No More Learning

Let A be a
builder, B a shoemaker, C a house, D a shoe. The builder, then, must
get from the shoemaker the latter's work, and must himself give him in
return his own. If, then, first there is proportionate equality of
goods, and then reciprocal action takes place, the result we mention
will be effected. If not, the bargain is not equal, and does not hold;
for there is nothing to prevent the work of the one being better
than that of the other; they must therefore be equated. (And this is
true of the other arts also; for they would have been destroyed if
what the patient suffered had not been just what the agent did, and of
the same amount and kind. ) For it is not two doctors that associate
for exchange, but a doctor and a farmer, or in general people who
are different and unequal; but these must be equated. This is why
all things that are exchanged must be somehow comparable. It is for
this end that money has been introduced, and it becomes in a sense
an intermediate; for it measures all things, and therefore the
excess and the defect-how many shoes are equal to a house or to a
given amount of food. The number of shoes exchanged for a house (or
for a given amount of food) must therefore correspond to the ratio
of builder to shoemaker. For if this be not so, there will be no
exchange and no intercourse. And this proportion will not be
effected unless the goods are somehow equal. All goods must
therefore be measured by some one thing, as we said before. Now this
unit is in truth demand, which holds all things together (for if men
did not need one another's goods at all, or did not need them equally,
there would be either no exchange or not the same exchange); but money
has become by convention a sort of representative of demand; and
this is why it has the name 'money' (nomisma)-because it exists not by
nature but by law (nomos) and it is in our power to change it and make
it useless. There will, then, be reciprocity when the terms have
been equated so that as farmer is to shoemaker, the amount of the
shoemaker's work is to that of the farmer's work for which it
exchanges. But we must not bring them into a figure of proportion when
they have already exchanged (otherwise one extreme will have both
excesses), but when they still have their own goods. Thus they are
equals and associates just because this equality can be effected in
their case. Let A be a farmer, C food, B a shoemaker, D his product
equated to C. If it had not been possible for reciprocity to be thus
effected, there would have been no association of the parties. That
demand holds things together as a single unit is shown by the fact
that when men do not need one another, i. e. when neither needs the
other or one does not need the other, they do not exchange, as we do
when some one wants what one has oneself, e. g. when people permit
the exportation of corn in exchange for wine. This equation
therefore must be established. And for the future exchange-that if
we do not need a thing now we shall have it if ever we do need
it-money is as it were our surety; for it must be possible for us to
get what we want by bringing the money. Now the same thing happens
to money itself as to goods-it is not always worth the same; yet it
tends to be steadier. This is why all goods must have a price set on
them; for then there will always be exchange, and if so, association
of man with man. Money, then, acting as a measure, makes goods
commensurate and equates them; for neither would there have been
association if there were not exchange, nor exchange if there were not
equality, nor equality if there were not commensurability. Now in
truth it is impossible that things differing so much should become
commensurate, but with reference to demand they may become so
sufficiently. There must, then, be a unit, and that fixed by agreement
(for which reason it is called money); for it is this that makes all
things commensurate, since all things are measured by money. Let A
be a house, B ten minae, C a bed. A is half of B, if the house is
worth five minae or equal to them; the bed, C, is a tenth of B; it
is plain, then, how many beds are equal to a house, viz. five. That
exchange took place thus before there was money is plain; for it makes
no difference whether it is five beds that exchange for a house, or
the money value of five beds.

We have now defined the unjust and the just. These having been
marked off from each other, it is plain that just action is
intermediate between acting unjustly and being unjustly treated; for
the one is to have too much and the other to have too little.
Justice is a kind of mean, but not in the same way as the other
virtues, but because it relates to an intermediate amount, while
injustice relates to the extremes. And justice is that in virtue of
which the just man is said to be a doer, by choice, of that which is
just, and one who will distribute either between himself and another
or between two others not so as to give more of what is desirable to
himself and less to his neighbour (and conversely with what is
harmful), but so as to give what is equal in accordance with
proportion; and similarly in distributing between two other persons.
Injustice on the other hand is similarly related to the unjust,
which is excess and defect, contrary to proportion, of the useful or
hurtful. For which reason injustice is excess and defect, viz. because
it is productive of excess and defect-in one's own case excess of what
is in its own nature useful and defect of what is hurtful, while in
the case of others it is as a whole like what it is in one's own case,
but proportion may be violated in either direction. In the unjust
act to have too little is to be unjustly treated; to have too much
is to act unjustly.

Let this be taken as our account of the nature of justice and
injustice, and similarly of the just and the unjust in general.

6

Since acting unjustly does not necessarily imply being unjust, we
must ask what sort of unjust acts imply that the doer is unjust with
respect to each type of injustice, e. g. a thief, an adulterer, or a
brigand. Surely the answer does not turn on the difference between
these types. For a man might even lie with a woman knowing who she
was, but the origin of his might be not deliberate choice but passion.
He acts unjustly, then, but is not unjust; e. g. a man is not a
thief, yet he stole, nor an adulterer, yet he committed adultery;
and similarly in all other cases.

Now we have previously stated how the reciprocal is related to the
just; but we must not forget that what we are looking for is not
only what is just without qualification but also political justice.
This is found among men who share their life with a view to
selfsufficiency, men who are free and either proportionately or
arithmetically equal, so that between those who do not fulfil this
condition there is no political justice but justice in a special sense
and by analogy. For justice exists only between men whose mutual
relations are governed by law; and law exists for men between whom
there is injustice; for legal justice is the discrimination of the
just and the unjust. And between men between whom there is injustice
there is also unjust action (though there is not injustice between all
between whom there is unjust action), and this is assigning too much
to oneself of things good in themselves and too little of things
evil in themselves. This is why we do not allow a man to rule, but
rational principle, because a man behaves thus in his own interests
and becomes a tyrant. The magistrate on the other hand is the guardian
of justice, and, if of justice, then of equality also. And since he is
assumed to have no more than his share, if he is just (for he does not
assign to himself more of what is good in itself, unless such a
share is proportional to his merits-so that it is for others that he
labours, and it is for this reason that men, as we stated
previously, say that justice is 'another's good'), therefore a
reward must be given him, and this is honour and privilege; but
those for whom such things are not enough become tyrants.

The justice of a master and that of a father are not the same as the
justice of citizens, though they are like it; for there can be no
injustice in the unqualified sense towards thing that are one's own,
but a man's chattel, and his child until it reaches a certain age
and sets up for itself, are as it were part of himself, and no one
chooses to hurt himself (for which reason there can be no injustice
towards oneself). Therefore the justice or injustice of citizens is
not manifested in these relations; for it was as we saw according to
law, and between people naturally subject to law, and these as we saw'
are people who have an equal share in ruling and being ruled. Hence
justice can more truly be manifested towards a wife than towards
children and chattels, for the former is household justice; but even
this is different from political justice.

