Eduard Limonov, Moya
politicheskaia
biografiia, St.
Dugin - Alexander Dugin and New European Radical Right
He then points out parallels between "Third Rome, the Third Reich, the Third Inter- national,"98 and attempts to prove their common eschatological basis.
For Dugin, the original triad
16 KENNAN INSTITUTE OCCASIONAL PAPER #294
of Father, Son and Holy Spirit reveal to the ini- tiated that the Third Reich, just like Third Rome, will be the kingdom of the Holy Spirit. Thus, examining the fear that the term "fas- cism" still causes today, even though the phe- nomenon no longer exists as such, Dugin explains: "By fascism we obviously do not mean a concrete political phenomenon, but our deep- seated secret fear that brings the nationalist, the liberal, the communist and the democrat closer together. This fear does not have a political or ideological nature, it expresses a more general, more deep-seated feeling [. . . ] [the fear of] a magical fascism. "94
Dugin therefore advances a positive reading of fascism, and does not denounce Nazism, even though he condemns its racism. He is content with regretting that Hitler attacked the USSR and made mistakes in his application of the theo- ries of conservative revolution, which were bet- ter preserved by left-wing Nazis who called for an alliance between Germany and the Soviet Union. He especially appreciates the Waffen-SS95 and, even more, the cultural organization Ahnenerbe. In his publications of the 1990s, par- ticularly in periodicals and on his web sites, Dugin's ideological arsenal borrows from anoth- er typical component of the original fascism: the ideologization of sex. According to him, men and women respond to different philosophical principles (active and passive), and men's superi- ority is proven etymologically since, in numerous languages, a single term designates both male persons and human beings in general. 96 Thus, the liberalization of sex, pornography, feminism, homosexuality, and the fashion for Freudianism and psychoanalysis are part of the process of forced Westernization of the world. This "era of gynecocracy"97 heralds the "castration" of men and, along with it, the disappearance of tradi- tional society. Dugin calls for a revindication of eroticism in a phallo-centric and patriarchal way, and hopes to develop a "patriotic conscience" of the sexual act because "empire represents the cul- minating point of eroticism. "98
Like the original Fascists, Dugin admires the Romantic taste for death and combat, shares a contempt for contemporary society, which he believes to be bourgeois and decadent, and aspires to form young, purified generations: "the Eurasian is a strong, healthy, and beautiful person, who has passionarity and passion [. . . ]
Our ideal is to make good physical and moral health, strength, valor, fidelity and pride honor- able goals. "99 The journals Elementy and Milyi Angel, as well as the Internet sites linked to Dugin, are therefore filled with a strong military symbolism, and sometimes exhibit muscular, weapon-laden and khaki-clad bodies. The back cover of one of his latest books, The Philosophy of War (2004), is particularly explicit: "The value of peoples, cultures and societies is proved in war and through it. The beautiful is what has as its foundation the accomplishment of self-affir- mation. War renews Man, and the price to pay for this gigantic personal effort confirms his adherence to the community. War has always been a collective business, having as its goal the conservation of the people and the State, the increase of their power, of their space, and of their life regions. Herein lies the social and national sense of war. "100
A VEILED ANTI-SEMITISM
His exaltation of this warlike spirit, combined with numerous references to Fascist ideas, prompts questions on the place of the "Jewish question" in Dugin's thought. As with the other Eurasianist thinkers, this question is particularly complex because they all combine philo-Semitic and anti-Semitic arguments. Dugin proposes his own version of that conjunction in the form of a paradoxical Judaeophobic philo-Zionism.
In The Conservative Revolution (1994), Dugin recognizes that the state of Israel has realized a kind of Traditionalism: "the only state that has partly succeeded in putting into practice certain aspects of the conservative revolution is the state of Israel. "101 This prompted him to establish close links with some Israeli ultra-nationalist currents. Thus, since 1998, Dugin has sought to develop contacts with that part of the Israeli right which upholds the belief that all Jews must live in Israel. This militant Zionism agrees with him because it is in accordance with the principle of ethno-plu- ralism: all peoples should live in peace, but "at home. " The Evraziia movement is linked with two radical Zionist groups, Vladimir Boukharsky's MAOF Analytical Group and Be'ad Artzeinu, controlled by Rabbi Avram Shmulevich. These two groups, situated to the right of the right-wing Israeli party Likhud, are led by two former Soviet citizens of Jewish ori- gin who emigrated to Israel and are now com-
ALEKSANDR DUGIN: A RUSSIAN VERSION OF THE EUROPEAN RADICAL RIGHT? 17
mitted to politicizing the Israeli Russians. Both of them participated in the founding convention of Evraziia and occupy important positions in the party hierarchy. 102 The web site of the International Eurasianist Movement also men- tions a link with Avigdor Eskin, a former Soviet Jew who took refuge in Israel and is now fighting the "liberal oligarchy" which he says is running the country. 103 Some radical currents of Judaism (most often Zionist, but also Hasidic and mysti- cal)arealsorepresentedinEvraziiabyRabbisstill living in Russia, for example Adol'f Shaevich. They are all united by the idea that Jewish tradi- tion, like Orthodoxy and Islam, is a target of unceasing attacks by secularization, a kind of reli- gious globalization: only the unification of the traditionalists of all religions will allow for the development of strategies of resistance. 104
Dugin's objective of an alliance with Israel derives from the idea of a distinction between "good" and "bad" Judaism, which had already been developed by the first Eurasianists, in par- ticular in Iakov Bromberg's texts on the Jewish question. Dugin borrows from Bromberg the distinction between a Eurasian and an Atlanticist Jewishness. For Bromberg, the goal was to involve the Jews of the Russian Empire in the construction of Eurasia, and to invite them to cultivate their specificities without trying to assimilate to the Russians. However, he belittled the West European Jews whom he saw as bear- ers of political and economic modernity, of cap- italism and communism, and as being excessive- ly assimilated to the Romano-Germanic world. In Dugin's texts, the distinction is different: the "good" Jews are the citizens of Israel, as well as those who choose to leave for Israel, because this act signals their awareness of their irreducible Jewish specificity. The "bad" Jews are those who continue to live in the diaspora and try to be assimilated by the surrounding cultures, be it in the Atlanticist or the post-Soviet world. Thus, unlike the original Eurasianists, Dugin does not attempt to attract the East European Jews, whom he presents as historical enemies of Russian nationalism.
Dugin thus demonstrates a complex philo- Zionism combined with anti-Semitic state- ments, another combination typical of a part of the Western New Right. While he regularly criticizes the vulgar anti-Semitism espoused by most currents of Russian nationalism, he does
expound a more sophisticated and euphemized version of anti-Semitism, centered on more sub- tle religious and philosophical arguments. For example, he disagrees with Rene? Gue? non, who considered the Kabbala to be an authentic eso- tericism: for Dugin, the sense of the universal-- an indispensable element of any real Traditionalism--is absent from the Kabbala, which, like the Talmud, is founded on the Jewish ethnic consciousness. 105 He also argues that Traditionalism views history as cyclical, whereas Judaism, because of its pessimism, regards it as linear. 106 For Dugin, the idea of God's incarnation as a man fundamentally changed the metaphysical cosmogony of Christianity. Thus, "from the point of view of Orthodox esotericism, the counter-initiation is, without doubt, Judaism. "107 Dugin then consid- ers the term "Judeo-Christianity" to be an incorrect formula, in particular for Orthodoxy, which he argues is even more distant from Judaism than Catholicism is. 108
This argument illustrates Dugin's version of anti-Semitism. He attempts to efface the com- mon historical roots that link Judaism to the two other monotheistic religions, and accuses the Jewish world of having created a biological con- ception of itself. This inversion, a classical feature of anti-Semitism, is found in many of his texts, where he rejects, but also partly admires, the Jews' alleged capacity for conceiving of them- selves as a race. Thus, according to Dugin, Israel is the archetypal example of a state founded on an ethnic or racial principle, born of the Holocaust, of course, but also having contributed to the cre- ation of this drama to which the Jews fell victim. Dugin argues that Zionism and Nazism are an ideological couple, in which it is difficult to know which caused the other: their polarity is a sign of their intimate correlation. 109
Dugin also repeatedly asserts that the Jews consider themselves to be a chosen people, which squarely opposes them to Russian Messianism, another ideology of national excep- tionalism. Another consistent opposition between Judaism and Russianness concerns the relation to territory. According to Dugin, life in the diaspora has desacralized in the Jewish mind the territories on which the Jews have lived for two millenia, and only the long inaccessible land of Israel has kept its sacred character. Their lack of emotion toward nature and their theological
18 KENNAN INSTITUTE OCCASIONAL PAPER #294
rejection of redemption by the earth--embod- ied by Jesus in Christianity--reveals their incompatibility with the Eurasian idea, for which territory is laden with meaning, as well as with Russian identity, marked by the cult of the nurturing soil. The famous Jewish nomadism found its most sophisticated expression in the maritime character of the thallassocracies. 110 This is why only the traditionalist Jews returning to live in Israel can be in agreement with the Eurasianist idea, all others being (possibly unconscious) bearers of an Atlanticist identity marked by affective indifference toward soil.
