No More Learning

action, than througn that of the permanence of a pheno menon
Where action (consequently activity aud force) exists, sub stance also must exist, and in it alone must be sought the seat of that fruitful source of phenomena. Very well. But if we are called upon to explain what we mean by substance, and wish to avoid the vice of reasoning in a circle, the answer is by no means so easy. How shall we conclude immediately from the action to the -permanence of that whicli acts, this being nevertheless an essential and peculiar criterion of sub stance (phenomenon) ? But after what has been said above, the solution of this question becomes easy enough, although by the common mode of procedure --merely analysing our conceptions --it would be quite impossible. The conception of action indicates the relation of the subject of causality to the effect. Now because all effect consists in that which happens, therefore in the changeable, ""the last subject thereof is the permanent, as the substratum of all that
changes, that substance. For according to the prin ciple of causality, actions are always the first ground of all
change in phenomena, and consequently cannot be pro perty of subject which itself changes, because this were the case, other actions and another subject would be necessary to determine this change. From all this results that action alone, as an empirical criterion, sufficient proof of the presence of substantiality, without any necessity on my part of endeavouring to discover the permanence of substance
? Besides, this mode of induction we could not attain to the completeness which the magnitude and strict universality of the conception requires. For that the primary subject of the causality of all arising and passing away, all
origin and extinction, cannot itself (in the sphere of phenom ena) arise and pass away, sound and safe conclusion, con clusion which leads us to the conception of empirical necessity and permanence in existence, and consequently to the concep tion of substance as phenomenon.
When something happens, the mere fact of the occurrence, without regard to that which occurs, an object requiring vestigation. The transition from the non-being of state into the existence of supposing that this state contains no quality which previously existed the phenomenon, fart of itscll
comparison.
? ? in
is a
by
is a
if
a
it,
is,
a
is
is a
in
by
a
a
a
a
it
? OP TUB SUCCESSION OF TIME. 158
demanding inquiry. Such an event, as has been shown in No. A, does not concern substance (for substance does not thus originate), but its condition or state. It is therefore . only change, and not origin from nothing. If this origin be re garded as the effect of a foreign cause, it is termed creation, which cannot be admitted as an event among phenomena, be cause the very possibility of it would annihilate the unity of experience. If, however, I regard all things not as phenomena, but as things in themselves, and objects of understanding alone, they, although substances, may be considered as dependent, in respect of their existence, on a foreign cause. But this would require a very different meaning in the words, a meaning which could not apply to phenomena as objects of possible ex
? perience.
How a thing can be changed, how it is possible that upon
one state existing in one point of time, an opposite state should follow in another point of time--of this we have not the smallest conception ^priori. There is requisite for this the knowledge of real powers, which can only be given empirically ; for example, knowledge of moving forces, or, in other words, Df certain successive phsenomena (as movements) which in dicate the presence of such forces. But the form of every change, the condition under which alone it can take place ns
the coming into existence of another state (be the content of the change, that the state which changed, what may), and consequently the succession of the states themselves, can very well be considered priori, in relation to the law of causality and the conditions of time. *
When substance passes from one state, a, into another state,
the point of time in which the latter exists different from, and subsequent to that in which the former existed. In like manner, the second state, as reality (in the phenomenon), differs from the first, in which the reality of the second did not exist, as from sero. That to say, the state, differs from the state, a, only in respect to quantity, the change coming into existence of -- a, which in the former state did not exist,
=
must be remarked, that do not speak of the change of certain relations, but of the change of the state. Thus, when bod) moves in an uniform manner, does not change its staU (of motion) but only Chea Ha ro? tion increases or decreases.
and in relation to which that state
"--
? ? ;
a is b\
* It
6,
it
b
is, A
is I
is
if
is
0.
is a
it
b
a
? 151 THANSOENDENTAX DOCTRINE.
Now the question arises, haw a thing passes from one state =o, into another state = b. Between two moments there is always a certain time, and between two states existing in these moments, there is always a difference having a certain quantity (for all parts of phenomena are in their turn quan
Consequently, every transition from one state into another, is always effected in a time contained between two moments, of which the first determines the state which the thing leaves, and the second determines the state into which the thing passes. Both moments, then, are limitations of the time of a change, consequently of the intermediate state be tween both, and as such they belong to the total of the change. Now every change has a cause, which evidences its causality in the whole time during which the change takes place. The cause, therefore, does not produce the change all at once or in one moment, but in a time, so that, as the time gradually increases from the commencing instant, a, to its completion at 4, in like manner also, the quantity of the reality (6--a) is generated through the lesser degrees which are contained between the first and last. All change is therefore possible only through a continuous action of the causality, which, in
bo far as it is uniform, we call a momentum. The change does not consist of these momenta, but is generated or produced by them as their effect.
Such is the law of the continuity of all change, the ground of which that neither time itself nor any phenomenon in time consists of parts which are the smallest possible, but that, notwithstanding, the state of thing passes in the process of
change through all these parts, as elements, to its second state. There no smallest degree of reality in phenomenon, just as there no smallest degree in the quantity of time and so the new state of the reality grows up out of the former state, through all the infinite degrees thereof, the differences of which one from another, taken all together, are less than the difference between and a.
not our business to enquire here into the utility of this principle in the investigation of nature. But how such pro position, which appears bo greatly to extend our knowledge of nature, possible completely priori, indeed question which
deserves investigation, although the first view seems to de monstrate the truth and reality of the principle, and the quo*
tities).