7

Of political justice part is natural, part legal, natural, that
which everywhere has the same force and does not exist by people's
thinking this or that; legal, that which is originally indifferent,
but when it has been laid down is not indifferent, e. g. that a
prisoner's ransom shall be a mina, or that a goat and not two sheep
shall be sacrificed, and again all the laws that are passed for
particular cases, e. g. that sacrifice shall be made in honour of
Brasidas, and the provisions of decrees. Now some think that all
justice is of this sort, because that which is by nature is
unchangeable and has everywhere the same force (as fire burns both
here and in Persia), while they see change in the things recognized as
just. This, however, is not true in this unqualified way, but is
true in a sense; or rather, with the gods it is perhaps not true at
all, while with us there is something that is just even by nature, yet
all of it is changeable; but still some is by nature, some not by
nature. It is evident which sort of thing, among things capable of
being otherwise, is by nature, and which is not but is legal and
conventional, assuming that both are equally changeable. And in all
other things the same distinction will apply; by nature the right hand
is stronger, yet it is possible that all men should come to be
ambidextrous. The things which are just by virtue of convention and
expediency are like measures; for wine and corn measures are not
everywhere equal, but larger in wholesale and smaller in retail
markets. Similarly, the things which are just not by nature but by
human enactment are not everywhere the same, since constitutions
also are not the same, though there is but one which is everywhere
by nature the best. Of things just and lawful each is related as the
universal to its particulars; for the things that are done are many,
but of them each is one, since it is universal.

There is a difference between the act of injustice and what is
unjust, and between the act of justice and what is just; for a thing
is unjust by nature or by enactment; and this very thing, when it
has been done, is an act of injustice, but before it is done is not
yet that but is unjust. So, too, with an act of justice (though the
general term is rather 'just action', and 'act of justice' is
applied to the correction of the act of injustice).

Each of these must later be examined separately with regard to the
nature and number of its species and the nature of the things with
which it is concerned.

8

Acts just and unjust being as we have described them, a man acts
unjustly or justly whenever he does such acts voluntarily; when
involuntarily, he acts neither unjustly nor justly except in an
incidental way; for he does things which happen to be just or
unjust. Whether an act is or is not one of injustice (or of justice)
is determined by its voluntariness or involuntariness; for when it
is voluntary it is blamed, and at the same time is then an act of
injustice; so that there will be things that are unjust but not yet
acts of injustice, if voluntariness be not present as well. By the
voluntary I mean, as has been said before, any of the things in a
man's own power which he does with knowledge, i. e. not in ignorance
either of the person acted on or of the instrument used or of the
end that will be attained (e. g. whom he is striking, with what, and to
what end), each such act being done not incidentally nor under
compulsion (e. g. if A takes B's hand and therewith strikes C, B does
not act voluntarily; for the act was not in his own power). The person
struck may be the striker's father, and the striker may know that it
is a man or one of the persons present, but not know that it is his
father; a similar distinction may be made in the case of the end,
and with regard to the whole action. Therefore that which is done in
ignorance, or though not done in ignorance is not in the agent's
power, or is done under compulsion, is involuntary (for many natural
processes, even, we knowingly both perform and experience, none of
which is either voluntary or involuntary; e. g. growing old or
dying). But in the case of unjust and just acts alike the injustice or
justice may be only incidental; for a man might return a deposit
unwillingly and from fear, and then he must not be said either to do
what is just or to act justly, except in an incidental way.
Similarly the man who under compulsion and unwillingly fails to return
the deposit must be said to act unjustly, and to do what is unjust,
only incidentally. Of voluntary acts we do some by choice, others
not by choice; by choice those which we do after deliberation, not
by choice those which we do without previous deliberation. Thus
there are three kinds of injury in transactions between man and man;
those done in ignorance are mistakes when the person acted on, the
act, the instrument, or the end that will be attained is other than
the agent supposed; the agent thought either that he was not hiting
any one or that he was not hitting with this missile or not hitting
this person or to this end, but a result followed other than that
which he thought likely (e. g. he threw not with intent to wound but
only to prick), or the person hit or the missile was other than he
supposed. Now when (1) the injury takes place contrary to reasonable
expectation, it is a misadventure. When (2) it is not contrary to
reasonable expectation, but does not imply vice, it is a mistake
(for a man makes a mistake when the fault originates in him, but is
the victim of accident when the origin lies outside him). When (3)
he acts with knowledge but not after deliberation, it is an act of
injustice-e. g. the acts due to anger or to other passions necessary or
natural to man; for when men do such harmful and mistaken acts they
act unjustly, and the acts are acts of injustice, but this does not
imply that the doers are unjust or wicked; for the injury is not due
to vice. But when (4) a man acts from choice, he is an unjust man
and a vicious man.

Hence acts proceeding from anger are rightly judged not to be done
of malice aforethought; for it is not the man who acts in anger but he
who enraged him that starts the mischief. Again, the matter in dispute
is not whether the thing happened or not, but its justice; for it is
apparent injustice that occasions rage. For they do not dispute
about the occurrence of the act-as in commercial transactions where
one of the two parties must be vicious-unless they do so owing to
forgetfulness; but, agreeing about the fact, they dispute on which
side justice lies (whereas a man who has deliberately injured
another cannot help knowing that he has done so), so that the one
thinks he is being treated unjustly and the other disagrees.

But if a man harms another by choice, he acts unjustly; and these
are the acts of injustice which imply that the doer is an unjust
man, provided that the act violates proportion or equality. Similarly,
a man is just when he acts justly by choice; but he acts justly if
he merely acts voluntarily.

Of involuntary acts some are excusable, others not. For the mistakes
which men make not only in ignorance but also from ignorance are
excusable, while those which men do not from ignorance but (though
they do them in ignorance) owing to a passion which is neither natural
nor such as man is liable to, are not excusable.

9

Assuming that we have sufficiently defined the suffering and doing
of injustice, it may be asked (1) whether the truth in expressed in
Euripides' paradoxical words:

I slew my mother, that's my tale in brief.

Were you both willing, or unwilling both?

