No More Learning

Five hundred thousand pounds is a serious sum. But it is nothing to the prolific principle upon which the sum was voted: a principle that may be well called, the fruitful mother of an hundred more. Nei ther is the damage to public credit of very great con sequence, when compared with that which results to public morals and to the safety of the constitution, from the exhaustless mine of corruption
the precedent, and to be wrought by the principle, of
the late payment of the debts of the civil list. The power of discretionary disqualification by one law of Parliament, and the necessity of paying every debt of the civil list by another law of Parliament, if suffered to pass unnoticed, must establish such a fund of re
wards and terrors as will make Parliament the best
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appendage and support of arbitrary power that ever was invented by the wit of man. This is felt. The quarrel is begun between the representatives and the
people. them.
The court faction have at length committed
In such a strait the wisest may well be perplexed, and the boldest staggered. The circumstances are in a great measure new. We have hardly any land marks from the wisdom of our ancestors, to guide us. At best we can only follow the spirit of their proceed ing in other cases. I know the diligence with which my observations on our public disorders have been made; I am very sure of the integrity of the motives on which they are published: I cannot be equally confident in any plan for the absolute cure of those disorders, or for their certain future prevention. My aim is to bring this matter into more public discus sion. Let the sagacity of others work upon it. It is not ILIICOIDIIIOII for medical writers to describe histo ries of diseases very accurately, on whose cure they can say but very little.
The first ideas which generally suggest themselves, for the cure of Parliamentary disorders, are, to short en the duration of Parliaments; and to disqualify all, or a great number of placemen, from a seat in the House of Commons. Whatever efficacy there may be in those remedies, I am sure in the present state of things it is impossible to apply them. A restoration of the right of free election is a prelimina ry indispensable to every other reformation. What alterations ought afterwards to be made in the consti tution, is a matter of deep and difiicult research.
? If I wrote merely to please the popular palate, it would indeed be as little troublesome to me as to an
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other, to extol these remedies, so famous in specula tion, but to which their greatest admirers have never attempted seriously to resort in practice. I confess then, that I have no sort of reliance upon either a tri ennial Parliament, or a place-bill. With regard to the former, perhaps it might rather serve to counter act, than to promote the ends that are proposed by it. To say nothing of the horrible disorders among the people attending frequent elections, I should be fear ful of committing, every three years, the independent gentlemen of the country into a contest with the treasury. It is easy to see which of the contending parties would be ruined first. Whoever has taken a careful view of public proceedings, so as to endeavor to ground his speculations on his experience, must have observed how prodigiously greater the power of ministry is in the first and last session of a Parlia ment, than it is in the intermediate period, when members sit a little firm on their seats. The persons of the greatest Parliamentary experience, with whom I have conversed, did constantly, in canvassing the fate of questions, allow something to the court side, upon account of the elections depending or immi nent. The evil complained of, if it exists in the pres ent state of things, would hardly be removed by a
triennial Parliament: for, unless the influence of government in elections can be entirely taken away, the more frequently they return, the more they will harass private independence; the more generally men will be compelled to fly to the settled system atic interest of government, and to the resources of a boundless civil list. Certainly something may be done, and ought to be done, towards lessening that influence in elections; and this will be necessary up
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on a plan either of longer or shorter duration of Par liament. But nothing can so perfectly remove the evil, as not to render such contentions, too frequent ly repeated, utterly ruinous, first to independence of fortune, and then to independence of spirit. As I am only giving an opinion on this point, and not at all debating it in an adverse line, I hope I may be excused in another observation. With great truth I may aver, that I never remember to have talked on this subject with any man much conversant with public business, who considered short Parliaments as a real improvement of the constitution. Gentlemen, warm in a popular cause, are ready enough to attrib ute all the declarations of such persons to corrupt
? motives. But the habit of affairs, tends to corrupt the mind, furnishes with the means of better information.
on one hand, on the other, The authori
of such persons will always have some weight. It may stand upon par with the speculations of those who are less practised in business; and who, with perhaps purer intentions, have not so effectual means of judging. It besides an effect of vulgar and pu erile malignity to imagine, that every statesman of course corrupt; and that his opinion, upon every constitutional point, solely formed upon some sinis ter interest.