? ? ? is is
0 d
a
is
It
aa
a;
a
is, is is
? OF THE SUCCESSION OF TIMX. 165
tion, how it is possible, may be considered superfluous. For there are so many groundless pretensions to the eulareement of our knowledge by pure reason, that we must take it as a general rule to be mistrustful of all such, and without a thorough-going and radical deduction, to believe nothing of the sort even on the clearest dogmatical evidence.
Everyadditiou toour empirical knowledge, and every advance made in the exercise of our perception, is nothing more than an extension of the determination of the internal sense, that is to say, a progression in time, be objects themselves what they may, phenomena, or pure intuitions. This progression in time determines everything, and is itself determined by nothing else. That is to say, the parts of the progression exist only in time, and by means of the synthesis thereof, and are not given antecedently to it. For this reason, every transition in perception to anything which follows upon an other in time, is a determination of time by means of the pro
? duction of this perception. always and in all its parts,
duced to be considered as
all its degrees --no one of which
zero up to its determined degree.
possibility of cognizing priori
ever, which concerns their form merely. We merely antici pate our own apprehension, the formal condition of which, inasmuch as m itself to be found in the mind antecedently to all given phenomena, must certainly be capable of being cognized priori.
Thus, as time contains the sensuous condition a priori of the possibility of continuous progression of that which exists to that which follows the understanding, virtue of the unity of apperception, contains the condition priori of the possibility of continuous determination of the position in time of all phenomena, and this by means of the series of causes and effects, the former of which necessitate the sequence of the latter, and thereby render universally and for all time,
and by consequence, objectively, valid the empirical cognition of the relations of time.
And as this determination of time
quantity, the perception pro quantity which proceeds through
the smallest possible --from From this we perceive the
law of changes -- law, how
? ? a
a
h
it
ct by
it,
h
a
a
a is
a
is, is
? IM
TJUNgCENDENrAX DOCnUFH
C.
THIRD ANALOGY.
PB15CIPLB OF CO EXISTENCE, ACCOHDING TO THE LAW Of
BECIPBOCITY OB COMMUNITY.
All substancet, in so far as they can be perceived in space at the same time, exist in a state of complete reciprocity of action.
Proof.
Things are co-existent, when in empirical intuition the per ception of the one can follow upon the perception of the other, and vice versd -- which cannot occur in the succession of phsenomena, as we have shown in the explanation of the second principle. Thus I can perceive the moon and then the earth, or conversely, first the earth and then the moon ; and for the reason that my perception of these objects can reciprocally follow each other, I say, they exist contempo
Now co-existence is the existence of the manifold in the same time. But time itself is not an object of percep tion ; and therefore we cannot conclude from the fact thst things are placed in the same time, the other fact, that the perceptions of these things can follow each other reciprocally. The synthesis of the imagination in apprehension would only present to us each of these perceptions as present in the subject when the other is not present, and contrariwise ; but would not show that the objects are co-existent, that is to say, that, if the one exists, the other also exists in the same time, and that this is necessarily so, in order that the perceptions may be capable of following each other reciprocally. ItfoIlows thataconception of the understanding or category of the reciprocal sequence of the determinations of phsenomena (existing, as they do, apart from each other, and yet contemporaneously), is requisite
to justify us in saying that the reciprocal succession of per ceptions has its foundation iu the object, and to enable us to represent co-existence as objective. But that relation of sub- stnnces in which the one contains determinations the ground of which is in the other substance, is the relation of influence. And, when this influence is reciprocal, it is the relation of community or reciprocity. Consequently the co-existence of substances iu space cannot be cognized in experience other
? raneously.
? ? ? PRINCIPLE OF CO-EX . STE5CB. 167
wide than under the precondition of their reciprocal action.
This is therefore the condition of the possibility of things
themselves as objects of experience.
Things are co-existent, in so far as they exist in one and the
same time. But how can we know that they exist in one and the same time ? Only by observing that the order in the syn thesis of apprehension of the manifold is arbitrary and a matter of indifference, that is to say, that it can proceed from A, through B,. C, D, to E, or contrariwise from ? to A. For if they were successive in time (and in the order, let us suppose, which begins with A), it is quite impossible for the apprehension in perception to begin with E and go backwards to A, inasmuch as A belongs to past time, and therefore cannot be an object of apprehension.
Let us assume that in a number of substances considered as phenomena each is completely isolated, that that no one ants upon another. Then say that the co-existence of these cannot be an object of possible perception, and that the existence of one cannot, any mode of empirical synthesis, lead us to the existence of another. For we imagine them in this case to be separated by completely void space, and thus percep tion, which proceeds from the one to the other in time, would indeed determine their existence means of a following per
? but would be quite unable to distinguish whether the one phsenomenon follows objectively upon the first, or co-existent with it.