Is it truly possible to be willingly treated unjustly, or is all
suffering of injustice the contrary involuntary, as all unjust
action is voluntary? And is all suffering of injustice of the latter
kind or else all of the former, or is it sometimes voluntary,
sometimes involuntary? So, too, with the case of being justly treated;
all just action is voluntary, so that it is reasonable that there
should be a similar opposition in either case-that both being unjustly
and being justly treated should be either alike voluntary or alike
involuntary. But it would be thought paradoxical even in the case of
being justly treated, if it were always voluntary; for some are
unwillingly treated justly. (2) One might raise this question also,
whether every one who has suffered what is unjust is being unjustly
treated, or on the other hand it is with suffering as with acting.
In action and in passivity alike it is possible to partake of
justice incidentally, and similarly (it is plain) of injustice; for to
do what is unjust is not the same as to act unjustly, nor to suffer
what is unjust as to be treated unjustly, and similarly in the case of
acting justly and being justly treated; for it is impossible to be
unjustly treated if the other does not act unjustly, or justly treated
unless he acts justly. Now if to act unjustly is simply to harm some
one voluntarily, and 'voluntarily' means 'knowing the person acted on,
the instrument, and the manner of one's acting', and the incontinent
man voluntarily harms himself, not only will he voluntarily be
unjustly treated but it will be possible to treat oneself unjustly.
(This also is one of the questions in doubt, whether a man can treat
himself unjustly. ) Again, a man may voluntarily, owing to
incontinence, be harmed by another who acts voluntarily, so that it
would be possible to be voluntarily treated unjustly. Or is our
definition incorrect; must we to 'harming another, with knowledge both
of the person acted on, of the instrument, and of the manner' add
'contrary to the wish of the person acted on'? Then a man may be
voluntarily harmed and voluntarily suffer what is unjust, but no one
is voluntarily treated unjustly; for no one wishes to be unjustly
treated, not even the incontinent man. He acts contrary to his wish;
for no one wishes for what he does not think to be good, but the
incontinent man does do things that he does not think he ought to
do. Again, one who gives what is his own, as Homer says Glaucus gave
Diomede

Armour of gold for brazen, the price of a hundred beeves for nine,

is not unjustly treated; for though to give is in his power, to be
unjustly treated is not, but there must be some one to treat him
unjustly. It is plain, then, that being unjustly treated is not
voluntary.

Of the questions we intended to discuss two still remain for
discussion; (3) whether it is the man who has assigned to another more
than his share that acts unjustly, or he who has the excessive
share, and (4) whether it is possible to treat oneself unjustly. The
questions are connected; for if the former alternative is possible and
the distributor acts unjustly and not the man who has the excessive
share, then if a man assigns more to another than to himself,
knowingly and voluntarily, he treats himself unjustly; which is what
modest people seem to do, since the virtuous man tends to take less
than his share. Or does this statement too need qualification? For (a)
he perhaps gets more than his share of some other good, e. g. of honour
or of intrinsic nobility. (b) The question is solved by applying the
distinction we applied to unjust action; for he suffers nothing
contrary to his own wish, so that he is not unjustly treated as far as
this goes, but at most only suffers harm.

It is plain too that the distributor acts unjustly, but not always
the man who has the excessive share; for it is not he to whom what
is unjust appertains that acts unjustly, but he to whom it
appertains to do the unjust act voluntarily, i. e. the person in whom
lies the origin of the action, and this lies in the distributor, not
in the receiver. Again, since the word 'do' is ambiguous, and there is
a sense in which lifeless things, or a hand, or a servant who obeys an
order, may be said to slay, he who gets an excessive share does not
act unjustly, though he 'does' what is unjust.

Again, if the distributor gave his judgement in ignorance, he does
not act unjustly in respect of legal justice, and his judgement is not
unjust in this sense, but in a sense it is unjust (for legal justice
and primordial justice are different); but if with knowledge he judged
unjustly, he is himself aiming at an excessive share either of
gratitude or of revenge. As much, then, as if he were to share in
the plunder, the man who has judged unjustly for these reasons has got
too much; the fact that what he gets is different from what he
distributes makes no difference, for even if he awards land with a
view to sharing in the plunder he gets not land but money.

Men think that acting unjustly is in their power, and therefore that
being just is easy. But it is not; to lie with one's neighbour's wife,
to wound another, to deliver a bribe, is easy and in our power, but to
do these things as a result of a certain state of character is neither
easy nor in our power. Similarly to know what is just and what is
unjust requires, men think, no great wisdom, because it is not hard to
understand the matters dealt with by the laws (though these are not
the things that are just, except incidentally); but how actions must
be done and distributions effected in order to be just, to know this
is a greater achievement than knowing what is good for the health;
though even there, while it is easy to know that honey, wine,
hellebore, cautery, and the use of the knife are so, to know how, to
whom, and when these should be applied with a view to producing
health, is no less an achievement than that of being a physician.
Again, for this very reason men think that acting unjustly is
characteristic of the just man no less than of the unjust, because
he would be not less but even more capable of doing each of these
unjust acts; for he could lie with a woman or wound a neighbour; and
the brave man could throw away his shield and turn to flight in this
direction or in that. But to play the coward or to act unjustly
consists not in doing these things, except incidentally, but in
doing them as the result of a certain state of character, just as to
practise medicine and healing consists not in applying or not applying
the knife, in using or not using medicines, but in doing so in a
certain way.

Just acts occur between people who participate in things good in
themselves and can have too much or too little of them; for some
beings (e. g. presumably the gods) cannot have too much of them, and to
others, those who are incurably bad, not even the smallest share in
them is beneficial but all such goods are harmful, while to others
they are beneficial up to a point; therefore justice is essentially
something human.

10

Our next subject is equity and the equitable (to epiekes), and their
respective relations to justice and the just. For on examination
they appear to be neither absolutely the same nor generically
different; and while we sometime praise what is equitable and the
equitable man (so that we apply the name by way of praise even to
instances of the other virtues, instead of 'good' meaning by
epieikestebon that a thing is better), at other times, when we
reason it out, it seems strange if the equitable, being something
different from the just, is yet praiseworthy; for either the just or
the equitable is not good, if they are different; or, if both are
good, they are the same.

These, then, are pretty much the considerations that give rise to
the problem about the equitable; they are all in a sense correct and
not opposed to one another; for the equitable, though it is better
than one kind of justice, yet is just, and it is not as being a
different class of thing that it is better than the just. The same
thing, then, is just and equitable, and while both are good the
equitable is superior. What creates the problem is that the
equitable is just, but not the legally just but a correction of
legal justice. The reason is that all law is universal but about
some things it is not possible to make a universal statement which
shall be correct. In those cases, then, in which it is necessary to
speak universally, but not possible to do so correctly, the law
takes the usual case, though it is not ignorant of the possibility
of error. And it is none the less correct; for the error is in the law
nor in the legislator but in the nature of the thing, since the matter
of practical affairs is of this kind from the start. When the law
speaks universally, then, and a case arises on it which is not covered
by the universal statement, then it is right, where the legislator
fails us and has erred by oversimplicity, to correct the omission-to
say what the legislator himself would have said had he been present,
and would have put into his law if he had known. Hence the equitable
is just, and better than one kind of justice-not better than
absolute justice but better than the error that arises from the
absoluteness of the statement. And this is the nature of the
equitable, a correction of law where it is defective owing to its
universality. In fact this is the reason why all things are not
determined by law, that about some things it is impossible to lay down
a law, so that a decree is needed. For when the thing is indefinite
the rule also is indefinite, like the leaden rule used in making the
Lesbian moulding; the rule adapts itself to the shape of the stone and
is not rigid, and so too the decree is adapted to the facts.

