Persia
was the power of which they were always thinking as
* The king of Persia.
was the power of which they were always thinking as
* The king of Persia.
Demosthenese - 1869 - Brodribb
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? EARLY SPEECHES ON FOREIGN POLICY. 55
for her soldiers in other quarters, contrived to send
an army into the Peloponnese; and after some inde~
cisive engagements, a truce was concluded, which left
matters as they were. Megalopolis and the . Arcadian
confederacy escaped the peril with which Sparta had
threatened them. But the result to Athens and to
Greece was unsatisfactory. Subsequently, when they
apprehended a similar danger from Sparta, they did
not think it worth their while to ask help from Athens.
They did not care to be refused a second time, and on
this occasion they applied to Philip. He was not the
man to miss such an opportunity; and thus Mace-
donian influence was brought to bear on the affairs of
the Peloponnese. This was the unfortunate conse-
quence of the indifference of Athens to the progress
of Spartan ambition. She gave the impression to the
Greek world that she was not in earnest in wishing to
maintain the liberties of the states of the Peloponnese,
although it had been her constant profession to do so.
This was the inference drawn from her refusal to ally
herself with Megalopolis against Sparta. Had she
been guided by the counsels of Demosthenes, she
would have assumed a dignified political attitude, and,
as events turned out, have put a stumbling-block in
the way of her future enemy and destroyer. It is
true, indeed, that at that time there was no distinct
cause of apprehension from Macedon, and there is not
even any allusion to Philip in this speech of Demos-
thenes. We may therefore conclude that as yet he
himself feared nothing in that quarter. Still, it is not
the less to his credit that he urged Athens to adopt a
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? 56 DEMOSTHENES.
policy which would have won for her the respect and
confidence of many of the Greeks, and might have had
the effect of excluding the intrusion of a most danger-
ous foreign infiuence into an important part of the
Greek world.
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? CHAPTER VI.
FIRST SPEECH OF DEMOSTHENES AGAINST PHILIP--SPEECH
FOR THE FREEDOM OF THE PEOPLE OF RHODES.
THE year 352 no. brought with it the beginnings of
great events. In that year, for the first time, the king
of Macedon really showed that he might possibly be
entertaining designs fraught with peril to the Greek
world. He had prominently intervened in Greek
politics. He had taken a conspicuous part in the
Sacred or Holy War between the Thebans and Phocians.
Once, indeed, he had been utterly defeated by the
Phocian leader, Onomarchus, and had been driven
back into his kingdom with loss and disaster, though
report made him say that "he did not fly, but fell
back, like the battering-ram, to give a more 'violent
shock another time. " He speedily again entered Thes-
saly with a more powerful army; and with the help of
his allies in that country and of the admirable Thes-
salian cavalry, he won at Pagasae a decisive victory
over Onomarchus, who perished in the flight. N ow
he was completely master of Thessaly, a country which
ought to have been under the control of a Greek state,
and in which, of late, Theban influence had been
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? 58 DEMOSTHENES.
supreme. Macedon was thus in effect the principal
land power to the north of the Peloponnese; and her
king had both displayed military genius, and had
shown that he was in command of an army with
which it was already a question 'whether any single
Greek state could cope. The battle just fought was
on a very considerable scale, and could not have failed
to suggest unpleasant apprehensions to the mind of
every thinking politician. Philip might very possibly
follow up his success with an instant invasion of
northern Greece. He did in fact advance on Ther-
mopylae; but Athens had forestalled him, and the
famous pass was guarded by a force before which he
thought it prudent to retire. The Athenians exulted
in the reflection that they had once again been the
deliverers of Greece. But their joy was doomed to be
of very brief duration. __'
For a few months the king of Macedon einployed
himself in securing a firm hold on Thessaly. Mean-
while his cruisers and privateers, of which he had
contrived to raise a formidable number, infested the
northern islands and coasts of the ]Egean, to the great
annoyance and injury of Athenian trade. In the
autumn of 352 13. 0. he hurried northwards, entered
Thrace, and took advantage of its intestine feuds, with
a view to getting the country under his control. In
November news reached Athens, the serious import of
which could not be misunderstood. Philip was be- .
sieging Heraeum--a place probably on the northern
coast of the Propontis, to the west of Perinthus. It
was contiguous to the Thracian Chersonese, occupied,
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? FIRST SPEECH AGAINST PHILIP. 59
as we have seen, by Athenian colonists, ano, as it
appears, actually garrisoned by an Athenian force.
The act was thus one of almost open hostility, and
practically equivalent to a declaration of war. But
what made it singularly alarming was, that it was a
most dangerous menace to the Athenian interests on
the north of the ]Egean. It meant, in fact, peril to
the corn trade of Athens, and high prices and possibly
famine to the citizens. It showed too, clearly enough,
that Philip, if he could, would rob the city of its most
valuable outlying possessions. Thus the eyes of the
people ought to have been thoroughly opened to the
'danger which hung over them; but as soon as they
knew that Philip was ill, and next heard a report of
his death, they fell back into their love of the easy,
comfortable life at Athens, with its pleasures and
amusements, and flattered themselves with the notion
that the crisis was finally past. The peace party, with
Eubulus at its head, always strong, was now for the
moment stronger than ever; and its best representative,
the really patriotic Phocion, was too cynical to believe
in the possibility of his countrymen being roused to
the degree of effort and endurance which a serious
struggle with Macedon would demand from them.
As soon as it was known that Philip had recovered,
and was as active and aggressive as ever, there were, it
appears, several acrimonious debates in the Assembly,
with grievous complaints as to the inefliciency of the
generals and of their troops. Athens still clung to her
maritime supremacy, and it was felt to be disgraceful
that this should be threatened by a barbarian. Still,
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? 60 DEMOSTHENES.
her public men had not themoral courage to tell the
people plainly the only way by which such a disgrace
could be ended. It was painful to speak to them of
personal service on shipboard, with all its hardships
and risks. Demosthenes, in his speech on the war
with Persia, had hinted, not obseurely, at this neces-
sity. He did so far more clearly and persistently on
the occasion we have been describing. At the age of
about thirty he spoke the memorable harangue known
as the First Philippic.