The next favorite remedy place-bill. The same principle guides in both; mean, the opinion which entertained by many, of the infallibility of laws
and regulations, in the cure of public distempers. Without being as unreasonably doubtful as many are unwisely confident, will only say, that this also
matter very well worthy of serious and mature re flection. It not easy to foresee, what the effect
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would be, of disconnecting with Parliament the great est part of those who hold civil employments, and of such mighty and important bodies as the military and naval establishments. It were better, perhaps, that they should have a corrupt interest in the forms of the constitution, than that they should have none at all. This is a question altogether different from the disqualification of a particular description of revenue officers from seats in Parliament ; or, perhaps, of all the lower sorts of them from votes in elections. In the former case, only the few are affected; in the lat ter, only the inconsiderable. But a great official, a great professional, a great military and naval interest, all necessarily comprehending many people of the first weight, ability, wealth, and spirit, has been grad ually formed in the kingdom. These new interests must be let into a share of representation, else pos sibly they may be inclined to destroy those institu tions of which they are not permitted to partake. This is not a thing to be trifled with ; nor is it every well-meaning man that is fit to put his hands to it. Many other serious considerations occur. I do not open them here, because they are not directly to my purpose ; proposing only to give the reader some taste of the difficulties that attend all capital changes in the constitution ; just to hint the uncertainty, to say no worse, of being able to prevent the court, as long as it has the means of influence abundantly in its
power, of applying that influence to Parliament ; and
perhaps, if the public method were preqluded, of doing it in some worse and more dangerous meth od. Underhand and oblique ways would be studied. The science of evasion, already tolerably m1derstood, would then be brought to the greatest perfection.
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It is no inconsiderable part of wisdom, to know how
much of an evil ought to be tolerated; lest, by at
tempting a degree of purity impracticable in degener ate times and manners, instead of cutting off the
subsisting ill-practices, new corruptions might be pro duced for the concealment and security of the old. It were better, undoubtedly, that no influence at all could affect the mind of a member of Parliament. But of all modes of influence, in my opinion, a place under the government is the least disgraceful to the man who holds and by far the most safe to the country. would not shut out that sort of influence which open and visible, which connected with the dignity and the service of the state, when
not in my power to prevent the influence of contracts, of subscriptions, of direct bribery, and those innumer able methods of clandestine corruption, which are abundantly in the hands of the court, and which will be applied as long as these means of corruption, and the disposition to be corrupted, have existence amongst us. Our constitution stands on nice equi poise, with steep precipices and deep waters upon all sides of it. In removing from dangerous leaning towards one side, there may be risk of oversetting
on the other. Every project of material change in government so complicated as ours, combined at the same time with external circumstances still more complicated, matter full of difficulties in which
considerate man will not be too ready to decide a prudent man too ready to undertake; or an honest man too ready to promise. They do not respect the public nor themselves, who engage for more than they are sure that "they ought to attempt, or that they are able to perform. These are my sentiments, weak
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but honest and unbiassed; and submitted entirely to the opinion of grave men, well-affected to the constitution of their country, and of experience in what may best promote or hurt it.
Indeed, in the situation in which we stand, with an immense revenue, an enormous debt, mighty estab lishments, government itself a great banker and a great merchant, I see no other way for the preserva tion of a decent attention to public interest in the representatives, but the interposition of the body of the
perhaps,
people itself, whenever it shall appear, by some flagrant and notorious act, by some capital innovation, that these representatives are going to overleap the fences of the law, and to introduce an arbitrary
? power. This interposition is a most unpleasant remedy. But,
if it be a legal remedy, it is intended on some occa sion to be used; to be used then only, when it is evident that nothing else can hold the constitution
to its true principles.
The distempers of monarchy were the great sub
jects of apprehension and redress, in the last cen tury; in this the distempers of Parliament. It is not in Parliament alone that the remedy for Parlia mentary disorders can be completed ; hardly indeed can it begin there. Until a confidence in govern ment is re-established, the people ought to be excited to a more strict and detailed attention to the conduct of their representatives. Standards for judging more systematically upon their conduct ought to be settled in the meetings of counties and corporations. Fre
quent and correct lists of the voters in all important questions ought to be procured.