Besides the mere fact of existence then, there must be
something by means of which determines the position of
in time, and conversely, the position of because only under this condition can substances be empirically represented
as existing contemporaneously. Now that alone determines the position of another thing in time, which the cause of or of its determinations. Consequently every substance (inas much as can have succession predicated of only respect of its determinations) must contain the causality of certain determinations in another substance, and at the same time the effects of the causality of the other in itself. That to say
substances mmst stand (mediately or immediately) in dyna mical community with each other, co-existence to be cog-
nixed any possible experience. But, in regard to object* of experience, that absolutely necessary, without which the
ception,
? ? is
by a
I
in
if
A
by
is
is in
it
it
is
;A
is,
it
is
B
B
? 158 TRAKSCENDENTAL DOCTalKB.
experience of three objects would itself be impossible. Con* sequently it is absolutely necessary that all substances in the world of phsenomena, in so far as they are co-existent, stand in a relation of complete community of reciprocal action to each other.
The word community has in our language* two meanings, and contains the two notions conveyed in the Latin communio, and commercium. We employit in this place in the latter sense -- that of a dynamical community, without which even the com munity of place (communio spatii) could not be empirically cognized. In our experiences it is easy to observe, that it is only the continuous influences in all parts of space that can conduct our senses from one object to another ; that the light which plays between our eyes and the heavenly bodies pro duces a mediating community between them and us, and thereby evidences their co-existence with us ; that we cannot empirically change our position (perceive this change), unless the existence of matter throughout the whole of space ren dered possible the perception of the positions we occupy ; and that this perception can prove the contemporaneous ex istence of these places only through their reciprocal influence, and thereby also the co-existence of even the most remote ob jects -- although in this case the proof is only mediate. With out community, every perception (of a phenomenon in space) is separated from every other and isolated, and the chain of empirical representations, that of experience, must, with the appearance of new object, begin entirely denovo, without the least connexion with preceding representations, and without standing towards these even in the relation of time. My intention here no means to combat the notion of empty space for may exist where our perceptions cannot exist, inasmuch as they cannot reach thereto, and where, there fore, no empirical perception of co-existence takes place. But in this case not an object of possible experience.
The following remarks may be useful in the way of explana tion. In the mind, all phamomena, as contents of possible
experience, must exist in community (communio) of apper ception or consciousness, and in so far as requisite that objects be represented as co-existent and connected, in so far must they reciprocally determine the position time of each
Uermau
? ? ? ?
it is
in
a
it ; is
it is
a by
is,
? FRINCIPLE CW CO-EXISTENCE. 159
Other, and thereby constitute a whole. If this subjective community is to rest upon an objective basis, or to be applied to substances as phenomena, the perception of one substance must render possible the perception of another, and conversely. For otherwise succession, which is always found in percep tions as apprehensions, would be predicated of external objects, and their representation of their co-existence be thus impossible. But this is a reciprocal influence, that is to say, a real community (commercium) of substances, without wIhcIi therefore the empirical relation of co-existence would be a notion beyond the reach of our minds. By virtue of this com mercium, phenomena, in so far as they are apart from, and nevertheless in connection with each other, constitute a com- positum reale. Such comporita are possible in many different ways. The three dynamical relations then, from which all others spring, are those of Inherence, Consequence, and Com position.
? *****
These, then, are the three analogies of experience. They are nothing more than principles of the determination of the existence of phenomena in time, according to the three modi of this determination ; to wit, the relation to time itself as a quantity (the quantity of existence, that duration), the re lation in time as series or succession, finally, the relation in time as the complex of all existence (simultaneity). This unity of determination in regard to time thoroughly dynamical that to say, time not considered as that in which experience determines immediately to every existence its position for this impossible, inasmuch as absolute time not an object of perception, by means of which phenomena can be connected with each other. On the contrary, the rule of the understanding, through which alone the existence of phenomena can receive syuthetical unity as regards relations of time, determines for every phe nomenon its position in time, and consequently priori, and with validity for all and every time.
By nature, in the empirical sense of the word, we under stand the totality of phsenomena connected, in respect of theii existence, according to necessary rules, that is, laws. There are therefore certain laws (which are moreover priori) which
? ? ft
is, is
ft
is
; ;
is a is
is
? 160 TBAHSCENDEKTAIi DOCTKIKIS.
make nature possible ; and all empirical laws can exist only by means of experience, and by virtue of those primitive laws through which experience itself becomes possible. The par- pose of the analogies is therefore to represent to us the unity of nnturc in the connection of all phenomena under certain ex ponents, the only business of which is to express the relation of time (in so far as it contains all existence in itself) to the
unity of apperception, which can exist iu synthesis only ac cording to rules. The combined expression of all is this : All phenomena exist in one nature, and must so exist, inasmuch as without this & priori unity, no unity of experience, and consequently no determination of objects in experience, is pos sible.
As regards the mode of proof which we have employed in treating of these transcendental laws of nature, and the pecu liar character of we must make one remark, which will at the same time be important as guide in every other attempt to demonstrate the truth of intellectual and likewise synthe tical propositions priori. Had we endeavoured to prove these analogies dogmatically, that from conceptions that
to say, had we employed this method in attempting to show that every thing which exists, exists only in that which per manent, --that every thingor event presupposes the existence ot something in preceding state, upon which follows in con formity with rule --lastly, that in the manifold, which co existent, the states co-exist in connection with each other according to rule, --all our labour would have been utterly in vain. For mere conceptions of things, analyse them as we may, cannot enable us to conclude from the existence of one object to the existence of another. What other course was left for us to pursue This only, to demonstrate the possibility of experience as cognition in which at last all objects must be curable of beiug presented to us, the representation of them
to possess any objective reality. Now in this third, this mediating term, the essential form of which consists in the
synthetical unity of the apperception of all plisenomena, we found priori conditions of the universal and necessary de termination as to time of all existences in the world of pha> nomena, without which the empirical determination thereof as to time would itself be impossible, and we also discovered rules of synthetical unity priori, by means of wluch we could
? ? ? 4
is
is
d
a?