The speech shows that he had now quite made up
his mind on the subject of the foreign policy of Athens.
A year ago he had not, as we may reasonably infer,
regarded Macedon as a source of real danger to the
freedom of the Greek world. He was now convinced
that Philip had designs beyond the mere establishment
of a compact and powerful northern kingdom. He
takes a broad view of the political situation, and speaks
not merely as a citizen of the foremost state of Greece,
but as a Greek on behalf of Greek security and inde-
pendence.
It was assuredly much to the honour of Demosthenes
that, as a young politician, he sounded a distinct note
of warning, which he must have known would have
jarred on the easy-going temper of his countrymen.
Their affairs, he plainly tells them, were in a very bad
plight; but there was hope, just because they had not
as yet really exerted themselves. Therefore there was
no reason for despair. Philip's power, indeed, was
already great: he had Thessaly at his feet; he had
defeated a Greek army under a brave and experienced
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? FIRST SPEECH AGAINST PHILIP. ' 61
leader; he was now threatening the Chersonese and
the northern coasts of the Aigean, and with his fleet
was harassing the commerce of Athens; still, he was
not a more formidable foe than Sparta had been; and
the fact that he was formidable at all was due to their
own voluntary supineness, which, for the sake of
Greece and for the glory of Athens, they must shake
off once and for ever. Otherwise, even if rumour had
truly asserted Philip's death, they would soon raise up
against themselves another Philip equally terrible.
" You must not despond," he says at the beginning
of his speech, "under your present circumstances,
wretched as they are; for that which is worst in them
as regards the past, is best for the future. My mean-
ing is this--your affairs are amiss because you do no-
thing which is required. If the result were the same,
although you performed your duties, there would. be
no hope of amendment. Consider, further, what is
known to you by hearsay, and what men of experience
remember. Not long ago, how vast a power the Lace-
daemonians possessed ! Yet how nobly and admirably
did you consult the dignity of Athens, and undertook
the war against them for the rights of Greece! Why
do I mention this! To show and convince you that
nothing, if you take precaution, is to be feared; noth-
ing, if you are negligent, goes as you desire. Take, for
examples, the strength of the Lacedaemonians, which
you overcame by minding your duty; and the insolent
ambition of this Philip now, which utterly confounds
us through our neglect of our interest. If any of you
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? 02 _ zwuosryazvas.
think the man a formidable foe, looking at the vastness
of his present power and our loss of all our strongholds,
that is reasonable enough; only you should reflect that
there was a time when we held Pydna, and Potidaea,
and Methone, with all the adjacent country, and that
many of the nations now in league with Philip were
independent and free, and preferred our friendship to
his. Had Philip then taken it into his head that
Athens was too formidable a foe to fight, when she
had so many fortresses to threaten his country, and he
was destitute of allies, nothing that he has accomplished
would he have attempted, and never would he have
acquired so large a dominion. But he saw clearly
enough that such places are the open prizes of war ;--
that the possessions of the absent belong to the pre-
sent, those of the careless to the adventurous who
shrink not from toil. Acting on that principle, he has
won everything, and keeps it either by way of con-,
quest or by friendly attachment and alliance; for all
men will side with and respect those whom they see
prepared and willing to make proper exertions. If
you will adopt this principle now, though you have
'not hitherto done so--and if every man, when he can
and ought to give his service to the State, be ready to
give it without excuse--if the rich will contribute, if-
the able-bodied will enlist,--in a word, plainly, if you
will become your own masters, and cease each expect-
ing to do nothing himself, while his neighbour does
everything for him,--then will you, with heaven's
permission, recover your own, and get back what has
been frittered away, and chastise Philip. Do not im-
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? FIRST SPEECH AGAINST PHILIP. 63
agine that his empire is everlastingly secured to him as
to a god. There are who hate and fear and envy him,
even among those that seem most friendly ; and all
feelings natural to other men exist, we may assume, in
his confederates. But now they are all cowed, for they
have no refuge because of your tardiness and indolence,
which I say you must abandon forthwith. "
On the subject of the preparations they ought to
make, Demosthenes thus advises them :--
"First, we must provide fifty war-ships, and hold
ourselves prepared in case of emergency to embark and
sail. There must, too, be an equipment of transports
for half the cavalry, and sufficient boats. This we
must have in readiness against his sudden marches
from his own country to Thermopylae, the Chersonesc,
Olynthus, and anywhere he likes. For he should be
made to have the idea that possibly you may rouse
yourselves out of this over-supineness and start off as
you did to Euboea, and very lately to Thermopylae.
Such an armament, I say, ought instantly to be agreed
upon and provided. "
In the following passage, the want of skill and
method with which Athens was carrying on the con-
test is strikingly exposed :--
" You, Athenians, with larger means than any people,
have never up to this day made proper use of any of
them, and your war with Philip is exactly like the
boxing of barbarians. VVith them, the party struck
first is always feeling for the blow; strike him any-
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? 64 ' DEMOSTHENES.
where else, there go his hands again ; ward or look
you in the face he cannot and will not. So with you.
If you hear of Philip in the Chersonese or at Ther-
mopylae, you vote to send a force there; if you hear of
him somewhere else, you run, so to say, after his heels
up and down, and are, in fact, commanded by him.
No plan have you devised for the war; no circum-
stance do you see beforehand, but only when you learn
that something is done or is about to be done. For-
merly, perhaps, this was allowable; now it is come to
a crisis to be borne no longer. It seems as if some
god, in shame at our proceedings, had put this activity
into Philip. For had he been willing to remain quiet
in possession of his conquests and prizes, and attempted
nothing further, some of you, I think, would be satis-
fied with a state of things which brands our nation
with the shame of cowardice and of the foulest dis-
grace. But by continually encroaching and grasping
after more, he may possibly rouse you, if you have not
altogether despaired. I marvel, indeed, that not one
of you notices with concern and anger that the begin-
ning of this war was to chastise Philip; the end is to
protect ourselves against his attacks. "
Towards the conclusion of his speech, Demosthenes
reproaches the people with their silly fondness for
gossiping about Philip's reported movements, and bids
them remember that he now is and long has been their
enemy :-- _
"Some among ourselves go about and say that
Philip is concerting with the Lacedaemonians the de-
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? FIRST SPEECH AGAINST PHILIP. 65
struction of Thebes and the dissolution of free states;
some, that he has sent envoys to the King;* others,
that he is fortifying cities in Illyria. So we wander
about, each inventing stories. For my part, I quite
believe that Philip is thoroughly intoxicated with the
magnitude of his exploits, and that he has many such
dreams in his imagination. Still, most assuredly his
plan of action is not such as to let the greatest fools
among us know what his intentions are. For the
greatest fools are these newsmongers. Let us dismiss
such talk, and remember only that Philip is an enemy
who robs us of our own, and has long insulted us;
that whenever we have expected aid from any quarter,
it has been found hostile; and that the future depends
on ourselves; and, unless we are willing to fight him
there, we shall perhaps be compelled to fight here.