By such means something may be done. By such means it may appear who those are, that, by an indis
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criminate support of all administrations, have totally banished all integrity and confidence out of public proceedings ; have confounded the best men with the worst; and weakened and dissolved, instead of strengthening and compacting, the general frame of government. If any person is more concerned for government and order, than for the liberties of his country; even he is equally concerned to put an end to this course of indiscriminate support. It is this blind and u1idistinguishing support, that feeds the spring of those very disorders, by which he is fright ened into the arms of the faction which contains in itself the source of all disorders, by enfeebling all the visible and regular authority of the state. The dis temper is increased by his injudicious and preposter ous endeavors, or pretences, for the cure of it.
An exterior administration, chosen for its impo tency, or after it is chosen purposely rendered impo tent, in order to be rendered subservient, will not be obeyed. The laws themselves will not be respected, when those who execute them are despised: and they will be despised, when their power is not immediate from the crown, or natural in the kingdom. Never were ministers better supported in Parliament. Par liamentary support comes and goes with office, totally regardless of the man, or the merit. Is government strengthened? It grows weaker and weaker. The popular torrent gains upon it every hour. Let us learn from our experience. It is not support that is wanting to government, but reformation. When ministry rests upon public opinion, it is not indeed built upon a rock of adamant ; it has, however, some stability. But when it stands upon private humor,
its structure is of stubble, and its foundation is on
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quicksand. I repeat it again, -- He that supports ev ery administration subverts all government. The reason is this: The whole business in which a court usually takes an interest goes on at present equally well, in whatever hands, whether high or low, wise or foolish, scandalous or reputable; there is nothing therefore to hold it firm to any one body of men, or to any one consistent scheme of politics. Nothing interposes, to prevent the full operation of all the ca prices and all the passions of a court upon the ser vants of the public. The system of administration is open to continual shocks and changes, upon the prin ciples of the meanest cabal, and the most contemptible intrigue. Nothing can be solid and permanent. All good men at length fly with horror from such a ser vice. Men of rank and ability, with the spirit which ought to animate such men in a free state, while they decline the jurisdiction of dark cabal on their actions and their fortunes, will, for both, cheerfully put themselves upon their country. They will trust an inquisitive and distinguishing Parliament; because it does inquire, and does distinguish. If they act well, they know, that, in such a Parliament they will be supported against any intrigue; if they act ill, they know that no intrigue can protect them. This situa tion, however awful, is honorable. But in one hour, and in the self-same assembly, without any assigned or assignable cause, to be precipitated from the high est authority to the most marked neglect, possibly in to the greatest peril of life and reputation, is a situa tion full of danger, and destitute of honor. It will be shunned equally by every man of prudence, and every man of spirit.
Such are the consequences of the division of court
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from the administration; and of the division of pub lic men among themselves. By the former of these, lawful government is undone ; by the latter, all oppo sition to lawless power is rendered impotent. Gov ernment may in a great measure be restored, if any considerable bodies of men have honesty and resolu tion enough never to accept administration, unless this garrison of king's men, which is stationed, as in a citadel, to control and enslave it, be entirely broken and disbanded, and every work they have thrown up be levelled with the ground. The disposition of pub lic men to keep this corps together, and to act under
or to co-operate with touchstone by which every administration ought in future to be tried. There has not been one which has not sufficiently ex
the utter incompatibility of that faction with the public peace, and with all the ends of good government: since, they opposed they soon lost every power of serving the crown; they submitted to they lost all the esteem of their country. Until ministers give to the public full proof of their entire alienation from that system, however plausible their pretences, we may be sure they are more intent on the emoluments than the duties of office. If they re fuse to give this proof, we know of what stuff they are made. In this particular, ought to be the elec tors' business to look to their representatives. The electors ought to esteem no less culpable in their member to give single vote in Parliament to such an administration, than to take an office under to endure than to act in it. The notorious. infidelity and versatility of members of Parliament, in their
opinions of men and things, ought in particular manner to be considered by the electors in the in
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quiry which is recommended to them. This is one of the principal holdings of that destructive system, which has endeavored to unhinge all the virtuous, honorable, and useful connections in the kingdom.