aaa
if
a is,
is
is
;
it
h
it,
? TrtE POSTULATES Ot EMP1MCAL TUOrGHT. 101
For <<ant of this method, and from the fancy that it was possible to discover a dogmatical proof
of the synthetical propositions which are requisite in the em pirical employment of the understanding, has it happened, that a proof of the principle of sufficient reason has been so often attempted, and always in vain. The other two analogies nobody has ever thought of, although they have always been silently employed by the mind,* because the guiding thread famished by the categories was wanting, the guide which alone can enable us to discover every hiatus, both in the system
of conceptions and of principles.
IV.
The Postulates of Empirical Thought.
1 . That which agrees with the formal conditions (intuition
and conception) of experience, is possible.
2. Tlmt which coheres with the material conditions of ex
perience (sensation), is real.
3. That whose coherence with the real is determined ac
cording to universal conditions of experience is (exists) ne cessary.
Explanation.
The categories of modality possess this peculiarity, that they do not in the least determine the object, or enlarge the con ception to which they are annexed as predicates, but only ex press its relation to the faculty of cognition. Though my conception of a thing is in itself complete, I am still entitled to ask whether the object of it is merely possible, or whether it is also real, or, if the hitter, whether it is also necessary. But hereby the object itself is not more definitely determined
* The unity of tlie universe, in which all phenomena must be con nected, is evidently a mere consequence of the tacitly admitted principle of the community of all substances which are co-existent. For wer? sub stances isolated, they could not as parts constitute a whole, and were their connection (reciprocal action of the manifold) not necessary from the very fact of co-existence, we could not conclude from the fact of the latter as a merely ideal relation to the former as a real one. We have, however shown in its place, that community is the proper ground of the possibility of an empirical cognition of co-existence, and that wc may therefore pro perly reason from the latter to the former as its condition.
M
anticipate experience.
? ? ? ? 162
THANSC? KDJ5KTAL
DOCTRHTE.
in thought, out the question is only in what relation in cluding all its determinations, stands to the understanding and its employment in experience, to the empirical faculty of judgment, and to the reason in its application to expe
rience. of modality are For this very reason, too, the categories
nothing more than explanations of the conceptions of possi bility, reality, and necessity, as employed in experience, and at the same time, restrictions of all the categories to empirical use alone, not authorizing the transcendental employment of them. For they are to have something more than merely logical significance, and to be something more than mere analytical expression of the form of thought, and to have relation to things and their possibility, reality or necessity,
The postulate of the possibility of things requires also, that the conception of the things agree with the formal conditions of our experience in general. But this, that to say, the ob jective form of experience, contains all the kinds of synthesis which are requisite for the cognition of objects. concep tion which contains synthesis must be regarded as empty and without reference to an object, its synthesis does not belong to experience -- either as borrowed from and in this case called an empirical conception, or such as the ground and a priori condition of experience (its form), and in this case pure conception, conception which neverthe
less belongs to experience, inasmuch as its object can be
found in this alone. For where shall we find the criterion or
character of the possibility of an object which cogitated by
means of an priori synthetical conception, not in the syn thesis which constitutes the form of empirical cognition of ob
jects That in such conception no contradiction exists indeed necessary logical condition, but very far from being
sufficient to establish the objective reality of the conception, that is, the possibility of such an object as thought in the conception. Thus, in" the conception of figure which contained within two straight lines, there no contradiction, for the conceptions of two straight lines and of their junction
contain no negation of figure. The impossibility such case does not rest upon the conception itself, but upon the
? they must concern possible experience
unity, in which alone objects of cognition can be given.
and its synthetical
? ? in
a
in
a is
Aa
is a it,
is a is
if
is
is
? a
it is a
it is
a
a
it
a
a
if
a
if
it,
? THE POSTULATES Of EMMRIOAL THOU8HT. 163
construction of it in space, that is to say, upon the conditions of space and its determinations. But these have themselves objective reality, that is, they apply to possible things, because they contain o priori the form of experience in genernl.
And now we shall proceed to point out the extensive utility and influence of this postulate of possibility. When I repre sent to myself a thing that is permanent, so that everything in it which changes belongs merely to its state or condition, from such a conception alone I never can cognize that such a thing is possible. Or, if I represent to myself something which is so constituted that, when it is posited, something else follows always and infallibly, my thought contains no self- contradiction ; but whether such a property as causality is to be found in any possible thing, my thought alone affords no means of judging. Finally, I can represent to myself different things (substances) which are so constituted, that the state or
condition of one causes a change in the state of the other,
and reciprocally ; but whether such a relation is a property of
things cannot be perceived from these conceptions, which con
tain a merely arbitrary synthesis. Only from the fact, there
fore, that these conceptions express a priori the relations of
perceptions in every experience, do we know that they possess objective reality, that is, transcendental truth ; and that inde
pendent of experience, though not independent of all relation to the form of an experience in general and its synthetical unity, in which alone objects can be empirically cognized.