In his interpretation of Jewishness, Dugin also employs the esoteric elements that he devel- ops in his theory of peoples. According to him, the world is divided into two types of cultures: Finnish (Judaism and Sunnism) and Aryan (Christianity, Aryan paganism, Shiism). The par- allel is also sexual: Dugin argues that masochism is Jewish, while sadism is Aryan. 111 The funda- mental difference between them resides in their vision of the universe: for the Jews, the cosmos is God's place of exile, whereas in Christianity, it is the place willed by God. Dugin's anti- Semitism appears in full here: the identity of the Jews, the 'Finnish' culture par excellence, is not just different from that of the Aryans, it is unas- similable to it. This irreducibility foreshadows, according to him, the coming metaphysical war between the Aryan and Semitic worlds: "The world of 'Judaica' is a world hostile to us. But the sense of Aryan justice and the gravity of our geopolitical situation require us to comprehend its laws, its rules, its interests. The Indo- European elite is facing a titanic mission today: to understand those who are different from us, not only culturally, nationally, and politically, but also metaphysically. And in this case, to under- stand does not mean to forgive, but to van- quish. "112 This paradoxical combination of a clas- sic anti-Semitism and a politically committed philo-Zionism can partly be explained by Dugin's differentialist theories.
ETHNO-DIFFERENTIALISM AND
THE IDEA OF RUSSIAN DISTINCTIVENESS As we have already noted, Dugin followed the theoretical turn of the New Right, which moved from a biological view of the differences between peoples to a primarily cultural one. This fashion for ethno-pluralism, transferred
from the "left" to the "right" in the 1980s, catches on particularly well in Russia, where it fits into a conception of national distinctiveness that was already highly ethnicized. This differ- entialist neo-racism (in Taguieff's formula) and the exaltation of the "right to be different" are neither a new idea nor a mere import from the West. Throughout the 19th century, the princi- pal thinkers of "Russian national distinctive- ness" had upheld a culturalist approach, and, unlike their Western colleagues, accorded only very little importance to racial determinism. 113 Slavophile and Pan-Slavist thought remained under the influence of Hegel and Herder, and perceived the factual dimension of reality as a hidden fight between ideas. Thus, for over a century, it has been "normal" for Russian intel- lectuals sensitive to the national question to affirm, in Dugin's phrase, that "every people advances in History according to its own trajec- tory, upholding its own understanding of the world. That is why what is good for some peo- ples cannot be applied to others. "114
Dugin, however, deploys an ambiguous cul- turalist and biological terminology with regard to this question: he uses the term ethnos with a positive meaning, seeing it as the primary point of collective reference ("the whole, the ethnos, according to the Eurasianists, is higher than the part, the individual"115), but at the same time remains critical of ethno-nationalism. According to Dugin, the superiority of the collectivity over the individual must be expressed in the political field as a "political ethnism. " This differential pluralism would be based on a corporatist system that would institutionalize intermediate echelons between the individual and the state. It would reveal Russia's true imperial nature. Unlike the Russians, who are "the empire's constitutive nation" [imperoobrazuiushchaia natsiia], the non- Russian peoples may benefit from cultural autonomy, but not from sovereignty, contrary to what was proclaimed during perestroika. 116 No nationality should be recognized territorially, because "Russians exist as the only national community within a supranational imperial complex. "117 Dugin argues that the negotiations between the federal center and the subjects of the federation started by Boris Yeltsin fostered separatism in the Caucasus and in the Volga-Ural region. This ethno-centrism should, on the con- trary, be condemned, since stands in the way of
ALEKSANDR DUGIN: A RUSSIAN VERSION OF THE EUROPEAN RADICAL RIGHT? 19
a national supra-unification of the Eurasian eth- nos. Dugin's strength is in his capacity for playing with concepts: for example, he proposes to "meet these identification tendencies of the peo- ples and regions of the Federation half-way," but in a controlled way that would subject them to the center. 118
Whether he bases himself on Eurasianist or New Right arguments, Dugin condemns nationalism in its ethnic and "chauvinist"variety, which he considers dangerous and obsolete. The idea of an ethnic miscegenation of peoples cele- brated by Western newspeak appears to him as disastrous as was the theory of racial purity, because both lead to ethnocide. On the contrary, "the Eurasianist attitude toward the ethnos remains conservative, based on the principle of the absolute necessity of protecting each ethnic group from the prospect of historical disappear- ance. "119 This terminology remains paradoxical: not only does Dugin refrain from rejecting the idea of race, he also seems confused in his understanding of ethnicity, as he gives it an emi- nently culturalist and civilizationist meaning, while at the same time using the terminology of the ethnos, which, following the Soviet tradition, remains very much tied to nature and even biol- ogy. This contradiction can be explained by Dugin's "post-modern" approach: he says he wishes to restore all the ideas, both religious and ethnic, that have been thrown out by moderni- ty, which is why he addresses the ethnic question in both a positive and a negative way: positive when he uses it against the globalized liberalism which he views as destructive of the differences between peoples, and negative when he sees ethnic nationalism as preventing the affirmation of Eurasian unity.
Thus Dugin's main activity, for several years, has been to speak out for a new interpretation of the idea of human rights. He is convinced that they constitute, through their claim to universal- ity, a "new kind of totalitarianism". He propos- es to develop a theory of the "rights of peo- ples,"120 appropriating Third Worldist discourse as the right has been doing for some time. According to Dugin, this theory will first be put into practice in Russia, because, due to its natu- ral federalism, that country advocates ethno-cul- tural autonomy in exchange for unitarianism in state affairs. "The concept of people [narod] must be recognized as the fundamental legal category,
as the main subject of international and civil law. "121 Individuals will be legally identified by their ethnic, religious or cultural affiliation. A similar theory had already been proposed a long time ago by Panarin, who put forward a "civi- lizational" rather than political pluralism which he saw as typical of Eurasia.
Dugin's absolutization of the ethnic collectiv- ity implies a difficult attitude toward the idea of cultural transfer. As Pierre-Andre? Taguieff has justly and repeatedly noted, the cult of difference implies a phobia of intermingling: it celebrates heterogeneity, but fears the mixing of peoples and traditions. Dugin considers the possibility of miscegenation between populations, or the transfer of cultural or political elements from one "civilization" to another, as dangerous. Indeed, he claims he has a "tolerant attitude toward eth- nic miscegenation on the level of the elites, but a cautious attitude on level of the masses. "122 Here he is once more in tune with the tradition of Soviet ethnology, which, following the theories of Yulian Bromlei and Lev Gumilev, had regular- lycalledforthedevelopmentofendogamoustra- ditions in order to preserve the "genetic fund" [genofond] of each ethnic entity. Once again, Dugin succeeds with aplomb in fitting old con- ceptions based on Russian or Soviet stereotypes into global intellectual debates. He adapts the Russian case to a more global theory on the cur- rent recomposition of collective identities under conditions of globalization, anchoring his ideas in alter-globalization movements, many of which have turned differentialism into one of their main dogmas.