This cabal has, with great success, propagated a doctrine which serves for a color to those acts of treachery ; and whilst it receives any degree of coun tenance it will be utterly senseless to look for a vig orous opposition to the court party. The doctrine is this: That all political connections are in their na ture factious, and as such ought to be dissipated and destroyed ; and that the rule for forming administra tions is mere personal ability, rated by the judgment of this cabal upon and taken by draughts from every division and denomination of public men. This decree was solemnly promulgated the head of the court corps, the Earl of Bute himself, in speech
which he made, in the year 1766, against the then administration, the only administration which he has ever been known directly and publicly to oppose.
indeed in no way wonderful, that such persons should make such declarations. That connection and faction are equivalent terms, an opinion which has been carefully inculcated at all times by unconstitu tional statesmen. The reason evident. Whilst men are linked together, they easily and speedily communi cate the alarm of any evil design. They are enabled to fathom with common counsel, and to oppose with united strength. Whereas, when they lie dis persed, without concert, order, or discipline, commu nication uncertain, counsel difficult, and resistance
? Where men are not acquainted with each other's principles, nor experienced in each oth er's talents, nor at all practised in their mutual habi
impracticable.
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tudes and dispositions by joint efforts in business; no personal confidence, no friendship, no common inter est, subsisting among them; it is evidently impossible that they can act a public part with uniformity, per severance, or efficacy. In, a connection, the most in considerable man, by adding to the weight of the whole, has his value, and his use; out of the great est talents are wholly unserviceable to the public. N man, who not inflamed by vainglory into enthusi asm, can flatter himself that his single, unsupported, desultory, unsystematic endeavors are of power to de feat the subtle designs and united cabals of ambitious citizens. When bad men combine, the good must as sociate else they will fall, one by one, an unpitied sacrifice in
? contemptible struggle.
It not enough in situation of trust in the com
monwealth, that man means well to his country; not enough that in his single person he never
did an evil act, but always voted according to his conscience, and even harangued against every design which he apprehended to be prejudicial to the inter ests of his country. This innoxious and ineffectual character, that seems formed upon plan of apology and disculpation, falls miserably short of the mark of public duty. That duty demands and requires, that what right should not only be made known, but made prevalent that what evil should not only be detected, but defeated. When the public man omits to put himself in situation of doing his duty with effect, an omission that frustrates the purposes of his trust almost as much as he had formally be trayed it. It surely no very rational account of man's life, that he has always acted right; but has taken special care, to act in such manner that his
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endeavors could not possibly be productive of any consequence.
I do not wonder that the behavior of many par ties should have made persons of tender and scrupu lous virtue somewhat out of humor with all sorts of connection in politics. I admit that people frequently acquire in such confederacies a narrow, bigoted, and proscriptive spirit ; that they are apt to sink the idea of the general good in this circumscribed and par tial interest. But, where duty renders a critical sit uation a necessary one, it is our business to keep free from the evils attendant upon it; and not to fly from the situation itself. If a fortress is seated in an un wholesome air, an officer of the garrison is obliged to be attentive to his health, but he must not desert his station. Every profession, not excepting the glori ous one of a soldier, or the sacred one of a priest, is liable to its own particular vices; which, however, form no argument against those ways of life ; nor are the vices themselves inevitable to every individual in those professions. Of such a nature are connections in politics; essentially necessary for the full perform ance of our public duty, accidentally liable to de generate into faction. Commonwealths are made of families, free commonwealths of parties also ; and we
may as well affirm, that our natural regards and ties of blood tend inevitably to make men bad citizens, as that the bonds of our party weaken those by which
? we are held to our country.
Some legislators went so far as to make neutrality
in party a crime against the state. I do not know whether this might not have been rather to overstrain the principle. Certain it the best patriots in the greatest commonwealths have always commended
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and promoted such connections. Idem sentire de republica, was with them a principal ground of friend ship and attachment ; nor do I know any other capa ble of forming firmer, dearer, more pleasing, more honorable, and more virtuous habitudes. The Ro mans carried this principle a great way. Even the holding of offices together, the disposition of which arose from chance, not selection, gave rise to a rela tion which continued for life. It was called necessi tudo sortie; and it was looked upon with a sacred reverence. Breaches of any of these kinds of civil relation were considered as acts of the most distin guished turpitude. The whole people was distributed into political societies, in which they acted in support of such interests in the state as they severally affect ed. For it was then thought no crime to endeavor by every honest means to advance to superiority and power those of your own sentiments and opinions.