It is plain, then, what the equitable is, and that it is just and is
better than one kind of justice. It is evident also from this who
the equitable man is; the man who chooses and does such acts, and is
no stickler for his rights in a bad sense but tends to take less
than his share though he has the law oft his side, is equitable, and
this state of character is equity, which is a sort of justice and
not a different state of character.

11

Whether a man can treat himself unjustly or not, is evident from
what has been said. For (a) one class of just acts are those acts in
accordance with any virtue which are prescribed by the law; e. g. the
law does not expressly permit suicide, and what it does not
expressly permit it forbids. Again, when a man in violation of the law
harms another (otherwise than in retaliation) voluntarily, he acts
unjustly, and a voluntary agent is one who knows both the person he is
affecting by his action and the instrument he is using; and he who
through anger voluntarily stabs himself does this contrary to the
right rule of life, and this the law does not allow; therefore he is
acting unjustly. But towards whom? Surely towards the state, not
towards himself. For he suffers voluntarily, but no one is voluntarily
treated unjustly. This is also the reason why the state punishes; a
certain loss of civil rights attaches to the man who destroys himself,
on the ground that he is treating the state unjustly.

Further (b) in that sense of 'acting unjustly' in which the man
who 'acts unjustly' is unjust only and not bad all round, it is not
possible to treat oneself unjustly (this is different from the
former sense; the unjust man in one sense of the term is wicked in a
particularized way just as the coward is, not in the sense of being
wicked all round, so that his 'unjust act' does not manifest
wickedness in general). For (i) that would imply the possibility of
the same thing's having been subtracted from and added to the same
thing at the same time; but this is impossible-the just and the unjust
always involve more than one person. Further, (ii) unjust action is
voluntary and done by choice, and takes the initiative (for the man
who because he has suffered does the same in return is not thought
to act unjustly); but if a man harms himself he suffers and does the
same things at the same time. Further, (iii) if a man could treat
himself unjustly, he could be voluntarily treated unjustly. Besides,
(iv) no one acts unjustly without committing particular acts of
injustice; but no one can commit adultery with his own wife or
housebreaking on his own house or theft on his own property,

In general, the question 'can a man treat himself unjustly? ' is
solved also by the distinction we applied to the question 'can a man
be voluntarily treated unjustly? '

(It is evident too that both are bad, being unjustly treated and
acting unjustly; for the one means having less and the other having
more than the intermediate amount, which plays the part here that
the healthy does in the medical art, and that good condition does in
the art of bodily training. But still acting unjustly is the worse,
for it involves vice and is blameworthy-involves vice which is
either of the complete and unqualified kind or almost so (we must
admit the latter alternative, because not all voluntary unjust
action implies injustice as a state of character), while being
unjustly treated does not involve vice and injustice in oneself. In
itself, then, being unjustly treated is less bad, but there is nothing
to prevent its being incidentally a greater evil. But theory cares
nothing for this; it calls pleurisy a more serious mischief than a
stumble; yet the latter may become incidentally the more serious, if
the fall due to it leads to your being taken prisoner or put to
death the enemy. )

Metaphorically and in virtue of a certain resemblance there is a
justice, not indeed between a man and himself, but between certain
parts of him; yet not every kind of justice but that of master and
servant or that of husband and wife. For these are the ratios in which
the part of the soul that has a rational principle stands to the
irrational part; and it is with a view to these parts that people also
think a man can be unjust to himself, viz. because these parts are
liable to suffer something contrary to their respective desires; there
is therefore thought to be a mutual justice between them as between
ruler and ruled.

Let this be taken as our account of justice and the other, i. e.
the other moral, virtues.

BOOK VI

1

SINCE we have previously said that one ought to choose that which is
intermediate, not the excess nor the defect, and that the intermediate
is determined by the dictates of the right rule, let us discuss the
nature of these dictates. In all the states of character we have
mentioned, as in all other matters, there is a mark to which the man
who has the rule looks, and heightens or relaxes his activity
accordingly, and there is a standard which determines the mean
states which we say are intermediate between excess and defect,
being in accordance with the right rule. But such a statement,
though true, is by no means clear; for not only here but in all
other pursuits which are objects of knowledge it is indeed true to say
that we must not exert ourselves nor relax our efforts too much nor
too little, but to an intermediate extent and as the right rule
dictates; but if a man had only this knowledge he would be none the
wiser e. g. we should not know what sort of medicines to apply to our
body if some one were to say 'all those which the medical art
prescribes, and which agree with the practice of one who possesses the
art'. Hence it is necessary with regard to the states of the soul also
not only that this true statement should be made, but also that it
should be determined what is the right rule and what is the standard
that fixes it.

We divided the virtues of the soul and a said that some are
virtues of character and others of intellect. Now we have discussed in
detail the moral virtues; with regard to the others let us express our
view as follows, beginning with some remarks about the soul. We said
before that there are two parts of the soul-that which grasps a rule
or rational principle, and the irrational; let us now draw a similar
distinction within the part which grasps a rational principle. And let
it be assumed that there are two parts which grasp a rational
principle-one by which we contemplate the kind of things whose
originative causes are invariable, and one by which we contemplate
variable things; for where objects differ in kind the part of the soul
answering to each of the two is different in kind, since it is in
virtue of a certain likeness and kinship with their objects that
they have the knowledge they have. Let one of these parts be called
the scientific and the other the calculative; for to deliberate and to
calculate are the same thing, but no one deliberates about the
invariable. Therefore the calculative is one part of the faculty which
grasps a rational principle. We must, then, learn what is the best
state of each of these two parts; for this is the virtue of each.

2

The virtue of a thing is relative to its proper work. Now there
are three things in the soul which control action and truth-sensation,
reason, desire.
Of these sensation originates no action; this is plain from the fact
that the lower animals have sensation but no share in action.

What affirmation and negation are in thinking, pursuit and avoidance
are in desire; so that since moral virtue is a state of character
concerned with choice, and choice is deliberate desire, therefore both
the reasoning must be true and the desire right, if the choice is to
be good, and the latter must pursue just what the former asserts.
Now this kind of intellect and of truth is practical; of the intellect
which is contemplative, not practical nor productive, the good and the
bad state are truth and falsity respectively (for this is the work
of everything intellectual); while of the part which is practical
and intellectual the good state is truth in agreement with right
desire.