CONTEXTUALIZING DUGIN'S PLACE
IN RUSSIAN PUBLIC LIFE
A survey of Dugin's ideas naturally prompts questions about the extent to which he is repre- sentative, about his strategies, and about the net- works through which his ideas are spread. In many senses, especially regarding his career, he can be considered to represent the general evo- lution of the Russian nationalist milieux over the past two decades. In the first half of the 1990s, these currents, then presented as "red-and- brown," were united in their opposition to the liberal reforms of the Yeltsin era. A change in their attitude toward the establishment set in during the prime ministership of Primakov, and gained momentum when Putin came to power,
20 KENNAN INSTITUTE OCCASIONAL PAPER #294
an event which recomposed and narrowed down the political spectrum. Numerous nation- alist figures came to support the authorities while preserving their political structures, resulting in a kind of vociferous but fictitious opposition. This was the case with Ziuganov's Communist Party, as well as with Zhirinovskii's LDPR and the Rodina bloc. Dugin also followed this path from radical opposition to public pro- fessions of loyalty. This is why he likes to classi- fy himself as being in the "radical center" of the public spectrum:123 radical in his political and philosophical doctrines, but centrist by virtue of his support for the current president. He thus embodies one of the main tendencies of the European radical right, which virulently attempts to differentiate itself from the centrist discourse of the powers-that-be on an ideolog- ical level, while developing a public strategy for gaining respectability.
Paradoxically, Dugin is isolated within the nationalist currents. He is their only substantial thinker, and his theories inspire numerous pub- lic figures and movements. At the same time, his theoretical position is too complex for any party to follow him entirely and turn him into its official thinker. He is also disturbing for the entire camp of Russian nationalism on several points: he condemns populism, which is central to the strategies of of the main figures: Ziuganov, Zhirinovskii, and Eduard Limonov. The various nationalist currents do not recog- nize him as their ideologist; thus, while he makes numerous Aryanist statements and adopts an ambiguous anti-Semitism, he is seldom quoted by Aryanist leaders, as he does not refer to the main neo-pagan reference book, the Book of Vles. He is also strongly criticized by anti-Semitic circles for condemning theories of a Jewish plot, rejecting revisionism, and appar- ently denying the authenticity of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. This elitist position, which he refuses to compromise in exchange for electoral success, is reminiscent of Alain de Benoist. However, Dugin cannot be entirely equated with the New Right: his stance is also informed by Traditionalism and fascism (in the sense out- lined above). Thus he does not go as far as de Benoist on Third Worldism, and uses racist arguments in a more pronounced way.
Dugin's intellectual eclecticism assures him a certain degree of success among the young gen-
eration, revealing post-Soviet Russia's lack of foundations of identity. His occultist leanings, his exacerbated religious sensibility, his rejection of communist ideology but not of the Soviet experience, as well as his ahistorical discourse about Russian grandeur, are his attractive points. Not only do his geopolitical theories restore to Russia the role of a global superpow- er, he also modernizes a certain variety of polit- ical fundamentalism, exalts a sense of hierarchy and war, resurrects the mythical triangle between Germany, Russia and Japan, and argues that cultures are incommensurable and will unavoidably come into conflict with one anoth- er. His anti-Western feelings are reinforced by the revival of Pan-Asianism in South-East Asia: all Neo-Eurasianists admire these countries for having successfully allied economic dynamism to political authoritarianism, as well as for their general rejection of Western domination and the "return" to Islamic values in the Muslim states of Indonesia and Malaysia.
Attempts to classify such a doctrine and per- sonality inevitably remain guesswork: Dugin is above all in search of himself, and his inner quest, particular the religious one, probably constitutes one of the matrixes of his political doctrines. Dugin's strategies are therefore tai- lored to fit his personal evolution and the insti- tutional position he hopes to reach. These strategies are organized along several lines: Dugin understands that the Eurasianist and geopolitical part of his theories is best suited to be widely spread in contemporary Russian soci- ety. In the same way, the idea of a unification of the patriotic scene and the creation of a kind of "union of nationalists without borders," which the International Eurasianist Movement hopes to become, strike a chord with numerous Russian political circles. Traditionalism, escha- tologism and esotericism are relegated to the background of his public activities, and are reserved for a more restricted circle of initiated followers, for example in the framework of the New University. Dugin's Eurasianism is proba- bly more promising than his National Bolshevism or Traditionalism: the term "Eurasia" is being adopted very extensively in Russia among very varied social and political milieux, though in a way that strips it of its orig- inal theoretical implications. Dugin thus seems to have succeeded, at least regarding this aspect
ALEKSANDR DUGIN: A RUSSIAN VERSION OF THE EUROPEAN RADICAL RIGHT? 21
of his thought, in his entryism into official structures. Indeed, as was observed very justly by the weekly Obshchaia gazeta, "Dugin is no longer considered to be the preacher of an ide- ological sect, but rather as an officially recog- nized specialist on geopolitical questions. "124
Dugin thus attempts to pursue a multiform strategy on the fringe of the classical electoral political spectrum. He develops a geopolitical discourse aimed at a large public, a concept of Eurasia as the basis for a new ideology of Russian great power for the Putin establishment, and Traditionalism and other philosophical and religious doctrines restricted to small but influ- ential and consciously elitist intellectual circles. Even if Dugin's institutional presence, in Russia and abroad, is based on groupuscules, the influ- ence of his personality and his works must not be underestimated. In spite of his rhetorical rad- icalism, which few people are prepared to follow in all its philosophical and political conse- quences, Dugin has become one of the most fashionable thinkers of the day. Using networks that are difficult to trace, he is disseminating the myth of Russian great power, accompanied by imperialist, racialist, Aryanist and occultist beliefs that are expressed in a euphemistic way and whose scope remains unclear, but that can- not remain without consequences.
Dugin's role as an ideological mediator will probably be an important point to consider in any long-term historical assessment: he is one of the few thinkers to engage in a profound renew- al of Russian nationalist doctrines, which had been repetitive in their Slavophilism and their czarist and/or Soviet nostalgia. His originality lies precisely in his attempt to create a revolu- tionary nationalism refreshed by the achieve- ments of 20th century Western thought, fully accepting the political role these ideas played between the two world wars. Therefore, in his opposition to American globalization, Dugin unintentionally contributes to the international- ization of identity discourse and to the uni- formization of those theories that attempt to resist globalization. He illustrates that, although aiming for universality, these doctrines are still largely elaborated in the West. This is a paradox- ical destiny for a Russian nationalist, whose self- defined and conscious "mission" is to anchor a profoundly Western intellectual heritage in Russia, and to use it to enrich his fellow citizens.
NOTES
1. For further details on the distribution of his publications (print runs, re-editions), see: Andreas Umland, "Kulturhegemoniale Strategien der russischen extremen Rechten: Die Verbindung von faschistischer ideologie und metapolitischer Taktik im Neoeurasismus des Aleksandr Dugin," O? ster- reichische Zeitschrift fu? r Politikwissenschaft, vol. 33, no. 2/2004, pp. 437-454.
2. Viacheslav Likhachev, Natsizm v Rossii, Moscow: Panorama, 2002, p. 103.
3. The title of this show is not neutral. It refers to a famous collection of articles from 1909 called Vekhi, considered a manifesto against the ideology of the radical intelligentsia. The authors of Vekhi argued for the primacy of the spiritual and appealed to the revolution- ary intelligentsia to recognize the spiritual source of human life: to them, only concrete idealism, manifested in Russian in the form of religious philosophy, allows to objectivate traditional mysticism and to fuse knowledge and faith.
4. All his publications are available on the web. His two web sites, Arctogaia (www. arcto. ru) and Evraziia (www. evrazia. org) also include links to a nationalist network that includes web sites such as Novoe soprotivlenie (New Resistance), as well as to web-based maga- zines such as Lenin.
5. The Ways of the Absolute (Puti absoliuta), writ- ten in 1989 and published in 1991, The Conservative Revolution (Konservativnaia revoli- utsiia, 1994), Goals and Tasks of our Revolution (Tseli i zadachi nashei revoliutsii, 1995), Templars of the Proletariat (Tampliery proletaria- ta, 1997), The Philosophy of Traditionalism (Filosofiia traditsionalizma) and The Evolution of the Paradigmatic Foundations of Science (Evoliuciia paradigmal'nykh osnovanii nauki, 2002), The Philosophy of Politics (Filosofiia poli- tiki) and The Philosophy of War (Filosofiia voiny, 2004).
6. The Metaphysics of the Gospel: Orthodox Esotericism (Metafizika Blagoi Vesti (Pravoslavnyi ezoterizm), 1996) and The End of the World. Eschatology and Tradition (Konets sveta: Eskhatologiia i tradiciia, 1997).