This let us remember, and then we shall have deter-
mined wisely, and have done with idle conjectures.
You need not pry into the future, but assure your-
selves that it will be disastrous, unless you give your
mind to your duty, and are willing to act as becomes
you. "
The only result of this speech was, that a paltry
four or five ships were sent to the Chersonese under a
mercenary and somewhat disreputable general, Chari-
demus. The fact was, that there was a numerous party
at Athens who never could be persuaded that Philip
would some day be a really dangerous enemy.
Persia
was the power of which they were always thinking as
* The king of Persia.
a. o. s. s. vol. iv. E
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? 66 DEAIOSTHENES.
the great source of peril to Greece. There were still
rumours flying about 'as to the gigantic preparations
which the King was said to be making against them to
revenge the defeats of Marathon and Salamis. Possibly
such reports were stimulated by Philip himself. Next
there were those who were, in fact, Philip's paid agents,
now, no doubt, a considerable class in several Greek
states. And, last of all, there was incredulity and
apathy among the Athenians themselves. All these
adverse influences were too strong for Demosthenes,
and his appeal to the patriotism of his countrymen
was made in vain.
In the speech we have been describing, Demosthenes
dwelt on the duty of Athens _to put herself forward as
the champion of Greece and of its free states. In a
speech delivered some months or perhaps a year after-
wards, he reminds her that she ought to be the cham-
pion of democracy and of popular government. From
this point of view, the oration entitled " On the
freedom of the people of Rhodes " has much interest.
We rather gather, from the general tone of the speech,
that Philip's restlessness had ceased for a time, or at
all events that he had something else to do than to
threaten the possessions and the commerce of Athens.
It was made on the occasion of a deputation from the
democratic party in Rhodes, who wished the island to
pass again under Athenian control.
' Rhodes had more than once been in alliance with
Athens--a connection which practically implied a cer-
tain degree of subjection and dependence. With the
close of the Peloponnesian War and the triumph of
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? FIRST SPEECH AGAINST PHILIP. 67
Sparta, it was put under an oligarchy, which meant
Spartan control. About the year 396 no. the Athenian
general Conon, who had a powerful fleet in the ZEgean,
again forced the Rhodians to become the allies of
Athens. Four years afterwards a Spartan fleet appeared,
and this was the signal for another revolution in the
government. There was, it seems, one of those horrible
incidents with which Greek history is so often dis-
figured--a massacre of the democratic leaders and of
the adherents of Athens. But the oligarchy now im-
posed on the island did not last long. The Spartan
fleet was defeated, and Rhodes and most of the islands
of the i/Egean returned to the Athenian alliance. We
may take for granted that democracy was re-established.
Then came, in 358 B. 0. , the Social War, the war between
Athens and her allies, which broke up the second
Athenian empire. Of this, Rhodes was the orig:'n.
Chares, the Athenian general, of whom we have
already had occasion to speak, provoked and disgusted
the Rhodians by plunder and extortion. Cos and
Chios had similar grievances ; and the three islands
threw off their connection with Athens, and began the
Social War--Rhodes being the prime mover. They
were helped by Mausolus, king of Caria and a vassal
prince of the Persian empire. He was a man of con-
siderable ambition, and his idea was to annex Rhodes,
which was adjacent to his own territories. It was first
necessary to detach it from the Athenian alliance ; and
Mausolus contrived, by intrigues with the oligarchical
party in the island, to introduce a Carian garrison ; and
once more the government was revolutionised. The
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? 68 DEMOSTHENES.
people and their leaders found themselves in a hopeless
plight, now that they had renounced their connection
with Athens, while the oligarchy was supported by
Persian influence through Mausolus. When that
king died and his queen Artemisia succeeded, the
government became so intolerably oppressive that the
popular party ventured to send an embassy to Athens',
and humbly to implore relief. It was hardly to be
expected that the embassy would be well received.
The Athenians felt that Rhodes had inflicted a grievous
injury on them by plunging them in a disastrous war,
which had ended in dissolving their confederacy. They
were in no mood to listen to the present petition.
Nevertheless it was supported by Demosthenes.
It is a hard matter to soothe the temper of people
when they feel, as the Athenians now did, that they
have suffered much from ingratitude. Popular as-
semblies, under such circumstances, are apt to be
peculiarly angry and excited. All that Demosthenes
could do was to appeal to the better and more generous
sentiments of his countrymen. They ought not, he
argued, to brood over the wrongs done to them by
these insignificant islanders, but to think only of what
was due to Athens and to Greece. It was alike their
duty and interest to vindicate the freedom of an op-
pressed Greek people, and to stand by the policy of
supporting popular and democratic government against
oligarchs and tyrants. 'Unless they resolved to act
thus, the political constitution of Athens would itself
be imperilled. If all democracies were put down, their
own would fall at last. Demosthenes, we see, was
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? SPEECH FOR THE FREEDOM OF RHODES. 69
heartily in sympathy with democracy, and regarded it
as the special glory of Athens to be its champion and
upholder. If at times he felt its weak side, and its
tendency to vacillation and irresolution, still he never
seems to have doubted that it was on the whole the
best and most manly type of government.