The origin of action-its efficient, not its final cause-is choice,
and that of choice is desire and reasoning with a view to an end. This
is why choice cannot exist either without reason and intellect or
without a moral state; for good action and its opposite cannot exist
without a combination of intellect and character. Intellect itself,
however, moves nothing, but only the intellect which aims at an end
and is practical; for this rules the productive intellect, as well,
since every one who makes makes for an end, and that which is made
is not an end in the unqualified sense (but only an end in a
particular relation, and the end of a particular operation)-only
that which is done is that; for good action is an end, and desire aims
at this. Hence choice is either desiderative reason or ratiocinative
desire, and such an origin of action is a man. (It is to be noted that
nothing that is past is an object of choice, e. g. no one chooses to
have sacked Troy; for no one deliberates about the past, but about
what is future and capable of being otherwise, while what is past is
not capable of not having taken place; hence Agathon is right in
saying

For this alone is lacking even to God,

To make undone things thathave once been done. )

The work of both the intellectual parts, then, is truth. Therefore
the states that are most strictly those in respect of which each of
these parts will reach truth are the virtues of the two parts.

3

Let us begin, then, from the beginning, and discuss these states
once more. Let it be assumed that the states by virtue of which the
soul possesses truth by way of affirmation or denial are five in
number, i. e. art, scientific knowledge, practical wisdom,
philosophic wisdom, intuitive reason; we do not include judgement
and opinion because in these we may be mistaken.

Now what scientific knowledge is, if we are to speak exactly and not
follow mere similarities, is plain from what follows. We all suppose
that what we know is not even capable of being otherwise; of things
capable of being otherwise we do not know, when they have passed
outside our observation, whether they exist or not. Therefore the
object of scientific knowledge is of necessity. Therefore it is
eternal; for things that are of necessity in the unqualified sense are
all eternal; and things that are eternal are ungenerated and
imperishable. Again, every science is thought to be capable of being
taught, and its object of being learned. And all teaching starts
from what is already known, as we maintain in the Analytics also;
for it proceeds sometimes through induction and sometimes by
syllogism. Now induction is the starting-point which knowledge even of
the universal presupposes, while syllogism proceeds from universals.
There are therefore starting-points from which syllogism proceeds,
which are not reached by syllogism; it is therefore by induction
that they are acquired. Scientific knowledge is, then, a state of
capacity to demonstrate, and has the other limiting characteristics
which we specify in the Analytics, for it is when a man believes in
a certain way and the starting-points are known to him that he has
scientific knowledge, since if they are not better known to him than
the conclusion, he will have his knowledge only incidentally.

Let this, then, be taken as our account of scientific knowledge.

4

In the variable are included both things made and things done;
making and acting are different (for their nature we treat even the
discussions outside our school as reliable); so that the reasoned
state of capacity to act is different from the reasoned state of
capacity to make. Hence too they are not included one in the other;
for neither is acting making nor is making acting. Now since
architecture is an art and is essentially a reasoned state of capacity
to make, and there is neither any art that is not such a state nor any
such state that is not an art, art is identical with a state of
capacity to make, involving a true course of reasoning. All art is
concerned with coming into being, i. e. with contriving and considering
how something may come into being which is capable of either being
or not being, and whose origin is in the maker and not in the thing
made; for art is concerned neither with things that are, or come
into being, by necessity, nor with things that do so in accordance
with nature (since these have their origin in themselves). Making
and acting being different, art must be a matter of making, not of
acting. And in a sense chance and art are concerned with the same
objects; as Agathon says, 'art loves chance and chance loves art'.
Art, then, as has been is a state concerned with making, involving a
true course of reasoning, and lack of art on the contrary is a state
concerned with making, involving a false course of reasoning; both are
concerned with the variable.

5

Regarding practical wisdom we shall get at the truth by
considering who are the persons we credit with it. Now it is thought
to be the mark of a man of practical wisdom to be able to deliberate
well about what is good and expedient for himself, not in some
particular respect, e. g. about what sorts of thing conduce to health
or to strength, but about what sorts of thing conduce to the good life
in general. This is shown by the fact that we credit men with
practical wisdom in some particular respect when they have
calculated well with a view to some good end which is one of those
that are not the object of any art. It follows that in the general
sense also the man who is capable of deliberating has practical
wisdom. Now no one deliberates about things that are invariable, nor
about things that it is impossible for him to do. Therefore, since
scientific knowledge involves demonstration, but there is no
demonstration of things whose first principles are variable (for all
such things might actually be otherwise), and since it is impossible
to deliberate about things that are of necessity, practical wisdom
cannot be scientific knowledge nor art; not science because that which
can be done is capable of being otherwise, not art because action
and making are different kinds of thing. The remaining alternative,
then, is that it is a true and reasoned state of capacity to act
with regard to the things that are good or bad for man. For while
making has an end other than itself, action cannot; for good action
itself is its end. It is for this reason that we think Pericles and
men like him have practical wisdom, viz. because they can see what
is good for themselves and what is good for men in general; we
consider that those can do this who are good at managing households or
states. (This is why we call temperance (sophrosune) by this name;
we imply that it preserves one's practical wisdom (sozousa tan
phronsin). Now what it preserves is a judgement of the kind we have
described. For it is not any and every judgement that pleasant and
painful objects destroy and pervert, e. g. the judgement that the
triangle has or has not its angles equal to two right angles, but only
judgements about what is to be done. For the originating causes of the
things that are done consist in the end at which they are aimed; but
the man who has been ruined by pleasure or pain forthwith fails to see
any such originating cause-to see that for the sake of this or because
of this he ought to choose and do whatever he chooses and does; for
vice is destructive of the originating cause of action. ) Practical
wisdom, then, must be a reasoned and true state of capacity to act
with regard to human goods. But further, while there is such a thing
as excellence in art, there is no such thing as excellence in
practical wisdom; and in art he who errs willingly is preferable,
but in practical wisdom, as in the virtues, he is the reverse.
Plainly, then, practical wisdom is a virtue and not an art. There
being two parts of the soul that can follow a course of reasoning,
it must be the virtue of one of the two, i. e. of that part which forms
opinions; for opinion is about the variable and so is practical
wisdom. But yet it is not only a reasoned state; this is shown by
the fact that a state of that sort may forgotten but practical
wisdom cannot.

6

Scientific knowledge is judgement about things that are universal
and necessary, and the conclusions of demonstration, and all
scientific knowledge, follow from first principles (for scientific
knowledge involves apprehension of a rational ground). This being
so, the first principle from which what is scientifically known
follows cannot be an object of scientific knowledge, of art, or of
practical wisdom; for that which can be scientifically known can be
demonstrated, and art and practical wisdom deal with things that are
variable. Nor are these first principles the objects of philosophic
wisdom, for it is a mark of the philosopher to have demonstration
about some things. If, then, the states of mind by which we have truth
and are never deceived about things invariable or even variable are
scientific knowlededge, practical wisdom, philosophic wisdom, and
intuitive reason, and it cannot be any of the three (i. e. practical
wisdom, scientific knowledge, or philosophic wisdom), the remaining
alternative is that it is intuitive reason that grasps the first
principles.