7. The Mysteries of Eurasia (Misterii Evrazii) and The Hyperborean (Giperboreec, 1991), The Hyperborean Theory (1993).
22 KENNAN INSTITUTE OCCASIONAL PAPER #294
8. Conspirology (Konspirologiia, 1992, republished in 2005), The Foundations of Geopolitics (Osnovy geopolitiki, 1996, four re-editions), Our Way. Strategic Prospects for the Development of Russia in the 21st Century (Nash put'. Strategicheskie perspektivy razvitiia Rossii v XXI veke, 1998), The Russian Thing. Essays in National Philosophy (Russkaia veshch'. Ocherki natsion- al'noi filosofii, 2001), The Foundations of Eurasianism (Osnovy evraziistva), The Eurasianist Path (Evraziiskii put') and The Eurasian Path as National Idea (Evraziiskii put' kak natsional'naia ideia, 2002).
9. Markus Mathyl, "The National-Bolshevik Party and Arctogaia: Two Neo-fascist Groupuscules in the Post-Soviet Political Space," Patterns of Prejudice, vol. 36, no. 3/2003, pp. 62-76.
10. Stephen Shenfield, Russian Fascism. Traditions, tendencies, movements, London: M. E. Sharpe, 2001, p. 194.
11.
Eduard Limonov, Moya politicheskaia biografiia, St. Petersburg: Amfora, 2002, p. 64.
12. Andrei Tsygankov, "Hard-Line Eurasianism and Russia's contending geopolitical per- spectives," East European Quaterly, no. 3, 1998, pp. 315-334.
13. Osnovy geopolitiki: Geopoliticheskoe budushchee Rossii, Moscow: Arktogeya, 1997. On this book, see J. B. Dunlop, "Aleksandr Dugin's 'Neo-Eurasian' Textbook and Dmitrii Trenin's Ambivalent Response," Harvard Ukrainian Studies, vol. xxv, no. 1-2/2001, pp. 91-127.
14. Aleksandr Dugin, "Evraziiskaia platforma," Zavtra, 21 January 2000.
15. Wayne Allensworth, The Russia Question: Nationalism, Modernization, and Post- Communist Russia, Lanham, Md. : Rowman & Littlefield, 1998, and "The Eurasian Project: Russia-3, Dugin and Putin's Kremlin," paper presented at the National Convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Salt Lake City, 4-6 November 2005.
16. For further details on Dugin's connections with military circles, see: Dunlop, op. cit. , pp. 94, 102.
17. Franc? oise Thom, "Eurasisme et ne? o- eurasisme," Commentaires, no. 66/1994, p. 304.
18. "Evraziistvo: ot filosofii k politike," Dugin's paper at the founding congress of the Evraziia movement, 21 April 2001.
19. "My--partiia natsional'noi idei," Dugin's paper at the conference preparing the transformation of Evraziia from a move- ment into a political party, 1 March 2002.
20. An economist by training, Glaz'ev was known since the collapse of the Soviet Union as a partisan of economic reforms. In 1991, he was named vice-minister (and, in December 1992, minister) of foreign economic relations in Egor Gaidar's gov- ernment. He resigned after the October 1993 events, when he refused to support Boris Yeltsin in his struggle against the White House. Between 1993 and 1995, he was a Duma deputy, chairing the parlia- ment's committee on economic policies. Between 1995 and 1999, he worked at the Federation Council and moved closer to Aleksandr Lebed'. During these years, Glaz'ev changed his mind on his liberal economic principles and moved closer to the Communists. Today he is an interven- tionist and statist in economic matters, although he doesn't advocate a return to the Soviet model. In 1999, he was elected deputy on the CPRF list. Within Rodina, Glaz'ev embodied the left wing. In spite of his hasty departure from the electoral block, he succeeded in standing as candi- date in the presidential elections of March 2004 and garnered 4. 1% of the votes.
21. Dunlop, op. cit. , p. 104.
22. "Partiia Evraziia vykhodit iz bloka
Glaz'eva," Km. Ru, 19 September 2003, http://www. km. ru/news/view. asp? id=7D D7770F40434412B24FDB116 DB19000.
23. http://glazev. evrazia. org/news/190903- 1. html.
24. Aleksandr Barkashov's Russian National Unity (RNU) was one of the first groups to emerge after Pamiat' split up. Barkashov, who rejects the Orthodox and czarist nos- talgia of Pamiat' leaders, founded his own movement as well as the party newspaper Russkii poriadok. The RNU borrowed a significant part of its symbols from Nazism: the swastika, the Roman salute, paramili- tary clothes, and parts of the NSDAP's program, including a mixed economy and
ALEKSANDR DUGIN: A RUSSIAN VERSION OF THE EUROPEAN RADICAL RIGHT? 23
eugenic theories. The RNU contends that the USSR implemented a program of racial miscegenation between Slavs and non- Aryan peoples in order to make the Slavs disappear. The RNU differed from numer- ous others post-Soviet nationalist groups in its racialist definition of the Russian nation. The movement imploded in 2000 and is now split into numerous small groups.
25. The main exception was Dmitrii Riurikov, one of Boris Yeltsin's counselors on inter- national politics. In 2001, he became a member of the central board of Evraziia while he was Russia's ambassador to Uzbekistan (he was later transferred to Denmark).
26. In Russian it is impossible to distinguish between 'Eurasian' and 'Eurasianist' (evrazi- iskii chelovek).
27. Andreas Umland, "Toward an Uncivil Society? Contextualizing the Recent Decline of Extremely Right-Wing Parties in Russia," Weatherhead Center for International Affairs Working Paper No. 02-03, 2002.
28. http://evrazia. org/modules. php? name =News&file=article&sid=1508.
29. He also republished Iakov Bromberg's Evrei i Evraziia and E. Khara-Davan's Rus' mon- gol'skaia in 2002.
30. Osnovy geopolitiki, p. 97.
31. "Evraziisky triumf," in: P. Savitsky,
Kontinent Evraziia, Moscow: Agraf, 1997,
p. 434.
32. Osnovy geopolitiki, p. 159.
33. Leontyev stood for a far-reaching turn in
Russian thought. He argued that Russians are not really Slavs but above all a people mixed with Turkic groups. In an ambiguous man- ner, he anticipated the "turn to the East" of the later Eurasianists: he abandoned the lin- guistic argument about Slavic identity and, for example, acknowledged that he preferred the Greeks to the other Slavs in the religious realm. Leontyev was the first to understand the potential of the "Turanian argument" to help Russia assert her identity against Europe. See: M. Laruelle, "Existe-t-il des pre? curseurs au mouvement eurasiste? L'obsession russe pour l'Asie a` la fin du xixe sie`cle," Revue des e? tudes slaves, Paris: Institut d'e? tudes slaves, vol. LXXV, no 3-4/2004, pp. 437-454.
34. Misterii Evrazii, p. 19.
35. Osnovy geopolitiki, p. 247.
36. However, Dugin accepts the separatism of
those areas that he considers non-Russian (he proposes to return the Kuril Islands to Japan and Kaliningrad to Germany) provid- ed they remain under the control of allies of Eurasia and Continentalism.
37. Osnovy geopolitiki, p. 341.
38. He also wishes to return Ukraine into the
Russian sphere of influence and to divide it in accordance with what he calls the ethno- cultural realities of the country. For further details, see: Dunlop, op. cit. , pp. 109-112.
39. "Evraziiskii otvet na vyzovy globalizacii," Osnovy evraziistva, p. 541-563.
40. Nash put', p. 47.
41. Osnovy geopolitiki, p. 261.
42. Konspirologiia, also online at www. arctoga-
ia. com/public/consp.
43. Evraziia prevyshe vsego, p. 4.
44. Osnovy evraziistva, p. 762.
45. The reference book on Traditionalism is:
Mark Sedgwick, Against the Modern World. Traditionalism and the Secret Intellectual History of the Twentieth Century, Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2004.
46. Introduction ge? ne? rale a` l'e? tude des doctrines hin- doues in 1921, Le the? osophisme, histoire d'une pseudo-religion in 1921, L'erreur spirite in 1923, Orient et Occident in 1924, La crise du monde moderne in 1927.
47. Tampliery proletariata, p. 128.
48. Filosofiia traditsionalizma, p. 11. 49. Milyi Angel, no. 1/1991, online at
www. angel. com. ru.