Such were his reasons for counselling the assembly
to listen favourably to the request for aid from the
Rhodians. In the following passage these views are
clearly expressed :---
"Observe, men of Athens, that you have waged
many wars both against democracies and against
oligarchies. This you know without my telling; but
for what causes you have been at war with either,
perhaps not one of you considers. What are the
causes' ! Against democratioal states your wars have
been either for private grievances, when you could not
make public satisfaction, or for territory or bound-
aries, or a point of honour, or for the leadership of
Greece. Against oligarchies you fought, not for such
things, but for your constitution and for freedom.
Therefore I would not hesitate to say that I think it
better that all the Greeks should be your enemies with
a popular government than your friends under an oli-
gar-chicaL For with free men I consider you would
have no dilficulty in making peace when you chose;
but with people under an oligarchy, even friendship I
hold to be insecure. It is impossible that the few can
be attached to the many, the seekers of power to the
lovers of constitutional equality. I marvel none of
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? 70 _ DEAIOSTHENEB.
you consider that, when the Rhodians and nearly all
people are drawn into this slavery, our constitution
must be in the same peril. If all other governments
are oligarchical, it is impossible that they will let your
democracy alone. They know too well that no other
people will bring things back to freedom; therefore
they will wish to destroy a government from which
they apprehend mischief to themselves. Ordinary
wrong-doers you may regard as enemies to the suffer-
ers ; while they who subvert constitutions and transform
them into oligarchies must be looked upon as the com-
mon enemies of all lovers of freedom. "
In the opinion of Demosthenes it thus appears
that oligarchy was in fact slavery, and wholly alien
to the Greek genius. The memory of the Athens of
Pericles was deeply impressed on his mind. But
he felt he was now addressing a people singularly
prone to be misled. He hints plainly in this speech
at the existence of an unpatriotic faction in the
State.
"It is difficult for you," he says, "to adopt right
measures. All other men have one battle to fight--
namely, against their open and avowed enemies. You
have a double contest--that which the rest have, and
also a prior and a more arduous one. You must in
counsel overcome a faction which acts among you in
systematic opposition to the State. Men who desert
the politics handed down to them by their ancestors,
and support oligarchical measures, should be degraded
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? SPEECH FOR THE FREEDOM OF RHODES. 71
and deprived of constitutional privileges, and disquali-
fied from being your political advisers. "
Again Demosthenes failed. The bitterness of Athe-
nian feeling towards the ungrateful islanders made the
people blind to higher considerations, and Rhodes re-
mained in the hands of an oligarchy. It was still
subject to Caria, and was thus really a Persian de-
pendcncy. '
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? CHAPTER VII.
PHILIP AND OLYNTHUS--SPEECHES OF DEMOSTHENES ON
BEHALF OF THE OLYNTHIANS.
WHEN Demosthenes, some time in the year 352 13. 0. ,
made his first speech against Philip, there were good
grounds for an uneasy feeling throughout the Greek
world as to the king's possible movements and designs.
He had already raised Macedon to a position it had
never before held. It had become a distinct power
in the politics of Greece. For a while, however, the
usually active Philip seemed to be really resting from
his labours, and next to nothing was heard of him.
Demosthenes does not so much as allude to him in his
speech "for the freedom of the people of Rhodes. " We
may fairly infer from his silence that anything like
serious apprehensions at Athens of peril from "the
barbarian," as Philip was called, had died away. The
peace party, always strong, and able to make out a
plausible ease for itself, would thus be strengthened;
and it would not be easy, even in the face of manifest
danger, thoroughly to reuse the Athenians to a sense of
the dutywhich they owed both to themselves and to
Greece.
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? PHILIP AND OLYNTHUS. 73
Philip was by this time a powerful prince; but still
he was as yet barely a match for Athens, had she
chosen to put forth her full strength. He had an
efficient army and a good revenue, and he also had
the luck to have other collateral advantages. He had
tools and agerits in several Greek states; and he had
practically on his side at Athens very many of the rich
and well-to-do citizens, who shrank from the idea of
a war which required personal service and exertion.
It was perfectly clear that a contest with him would
have been a serious undertaking. At the same time,
his position, though strong, was not altogether secure.
He had, as we have seen, possessed himself of some of
the coast towns, and he had a fleet in the 1Egean.
Athens should never have allowed him to advance to
this point. She had flung away opportunities; but
even now it was not too late to check him with the
help of a seasonable alliance. As yet he had no hold
on the district known as Chalcidice, which juts out
with its three peninsulas into the north-west of the
! Egean. It was a valuable and commanding strip of
country; and it contained thirty Greek towns, of
which the chief was the city Olynthus, at the
head of the Toronaean gulf. Some of these towns
regarded themselves as dependencies of Olynthus,
and formed what was known as the Olynthian
confederacy. There was a time when even Pella,
now the capital of Macedonia, was included in their
number. Olynthus, indeed, had been quite the most
powerful city in the north of the 1Egean, and far too
proud to submit to the supremacy of either Sparta or
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? 74 DEMOSTHENES.
Athens. Sparta with much difliculty forced it, in
379 B. 0. , into the Lacedaemonian confederacy; and
Athens, about ten years later, very much weakened its
influence by taking from it some of its territory and
of its subject-towns. Still, however, it was prosperous
and flourishing; and it could, at an extremity, bring
into the field a considerable military force, especially
of cavalry. Although it owed Athens a grudge, it had,
as we have seen, proposed alliance when it saw its
neighbour, Amphipolis, pass into the hands of Philip.
Athens declined the offer, and Philip was clever enough
temporarily to conciliate the goodwill of the Olynth-
ians by a trifling concession of territory,--intending, no
doubt, at the first convenient moment, to pick a quar-
rel with them and annex the whole district. It must
have been easy for him, in the case of a city immedi-
ately in his own neighbourhood, to have his partisans
among the citizens; and it was to this that he was in-
debted for his ultimate success. The towns, too, which
were connected with Olynthus by the loose tie of feder-
ation, were no doubt singularly open to his intrigues.
Still, there was the feeling that he might become a
dangerous aggressor; and accordingly Olynthus decided
on a change of policy, and, in 352 13. 0. , withdrew itself
from the Macedonian alliance. The next step was to
conclude peace with Athens, and even to show a wish
for a yet closer union with that state. Athens, too,
new saw the advantage of such a union, and, indeed,
actually made overtures to that effect; but Olynthus
was not- quite prepared to commit itself definitely
to an Athenian alliance, which it well knew' would
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? PHILIP AND OLYNTHUS.