This wise people was far from imagining that those
connections had no tie, and obliged to no duty; but that men might quit them without shame, upon every call of interest. They believed private honor to be the great foundation of public trust ; that friend ship was no mean step towards patriotism; that he who, in the common intercourse of life, showed he regarded somebody besides himself, when he came to act in a public situation, might probably consult some other interest than his own. Never may we become plus sages que les sages, as the French comedian has happily expressed wiser than all the wise and good men who have lived before us. It was their wish, to see public and private virtues, not dissonant and jar ring, and mutually destructive, but harmoniously combined, growing out of one another in noble
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and orderly gradation, reciprocally supporting and supported. In one of the most fortunate periods of our history this country was governed by a connection ; I mean, the great connection of Whigs in the reign of Queen Anne. They were complimented upon the principle of this connection by a poet who was in high esteem with them. Addison, who knew their senti ments, could not praise them for what they considered as no proper subject of commendation. As a poet who knew his business, he could not applaud them for a thing which in general estimation was not highly reputable. Addressing himself to Britain,--
" Thy favorites grow not up by fortune's sport,
Or from the crimes or follies of a court.
On the firm basis of desert they rise,
From long-tried faith, and friendship's holy ties. "
The Whigs of those days believed that the only proper method of rising into power was through hard essays of practised friendship and experimented fidel ity. At that time it was not imagined, that patriot ism was a bloody idol, which required the sacrifice of children and parents, or dearest connections in pri vate life, and of all the virtues that rise from those relations. They were not of that ingenious paradox ical morality, to imagine that a spirit of moderation was properly shown in patiently bearing the sufier ings of your friends; or that disinterestedness was clearly manifested at the expense of other people's fortune. They believed that no men could act with effect, who did not act in concert ; that no men could act in concert, who did not act with confidence ; that no men could act with confidence, who were not bound together by common opinions, common affec
? tions, and common interests. vor. . i. 84
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These wise men, for such I must call Lord Sunder land, Lord Godolphin, Lord Somers, and Lord Marl borough, were too well principled in these maxims upon which the whole fabric of public strength is built, to be blown off their ground by the breath of every childish talker. They were not afraid that they should be called an ambitious junto; or that their resolution to stand or fall together should, by placemen, be interpreted into a scuffle for places.
Party is a body of men united for promoting by their joint endeavors the national interest upon some particular principle in which they are all agreed. For my part, I find it impossible to conceive, that any one believes in his own politics, or thinks them to be of any weight, who refuses to adopt the means of having them reduced into practice. It is the busi ness of the speculative philosopher to mark the proper ends of government. It is the business of the poli tician, who is the philosopher in action, to find out proper means towards those ends, and to employ them with effect. Therefore every honorable con nection will avow it is their first purpose, to pursue every just method to put the men who hold their opinions into such a condition as may enable them to carry their common plans into execution, with all the power and authority of the state. As this power is attached to certain situations, it is their duty to con tend for these situations. Without a proscription of others, they are bound to give to their own party the preference in all things; and by no means, for pri
vate considerations, to accept any offers of power in which the whole body is not included ; nor to suffer themselves to be led, or to be controlled, or to be overbalanced, in office or in council, by those who
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contradict the very fundamental principles on which their party is formed, and even those upon which every fair connection must stand. Such a generous contention for power, on such manly and honorable maxims, will easily be distinguished from the mean and interested struggle for place and emolument.
The very style of such persons will serve to discrim inate them from those numberless impostors, who have deluded the ignorant with professions incompat ible with human practice, and have afterwards in censed them by practices below the level of vulgar rectitude.