50. Filosofiia traditsionalizma, p. 11.
51. Puti absoliuta, republished in Absoliutnaia
rodina (Moscow, 1999), p. 174.
52. Metafizika blagoi vesti, republished in
Absoliutnaia rodina, p. 510.
53. Puti absoliuta, p. 152-153.
54. Osnovy geopolitiki, p. 255.
55. See for example his papers given at the 6th
World Russian People's Council in Osnovy
evraziistva, p. 704-715.
56. The Old Believers are a current of
Orthodoxy born after the Schism [Raskol], that is the separation, in the 17th century, of a significant portion of the Orthodox population from the official Russian church. They refused Patriarch Nikon's
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KENNAN INSTITUTE OCCASIONAL PAPER #294
reforms of the Orthodox ritual and liturgy. They were repeatedly persecuted in czarist times and were at the origin of numerous religious and social revolts against the cen- tral authorities. Dugin sees himself as one of the so-called "united believers" who fol- low the Old Believers' rituals while recog- nizing the authority of the Patriarch. Other Old Believers, who have refused to acknowledge the Patriarchate in exchange for tolerance of their specific practice of worship, are in a minority today.
57. Russkaia veshch, vol . 1, p. 569.
58. Milyi Angel, no. 3/1996.
59.
16 KENNAN INSTITUTE OCCASIONAL PAPER #294
of Father, Son and Holy Spirit reveal to the ini- tiated that the Third Reich, just like Third Rome, will be the kingdom of the Holy Spirit. Thus, examining the fear that the term "fas- cism" still causes today, even though the phe- nomenon no longer exists as such, Dugin explains: "By fascism we obviously do not mean a concrete political phenomenon, but our deep- seated secret fear that brings the nationalist, the liberal, the communist and the democrat closer together. This fear does not have a political or ideological nature, it expresses a more general, more deep-seated feeling [. . . ] [the fear of] a magical fascism. "94
Dugin therefore advances a positive reading of fascism, and does not denounce Nazism, even though he condemns its racism. He is content with regretting that Hitler attacked the USSR and made mistakes in his application of the theo- ries of conservative revolution, which were bet- ter preserved by left-wing Nazis who called for an alliance between Germany and the Soviet Union. He especially appreciates the Waffen-SS95 and, even more, the cultural organization Ahnenerbe. In his publications of the 1990s, par- ticularly in periodicals and on his web sites, Dugin's ideological arsenal borrows from anoth- er typical component of the original fascism: the ideologization of sex. According to him, men and women respond to different philosophical principles (active and passive), and men's superi- ority is proven etymologically since, in numerous languages, a single term designates both male persons and human beings in general. 96 Thus, the liberalization of sex, pornography, feminism, homosexuality, and the fashion for Freudianism and psychoanalysis are part of the process of forced Westernization of the world. This "era of gynecocracy"97 heralds the "castration" of men and, along with it, the disappearance of tradi- tional society. Dugin calls for a revindication of eroticism in a phallo-centric and patriarchal way, and hopes to develop a "patriotic conscience" of the sexual act because "empire represents the cul- minating point of eroticism. "98
Like the original Fascists, Dugin admires the Romantic taste for death and combat, shares a contempt for contemporary society, which he believes to be bourgeois and decadent, and aspires to form young, purified generations: "the Eurasian is a strong, healthy, and beautiful person, who has passionarity and passion [. . . ]
Our ideal is to make good physical and moral health, strength, valor, fidelity and pride honor- able goals. "99 The journals Elementy and Milyi Angel, as well as the Internet sites linked to Dugin, are therefore filled with a strong military symbolism, and sometimes exhibit muscular, weapon-laden and khaki-clad bodies. The back cover of one of his latest books, The Philosophy of War (2004), is particularly explicit: "The value of peoples, cultures and societies is proved in war and through it. The beautiful is what has as its foundation the accomplishment of self-affir- mation. War renews Man, and the price to pay for this gigantic personal effort confirms his adherence to the community. War has always been a collective business, having as its goal the conservation of the people and the State, the increase of their power, of their space, and of their life regions. Herein lies the social and national sense of war. "100
A VEILED ANTI-SEMITISM
His exaltation of this warlike spirit, combined with numerous references to Fascist ideas, prompts questions on the place of the "Jewish question" in Dugin's thought. As with the other Eurasianist thinkers, this question is particularly complex because they all combine philo-Semitic and anti-Semitic arguments. Dugin proposes his own version of that conjunction in the form of a paradoxical Judaeophobic philo-Zionism.
In The Conservative Revolution (1994), Dugin recognizes that the state of Israel has realized a kind of Traditionalism: "the only state that has partly succeeded in putting into practice certain aspects of the conservative revolution is the state of Israel. "101 This prompted him to establish close links with some Israeli ultra-nationalist currents. Thus, since 1998, Dugin has sought to develop contacts with that part of the Israeli right which upholds the belief that all Jews must live in Israel. This militant Zionism agrees with him because it is in accordance with the principle of ethno-plu- ralism: all peoples should live in peace, but "at home. " The Evraziia movement is linked with two radical Zionist groups, Vladimir Boukharsky's MAOF Analytical Group and Be'ad Artzeinu, controlled by Rabbi Avram Shmulevich. These two groups, situated to the right of the right-wing Israeli party Likhud, are led by two former Soviet citizens of Jewish ori- gin who emigrated to Israel and are now com-
ALEKSANDR DUGIN: A RUSSIAN VERSION OF THE EUROPEAN RADICAL RIGHT? 17
mitted to politicizing the Israeli Russians. Both of them participated in the founding convention of Evraziia and occupy important positions in the party hierarchy. 102 The web site of the International Eurasianist Movement also men- tions a link with Avigdor Eskin, a former Soviet Jew who took refuge in Israel and is now fighting the "liberal oligarchy" which he says is running the country. 103 Some radical currents of Judaism (most often Zionist, but also Hasidic and mysti- cal)arealsorepresentedinEvraziiabyRabbisstill living in Russia, for example Adol'f Shaevich. They are all united by the idea that Jewish tradi- tion, like Orthodoxy and Islam, is a target of unceasing attacks by secularization, a kind of reli- gious globalization: only the unification of the traditionalists of all religions will allow for the development of strategies of resistance. 104
Dugin's objective of an alliance with Israel derives from the idea of a distinction between "good" and "bad" Judaism, which had already been developed by the first Eurasianists, in par- ticular in Iakov Bromberg's texts on the Jewish question. Dugin borrows from Bromberg the distinction between a Eurasian and an Atlanticist Jewishness. For Bromberg, the goal was to involve the Jews of the Russian Empire in the construction of Eurasia, and to invite them to cultivate their specificities without trying to assimilate to the Russians. However, he belittled the West European Jews whom he saw as bear- ers of political and economic modernity, of cap- italism and communism, and as being excessive- ly assimilated to the Romano-Germanic world. In Dugin's texts, the distinction is different: the "good" Jews are the citizens of Israel, as well as those who choose to leave for Israel, because this act signals their awareness of their irreducible Jewish specificity. The "bad" Jews are those who continue to live in the diaspora and try to be assimilated by the surrounding cultures, be it in the Atlanticist or the post-Soviet world. Thus, unlike the original Eurasianists, Dugin does not attempt to attract the East European Jews, whom he presents as historical enemies of Russian nationalism.