? EARLY SPEECHES ON FOREIGN POLICY. 55
for her soldiers in other quarters, contrived to send
an army into the Peloponnese; and after some inde~
cisive engagements, a truce was concluded, which left
matters as they were. Megalopolis and the . Arcadian
confederacy escaped the peril with which Sparta had
threatened them. But the result to Athens and to
Greece was unsatisfactory. Subsequently, when they
apprehended a similar danger from Sparta, they did
not think it worth their while to ask help from Athens.
They did not care to be refused a second time, and on
this occasion they applied to Philip. He was not the
man to miss such an opportunity; and thus Mace-
donian influence was brought to bear on the affairs of
the Peloponnese. This was the unfortunate conse-
quence of the indifference of Athens to the progress
of Spartan ambition. She gave the impression to the
Greek world that she was not in earnest in wishing to
maintain the liberties of the states of the Peloponnese,
although it had been her constant profession to do so.
This was the inference drawn from her refusal to ally
herself with Megalopolis against Sparta. Had she
been guided by the counsels of Demosthenes, she
would have assumed a dignified political attitude, and,
as events turned out, have put a stumbling-block in
the way of her future enemy and destroyer. It is
true, indeed, that at that time there was no distinct
cause of apprehension from Macedon, and there is not
even any allusion to Philip in this speech of Demos-
thenes. We may therefore conclude that as yet he
himself feared nothing in that quarter. Still, it is not
the less to his credit that he urged Athens to adopt a
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? 56 DEMOSTHENES.
policy which would have won for her the respect and
confidence of many of the Greeks, and might have had
the effect of excluding the intrusion of a most danger-
ous foreign infiuence into an important part of the
Greek world.
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? CHAPTER VI.
FIRST SPEECH OF DEMOSTHENES AGAINST PHILIP--SPEECH
FOR THE FREEDOM OF THE PEOPLE OF RHODES.
THE year 352 no. brought with it the beginnings of
great events. In that year, for the first time, the king
of Macedon really showed that he might possibly be
entertaining designs fraught with peril to the Greek
world. He had prominently intervened in Greek
politics. He had taken a conspicuous part in the
Sacred or Holy War between the Thebans and Phocians.
Once, indeed, he had been utterly defeated by the
Phocian leader, Onomarchus, and had been driven
back into his kingdom with loss and disaster, though
report made him say that "he did not fly, but fell
back, like the battering-ram, to give a more 'violent
shock another time. " He speedily again entered Thes-
saly with a more powerful army; and with the help of
his allies in that country and of the admirable Thes-
salian cavalry, he won at Pagasae a decisive victory
over Onomarchus, who perished in the flight. N ow
he was completely master of Thessaly, a country which
ought to have been under the control of a Greek state,
and in which, of late, Theban influence had been
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? 58 DEMOSTHENES.
supreme. Macedon was thus in effect the principal
land power to the north of the Peloponnese; and her
king had both displayed military genius, and had
shown that he was in command of an army with
which it was already a question 'whether any single
Greek state could cope. The battle just fought was
on a very considerable scale, and could not have failed
to suggest unpleasant apprehensions to the mind of
every thinking politician. Philip might very possibly
follow up his success with an instant invasion of
northern Greece. He did in fact advance on Ther-
mopylae; but Athens had forestalled him, and the
famous pass was guarded by a force before which he
thought it prudent to retire. The Athenians exulted
in the reflection that they had once again been the
deliverers of Greece. But their joy was doomed to be
of very brief duration. __'
For a few months the king of Macedon einployed
himself in securing a firm hold on Thessaly. Mean-
while his cruisers and privateers, of which he had
contrived to raise a formidable number, infested the
northern islands and coasts of the ]Egean, to the great
annoyance and injury of Athenian trade. In the
autumn of 352 13. 0. he hurried northwards, entered
Thrace, and took advantage of its intestine feuds, with
a view to getting the country under his control. In
November news reached Athens, the serious import of
which could not be misunderstood. Philip was be- .
sieging Heraeum--a place probably on the northern
coast of the Propontis, to the west of Perinthus. It
was contiguous to the Thracian Chersonese, occupied,
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? FIRST SPEECH AGAINST PHILIP. 59
as we have seen, by Athenian colonists, ano, as it
appears, actually garrisoned by an Athenian force.
The act was thus one of almost open hostility, and
practically equivalent to a declaration of war. But
what made it singularly alarming was, that it was a
most dangerous menace to the Athenian interests on
the north of the ]Egean. It meant, in fact, peril to
the corn trade of Athens, and high prices and possibly
famine to the citizens. It showed too, clearly enough,
that Philip, if he could, would rob the city of its most
valuable outlying possessions. Thus the eyes of the
people ought to have been thoroughly opened to the
'danger which hung over them; but as soon as they
knew that Philip was ill, and next heard a report of
his death, they fell back into their love of the easy,
comfortable life at Athens, with its pleasures and
amusements, and flattered themselves with the notion
that the crisis was finally past. The peace party, with
Eubulus at its head, always strong, was now for the
moment stronger than ever; and its best representative,
the really patriotic Phocion, was too cynical to believe
in the possibility of his countrymen being roused to
the degree of effort and endurance which a serious
struggle with Macedon would demand from them.
As soon as it was known that Philip had recovered,
and was as active and aggressive as ever, there were, it
appears, several acrimonious debates in the Assembly,
with grievous complaints as to the inefliciency of the
generals and of their troops. Athens still clung to her
maritime supremacy, and it was felt to be disgraceful
that this should be threatened by a barbarian. Still,
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? 60 DEMOSTHENES.
her public men had not themoral courage to tell the
people plainly the only way by which such a disgrace
could be ended. It was painful to speak to them of
personal service on shipboard, with all its hardships
and risks. Demosthenes, in his speech on the war
with Persia, had hinted, not obseurely, at this neces-
sity. He did so far more clearly and persistently on
the occasion we have been describing. At the age of
about thirty he spoke the memorable harangue known
as the First Philippic.
The speech shows that he had now quite made up
his mind on the subject of the foreign policy of Athens.