But when we fashion to ourselves new conceptions of sub stances, forces, action and reaction, from the material pre sented to us by perception, without following the example of experience in their connexion, we create mere chimeras, of the possibility of which we cannot discover any criterion, because we have not taken experience for our instructress, though we have borrowed tko conceptions from her. Such fictitious conceptions derive their character of possibility not, like the categories, d priori, as conceptions on which all experience de pends, but only, & posteriori, as conceptions given by means of experience itself, and their possibility must either be cog
nized & posteriori and empirically, or it cannot be cognized at all.
A substance, which is permanently present in space, yet without filling it (like that tertium quid between matter and the thinking subject which some have tried to introduce into
X2
? ? ? ? TBANBCEKDENTAIi DOCTBlWK.
metaphysics), or a peculiar fundamental power of the mlnJ of intuiting the future by anticipation (instead of merely infer ring from past and present events), or, finally, a power of the mind to place itself in community of thought with other men, however distant they may be -- these are conceptions, the pos sibility of which has no ground to rest upon. For they are not based upon experience and its known laws ; and with out experience, they are a merely arbitrary conjunction of thoughts, which, though containing no internal contradiction, has no claim to objective reality, neither, consequently, to the possibility of such an object as is thought in these concep tions. As far as concerns reality, it is self-evident that we cannot cogitate such a possibility in concrete without the aid of experience ; because reality is concerned only with sensa tion, as the matter of experience, and not with the form of thought, with which we can no doubt indulge in shaping fancies.
But I pass by everything which derives its possibility from reality in experience, and I purpose treating here merely of the possibility of things by means of a priori conceptions. I maintain, then, that the possibility of things is not derived from such conceptions per se, but only when considered as formal and objective conditions of an experience in general.
It seems, indeed, as if the possibility of a triangle could be cognized from the conception of it alone (which is certainly
of experience) ; for we can certainly give to the conception a corresponding object completely h priori, that is to say, we can construct it. But as a triangle is only the form of an object, it must remain a mere product of the ima gination, and the possibility of the existence of an object cor responding to it must remain doubtful, unless we can discover some other ground, unless we know that the figure can be cogitated under the conditions upon which all objects of ex perience rest. Now, the facts that space is a formal condition
& priori of external experience, that the formative synthesis, by which we coustruct a triangle in imagination, is the very same as that we employ in the apprehension of a phensmenou for the purpose of making an empirical conception of are what alone connect the notion of the possibility of such thing with the conception of it. In the same manner, the possibility ol continuous quantities, indeed of quantities in general, for the
? independent
? ? a
it,
? THE POBTULATZS OF EMPIBICAX THOUGHT. 166
conceptions of them are without exception synthetical, is never evident from the conceptions in themselves, but only when they are considered as the formal conditions of the determina tion of objects in experience. And where, indeed, should we look for objects to correspond to our conceptions, if not in experience, by which aione objects arc presented to us ? It
however, true that without antecedent experience we can cognize and characterize the possibility of things, relatively to the formal conditions, under which something determined in experience as an object, consequently completely priori. But still this possible only in relation to experience and within its limits.
The postulate concerning the cognition of the reality of things requires perception, consequently conscious sensation, not indeed immediately, that of the object itself, whose existence to be cognized, but still that the object have some connection with real perception, in accordance with the ana logies of experience, which exhibit all kinds of real connec
tion in experience.
From the mere conception of thing impossible to con
clude its existence. For, let the conception be ever so com plete, and containing statement of all the determinations of the thing, the existence of -- has nothing to do with all this, but only with the question whether such thing given, so that the perception of can in every case precede the concep tion. For the fact that the conception of precedes the per ception, merely indicates the possibility of its existence perception, which presents matter to the conception, that the sole criterion of reality. Prior to the perception of the thing, however, and therefore comparatively priori, we are able to cognize its existence, provided, stands in connection with some perceptions according to the principles of the em pirical conjunction of these, that is, in conformity with the analogies of perception. For, in this case, the existence of the supposed thing connected with our perceptions in possible experience, and we are able, with the guidance of these analogies, to reason in the series of possible perception* from thing which we do really perceive to the thing we do 'iot perceive. Thus, we cognize the existence of magnetic matter penetrating all bodies from the perception of the at tract ion of the steel- filin<<v hv the magnet, although the con
? ? ? a
is
is a
a
is
it
a
a
it is is
it
it is
it a
a
;
it
a
is,
is a
is
is,
? 166 TRANSCENDENTAL DOOTRHnt.
stitution of our organs renders an immediate perception of this matter impossible for us. For, according to the laws of sensibility and the connected context of our perceptions, we should in an experience come also on an immediate empirical intuition of this matter, if our senses were more acute, --but this obtuseness has no influence upon and cannot alter the form of possible experience in general. Our knowledge of the existence of things reaches as far as our perceptions, and what may be inferred from them according to empirical laws, extend. If we do not set out from experience, or do not pro ceed according to the laws of the empirical connection of phenomena, our pretensions to discover the existence of a thing which we do not immediately perceive are vain. Idealism, however, brings forward powerful objections to these rules for proving existence mediately. This therefore, the proper place for its refutation.
REFUTATION OF IDEALISM.