Dugin thus demonstrates a complex philo- Zionism combined with anti-Semitic state- ments, another combination typical of a part of the Western New Right. While he regularly criticizes the vulgar anti-Semitism espoused by most currents of Russian nationalism, he does
expound a more sophisticated and euphemized version of anti-Semitism, centered on more sub- tle religious and philosophical arguments. For example, he disagrees with Rene? Gue? non, who considered the Kabbala to be an authentic eso- tericism: for Dugin, the sense of the universal-- an indispensable element of any real Traditionalism--is absent from the Kabbala, which, like the Talmud, is founded on the Jewish ethnic consciousness. 105 He also argues that Traditionalism views history as cyclical, whereas Judaism, because of its pessimism, regards it as linear. 106 For Dugin, the idea of God's incarnation as a man fundamentally changed the metaphysical cosmogony of Christianity. Thus, "from the point of view of Orthodox esotericism, the counter-initiation is, without doubt, Judaism. "107 Dugin then consid- ers the term "Judeo-Christianity" to be an incorrect formula, in particular for Orthodoxy, which he argues is even more distant from Judaism than Catholicism is. 108
This argument illustrates Dugin's version of anti-Semitism. He attempts to efface the com- mon historical roots that link Judaism to the two other monotheistic religions, and accuses the Jewish world of having created a biological con- ception of itself. This inversion, a classical feature of anti-Semitism, is found in many of his texts, where he rejects, but also partly admires, the Jews' alleged capacity for conceiving of them- selves as a race. Thus, according to Dugin, Israel is the archetypal example of a state founded on an ethnic or racial principle, born of the Holocaust, of course, but also having contributed to the cre- ation of this drama to which the Jews fell victim. Dugin argues that Zionism and Nazism are an ideological couple, in which it is difficult to know which caused the other: their polarity is a sign of their intimate correlation. 109
Dugin also repeatedly asserts that the Jews consider themselves to be a chosen people, which squarely opposes them to Russian Messianism, another ideology of national excep- tionalism. Another consistent opposition between Judaism and Russianness concerns the relation to territory. According to Dugin, life in the diaspora has desacralized in the Jewish mind the territories on which the Jews have lived for two millenia, and only the long inaccessible land of Israel has kept its sacred character. Their lack of emotion toward nature and their theological
18 KENNAN INSTITUTE OCCASIONAL PAPER #294
rejection of redemption by the earth--embod- ied by Jesus in Christianity--reveals their incompatibility with the Eurasian idea, for which territory is laden with meaning, as well as with Russian identity, marked by the cult of the nurturing soil. The famous Jewish nomadism found its most sophisticated expression in the maritime character of the thallassocracies. 110 This is why only the traditionalist Jews returning to live in Israel can be in agreement with the Eurasianist idea, all others being (possibly unconscious) bearers of an Atlanticist identity marked by affective indifference toward soil.
In his interpretation of Jewishness, Dugin also employs the esoteric elements that he devel- ops in his theory of peoples. According to him, the world is divided into two types of cultures: Finnish (Judaism and Sunnism) and Aryan (Christianity, Aryan paganism, Shiism). The par- allel is also sexual: Dugin argues that masochism is Jewish, while sadism is Aryan. 111 The funda- mental difference between them resides in their vision of the universe: for the Jews, the cosmos is God's place of exile, whereas in Christianity, it is the place willed by God. Dugin's anti- Semitism appears in full here: the identity of the Jews, the 'Finnish' culture par excellence, is not just different from that of the Aryans, it is unas- similable to it. This irreducibility foreshadows, according to him, the coming metaphysical war between the Aryan and Semitic worlds: "The world of 'Judaica' is a world hostile to us. But the sense of Aryan justice and the gravity of our geopolitical situation require us to comprehend its laws, its rules, its interests. The Indo- European elite is facing a titanic mission today: to understand those who are different from us, not only culturally, nationally, and politically, but also metaphysically. And in this case, to under- stand does not mean to forgive, but to van- quish. "112 This paradoxical combination of a clas- sic anti-Semitism and a politically committed philo-Zionism can partly be explained by Dugin's differentialist theories.
ETHNO-DIFFERENTIALISM AND
THE IDEA OF RUSSIAN DISTINCTIVENESS As we have already noted, Dugin followed the theoretical turn of the New Right, which moved from a biological view of the differences between peoples to a primarily cultural one. This fashion for ethno-pluralism, transferred
from the "left" to the "right" in the 1980s, catches on particularly well in Russia, where it fits into a conception of national distinctiveness that was already highly ethnicized. This differ- entialist neo-racism (in Taguieff's formula) and the exaltation of the "right to be different" are neither a new idea nor a mere import from the West. Throughout the 19th century, the princi- pal thinkers of "Russian national distinctive- ness" had upheld a culturalist approach, and, unlike their Western colleagues, accorded only very little importance to racial determinism. 113 Slavophile and Pan-Slavist thought remained under the influence of Hegel and Herder, and perceived the factual dimension of reality as a hidden fight between ideas. Thus, for over a century, it has been "normal" for Russian intel- lectuals sensitive to the national question to affirm, in Dugin's phrase, that "every people advances in History according to its own trajec- tory, upholding its own understanding of the world. That is why what is good for some peo- ples cannot be applied to others. "114
Dugin, however, deploys an ambiguous cul- turalist and biological terminology with regard to this question: he uses the term ethnos with a positive meaning, seeing it as the primary point of collective reference ("the whole, the ethnos, according to the Eurasianists, is higher than the part, the individual"115), but at the same time remains critical of ethno-nationalism. According to Dugin, the superiority of the collectivity over the individual must be expressed in the political field as a "political ethnism. " This differential pluralism would be based on a corporatist system that would institutionalize intermediate echelons between the individual and the state. It would reveal Russia's true imperial nature. Unlike the Russians, who are "the empire's constitutive nation" [imperoobrazuiushchaia natsiia], the non- Russian peoples may benefit from cultural autonomy, but not from sovereignty, contrary to what was proclaimed during perestroika. 116 No nationality should be recognized territorially, because "Russians exist as the only national community within a supranational imperial complex. "117 Dugin argues that the negotiations between the federal center and the subjects of the federation started by Boris Yeltsin fostered separatism in the Caucasus and in the Volga-Ural region. This ethno-centrism should, on the con- trary, be condemned, since stands in the way of
ALEKSANDR DUGIN: A RUSSIAN VERSION OF THE EUROPEAN RADICAL RIGHT? 19
a national supra-unification of the Eurasian eth- nos. Dugin's strength is in his capacity for playing with concepts: for example, he proposes to "meet these identification tendencies of the peo- ples and regions of the Federation half-way," but in a controlled way that would subject them to the center. 118
Whether he bases himself on Eurasianist or New Right arguments, Dugin condemns nationalism in its ethnic and "chauvinist"variety, which he considers dangerous and obsolete. The idea of an ethnic miscegenation of peoples cele- brated by Western newspeak appears to him as disastrous as was the theory of racial purity, because both lead to ethnocide. On the contrary, "the Eurasianist attitude toward the ethnos remains conservative, based on the principle of the absolute necessity of protecting each ethnic group from the prospect of historical disappear- ance. "119 This terminology remains paradoxical: not only does Dugin refrain from rejecting the idea of race, he also seems confused in his understanding of ethnicity, as he gives it an emi- nently culturalist and civilizationist meaning, while at the same time using the terminology of the ethnos, which, following the Soviet tradition, remains very much tied to nature and even biol- ogy. This contradiction can be explained by Dugin's "post-modern" approach: he says he wishes to restore all the ideas, both religious and ethnic, that have been thrown out by moderni- ty, which is why he addresses the ethnic question in both a positive and a negative way: positive when he uses it against the globalized liberalism which he views as destructive of the differences between peoples, and negative when he sees ethnic nationalism as preventing the affirmation of Eurasian unity.
Thus Dugin's main activity, for several years, has been to speak out for a new interpretation of the idea of human rights. He is convinced that they constitute, through their claim to universal- ity, a "new kind of totalitarianism". He propos- es to develop a theory of the "rights of peo- ples,"120 appropriating Third Worldist discourse as the right has been doing for some time. According to Dugin, this theory will first be put into practice in Russia, because, due to its natu- ral federalism, that country advocates ethno-cul- tural autonomy in exchange for unitarianism in state affairs. "The concept of people [narod] must be recognized as the fundamental legal category,
as the main subject of international and civil law. "121 Individuals will be legally identified by their ethnic, religious or cultural affiliation. A similar theory had already been proposed a long time ago by Panarin, who put forward a "civi- lizational" rather than political pluralism which he saw as typical of Eurasia.
Dugin's absolutization of the ethnic collectiv- ity implies a difficult attitude toward the idea of cultural transfer. As Pierre-Andre? Taguieff has justly and repeatedly noted, the cult of difference implies a phobia of intermingling: it celebrates heterogeneity, but fears the mixing of peoples and traditions. Dugin considers the possibility of miscegenation between populations, or the transfer of cultural or political elements from one "civilization" to another, as dangerous. Indeed, he claims he has a "tolerant attitude toward eth- nic miscegenation on the level of the elites, but a cautious attitude on level of the masses. "122 Here he is once more in tune with the tradition of Soviet ethnology, which, following the theories of Yulian Bromlei and Lev Gumilev, had regular- lycalledforthedevelopmentofendogamoustra- ditions in order to preserve the "genetic fund" [genofond] of each ethnic entity. Once again, Dugin succeeds with aplomb in fitting old con- ceptions based on Russian or Soviet stereotypes into global intellectual debates. He adapts the Russian case to a more global theory on the cur- rent recomposition of collective identities under conditions of globalization, anchoring his ideas in alter-globalization movements, many of which have turned differentialism into one of their main dogmas.