A year ago he had not, as we may reasonably infer,
regarded Macedon as a source of real danger to the
freedom of the Greek world. He was now convinced
that Philip had designs beyond the mere establishment
of a compact and powerful northern kingdom. He
takes a broad view of the political situation, and speaks
not merely as a citizen of the foremost state of Greece,
but as a Greek on behalf of Greek security and inde-
pendence.
It was assuredly much to the honour of Demosthenes
that, as a young politician, he sounded a distinct note
of warning, which he must have known would have
jarred on the easy-going temper of his countrymen.
Their affairs, he plainly tells them, were in a very bad
plight; but there was hope, just because they had not
as yet really exerted themselves. Therefore there was
no reason for despair. Philip's power, indeed, was
already great: he had Thessaly at his feet; he had
defeated a Greek army under a brave and experienced
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? FIRST SPEECH AGAINST PHILIP. ' 61
leader; he was now threatening the Chersonese and
the northern coasts of the Aigean, and with his fleet
was harassing the commerce of Athens; still, he was
not a more formidable foe than Sparta had been; and
the fact that he was formidable at all was due to their
own voluntary supineness, which, for the sake of
Greece and for the glory of Athens, they must shake
off once and for ever. Otherwise, even if rumour had
truly asserted Philip's death, they would soon raise up
against themselves another Philip equally terrible.
" You must not despond," he says at the beginning
of his speech, "under your present circumstances,
wretched as they are; for that which is worst in them
as regards the past, is best for the future. My mean-
ing is this--your affairs are amiss because you do no-
thing which is required. If the result were the same,
although you performed your duties, there would. be
no hope of amendment. Consider, further, what is
known to you by hearsay, and what men of experience
remember. Not long ago, how vast a power the Lace-
daemonians possessed ! Yet how nobly and admirably
did you consult the dignity of Athens, and undertook
the war against them for the rights of Greece! Why
do I mention this! To show and convince you that
nothing, if you take precaution, is to be feared; noth-
ing, if you are negligent, goes as you desire. Take, for
examples, the strength of the Lacedaemonians, which
you overcame by minding your duty; and the insolent
ambition of this Philip now, which utterly confounds
us through our neglect of our interest. If any of you
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? 02 _ zwuosryazvas.
think the man a formidable foe, looking at the vastness
of his present power and our loss of all our strongholds,
that is reasonable enough; only you should reflect that
there was a time when we held Pydna, and Potidaea,
and Methone, with all the adjacent country, and that
many of the nations now in league with Philip were
independent and free, and preferred our friendship to
his. Had Philip then taken it into his head that
Athens was too formidable a foe to fight, when she
had so many fortresses to threaten his country, and he
was destitute of allies, nothing that he has accomplished
would he have attempted, and never would he have
acquired so large a dominion. But he saw clearly
enough that such places are the open prizes of war ;--
that the possessions of the absent belong to the pre-
sent, those of the careless to the adventurous who
shrink not from toil. Acting on that principle, he has
won everything, and keeps it either by way of con-,
quest or by friendly attachment and alliance; for all
men will side with and respect those whom they see
prepared and willing to make proper exertions. If
you will adopt this principle now, though you have
'not hitherto done so--and if every man, when he can
and ought to give his service to the State, be ready to
give it without excuse--if the rich will contribute, if-
the able-bodied will enlist,--in a word, plainly, if you
will become your own masters, and cease each expect-
ing to do nothing himself, while his neighbour does
everything for him,--then will you, with heaven's
permission, recover your own, and get back what has
been frittered away, and chastise Philip. Do not im-
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? FIRST SPEECH AGAINST PHILIP. 63
agine that his empire is everlastingly secured to him as
to a god. There are who hate and fear and envy him,
even among those that seem most friendly ; and all
feelings natural to other men exist, we may assume, in
his confederates. But now they are all cowed, for they
have no refuge because of your tardiness and indolence,
which I say you must abandon forthwith. "
On the subject of the preparations they ought to
make, Demosthenes thus advises them :--
"First, we must provide fifty war-ships, and hold
ourselves prepared in case of emergency to embark and
sail. There must, too, be an equipment of transports
for half the cavalry, and sufficient boats. This we
must have in readiness against his sudden marches
from his own country to Thermopylae, the Chersonesc,
Olynthus, and anywhere he likes. For he should be
made to have the idea that possibly you may rouse
yourselves out of this over-supineness and start off as
you did to Euboea, and very lately to Thermopylae.
Such an armament, I say, ought instantly to be agreed
upon and provided. "
In the following passage, the want of skill and
method with which Athens was carrying on the con-
test is strikingly exposed :--
" You, Athenians, with larger means than any people,
have never up to this day made proper use of any of
them, and your war with Philip is exactly like the
boxing of barbarians. VVith them, the party struck
first is always feeling for the blow; strike him any-
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? 64 ' DEMOSTHENES.
where else, there go his hands again ; ward or look
you in the face he cannot and will not. So with you.
If you hear of Philip in the Chersonese or at Ther-
mopylae, you vote to send a force there; if you hear of
him somewhere else, you run, so to say, after his heels
up and down, and are, in fact, commanded by him.
No plan have you devised for the war; no circum-
stance do you see beforehand, but only when you learn
that something is done or is about to be done. For-
merly, perhaps, this was allowable; now it is come to
a crisis to be borne no longer. It seems as if some
god, in shame at our proceedings, had put this activity
into Philip. For had he been willing to remain quiet
in possession of his conquests and prizes, and attempted
nothing further, some of you, I think, would be satis-
fied with a state of things which brands our nation
with the shame of cowardice and of the foulest dis-
grace. But by continually encroaching and grasping
after more, he may possibly rouse you, if you have not
altogether despaired. I marvel, indeed, that not one
of you notices with concern and anger that the begin-
ning of this war was to chastise Philip; the end is to
protect ourselves against his attacks. "
Towards the conclusion of his speech, Demosthenes
reproaches the people with their silly fondness for
gossiping about Philip's reported movements, and bids
them remember that he now is and long has been their
enemy :-- _
"Some among ourselves go about and say that
Philip is concerting with the Lacedaemonians the de-
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? FIRST SPEECH AGAINST PHILIP. 65
struction of Thebes and the dissolution of free states;
some, that he has sent envoys to the King;* others,
that he is fortifying cities in Illyria. So we wander
about, each inventing stories. For my part, I quite
believe that Philip is thoroughly intoxicated with the
magnitude of his exploits, and that he has many such
dreams in his imagination. Still, most assuredly his
plan of action is not such as to let the greatest fools
among us know what his intentions are. For the
greatest fools are these newsmongers. Let us dismiss
such talk, and remember only that Philip is an enemy
who robs us of our own, and has long insulted us;
that whenever we have expected aid from any quarter,
it has been found hostile; and that the future depends
on ourselves; and, unless we are willing to fight him
there, we shall perhaps be compelled to fight here.