Idealism-- mean material* idealism -- the theory which declares the existence of objects in space without us to be either (1) doubtful and indemonstrable, or (2) false and im
The first the problematical idealism of Des Cartes, who admits the undoubted certainty of only one empirical as sertion (atsertio), to wit, am. The second the dogmatical idealism of Berkeley, who maintains that space, together with all the objects of which the inseparable condition, thing which in itself impossible, and that consequently the objects in space are mere products of the imagination. The dogmatical theory of idealism unavoidable, we regard space as property of things in themselves for in that case
? possible.
with all to which serves as condition,
But the foundation for this kind of idealism we have already destroyed in the transcendental esthetic. Problematical ideal ism, which makes no such assertion, but only alleges our in capacity to prove the existence of anything besides ourselves
means of immediate experience, theory rational and evi dencing thorough and philosophical mode of thinking, for observes the rule, not to form decisive judgment before
In opposition to formal or critical idealism -- the theory of Kant-- which denies to us knowledge of things as things in themselves, and maintains that we can know only phenomena. -- 7V.
nonentity.
? ? itby it ?
a a
is,
a
a
a
is
it
is
it I is
a
is if
;
is, is
is I
is a
is
? B6F0TATION O! IDHALI8M. 167
sufficient proof be shown. The desired proof must therefore demonstrate that we have experience of external things, and not mere fancies. For this purpose, we must prove, that our internal and, to Des Cartes, indubitable experience is itself possible only uuder the previous assumption of external ex perience.
Theorem.
The simple but empirically determined consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of external objects in space.
Pboof.
I am conscious of my own existence as determined in time. All determination in regard to time presupposes the exist ence of something permanent in perception. But this perma nent something cannot be something in me, for the very reason that my existence in time is itself determined by this permanent something. It follows that the perception of this permanent existence is possible only through a thing without me, and not through the mere representation of a thing with out me. Consequently, the determination of my existence in time is possible only through the existence of real things ex ternal to me. Now, consciousness in time is necessarily con nected with the consciousness of the possibility of this deter mination in time. Hence it follows, that consciousness in time is necessarily connected also with the existence of things without me, inasmuch as the existence of these things is the condition of determination in time. That is to say, the con sciousness of my own existence is at the same time an im mediate consciousness of the existence of other things with out me.
Remark I. The reader will observe, that in the foregoing proof the game which idealism plays-, is retorted upon itself, and with more justice. It assumed, that the only immediate experience is internal, and that from this we can only infer the existence of external things. But, as always happens, when we reason from given effects to determined causes, idealism has reasoned with too much haste and uncertainty, for it is quite possible that the cause of our representations may lie in ourselves, and that we ascribe it falsely to external things. But our proof shows that external experience is pro
? ? ? ? 168 TRAJTSCENDENTiL DOCTRIXE.
perly immediate,* that only by virtue of it -- not, indeed, tlif consciousness of our own existence, but certainly the deter mination of our existence in time, that internal experi ence-- possible. true, that the representation am, which the expression of the consciousness which can ac company all my thoughts, that which immediately includes the existence of subject. But in this representation we cannot find any knowledge of the subject, and therefore also no empirical knowledge, that experience. For experience contains, in addition to the thought of something existing, intuition, and in this case must be internal intuition, that
time, in relation to which the subject must be determined. But the existence of external things absolutely requisite for this purpose, so that follows that internal experience itself possible only mediately and through external experience.
Remark II. Now with this view all empirical use of our faculty of cognition in the determination of time in perfect accord ance. Its truth supported by the fact, that possible to perceive determination of time only by means of change in external relations (motion) to the permanent in space (for ex ample, we become aware of the sun's motion, observing the changes of his relation to the objects of this earth). But this not all. We find that we possess nothing permanent that can correspond and be submitted to the conception of substance as intuition, except matter. This idea of permanence not itself derived from external experience, but an a priori necessary condition of all determination of time, consequently also of the internal sense in reference to our own existence, and that through the existence of external things. In the representation the consciousness of myself not an intui-
? The immediate consciousness of the existence of external things
in the preceding theorem, not presupposed, but proved, be the possibility of this consciousness understood by us or not. The question as to the possibility of would stand thus Have we an internal sense, but no ex ternal sense, and our belief in external perception mere delusion But evident that, in order merely to fancy to ourselves
external, that is, to present to the sense in intuition, we must already possess an external sense, and must thereby distinguish immediately the mere receptivity of an external intuition from the spontaneity which cha racterises every act of imagination. For merely to imagine also an exter nal sense, would annihilate the faculty of intuition itself which is to be deterni'nci! the imagination.
? anything at
? ? by
it
it is
is is
it
:
it
it
is is
is
I,
is
a isisbyit
is
? is, is is
/
a ais ;
a
is
is,
is,
is, is
a
It
? BKFUTAHON OF IDEALISM.
lion, but a merely intellectual representation produced by tLe
Ianeous activity of a thinking subject. It follows, that spont
Remark III. From the fact that the existence of external things is a necessary condition of the possibility of a deter mined consciousness of ourselves, it does not follow that every intuitive representation of external things involves the exist ence of these things, for their representations may very well be the mere products of the imagination (in dreams as well as in madness) ; though, indeed, these are themselves created by the reproduction of previous external perceptions, which, as has been shown, are possible only through the reality of ex ternal objects. The eole aim of our remarks has, however, been to prove that internal experience in general is possible only through external experience in general. Whether this or that supposed experience be purely imaginary, must be dis covered from its particular determinations, and by comparing
these with the criteria of all real experience.