CONTEXTUALIZING DUGIN'S PLACE
IN RUSSIAN PUBLIC LIFE
A survey of Dugin's ideas naturally prompts questions about the extent to which he is repre- sentative, about his strategies, and about the net- works through which his ideas are spread. In many senses, especially regarding his career, he can be considered to represent the general evo- lution of the Russian nationalist milieux over the past two decades. In the first half of the 1990s, these currents, then presented as "red-and- brown," were united in their opposition to the liberal reforms of the Yeltsin era. A change in their attitude toward the establishment set in during the prime ministership of Primakov, and gained momentum when Putin came to power,
20 KENNAN INSTITUTE OCCASIONAL PAPER #294
an event which recomposed and narrowed down the political spectrum. Numerous nation- alist figures came to support the authorities while preserving their political structures, resulting in a kind of vociferous but fictitious opposition. This was the case with Ziuganov's Communist Party, as well as with Zhirinovskii's LDPR and the Rodina bloc. Dugin also followed this path from radical opposition to public pro- fessions of loyalty. This is why he likes to classi- fy himself as being in the "radical center" of the public spectrum:123 radical in his political and philosophical doctrines, but centrist by virtue of his support for the current president. He thus embodies one of the main tendencies of the European radical right, which virulently attempts to differentiate itself from the centrist discourse of the powers-that-be on an ideolog- ical level, while developing a public strategy for gaining respectability.
Paradoxically, Dugin is isolated within the nationalist currents. He is their only substantial thinker, and his theories inspire numerous pub- lic figures and movements. At the same time, his theoretical position is too complex for any party to follow him entirely and turn him into its official thinker. He is also disturbing for the entire camp of Russian nationalism on several points: he condemns populism, which is central to the strategies of of the main figures: Ziuganov, Zhirinovskii, and Eduard Limonov. The various nationalist currents do not recog- nize him as their ideologist; thus, while he makes numerous Aryanist statements and adopts an ambiguous anti-Semitism, he is seldom quoted by Aryanist leaders, as he does not refer to the main neo-pagan reference book, the Book of Vles. He is also strongly criticized by anti-Semitic circles for condemning theories of a Jewish plot, rejecting revisionism, and appar- ently denying the authenticity of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. This elitist position, which he refuses to compromise in exchange for electoral success, is reminiscent of Alain de Benoist. However, Dugin cannot be entirely equated with the New Right: his stance is also informed by Traditionalism and fascism (in the sense out- lined above). Thus he does not go as far as de Benoist on Third Worldism, and uses racist arguments in a more pronounced way.
Dugin's intellectual eclecticism assures him a certain degree of success among the young gen-
eration, revealing post-Soviet Russia's lack of foundations of identity. His occultist leanings, his exacerbated religious sensibility, his rejection of communist ideology but not of the Soviet experience, as well as his ahistorical discourse about Russian grandeur, are his attractive points. Not only do his geopolitical theories restore to Russia the role of a global superpow- er, he also modernizes a certain variety of polit- ical fundamentalism, exalts a sense of hierarchy and war, resurrects the mythical triangle between Germany, Russia and Japan, and argues that cultures are incommensurable and will unavoidably come into conflict with one anoth- er. His anti-Western feelings are reinforced by the revival of Pan-Asianism in South-East Asia: all Neo-Eurasianists admire these countries for having successfully allied economic dynamism to political authoritarianism, as well as for their general rejection of Western domination and the "return" to Islamic values in the Muslim states of Indonesia and Malaysia.
Attempts to classify such a doctrine and per- sonality inevitably remain guesswork: Dugin is above all in search of himself, and his inner quest, particular the religious one, probably constitutes one of the matrixes of his political doctrines. Dugin's strategies are therefore tai- lored to fit his personal evolution and the insti- tutional position he hopes to reach. These strategies are organized along several lines: Dugin understands that the Eurasianist and geopolitical part of his theories is best suited to be widely spread in contemporary Russian soci- ety. In the same way, the idea of a unification of the patriotic scene and the creation of a kind of "union of nationalists without borders," which the International Eurasianist Movement hopes to become, strike a chord with numerous Russian political circles. Traditionalism, escha- tologism and esotericism are relegated to the background of his public activities, and are reserved for a more restricted circle of initiated followers, for example in the framework of the New University. Dugin's Eurasianism is proba- bly more promising than his National Bolshevism or Traditionalism: the term "Eurasia" is being adopted very extensively in Russia among very varied social and political milieux, though in a way that strips it of its orig- inal theoretical implications. Dugin thus seems to have succeeded, at least regarding this aspect
ALEKSANDR DUGIN: A RUSSIAN VERSION OF THE EUROPEAN RADICAL RIGHT? 21
of his thought, in his entryism into official structures. Indeed, as was observed very justly by the weekly Obshchaia gazeta, "Dugin is no longer considered to be the preacher of an ide- ological sect, but rather as an officially recog- nized specialist on geopolitical questions. "124
Dugin thus attempts to pursue a multiform strategy on the fringe of the classical electoral political spectrum. He develops a geopolitical discourse aimed at a large public, a concept of Eurasia as the basis for a new ideology of Russian great power for the Putin establishment, and Traditionalism and other philosophical and religious doctrines restricted to small but influ- ential and consciously elitist intellectual circles. Even if Dugin's institutional presence, in Russia and abroad, is based on groupuscules, the influ- ence of his personality and his works must not be underestimated. In spite of his rhetorical rad- icalism, which few people are prepared to follow in all its philosophical and political conse- quences, Dugin has become one of the most fashionable thinkers of the day. Using networks that are difficult to trace, he is disseminating the myth of Russian great power, accompanied by imperialist, racialist, Aryanist and occultist beliefs that are expressed in a euphemistic way and whose scope remains unclear, but that can- not remain without consequences.
Dugin's role as an ideological mediator will probably be an important point to consider in any long-term historical assessment: he is one of the few thinkers to engage in a profound renew- al of Russian nationalist doctrines, which had been repetitive in their Slavophilism and their czarist and/or Soviet nostalgia. His originality lies precisely in his attempt to create a revolu- tionary nationalism refreshed by the achieve- ments of 20th century Western thought, fully accepting the political role these ideas played between the two world wars. Therefore, in his opposition to American globalization, Dugin unintentionally contributes to the international- ization of identity discourse and to the uni- formization of those theories that attempt to resist globalization. He illustrates that, although aiming for universality, these doctrines are still largely elaborated in the West. This is a paradox- ical destiny for a Russian nationalist, whose self- defined and conscious "mission" is to anchor a profoundly Western intellectual heritage in Russia, and to use it to enrich his fellow citizens.
NOTES
1. For further details on the distribution of his publications (print runs, re-editions), see: Andreas Umland, "Kulturhegemoniale Strategien der russischen extremen Rechten: Die Verbindung von faschistischer ideologie und metapolitischer Taktik im Neoeurasismus des Aleksandr Dugin," O? ster- reichische Zeitschrift fu? r Politikwissenschaft, vol. 33, no. 2/2004, pp. 437-454.
2. Viacheslav Likhachev, Natsizm v Rossii, Moscow: Panorama, 2002, p. 103.
3. The title of this show is not neutral. It refers to a famous collection of articles from 1909 called Vekhi, considered a manifesto against the ideology of the radical intelligentsia. The authors of Vekhi argued for the primacy of the spiritual and appealed to the revolution- ary intelligentsia to recognize the spiritual source of human life: to them, only concrete idealism, manifested in Russian in the form of religious philosophy, allows to objectivate traditional mysticism and to fuse knowledge and faith.
4. All his publications are available on the web. His two web sites, Arctogaia (www. arcto. ru) and Evraziia (www. evrazia. org) also include links to a nationalist network that includes web sites such as Novoe soprotivlenie (New Resistance), as well as to web-based maga- zines such as Lenin.