This let us remember, and then we shall have deter-
mined wisely, and have done with idle conjectures.
You need not pry into the future, but assure your-
selves that it will be disastrous, unless you give your
mind to your duty, and are willing to act as becomes
you. "
The only result of this speech was, that a paltry
four or five ships were sent to the Chersonese under a
mercenary and somewhat disreputable general, Chari-
demus. The fact was, that there was a numerous party
at Athens who never could be persuaded that Philip
would some day be a really dangerous enemy.
Persia
was the power of which they were always thinking as
* The king of Persia.
a. o. s. s. vol. iv. E
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? 66 DEAIOSTHENES.
the great source of peril to Greece. There were still
rumours flying about 'as to the gigantic preparations
which the King was said to be making against them to
revenge the defeats of Marathon and Salamis. Possibly
such reports were stimulated by Philip himself. Next
there were those who were, in fact, Philip's paid agents,
now, no doubt, a considerable class in several Greek
states. And, last of all, there was incredulity and
apathy among the Athenians themselves. All these
adverse influences were too strong for Demosthenes,
and his appeal to the patriotism of his countrymen
was made in vain.
In the speech we have been describing, Demosthenes
dwelt on the duty of Athens _to put herself forward as
the champion of Greece and of its free states. In a
speech delivered some months or perhaps a year after-
wards, he reminds her that she ought to be the cham-
pion of democracy and of popular government. From
this point of view, the oration entitled " On the
freedom of the people of Rhodes " has much interest.
We rather gather, from the general tone of the speech,
that Philip's restlessness had ceased for a time, or at
all events that he had something else to do than to
threaten the possessions and the commerce of Athens.
It was made on the occasion of a deputation from the
democratic party in Rhodes, who wished the island to
pass again under Athenian control.
' Rhodes had more than once been in alliance with
Athens--a connection which practically implied a cer-
tain degree of subjection and dependence. With the
close of the Peloponnesian War and the triumph of
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? FIRST SPEECH AGAINST PHILIP. 67
Sparta, it was put under an oligarchy, which meant
Spartan control. About the year 396 no. the Athenian
general Conon, who had a powerful fleet in the ZEgean,
again forced the Rhodians to become the allies of
Athens. Four years afterwards a Spartan fleet appeared,
and this was the signal for another revolution in the
government. There was, it seems, one of those horrible
incidents with which Greek history is so often dis-
figured--a massacre of the democratic leaders and of
the adherents of Athens. But the oligarchy now im-
posed on the island did not last long. The Spartan
fleet was defeated, and Rhodes and most of the islands
of the i/Egean returned to the Athenian alliance. We
may take for granted that democracy was re-established.
Then came, in 358 B. 0. , the Social War, the war between
Athens and her allies, which broke up the second
Athenian empire. Of this, Rhodes was the orig:'n.
Chares, the Athenian general, of whom we have
already had occasion to speak, provoked and disgusted
the Rhodians by plunder and extortion. Cos and
Chios had similar grievances ; and the three islands
threw off their connection with Athens, and began the
Social War--Rhodes being the prime mover. They
were helped by Mausolus, king of Caria and a vassal
prince of the Persian empire. He was a man of con-
siderable ambition, and his idea was to annex Rhodes,
which was adjacent to his own territories. It was first
necessary to detach it from the Athenian alliance ; and
Mausolus contrived, by intrigues with the oligarchical
party in the island, to introduce a Carian garrison ; and
once more the government was revolutionised. The
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? 68 DEMOSTHENES.
people and their leaders found themselves in a hopeless
plight, now that they had renounced their connection
with Athens, while the oligarchy was supported by
Persian influence through Mausolus. When that
king died and his queen Artemisia succeeded, the
government became so intolerably oppressive that the
popular party ventured to send an embassy to Athens',
and humbly to implore relief. It was hardly to be
expected that the embassy would be well received.
The Athenians felt that Rhodes had inflicted a grievous
injury on them by plunging them in a disastrous war,
which had ended in dissolving their confederacy. They
were in no mood to listen to the present petition.
Nevertheless it was supported by Demosthenes.
It is a hard matter to soothe the temper of people
when they feel, as the Athenians now did, that they
have suffered much from ingratitude. Popular as-
semblies, under such circumstances, are apt to be
peculiarly angry and excited. All that Demosthenes
could do was to appeal to the better and more generous
sentiments of his countrymen. They ought not, he
argued, to brood over the wrongs done to them by
these insignificant islanders, but to think only of what
was due to Athens and to Greece. It was alike their
duty and interest to vindicate the freedom of an op-
pressed Greek people, and to stand by the policy of
supporting popular and democratic government against
oligarchs and tyrants. 'Unless they resolved to act
thus, the political constitution of Athens would itself
be imperilled. If all democracies were put down, their
own would fall at last. Demosthenes, we see, was
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? SPEECH FOR THE FREEDOM OF RHODES. 69
heartily in sympathy with democracy, and regarded it
as the special glory of Athens to be its champion and
upholder. If at times he felt its weak side, and its
tendency to vacillation and irresolution, still he never
seems to have doubted that it was on the whole the
best and most manly type of government.
Such were his reasons for counselling the assembly
to listen favourably to the request for aid from the
Rhodians. In the following passage these views are
clearly expressed :---
"Observe, men of Athens, that you have waged
many wars both against democracies and against
oligarchies. This you know without my telling; but
for what causes you have been at war with either,
perhaps not one of you considers. What are the
causes' ! Against democratioal states your wars have
been either for private grievances, when you could not
make public satisfaction, or for territory or bound-
aries, or a point of honour, or for the leadership of
Greece. Against oligarchies you fought, not for such
things, but for your constitution and for freedom.