Finally, as regards the third postulate, it applies to material necessity in existence, and not to merely formal and logical necessity in the connection of conceptions. Now as we cannot cognize completely a priori the existence of any object of sense, though we can do so comparatively h priori, that relatively to some other previously given existence, -- cognition, however, which can only be of such an existence as must be contained in the complex of experience, of which the previously given perception part, -- the necessity of existence can never be cognised from conceptions, but always, on the contrary, from its connection with that which an object of perception. But the only existence cognized, nnder the condition of other given phenomena, as necessary, the existence of effects from given causes in conformity with the laws of causality.
consequently not the necessity of the existence of things (as substances), but the necessity of the state of things that we cognise, and that not immediately, but by means of the existence of ether states given perception, according to
has not of intuition, which, in its cha any predicate
this
racter of permanence, could serve as correlate to the deter mination of time in the internal sense --in the same way as impenetrability is the correlate of matter as an empirical intuition.
169
? ? ? in
is
is
It is
is a
a
is,
? 170 TBANSCENDENTAL DOCTBIKB.
empirical laws of causality. Hence it follows, that tbe crite>> rion of necessity is to be found only in the law of a possible experience, --that every thing which happens is determined ii priori in the phenomenon by its cause. Thus we cognise only the necessity of effects in nature, the causes of which are given us. Moreover, the criterion of necessity in exist ence possesses no application beyond the field of possible ex perience, and even in this it is not valid of the existence of things as substances, because these can never be considered as empirical effects, or as something that happens a>d has a beginning. Necessity, therefore, regards only the relations of phenomena according to the dynamical law of causality, and the possibility grounded thereon, of reasoning from some given existence (of a cause) a priori to another existence (of an effect) . Every thing that happens is hypothetically necessary, is a principle which subjects the changes that take place in the world to a law, that is, to a rule of necessary existence, without which nature herself could not possibly exist. Hence the proposition, Nothing happens by blind chance (in mundo non datur casus), is an h priori law "of nature. The case is the same with the proposition, Necessity in nature is not blind, that conditioned,
? consequently intelligible necessity (non datur fatum). Both laws subject the play of change to nature things (as phenomena), or, which the same
thing, to the unity of the understanding, and through the un derstanding alone can changes belong to an experience, as the synthetical unity of phenomena. Both belong to the class of dynamical principles. The former properly conse quence of the principle of causality -- one of the analogies of experience. The latter belongs to the principles of modality, which to the determination of causality adds the conception of necessity, which itself, however, subject to rule of the understanding. The principle of continuity forbids any leap in the series of phenomena regarded as changes (in mundo non datur saltus) and likewise, in the complex of all empirical intuitions in space, any break or hiatus between two pheno mena (non datur hiatus), --for we can so express the principle,
that experience can admit nothing which proves the existence of vacuum, or which even admits as part of an empirical synthesis. For, as regards vacuum or void, which we may cogitate as out and beyond of the field of possible experience
? ? a
a
;
it
a is
is
a
a
is
a
of
is, it is
? REFUTATION OT IDEALISM.
171
(the world), such a question cannot come before tbe tribunal of mere understanding, which decides only upon questions that concern the employment of given phenomena for the construction of empirical cognition. It is rather a problem for ideal reason, which passes beyond the sphere of a pos sible experience, and aims at forming a judgment of that which surrounds and circumscribes and the proper place for the consideration of the transcendental dialectic. These four propositions, In mundo non datur hiatus, non datur sullus, non datur casus, non datur fatum, as well as all principles of transcendental origin, we could very easily exhibit in their proper order, that is, in conformity with the order of the cate gories, and assign to each its proper place. But the already practised reader will do this for himself, or discover the clue to such an arrangement. But the combined result of all simply this, to admit into the empirical synthesis nothing which might cause a break in or be foreign to the under
standing and the continuous connection of all phenomena, that the unity of the conceptions of the understanding. For in the understanding alone the unity of experience, in which all perceptions must have their assigned place, possible.
Whether the field of possibility be greater than that ot reality, and whether the field of the latter be itself greater than that of necessity, are interesting enough questions, and
? of synthetical solution, questions, however, which come under the jurisdiction of reason alone. For they are tantamount to asking, whether all things as phenomena do without exception belong to the complex and connected
whole of single experience, of which every given perception part, part which therefore cannot be conjoined with any other phenomena -- or, whether my perceptions can belong to more than one possible experience? The understanding gives
to experience, according to the subjective and formal condi tions, of sensibility as well as of apperception, the rules which alone make this experience possible. Other forms of ntui tion, besides those of space and time, other forms of under standing besides the discursive forms of thought, or of cog nition means of conceptions, we can neither imagine nor make intelligible to ourselves and even we could, they would still not belong to experience, which the only mode of cognition which objects are presented to us. Whcthei
quite capable
? ? by by
aa
is if
;
it is
is a
is
is,
is
it,
? 172 TKAJfSCENDENTAX DOCTRINE.