7

Wisdom (1) in the arts we ascribe to their most finished
exponents, e. g. to Phidias as a sculptor and to Polyclitus as a
maker of portrait-statues, and here we mean nothing by wisdom except
excellence in art; but (2) we think that some people are wise in
general, not in some particular field or in any other limited respect,
as Homer says in the Margites,

Him did the gods make neither a digger nor yet a ploughman

Nor wise in anything else.

Therefore wisdom must plainly be the most finished of the forms of
knowledge. It follows that the wise man must not only know what
follows from the first principles, but must also possess truth about
the first principles. Therefore wisdom must be intuitive reason
combined with scientific knowledge-scientific knowledge of the highest
objects which has received as it were its proper completion.

Of the highest objects, we say; for it would be strange to think
that the art of politics, or practical wisdom, is the best
knowledge, since man is not the best thing in the world. Now if what
is healthy or good is different for men and for fishes, but what is
white or straight is always the same, any one would say that what is
wise is the same but what is practically wise is different; for it
is to that which observes well the various matters concerning itself
that one ascribes practical wisdom, and it is to this that one will
entrust such matters. This is why we say that some even of the lower
animals have practical wisdom, viz. those which are found to have a
power of foresight with regard to their own life. It is evident also
that philosophic wisdom and the art of politics cannot be the same;
for if the state of mind concerned with a man's own interests is to be
called philosophic wisdom, there will be many philosophic wisdoms;
there will not be one concerned with the good of all animals (any more
than there is one art of medicine for all existing things), but a
different philosophic wisdom about the good of each species.

But if the argument be that man is the best of the animals, this
makes no difference; for there are other things much more divine in
their nature even than man, e. g. , most conspicuously, the bodies of
which the heavens are framed. From what has been said it is plain,
then, that philosophic wisdom is scientific knowledge, combined with
intuitive reason, of the things that are highest by nature. This is
why we say Anaxagoras, Thales, and men like them have philosophic
but not practical wisdom, when we see them ignorant of what is to
their own advantage, and why we say that they know things that are
remarkable, admirable, difficult, and divine, but useless; viz.
because it is not human goods that they seek.

Practical wisdom on the other hand is concerned with things human
and things about which it is possible to deliberate; for we say this
is above all the work of the man of practical wisdom, to deliberate
well, but no one deliberates about things invariable, nor about things
which have not an end, and that a good that can be brought about by
action. The man who is without qualification good at deliberating is
the man who is capable of aiming in accordance with calculation at the
best for man of things attainable by action. Nor is practical wisdom
concerned with universals only-it must also recognize the particulars;
for it is practical, and practice is concerned with particulars.
This is why some who do not know, and especially those who have
experience, are more practical than others who know; for if a man knew
that light meats are digestible and wholesome, but did not know
which sorts of meat are light, he would not produce health, but the
man who knows that chicken is wholesome is more likely to produce
health.

Now practical wisdom is concerned with action; therefore one
should have both forms of it, or the latter in preference to the
former. But of practical as of philosophic wisdom there must be a
controlling kind.

8

Political wisdom and practical wisdom are the same state of mind,
but their essence is not the same. Of the wisdom concerned with the
city, the practical wisdom which plays a controlling part is
legislative wisdom, while that which is related to this as particulars
to their universal is known by the general name 'political wisdom';
this has to do with action and deliberation, for a decree is a thing
to be carried out in the form of an individual act. This is why the
exponents of this art are alone said to 'take part in politics'; for
these alone 'do things' as manual labourers 'do things'.

Practical wisdom also is identified especially with that form of
it which is concerned with a man himself-with the individual; and this
is known by the general name 'practical wisdom'; of the other kinds
one is called household management, another legislation, the third
politics, and of the latter one part is called deliberative and the
other judicial. Now knowing what is good for oneself will be one
kind of knowledge, but it is very different from the other kinds;
and the man who knows and concerns himself with his own interests is
thought to have practical wisdom, while politicians are thought to
be busybodies; hence the word of Euripides,

But how could I be wise, who might at ease,

Numbered among the army's multitude,

Have had an equal share?

For those who aim too high and do too much.

Those who think thus seek their own good, and consider that one
ought to do so. From this opinion, then, has come the view that such
men have practical wisdom; yet perhaps one's own good cannot exist
without household management, nor without a form of government.
Further, how one should order one's own affairs is not clear and needs
inquiry.

What has been said is confirmed by the fact that while young men
become geometricians and mathematicians and wise in matters like
these, it is thought that a young man of practical wisdom cannot be
found. The cause is that such wisdom is concerned not only with
universals but with particulars, which become familiar from
experience, but a young man has no experience, for it is length of
time that gives experience; indeed one might ask this question too,
why a boy may become a mathematician, but not a philosopher or a
physicist. It is because the objects of mathematics exist by
abstraction, while the first principles of these other subjects come
from experience, and because young men have no conviction about the
latter but merely use the proper language, while the essence of
mathematical objects is plain enough to them?

Further, error in deliberation may be either about the universal
or about the particular; we may fall to know either that all water
that weighs heavy is bad, or that this particular water weighs heavy.

That practical wisdom is not scientific knowledge is evident; for it
is, as has been said, concerned with the ultimate particular fact,
since the thing to be done is of this nature. It is opposed, then,
to intuitive reason; for intuitive reason is of the limiting
premisses, for which no reason can be given, while practical wisdom is
concerned with the ultimate particular, which is the object not of
scientific knowledge but of perception-not the perception of qualities
peculiar to one sense but a perception akin to that by which we
perceive that the particular figure before us is a triangle; for in
that direction as well as in that of the major premiss there will be a
limit. But this is rather perception than practical wisdom, though
it is another kind of perception than that of the qualities peculiar
to each sense.