Therefore I would not hesitate to say that I think it
better that all the Greeks should be your enemies with
a popular government than your friends under an oli-
gar-chicaL For with free men I consider you would
have no dilficulty in making peace when you chose;
but with people under an oligarchy, even friendship I
hold to be insecure. It is impossible that the few can
be attached to the many, the seekers of power to the
lovers of constitutional equality. I marvel none of
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? 70 _ DEAIOSTHENEB.
you consider that, when the Rhodians and nearly all
people are drawn into this slavery, our constitution
must be in the same peril. If all other governments
are oligarchical, it is impossible that they will let your
democracy alone. They know too well that no other
people will bring things back to freedom; therefore
they will wish to destroy a government from which
they apprehend mischief to themselves. Ordinary
wrong-doers you may regard as enemies to the suffer-
ers ; while they who subvert constitutions and transform
them into oligarchies must be looked upon as the com-
mon enemies of all lovers of freedom. "
In the opinion of Demosthenes it thus appears
that oligarchy was in fact slavery, and wholly alien
to the Greek genius. The memory of the Athens of
Pericles was deeply impressed on his mind. But
he felt he was now addressing a people singularly
prone to be misled. He hints plainly in this speech
at the existence of an unpatriotic faction in the
State.
"It is difficult for you," he says, "to adopt right
measures. All other men have one battle to fight--
namely, against their open and avowed enemies. You
have a double contest--that which the rest have, and
also a prior and a more arduous one. You must in
counsel overcome a faction which acts among you in
systematic opposition to the State. Men who desert
the politics handed down to them by their ancestors,
and support oligarchical measures, should be degraded
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? SPEECH FOR THE FREEDOM OF RHODES. 71
and deprived of constitutional privileges, and disquali-
fied from being your political advisers. "
Again Demosthenes failed. The bitterness of Athe-
nian feeling towards the ungrateful islanders made the
people blind to higher considerations, and Rhodes re-
mained in the hands of an oligarchy. It was still
subject to Caria, and was thus really a Persian de-
pendcncy. '
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? CHAPTER VII.
PHILIP AND OLYNTHUS--SPEECHES OF DEMOSTHENES ON
BEHALF OF THE OLYNTHIANS.
WHEN Demosthenes, some time in the year 352 13. 0. ,
made his first speech against Philip, there were good
grounds for an uneasy feeling throughout the Greek
world as to the king's possible movements and designs.
He had already raised Macedon to a position it had
never before held. It had become a distinct power
in the politics of Greece. For a while, however, the
usually active Philip seemed to be really resting from
his labours, and next to nothing was heard of him.
Demosthenes does not so much as allude to him in his
speech "for the freedom of the people of Rhodes. " We
may fairly infer from his silence that anything like
serious apprehensions at Athens of peril from "the
barbarian," as Philip was called, had died away. The
peace party, always strong, and able to make out a
plausible ease for itself, would thus be strengthened;
and it would not be easy, even in the face of manifest
danger, thoroughly to reuse the Athenians to a sense of
the dutywhich they owed both to themselves and to
Greece.
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? PHILIP AND OLYNTHUS. 73
Philip was by this time a powerful prince; but still
he was as yet barely a match for Athens, had she
chosen to put forth her full strength. He had an
efficient army and a good revenue, and he also had
the luck to have other collateral advantages. He had
tools and agerits in several Greek states; and he had
practically on his side at Athens very many of the rich
and well-to-do citizens, who shrank from the idea of
a war which required personal service and exertion.
It was perfectly clear that a contest with him would
have been a serious undertaking. At the same time,
his position, though strong, was not altogether secure.
He had, as we have seen, possessed himself of some of
the coast towns, and he had a fleet in the 1Egean.
Athens should never have allowed him to advance to
this point. She had flung away opportunities; but
even now it was not too late to check him with the
help of a seasonable alliance. As yet he had no hold
on the district known as Chalcidice, which juts out
with its three peninsulas into the north-west of the
! Egean. It was a valuable and commanding strip of
country; and it contained thirty Greek towns, of
which the chief was the city Olynthus, at the
head of the Toronaean gulf. Some of these towns
regarded themselves as dependencies of Olynthus,
and formed what was known as the Olynthian
confederacy. There was a time when even Pella,
now the capital of Macedonia, was included in their
number. Olynthus, indeed, had been quite the most
powerful city in the north of the 1Egean, and far too
proud to submit to the supremacy of either Sparta or
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? 74 DEMOSTHENES.
Athens. Sparta with much difliculty forced it, in
379 B. 0. , into the Lacedaemonian confederacy; and
Athens, about ten years later, very much weakened its
influence by taking from it some of its territory and
of its subject-towns. Still, however, it was prosperous
and flourishing; and it could, at an extremity, bring
into the field a considerable military force, especially
of cavalry. Although it owed Athens a grudge, it had,
as we have seen, proposed alliance when it saw its
neighbour, Amphipolis, pass into the hands of Philip.
Athens declined the offer, and Philip was clever enough
temporarily to conciliate the goodwill of the Olynth-
ians by a trifling concession of territory,--intending, no
doubt, at the first convenient moment, to pick a quar-
rel with them and annex the whole district. It must
have been easy for him, in the case of a city immedi-
ately in his own neighbourhood, to have his partisans
among the citizens; and it was to this that he was in-
debted for his ultimate success. The towns, too, which
were connected with Olynthus by the loose tie of feder-
ation, were no doubt singularly open to his intrigues.
Still, there was the feeling that he might become a
dangerous aggressor; and accordingly Olynthus decided
on a change of policy, and, in 352 13. 0. , withdrew itself
from the Macedonian alliance. The next step was to
conclude peace with Athens, and even to show a wish
for a yet closer union with that state. Athens, too,
new saw the advantage of such a union, and, indeed,
actually made overtures to that effect; but Olynthus
was not- quite prepared to commit itself definitely
to an Athenian alliance, which it well knew' would
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? PHILIP AND OLYNTHUS.
