists who quitted the mines,} 5,600 yards of
the value of 140 pounds of gold, or } cloth.
By the capitalist who works the mine, No. 1, }
thirty pounds of gold increased in value, } 3,000 yards of
as 1 to 2-1/2, and therefore now of the } cloth.
value of }
Tax to the king seventy pounds, now of the } 7,000 yards of
value of } cloth.
------
15,600
------

Of the 7000 received by the king, the people of Spain would contribute
only 1400, and 5600 would be pure gain, effected by the liberated
capital.

If the tax, instead of being a fixed sum per mine worked, were a certain
portion of its produce, the quantity would not be reduced in
consequence. If a half, a fourth, or a third of each mine were taken for
the tax, it would nevertheless be the interest of the proprietors to
make their mines yield as abundantly as before; but if the quantity were
not reduced, but only a part of it transferred from the proprietor to
the king, its value would not rise; the tax would fall on the people of
the colonies, and no advantage would be gained. A tax of this kind would
have the effect that Adam Smith supposes taxes on raw produce would have
on the rent of land--it would fall entirely on the rent of the mine. If
pushed a little further, the tax would not only absorb the whole rent,
but would deprive the worker of the mine of the common profits of stock,
and he would consequently withdraw his capital from the production of
gold. If still further extended, the rent of still better mines would be
absorbed, and capital would be further withdrawn; and thus the quantity
would be continually reduced, and its value raised, and the same effects
would take place as we have already pointed out; a part of the tax would
be paid by the people of the Spanish colonies, and the other part would
be a new creation of produce, by increasing the power of the instrument
used as a medium of exchange. Taxes on gold are of two kinds, one on the
actual quantity of gold in circulation, the other on the quantity that
is annually produced from the mines. Both have a tendency to reduce the
quantity, and to raise the value of gold; but by neither will its value
be raised till the quantity is reduced, and therefore such taxes will
fall for a time, until the supply is diminished, on the proprietors of
money, but ultimately they will be paid by the owner of the mine in the
reduction of rent, and by the purchasers of that portion of gold, which
is used as a commodity contributing to the enjoyments of mankind, and
not set apart exclusively for a circulating medium.




CHAPTER XII.

TAXES ON HOUSES.


There are also other commodities besides gold which cannot be speedily
reduced in quantity; any tax on which will therefore fall on the
proprietor, if the increase of price should lessen the demand.

Taxes on houses are of this description; though laid on the occupier,
they will frequently fall by a diminution of rent on the landlord. The
produce of the land is consumed and reproduced from year to year, and so
are many other commodities; as they may therefore be speedily brought to
a level with the demand, they cannot long exceed their natural price.
But as a tax on houses may be considered in the light of an additional
rent paid by the tenant, its tendency will be to diminish the demand
for houses of the same annual rent, without diminishing their supply.
Rent will therefore fall, and a part of the tax will be paid indirectly
by the landlord.

"The rent of a house," says Adam Smith, "may be distinguished into two
parts, of which the one may very properly be called the building rent,
the other is commonly called the ground rent. The building rent is the
interest or profit of the capital expended in building the house. In
order to put the trade of a builder upon a level with other trades, it
is necessary that this rent should be sufficient first to pay the same
interest which he would have got for his capital, if he had lent it upon
good security; and secondly, to keep the house in constant repair, or
what comes to the same thing, to replace within a certain term of years
the capital which had been employed in building it. " "If in proportion
to the interest of money, the trade of the builder affords at any time a
much greater profit than this, it will soon draw so much capital from
other trades, as will reduce the profit to its proper level. If it
affords at any time much less than this, other trades will soon draw so
much capital from it as will again raise that profit. Whatever part of
the whole rent of a house is over and above what is sufficient for
affording this reasonable profit, naturally goes to the ground rent; and
where the owner of the ground, and the owner of the building are two
different persons, it is in most cases completely paid to the former. In
country houses, at a distance from any great town, where there is a
plentiful choice of ground, the ground rent is scarcely any thing, or no
more than what the space upon which the house stands, would pay if
employed in agriculture. In country villas, in the neighbourhood of some
great town, it is sometimes a good deal higher, and the peculiar
conveniency, or beauty of situation, is there frequently very highly
paid for. Ground rents are generally highest in the capital, and in
those particular parts of it, where there happens to be the greatest
demand for houses, whatever be the reason for that demand, whether for
trade and business, for pleasure and society, or for mere vanity and
fashion. " A tax on the rent of houses may either fall on the occupier,
on the ground landlord, or on the building landlord. In ordinary cases
it may be presumed, that the whole tax would be paid both immediately
and finally by the occupier.