It is an advantage to all narrow wisdom and nar row morals, that their maxims have a plausible air: and, on a cursory view, appear equal to first princi ples. They are light and portable. They are as cur rent as copper coin; and about as valuable. They serve equally the first capacities and the lowest; and they are, at least, as useful to the worst men as to the best. Of this stamp is the cant of Not men, but meas ures ; a sort of charm by which many people get loose from every honorable engagement. When I see a man acting this desultory and disconnected part, with as much detriment to his own fortune as prejudice to the cause of any party, I am not persuaded that he is right; but I am ready to believe he is in earnest. I respect virtue in all its situations; even when it is found in the unsuitable company of weakness. I la ment to see qualities, rare and valuable, squandered away without any public utility. But when a gentle man with grcat visible emoluments abandons the party in which he has long acted, and tells you, it is
because he proceeds upon his own judgment; that he acts on the merits of the several measures as they
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arise; and that he is obliged to follow his own con science, and not that of others; he gives reasons which it is impossible to controvert, and discovers a character which it is impossible to mistake. What shall we think of him who never differed from a cer tain set of men until the moment they lost their power, and who never agreed with them in a single instance afterwards? Would not such a coincidence of interest and opinion be rather fortunate ? Would it not be an extraordinary cast upon the dice, that a
man's connections should degenerate into faction, precisely at the critical moment when they lose their power, or he accepts a place? When people desert their connections, the desertion is a manifest fact, upon which a direct simple issue lies, triable by plain men. Whether a measure of government be right or wrong, is no matter offact, but a mere affair of opin ion, on which men may, as they do, dispute and wran gle without end. But whether the individual thinks the measure right or wrong, is a point at still a greater distance from the reach of all human decis
? ion. It is therefore very convenient to politicians, not to put the judgment of their conduct on overt acts, cognizable in any ordinary court, but upon such matter as can be triable only in that secret tribunal, where they are sure of being heard with favor, or where at worst the sentence will be only private whip ping.
I believe the reader would wish to find no sub stance in a doctrine which has a tendency to destroy all test' of character as deduced from conduct. He will therefore excuse my adding something more, towards the further clearing up a point, which the great convenience of obscurity to dishonesty has been
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able to cover with some degree of darkness and doubt.
In order to throw an odium on political connec tion, these politicians suppose it a necessary incident to that you are blindly to follow the opinions of your party, when in direct opposition to your own clear ideas; degree of servitude that no worthy man could bear the thought of submitting to; and such as, believe, no connections (except some court factions) ever could be so senselessly tyrannical as to
Men thinking freely, will, in particular in stances, think differently. But still as the greater part of the measures which arise in the course of
impose.
? business are related to, or dependent on,
public
some great, leading, general principles in govemmervt, man must be peculiarly unfortimate in the choice of his political company, he does not agree with them at least nine times in ten. If he does not concur in these general principles upon which the party founded, and which necessarily draw on concur rence in their application, he ought from the begin ning to have chosen some other, more conformable to his opinions. When the question in its nature doubtful, or not very material, the modesty which becomes an individual, and, (in spite of our court moralists) that partiality which becomes well-chosen friendship, will frequently bring on an acquiescence in the general sentiment. Thus the disagreement will naturally be rare will be only enough to in dulge freedom, without violating concord, or disturb
And this all that ever was re quired for character of the greatest uniformity and
steadiness in connection. How men can proceed with out any connection at all, to me utterly incompre
ing arrangement.
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hensible. Of what sort of materials must that man be made, how must he be tempered and put together, who can sit whole years in Parliament, with five hun dred and fifty of his fellow-citizens, amidst the storm of such tempestuous passions, in the sharp conflict of so many wits, and tempers, and characters, in the agitation of such mighty questions, in the discussion of such vast and ponderous interests, without seeing any one sort of men, whose character, conduct, or disposition, would lead him to associate himself with them, to aid and be aided, in any one system of pub
lic utility?
I remember an old scholastic aphorism, which says,
"that the man who lives wholly detached from others, must be either an angel or a devil. " When "I see in any of these detached gentlemen of our times the an gelic purity, power, and beneficence, I shall admit them to be angels. In the mean time we are born only to be men. We shall do enough if we form our selves to be good ones. It is therefore our business carefully to cultivate in our minds, to rear to the most perfect vigor and maturity, every sort of gener ous and honest feeling, that belongs to our nature. To bring the dispositions that are lovely in private life into the service and conduct of the commonwealth; so to be patriots, as not to forget we are gentlemen. To cultivate friendships, and to incur enmities. To have both strong, but both selected : in the one, to be placable ; in the other immovable. To model our principles to our duties and our situation. To be fully persuaded, that all virtue which is impracticable is spurious ; and rather to run the risk of falling into faults in a course which leads us to act with effect and energy, than to loiter out our days without blame,
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and without use. Public life is a situation of power and energy ; he trespasses against his duty who sleeps upon his watch, as well as he that goes over to the enemy.