9

There is a difference between inquiry and deliberation; for
deliberation is inquiry into a particular kind of thing. We must grasp
the nature of excellence in deliberation as well whether it is a
form of scientific knowledge, or opinion, or skill in conjecture, or
some other kind of thing. Scientific knowledge it is not; for men do
not inquire about the things they know about, but good deliberation is
a kind of deliberation, and he who deliberates inquires and
calculates. Nor is it skill in conjecture; for this both involves no
reasoning and is something that is quick in its operation, while men
deliberate a long time, and they say that one should carry out quickly
the conclusions of one's deliberation, but should deliberate slowly.
Again, readiness of mind is different from excellence in deliberation;
it is a sort of skill in conjecture. Nor again is excellence in
deliberation opinion of any sort. But since the man who deliberates
badly makes a mistake, while he who deliberates well does so
correctly, excellence in deliberation is clearly a kind of
correctness, but neither of knowledge nor of opinion; for there is
no such thing as correctness of knowledge (since there is no such
thing as error of knowledge), and correctness of opinion is truth; and
at the same time everything that is an object of opinion is already
determined. But again excellence in deliberation involves reasoning.
The remaining alternative, then, is that it is correctness of
thinking; for this is not yet assertion, since, while even opinion
is not inquiry but has reached the stage of assertion, the man who
is deliberating, whether he does so well or ill, is searching for
something and calculating.

But excellence in deliberation is a certain correctness of
deliberation; hence we must first inquire what deliberation is and
what it is about. And, there being more than one kind of
correctness, plainly excellence in deliberation is not any and every
kind; for (1) the incontinent man and the bad man, if he is clever,
will reach as a result of his calculation what he sets before himself,
so that he will have deliberated correctly, but he will have got for
himself a great evil. Now to have deliberated well is thought to be
a good thing; for it is this kind of correctness of deliberation
that is excellence in deliberation, viz. that which tends to attain
what is good. But (2) it is possible to attain even good by a false
syllogism, and to attain what one ought to do but not by the right
means, the middle term being false; so that this too is not yet
excellence in deliberation this state in virtue of which one attains
what one ought but not by the right means. Again (3) it is possible to
attain it by long deliberation while another man attains it quickly.
Therefore in the former case we have not yet got excellence in
deliberation, which is rightness with regard to the
expedient-rightness in respect both of the end, the manner, and the
time. (4) Further it is possible to have deliberated well either in
the unqualified sense or with reference to a particular end.
Excellence in deliberation in the unqualified sense, then, is that
which succeeds with reference to what is the end in the unqualified
sense, and excellence in deliberation in a particular sense is that
which succeeds relatively to a particular end. If, then, it is
characteristic of men of practical wisdom to have deliberated well,
excellence in deliberation will be correctness with regard to what
conduces to the end of which practical wisdom is the true
apprehension.

10

Understanding, also, and goodness of understanding, in virtue of
which men are said to be men of understanding or of good
understanding, are neither entirely the same as opinion or
scientific knowledge (for at that rate all men would have been men
of understanding), nor are they one of the particular sciences, such
as medicine, the science of things connected with health, or geometry,
the science of spatial magnitudes. For understanding is neither
about things that are always and are unchangeable, nor about any and
every one of the things that come into being, but about things which
may become subjects of questioning and deliberation. Hence it is about
the same objects as practical wisdom; but understanding and
practical wisdom are not the same. For practical wisdom issues
commands, since its end is what ought to be done or not to be done;
but understanding only judges. (Understanding is identical with
goodness of understanding, men of understanding with men of good
understanding. ) Now understanding is neither the having nor the
acquiring of practical wisdom; but as learning is called understanding
when it means the exercise of the faculty of knowledge, so
'understanding' is applicable to the exercise of the faculty of
opinion for the purpose of judging of what some one else says about
matters with which practical wisdom is concerned-and of judging
soundly; for 'well' and 'soundly' are the same thing. And from this
has come the use of the name 'understanding' in virtue of which men
are said to be 'of good understanding', viz. from the application of
the word to the grasping of scientific truth; for we often call such
grasping understanding.

11

What is called judgement, in virtue of which men are said to 'be
sympathetic judges' and to 'have judgement', is the right
discrimination of the equitable. This is shown by the fact that we say
the equitable man is above all others a man of sympathetic
judgement, and identify equity with sympathetic judgement about
certain facts. And sympathetic judgement is judgement which
discriminates what is equitable and does so correctly; and correct
judgement is that which judges what is true.

Now all the states we have considered converge, as might be
expected, to the same point; for when we speak of judgement and
understanding and practical wisdom and intuitive reason we credit
the same people with possessing judgement and having reached years
of reason and with having practical wisdom and understanding. For
all these faculties deal with ultimates, i. e. with particulars; and
being a man of understanding and of good or sympathetic judgement
consists in being able judge about the things with which practical
wisdom is concerned; for the equities are common to all good men in
relation to other men. Now all things which have to be done are
included among particulars or ultimates; for not only must the man
of practical wisdom know particular facts, but understanding and
judgement are also concerned with things to be done, and these are
ultimates. And intuitive reason is concerned with the ultimates in
both directions; for both the first terms and the last are objects
of intuitive reason and not of argument, and the intuitive reason
which is presupposed by demonstrations grasps the unchangeable and
first terms, while the intuitive reason involved in practical
reasonings grasps the last and variable fact, i. e. the minor
premiss. For these variable facts are the starting-points for the
apprehension of the end, since the universals are reached from the
particulars; of these therefore we must have perception, and this
perception is intuitive reason.

This is why these states are thought to be natural endowments-why,
while no one is thought to be a philosopher by nature, people are
thought to have by nature judgement, understanding, and intuitive
reason. This is shown by the fact that we think our powers
correspond to our time of life, and that a particular age brings
with it intuitive reason and judgement; this implies that nature is
the cause. (Hence intuitive reason is both beginning and end; for
demonstrations are from these and about these. ) Therefore we ought
to attend to the undemonstrated sayings and opinions of experienced
and older people or of people of practical wisdom not less than to
demonstrations; for because experience has given them an eye they
see aright.

We have stated, then, what practical and philosophic wisdom are, and
with what each of them is concerned, and we have said that each is the
virtue of a different part of the soul.

12

Difficulties might be raised as to the utility of these qualities of
mind. For (1) philosophic wisdom will contemplate none of the things
that will make a man happy (for it is not concerned with any coming
into being), and though practical wisdom has this merit, for what
purpose do we need it? Practical wisdom is the quality of mind
concerned with things just and noble and good for man, but these are
the things which it is the mark of a good man to do, and we are none
the more able to act for knowing them if the virtues are states of
character, just as we are none the better able to act for knowing
the things that are healthy and sound, in the sense not of producing
but of issuing from the state of health; for we are none the more able
to act for having the art of medicine or of gymnastics. But (2) if
we are to say that a man should have practical wisdom not for the sake
of knowing moral truths but for the sake of becoming good, practical
wisdom will be of no use to those who are good; again it is of no
use to those who have not virtue; for it will make no difference
whether they have practical wisdom themselves or obey others who
have it, and it would be enough for us to do what we do in the case of
health; though we wish to become healthy, yet we do not learn the
art of medicine. (3) Besides this, it would be thought strange if
practical wisdom, being inferior to philosophic wisdom, is to be put
in authority over it, as seems to be implied by the fact that the
art which produces anything rules and issues commands about that
thing.