If the tax be moderate, and the circumstances of the country such, that
it is either stationary or advancing, there would be little motive for
the occupier of a house to content himself with one of a worse
description. But if the tax be high, or any other circumstances should
diminish the demand for houses, the landlord's income would fall, for
the occupier would be partly compensated for the tax by a diminution of
rent. It is, however, difficult to say, in what proportions that part of
the tax, which was saved by the occupier by a fall of rent, would fall
on the building rent and the ground rent. It is probable, that in the
first instance, both would be affected; but as houses are, though
slowly, yet certainly perishable, and as no more would be built, till
the profits of the builder were restored to the general level, building
rent, would, after an interval, be restored to its natural price. As the
builder receives rent only whilst the building endures, he could pay no
part of the tax, under the most disastrous circumstances, for any longer
period.

The payment of this tax, then, would ultimately fall on the occupier and
ground landlord, but "in what proportion, this final payment would be
divided between them," says Adam Smith, "it is not perhaps very easy to
ascertain. The division would probably be very different in different
circumstances, and a tax of this kind might, according to those
different circumstances, affect very unequally both the inhabitant of
the house, and the owner of the ground. "[15]

Adam Smith considers ground rents as peculiarly fit subjects for
taxation. "Both ground rents, and the ordinary rent of land," he says,
"are a species of revenue, which the owner in many cases enjoys, without
any care or attention of his own. Though a part of this revenue should
be taken from him, in order to defray the expenses of the state, no
discouragement will thereby be given to any sort of industry. The annual
produce of the land and labour of the society, the real wealth and
revenue of the great body of the people, might be the same after such a
tax as before. Ground rents, and the ordinary rent of land, are,
therefore, perhaps the species of revenue, which can best bear to have a
peculiar tax imposed upon them. " It must be admitted that the effects of
these taxes would be such as Adam Smith has described; but it would
surely be very unjust, to tax exclusively the revenue of any particular
class of a community. The burdens of the state should be borne by all in
proportion to their means: this is one of the four maxims mentioned by
Adam Smith, which should govern all taxation. Rent often belongs to
those who after many years of toil, have realised their gains, and
expended their fortunes in the purchase of land; and it certainly would
be an infringement of that principle which should ever be held sacred,
the security of property, to subject it to unequal taxation. It is to be
lamented, that the duty by stamps, with which the transfer of landed
property is loaded, materially impedes the conveyance of it into those
hands, where it would probably be made most productive. And if it be
considered, that land, regarded as a fit subject for exclusive
taxation, would not only be reduced in price, to compensate for the risk
of that taxation, but in proportion to the indefinite nature and
uncertain value of the risk, would become a fit subject for
speculations, partaking more of the nature of gambling, than of sober
trade, it will appear probable, that the hands into which land would in
that case be most apt to fall, would be the hands of those, who possess
more of the qualities of the gambler, than of the qualities of the
sober-minded proprietor, who is likely to employ his land to the
greatest advantage.




CHAPTER XIII.

TAXES ON PROFITS.


Taxes on those commodities, which are generally denominated luxuries,
fall on those only who make use of them. A tax on wine is paid by the
consumer of wine. A tax on pleasure horses, or on coaches, is paid by
those who provide for themselves such enjoyments, and in exact
proportion as they provide them. But taxes on necessaries do not affect
the consumers of necessaries, in proportion to the quantity that may be
consumed by them, but often in a much higher proportion. A tax on corn,
we have observed, not only affects a manufacturer in the proportion that
he and his family may consume corn, but it alters the rate of profits of
stock, and therefore also affects his income. Whatever raises the wages
of labour, lowers the profits of stock; therefore every tax on any
commodity consumed by the labourer, has a tendency to lower the rate of
profits.

A tax on hats will raise the price of hats; a tax on shoes, the price of
shoes; if this were not the case, the tax would be finally paid by the
manufacturer; his profits would be reduced below the general level, and
he would quit his trade. A partial tax on profits will raise the price
of the commodity on which it falls: a tax, for example, on the profits
of the hatter, would raise the price of hats; for if his profits were
taxed, and not those of any other trade, his profits, unless he raised
the price of his hats, would be below the general rate of profits, and
he would quit his employment for another.