There however, time for all things. It not every conjuncture which calls with equal force upon the activity of honest men; but critical exigencies now and then arise; and am mistaken, this be not one of them. Men will see the necessity of hon est combination; but they may see when too late. They may embody, when will be ruinous to themselves, and of no advantage to the country; when, for want of such timely union as may enable them to oppose in favor of the laws, with the laws on their side, they may at length find themselves under the necessity of conspiring, instead of consulting. The law, for which they stand, may become
? weapon in the hands of its bitterest enemies; and they will
be cast, at length, into that miserable alternative be tween slavery and civil confusion, which no good man can look upon without horror an alternative in which impossible he should take either part, with conscience perfectly at repose. To keep that situation of guilt and remorse at the utmost distance is, therefore, our first obligation. Early activity may prevent late and fruitless violence. As yet we work in the light. The scheme of the enemies of public tranquillity has disarranged, has not destroyed us.
If the reader believes that there really exists such faction as have described; faction ruling the private inclinations of court, against the general
sense of the people; and that this faction, whilst pursues scheme for undermining all the founda tions of our freedom, weakens (for the present at
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? 536 THOUGHTS ON THE causn
least) all the powers of executory government, ren dering us abroad contemptible, and at home distract ed ; he will believe also, that nothing but a firm com bination of public men against this body, and that, too, supported by the hearty concurrence of the peo ple at large, can possibly get the better of it. The people will see the necessity of restoring public men to an attention to the public opinion, and of restoring the constitution to its original principles. Above all, they will endeavor to keep the House of Commons from assuming a character which does not belong to it. They will endeavor to keep that House, for its existence, for its powers, and its privileges, as inde pendent of every other, and as dependent upon them selves, as possible. This servitude is to a House of Commons (like obedience to the Divine law) "per fect freedom. " For if they once quit this natural,
rational, and liberal obedience, having deserted the only proper foundation of their power, they must seek a support in an abject and unnatural depend ence somewhere else. When, through the medium of this just connection with their constituents, the genuine dignity of the House of Commons is re stored, it will begin to think of casting from with scorn, as badges of servility, all the false ornaments of illegal power, with which has been, for some time, disgraced. It will begin to think of its old of fice of CONTROL. It will not suffer that last of evils to predominate in the country: men without popular confidence, public opinion, natural connection, or mutual trust, invested with all the powers of govern ment.
When they have learned this lesson themselves, they will be willing and able to teach the court, that
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? OF THE PRESENT DISCONTENTS.
537
it is the true interest of the prince to have but one administration ; and that one composed of those who recommend themselves to their sovereign through the opinion of their country, and not by their obsc quiousness to a favorite. Such men will serve their sovereign with affection and fidelity; because his choice of them, upon such principles, is a compliment to their virtue. They will be able to serve him effect ually ; because they will add the weight of the coun try to the force of the executory power. They will be able to serve their king with dignity; because they will never abuse his name to the gratification of their private spleen or avarice. This, with allow ances for human frailty, may probably be the general character of a ministry, which thinks itself accounta ble to the House of Commons; when the House of Commons thinks itself accountable to its constituents. If other ideas should prevail, things must remain in their present confusion, until they are hurried into all the rage of civil violence, or until they sink into the dead repose of despotism.
END OF VOL. I.
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The works of the Right Honorable Edmund Burke.
Burke, Edmund, 1729-1797.
Boston : Little, Brown, and company, 1869.
http://hdl. handle. net/2027/miun. aba1206. 0003. 001
Public Domain
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? ? ? THE
WORKS
OF
THE RIGHT HONORABLE EDMUND BURKE.
THIRD EDITION.
VOL. III.
BOSTON.
LITTLE, BROWN, AND COMPANY. I869.
? ? ? ? CONTENTS OF VOL. III.
PAGE
SPEECH ON THE NABOB OF ARCOT'S DEBTS, February 28,
1785; with an Appendix. . .