These, then, are the questions we must discuss; so far we have
only stated the difficulties.

(1) Now first let us say that in themselves these states must be
worthy of choice because they are the virtues of the two parts of
the soul respectively, even if neither of them produce anything.

(2) Secondly, they do produce something, not as the art of
medicine produces health, however, but as health produces health; so
does philosophic wisdom produce happiness; for, being a part of virtue
entire, by being possessed and by actualizing itself it makes a man
happy.

(3) Again, the work of man is achieved only in accordance with
practical wisdom as well as with moral virtue; for virtue makes us aim
at the right mark, and practical wisdom makes us take the right means.
(Of the fourth part of the soul-the nutritive-there is no such virtue;
for there is nothing which it is in its power to do or not to do. )

(4) With regard to our being none the more able to do because of our
practical wisdom what is noble and just, let us begin a little further
back, starting with the following principle. As we say that some
people who do just acts are not necessarily just, i. e. those who do
the acts ordained by the laws either unwillingly or owing to ignorance
or for some other reason and not for the sake of the acts themselves
(though, to be sure, they do what they should and all the things
that the good man ought), so is it, it seems, that in order to be good
one must be in a certain state when one does the several acts, i. e.
one must do them as a result of choice and for the sake of the acts
themselves. Now virtue makes the choice right, but the question of the
things which should naturally be done to carry out our choice
belongs not to virtue but to another faculty. We must devote our
attention to these matters and give a clearer statement about them.
There is a faculty which is called cleverness; and this is such as
to be able to do the things that tend towards the mark we have set
before ourselves, and to hit it. Now if the mark be noble, the
cleverness is laudable, but if the mark be bad, the cleverness is mere
smartness; hence we call even men of practical wisdom clever or smart.
Practical wisdom is not the faculty, but it does not exist without
this faculty. And this eye of the soul acquires its formed state not
without the aid of virtue, as has been said and is plain; for the
syllogisms which deal with acts to be done are things which involve
a starting-point, viz. 'since the end, i. e. what is best, is of such
and such a nature', whatever it may be (let it for the sake of
argument be what we please); and this is not evident except to the
good man; for wickedness perverts us and causes us to be deceived
about the starting-points of action. Therefore it is evident that it
is impossible to be practically wise without being good.

13

We must therefore consider virtue also once more; for virtue too
is similarly related; as practical wisdom is to cleverness-not the
same, but like it-so is natural virtue to virtue in the strict
sense. For all men think that each type of character belongs to its
possessors in some sense by nature; for from the very moment of
birth we are just or fitted for selfcontrol or brave or have the other
moral qualities; but yet we seek something else as that which is
good in the strict sense-we seek for the presence of such qualities in
another way. For both children and brutes have the natural
dispositions to these qualities, but without reason these are
evidently hurtful. Only we seem to see this much, that, while one
may be led astray by them, as a strong body which moves without
sight may stumble badly because of its lack of sight, still, if a
man once acquires reason, that makes a difference in action; and his
state, while still like what it was, will then be virtue in the strict
sense. Therefore, as in the part of us which forms opinions there
are two types, cleverness and practical wisdom, so too in the moral
part there are two types, natural virtue and virtue in the strict
sense, and of these the latter involves practical wisdom. This is
why some say that all the virtues are forms of practical wisdom, and
why Socrates in one respect was on the right track while in another he
went astray; in thinking that all the virtues were forms of
practical wisdom he was wrong, but in saying they implied practical
wisdom he was right. This is confirmed by the fact that even now all
men, when they define virtue, after naming the state of character
and its objects add 'that (state) which is in accordance with the
right rule'; now the right rule is that which is in accordance with
practical wisdom. All men, then, seem somehow to divine that this kind
of state is virtue, viz. that which is in accordance with practical
wisdom. But we must go a little further. For it is not merely the
state in accordance with the right rule, but the state that implies
the presence of the right rule, that is virtue; and practical wisdom
is a right rule about such matters. Socrates, then, thought the
virtues were rules or rational principles (for he thought they were,
all of them, forms of scientific knowledge), while we think they
involve a rational principle.

It is clear, then, from what has been said, that it is not
possible to be good in the strict sense without practical wisdom,
nor practically wise without moral virtue. But in this way we may also
refute the dialectical argument whereby it might be contended that the
virtues exist in separation from each other; the same man, it might be
said, is not best equipped by nature for all the virtues, so that he
will have already acquired one when he has not yet acquired another.
This is possible in respect of the natural virtues, but not in respect
of those in respect of which a man is called without qualification
good; for with the presence of the one quality, practical wisdom, will
be given all the virtues. And it is plain that, even if it were of
no practical value, we should have needed it because it is the
virtue of the part of us in question; plain too that the choice will
not be right without practical wisdom any more than without virtue;
for the one deter, mines the end and the other makes us do the
things that lead to the end.

But again it is not supreme over philosophic wisdom, i. e. over the
superior part of us, any more than the art of medicine is over health;
for it does not use it but provides for its coming into being; it
issues orders, then, for its sake, but not to it. Further, to maintain
its supremacy would be like saying that the art of politics rules
the gods because it issues orders about all the affairs of the state.

BOOK VII

1

LET us now make a fresh beginning and point out that of moral states
to be avoided there are three kinds-vice, incontinence, brutishness.
The contraries of two of these are evident,-one we call virtue, the
other continence; to brutishness it would be most fitting to oppose
superhuman virtue, a heroic and divine kind of virtue, as Homer has
represented Priam saying of Hector that he was very good,

For he seemed not, he,

The child of a mortal man, but as one that of God's seed came.

Therefore if, as they say, men become gods by excess of virtue, of
this kind must evidently be the state opposed to the brutish state;
for as a brute has no vice or virtue, so neither has a god; his
state is higher than virtue, and that of a brute is a different kind
of state from vice.

Now, since it is rarely that a godlike man is found-to use the
epithet of the Spartans, who when they admire any one highly call
him a 'godlike man'-so too the brutish type is rarely found among men;
it is found chiefly among barbarians, but some brutish qualities are
also produced by disease or deformity; and we also call by this evil
name those men who go beyond all ordinary standards by reason of vice.
Of this kind of disposition, however, we must later make some mention,
while we have discussed vice before we must now discuss incontinence
and softness (or effeminacy), and continence and endurance; for we
must treat each of the two neither as identical with virtue or
wickedness, nor as a different genus. We must, as in all other
cases, set the observed facts before us and, after first discussing
the difficulties, go on to prove, if possible, the truth of all the
common opinions about these affections of the mind, or, failing
this, of the greater number and the most authoritative; for if we both
refute the objections and leave the common opinions undisturbed, we
shall have proved the case sufficiently.