In the same manner a tax on the profits of the farmer would raise the
price of corn; a tax on the profits of the clothier, the price of cloth;
and if a tax in proportion to profits were laid on all trades, every
commodity would be raised in price. But if the mine, which supplied us
with the standard of our money, were in this country, and the profits of
the miner were also taxed, the price of no commodity would rise, each
man would give an equal proportion of his income, and every thing would
be as before.

If money be not taxed, and therefore be permitted to preserve its value,
whilst every thing else is taxed, and is raised in value, the hatter,
the farmer, and clothier, each employing the same capitals, and
obtaining the same profits, will pay the same amount of tax. If the tax
be 100_l. _, the hats, the cloth, and the corn, will each be increased in
value 100_l. _ If the hatter gain by his hats 1100_l. _, instead of
1000_l. _, he will pay 100_l. _ to Government for the tax; and therefore
will still have 1000_l. _ to lay out on goods for his own consumption.
But as the cloth, corn, and all other commodities, will be raised in
price from the same cause, he will not obtain more for his 1000_l. _ than
he before obtained for 910_l. _, and thus will he contribute by his
diminished expenditure to the exigencies of the state; he will, by the
payment of the tax, have placed a portion of the produce of the land and
labour of the country at the disposal of Government, instead of using
that portion himself. If instead of expending his 1000_l. _, he adds it
to his capital, he will find in the rise of wages, and in the increased
cost of the raw material and machinery, that his saving of 1000_l. _ does
not amount to more than a saving of 910_l. _ amounted to before.

If money be taxed, or if by any other cause its value be altered, and
all commodities remain precisely at the same price as before, the
profits of the manufacturer and farmer will also be the same as before,
they will continue to be 1000_l. _; and as they will each have to pay
100_l. _ to Government, they will retain only 900_l. _, which will give
them a less command over the produce of the land and labour of the
country, whether they expend it in productive or unproductive labour.
Precisely what they lose, Government will gain. In the first case the
contributor to the tax would, for 1000_l. _, have as great a quantity of
goods as he before had for 910_l. _; in the second, he would have only as
much as he before had for 900_l. _ This proceeds from the difference in
the amount of the tax; in the first case it is only an eleventh of his
income, in the second it is a tenth; money in the two cases being of a
different value.

But although, if money be not taxed, and do not alter in value, all
commodities will rise in price, they will not rise in the same
proportion; they will not after the tax bear the same relative value to
each other which they did before the tax. In a former part of this work,
we discussed the effects of the division of capital into fixed and
circulating, or rather into durable and perishable capital, on the
prices of commodities. We shewed that two manufacturers might employ
precisely the same amount of capital, and might derive from it precisely
the same amount of profits, but that they would sell their commodities
for very different sums of money, according as the capitals they
employed were rapidly, or slowly, consumed and reproduced. The one might
sell his goods for 4000_l. _, the other for 10,000_l. _, and they might
both employ 10,000_l. _ of capital, and obtain 20 per cent. profit, or
2000_l. _ The capital of one might consist for example of 2000_l. _
circulating capital, to be reproduced, and 8000_l. _ fixed, in buildings
and machinery; the capital of the other on the contrary might consist of
8000_l. _ of circulating, and of only 2000_l. _ fixed capital in machinery
and buildings. Now if each of these persons were to be taxed 10 per
cent. on his income, or 200_l. _, the one, to make his business yield him
the general rate of profit, must raise his goods from 10,000_l. _ to
10,200_l. _; the other would also be obliged to raise the price of his
goods from 4000_l. _ to 4200_l. _ Before the tax, the goods sold by one of
these manufacturers were 2-1/2 times more valuable than the goods of the
other; after the tax they will be 2. 42 times more valuable: the one kind
will have risen 2 per cent. ; the other 5 per cent. : consequently a tax
upon income, whilst money continued unaltered in value, would alter the
relative prices and value of commodities. This is true, if the tax
instead of being laid on the profits were laid on the commodities
themselves: provided they were taxed in proportion to the value of the
capital employed on their production, they would rise equally, whatever
might be their value, and therefore they would not preserve the same
proportion as before. A commodity, which rose from ten to eleven
thousand pounds, would not bear the same relation as before, to another
which rose from 2 to 3000_l. _ If under these circumstances money rose in
value, from whatever cause it might proceed, it would not affect the
prices of commodities in the same proportion. The same cause which would
lower the price of one from 10,200_l. _ to 10,000_l. _ or less than 2 per
cent. , would lower the price of the other from 4200_l. _ to 4000_l. _ or
4-3/4 per cent. If they fell in any different proportion, profits would
not be equal; for to make them equal, when the price of the first
commodity was 10,000_l. _, the price of the second should be 4000_l. _;
and when the price of the first was 10,200_l. _, the price of the other
should be 4200_l. _