other perceptions besides those which belong to the total of our possible experience, and consequently whether some other sphere of matter exists, the understanding has no power to decide, its proper occupation bring with the synthesis of that which is given. Moreover, the poverty of the usual argu ments which go to prove the existence of a vast sphere of pos
sibility, of which all that is real (every object of experience)
is but a small part, is very remarkable. " All real is possible ;"
from this follows naturally, according to the logical laws of
conversion, the particular proposition, " " Some possible is
real. " Now this seems to be equivalent to Much is possible
that is not real. " No doubt it does seem as if we ought to
consider the sum of the possible to be gr? ater than that of
the real, from the fact that something must be added to the
former to constitute the latter. But this notion of adding to
the possible is absurd. For that which is not in the sum of
the possible, and consequently requires to be added to
manifestly impossible. In addition to accordance with the
formal conditions of experience, the understanding requires connection with some perception but that which connected
with this perception, real, even although not immediately perceived. But that another series of phenomena, in com plete coherence with that which given in perception, con sequently more than one all-embracing experience possible,
an inference which cannot be concluded from the data given us by experience, and still less without any data at all. That which possible only under conditions which are them selves merely possible, not possible in any respect. And vet we can find no more certain ground on which to base the dis cussion of the question whether the sphere of possibility wider than that of experience.
have merely mentioned these questions, that in treating of the conception of the understanding, there might be no omission of anything that, in the common opinion, belongs to them. In reality, however, the notion of absolute possibility (possibility which valid in every respect) not mere con ception of the understanding, which can be employed empi rically, but belongs to reason alone, which passes the bounds of nll empirical use of the understanding. We have, therefore, contented ourselves with merely critical remark, leaving the sulijpc! to be explained t|ie sequel.
? ? ? is in a
is
I
is
is
is
a isis
is
it, is ais
is
;
it is
? ttEftrtATiolr or idealism.
I7d
Before concluding this fourth section, and at the same time the system of all principles of the pure understanding, it seems proper to mention the reasons which induced me to term the principles of modality postulates. This expression I do not here use in the sense which some more recent philoso phers, contrary to its meaning with mathematicians, to whom the word properly belongs, attach to it--that of a proposition, namely, immediately certain, requiring neither deduction nor proof. For in the case of synthetical propositions, however evident they may be, we accord to them without deduction, and merely on the strength of their own pretensions, unqualified belief, all critique of the understanding entirely lost and, as there no want of bold pretensions, which the common belief (though for the philosopher this no credential) does not reject, the understanding lies exposed to every delusion and conceit, without the power of refusing its assent to those as sertions, which, though illegitimate, demand acceptance as veritable axioms. When, therefore, to the conception of thing an a priori determination synthetically added, such proposition must obtain, not proof, at least deduction of the legitimacy of its assertion.
The principles of modality are, however, not objectively synthetical, for the predicates of possibility, reality, and ne cessity do not the least augment the conception of that of which they are affirmed, inasmuch as they contribute nothing to the representation of the object. But as they are, never theless, always synthetical, they are so merely subjectively. That to say, they have reflective power, and apply to the conception of thing, of which, in other respects, they affirm nothing, the faculty of cognition in which the conception originates and has its seat. So that the conception merely agree with the formal conditions of experience, its object called possible; ifitisin connection with perception, and deter mined thereby, the object real determined according to conceptions means of the connection of perceptions, the object called necessary. The principles of modality therefore predicate of conception nothing more than the pro cedure of the faculty of cognition which generated it. Now postulate in mathematics practical proposition which con tains nothing but the synthesis by which we present an object t"o ourselves, and produce the conception of for example--
With given line, to describe circle upon plane, froir
? ? ? a
is
if,
a
;if it is
a is
it, a
is a
is a if
is
by a
if
a
in
is
n is aa
a
is
is
;
? 174 VUS. S SUESDENTAL DOCTlitNE.
a given point ; and such a proposition does not admit of proof, because the procedure, which it requires, is exactly that by which alone it is possible to generate the conception of such a figure. With the same right, accordingly, can we postulate the principles of modality, because they do not aug ment* the conception of a thing, but merely indicate the manner in which it is connected with the faculty of cognition.
GENEBAL EEMAKK ON TUE SYSTEM OF PRINCIPLES.
It is very remarkable that we cannot perceive the possibility of a thing from the category alone, but must always have an intuition, by which to make evident the objective reality of the pure conception of the understanding. Take, for ex ample, the categories of relation. How (1) a thing can exist only as a subject, and not as a mere determination of other things, that is, can be substance ,. or how (2), because something exists, some other thing must exist, consequently how a thing can be a cause ; or (3) how, when several tilings exist, from the fact that one of these things exists, some consequence to the others follows, and reciprocally, and in this way a community of substances can be possible --are questions whose solution cannot be obtained from mere con ceptions. The very same is the case with the other cate gories; for example, how a thing can be of the same sort with many others, that can be quantity, and so on. So long as we have not intuition we cannot know, whether we do
really think an object by the categories, and where an object can anywhere be found to cohere with them, and thus the truth established, that the categories are not in themselves cognitions, but mere forms of thought for the construction of cognitions from given intuitions. For the same reason
true that from categories alone no synthetical proposition can be made. For example, " In every existence there sub stance," that something that can exist only as subject and not as mere predicate or, "everything quantity," -- to construct propositions such as these, we require something
? When think the reality of thing, do really think more than the possibility, but not in the thing for that can never contain more in rea lity than was contained in its complete possibility. But while the notion of possibility merely the notion of position of thing in relation to the understanding (its empirical use), reality the conjunction of tha thins Vfith perception.
? ? ? is
a
is a
I is
a
I
;
; a
a
is,
a
is
is . it
is
is,
? OlT THE BTBTEtt OF PRtKCtPLES.