The consideration of this fact will lead to the understanding of a very
important principle, which I believe has never been adverted to. It is
this; that in a country where no taxation subsists, the alteration in
the value of money arising from scarcity or abundance will operate in an
equal proportion on the prices of all commodities; that if a commodity
of 1000_l. _ value rise to 1200_l. _, or fall to 800_l. _, a commodity of
10,000_l. _ value will rise to 12,000_l. _ or fall to 8000_l. _; but in a
country where prices are artificially raised by taxation, the abundance
of money from an influx, or the exportation and consequent scarcity of
it from foreign demand, will not operate in the same proportion on the
prices of all commodities; some it will raise or lower 5, 6, or 12 per
cent. , others 3, 4, or 7 per cent. If a country were not taxed, and
money should fall in value, its abundance in every market would produce
similar effects in each. If meat rose 20 per cent. , bread, beer, shoes,
labour, and every commodity, would also rise 20 per cent. ; it is
necessary they should do so, to secure to each trade the same rate of
profits. But this is no longer true when any of these commodities is
taxed; if in that case they should all rise in proportion to the fall in
the value of money, profits would be rendered unequal; in the case of
the commodities taxed profits would be raised above the general level,
and capital would be removed from one employment to another, till an
equilibrium of profits was restored, which could only be, after the
relative prices were altered.

Will not this principle account for the different effects, which it was
remarked were produced on the prices of commodities, from the altered
value of money during the Bank-restriction? It was objected to those who
contended that the currency was at that period depreciated, from the too
great abundance of the paper circulation, that, if that were the fact,
all commodities ought to have risen in the same proportion; but it was
found that many had varied considerably more than others, and thence it
was inferred that the rise of prices was owing to something affecting
the value of commodities, and not to any alteration in the value of the
currency. It appears however, as we have just seen, that in a country
where commodities are taxed, they will not all vary in price in the same
proportion, either in consequence of a rise or of a fall in the value of
currency.

If the profits of all trades were taxed, excepting the profits of the
farmer, all goods would rise in money value, excepting raw produce. The
farmer would have the same corn income as before, and would sell his
corn also for the same money price; but as he would be obliged to pay an
additional price for all the commodities, except corn, which he
consumed, it would be to him a tax on expenditure. Nor would he be
relieved from this tax by an alteration in the value of money, for an
alteration in the value of money might sink all the taxed commodities to
their former price, but the untaxed one would sink below its former
level; and therefore, though the farmer would purchase his commodities
at the same price as before, he would have less money with which to
purchase them.

The landlord too would be precisely in the same situation, he would have
the same corn, and the same money rent as before, if all commodities
rose in price, and money remained at the same value; and he would have
the same corn, but a less money rent, if all commodities remained at the
same price: so that in either case, though his income were not directly
taxed, he would indirectly contribute towards the money raised.

But suppose the profits of the farmer to be also taxed, he then would be
in the same situation as other traders; his raw produce would rise, so
that he would have the same money revenue, after paying the tax, but he
would pay an additional price for all the commodities he consumed, raw
produce included.

His landlord however would be differently situated, he would be
benefited by the tax on his tenant's profits, as he would be compensated
for the additional price at which he would purchase his manufactured
commodities, if they rose in price; and he would have the same money
revenue, if in consequence of a rise in the value of money, commodities
sold at their former price. A tax on the profits of the farmer, is not a
tax proportioned to the gross produce of the land, but to its net
produce, after the payment of rent, wages, and all other charges. As the
cultivators of the different kinds of land, No. 1, 2, and 3, employ
precisely the same capitals, they will get precisely the same profits,
whatever may be the quantity of gross produce, which one may obtain more
than the other; and consequently they will be all taxed alike. Suppose
the gross produce of the land of the quality No. 1, to be 180 qrs. , that
of No. 2, 170 qrs. , and of No 3, 160, and each to be taxed 10 quarters,
the difference between the produce of No. 1, No.