5. The Ways of the Absolute (Puti absoliuta), writ- ten in 1989 and published in 1991, The Conservative Revolution (Konservativnaia revoli- utsiia, 1994), Goals and Tasks of our Revolution (Tseli i zadachi nashei revoliutsii, 1995), Templars of the Proletariat (Tampliery proletaria- ta, 1997), The Philosophy of Traditionalism (Filosofiia traditsionalizma) and The Evolution of the Paradigmatic Foundations of Science (Evoliuciia paradigmal'nykh osnovanii nauki, 2002), The Philosophy of Politics (Filosofiia poli- tiki) and The Philosophy of War (Filosofiia voiny, 2004).
6. The Metaphysics of the Gospel: Orthodox Esotericism (Metafizika Blagoi Vesti (Pravoslavnyi ezoterizm), 1996) and The End of the World. Eschatology and Tradition (Konets sveta: Eskhatologiia i tradiciia, 1997).
7. The Mysteries of Eurasia (Misterii Evrazii) and The Hyperborean (Giperboreec, 1991), The Hyperborean Theory (1993).
22 KENNAN INSTITUTE OCCASIONAL PAPER #294
8. Conspirology (Konspirologiia, 1992, republished in 2005), The Foundations of Geopolitics (Osnovy geopolitiki, 1996, four re-editions), Our Way. Strategic Prospects for the Development of Russia in the 21st Century (Nash put'. Strategicheskie perspektivy razvitiia Rossii v XXI veke, 1998), The Russian Thing. Essays in National Philosophy (Russkaia veshch'. Ocherki natsion- al'noi filosofii, 2001), The Foundations of Eurasianism (Osnovy evraziistva), The Eurasianist Path (Evraziiskii put') and The Eurasian Path as National Idea (Evraziiskii put' kak natsional'naia ideia, 2002).
9. Markus Mathyl, "The National-Bolshevik Party and Arctogaia: Two Neo-fascist Groupuscules in the Post-Soviet Political Space," Patterns of Prejudice, vol. 36, no. 3/2003, pp. 62-76.
10. Stephen Shenfield, Russian Fascism. Traditions, tendencies, movements, London: M. E. Sharpe, 2001, p. 194.
11.
Eduard Limonov, Moya politicheskaia biografiia, St. Petersburg: Amfora, 2002, p. 64.
12. Andrei Tsygankov, "Hard-Line Eurasianism and Russia's contending geopolitical per- spectives," East European Quaterly, no. 3, 1998, pp. 315-334.
13. Osnovy geopolitiki: Geopoliticheskoe budushchee Rossii, Moscow: Arktogeya, 1997. On this book, see J. B. Dunlop, "Aleksandr Dugin's 'Neo-Eurasian' Textbook and Dmitrii Trenin's Ambivalent Response," Harvard Ukrainian Studies, vol. xxv, no. 1-2/2001, pp. 91-127.
14. Aleksandr Dugin, "Evraziiskaia platforma," Zavtra, 21 January 2000.
15. Wayne Allensworth, The Russia Question: Nationalism, Modernization, and Post- Communist Russia, Lanham, Md. : Rowman & Littlefield, 1998, and "The Eurasian Project: Russia-3, Dugin and Putin's Kremlin," paper presented at the National Convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Salt Lake City, 4-6 November 2005.
16. For further details on Dugin's connections with military circles, see: Dunlop, op. cit. , pp. 94, 102.
17. Franc? oise Thom, "Eurasisme et ne? o- eurasisme," Commentaires, no. 66/1994, p. 304.
18. "Evraziistvo: ot filosofii k politike," Dugin's paper at the founding congress of the Evraziia movement, 21 April 2001.
19. "My--partiia natsional'noi idei," Dugin's paper at the conference preparing the transformation of Evraziia from a move- ment into a political party, 1 March 2002.
20. An economist by training, Glaz'ev was known since the collapse of the Soviet Union as a partisan of economic reforms. In 1991, he was named vice-minister (and, in December 1992, minister) of foreign economic relations in Egor Gaidar's gov- ernment. He resigned after the October 1993 events, when he refused to support Boris Yeltsin in his struggle against the White House. Between 1993 and 1995, he was a Duma deputy, chairing the parlia- ment's committee on economic policies. Between 1995 and 1999, he worked at the Federation Council and moved closer to Aleksandr Lebed'. During these years, Glaz'ev changed his mind on his liberal economic principles and moved closer to the Communists. Today he is an interven- tionist and statist in economic matters, although he doesn't advocate a return to the Soviet model. In 1999, he was elected deputy on the CPRF list. Within Rodina, Glaz'ev embodied the left wing. In spite of his hasty departure from the electoral block, he succeeded in standing as candi- date in the presidential elections of March 2004 and garnered 4. 1% of the votes.
21. Dunlop, op. cit. , p. 104.
22. "Partiia Evraziia vykhodit iz bloka
Glaz'eva," Km. Ru, 19 September 2003, http://www. km. ru/news/view. asp? id=7D D7770F40434412B24FDB116 DB19000.
23. http://glazev. evrazia. org/news/190903- 1. html.
24. Aleksandr Barkashov's Russian National Unity (RNU) was one of the first groups to emerge after Pamiat' split up. Barkashov, who rejects the Orthodox and czarist nos- talgia of Pamiat' leaders, founded his own movement as well as the party newspaper Russkii poriadok. The RNU borrowed a significant part of its symbols from Nazism: the swastika, the Roman salute, paramili- tary clothes, and parts of the NSDAP's program, including a mixed economy and
ALEKSANDR DUGIN: A RUSSIAN VERSION OF THE EUROPEAN RADICAL RIGHT? 23
eugenic theories. The RNU contends that the USSR implemented a program of racial miscegenation between Slavs and non- Aryan peoples in order to make the Slavs disappear. The RNU differed from numer- ous others post-Soviet nationalist groups in its racialist definition of the Russian nation. The movement imploded in 2000 and is now split into numerous small groups.
25. The main exception was Dmitrii Riurikov, one of Boris Yeltsin's counselors on inter- national politics. In 2001, he became a member of the central board of Evraziia while he was Russia's ambassador to Uzbekistan (he was later transferred to Denmark).
26. In Russian it is impossible to distinguish between 'Eurasian' and 'Eurasianist' (evrazi- iskii chelovek).
27. Andreas Umland, "Toward an Uncivil Society? Contextualizing the Recent Decline of Extremely Right-Wing Parties in Russia," Weatherhead Center for International Affairs Working Paper No. 02-03, 2002.
28. http://evrazia. org/modules. php? name =News&file=article&sid=1508.
29. He also republished Iakov Bromberg's Evrei i Evraziia and E. Khara-Davan's Rus' mon- gol'skaia in 2002.
30. Osnovy geopolitiki, p. 97.
31. "Evraziisky triumf," in: P. Savitsky,
Kontinent Evraziia, Moscow: Agraf, 1997,
p. 434.
32. Osnovy geopolitiki, p. 159.
33. Leontyev stood for a far-reaching turn in
Russian thought. He argued that Russians are not really Slavs but above all a people mixed with Turkic groups. In an ambiguous man- ner, he anticipated the "turn to the East" of the later Eurasianists: he abandoned the lin- guistic argument about Slavic identity and, for example, acknowledged that he preferred the Greeks to the other Slavs in the religious realm. Leontyev was the first to understand the potential of the "Turanian argument" to help Russia assert her identity against Europe. See: M. Laruelle, "Existe-t-il des pre? curseurs au mouvement eurasiste? L'obsession russe pour l'Asie a` la fin du xixe sie`cle," Revue des e? tudes slaves, Paris: Institut d'e? tudes slaves, vol. LXXV, no 3-4/2004, pp. 437-454.
34. Misterii Evrazii, p. 19.
35. Osnovy geopolitiki, p. 247.
36. However, Dugin accepts the separatism of
those areas that he considers non-Russian (he proposes to return the Kuril Islands to Japan and Kaliningrad to Germany) provid- ed they remain under the control of allies of Eurasia and Continentalism.
37. Osnovy geopolitiki, p. 341.
38. He also wishes to return Ukraine into the
Russian sphere of influence and to divide it in accordance with what he calls the ethno- cultural realities of the country. For further details, see: Dunlop, op. cit. , pp. 109-112.
39. "Evraziiskii otvet na vyzovy globalizacii," Osnovy evraziistva, p. 541-563.
40. Nash put', p. 47.
41. Osnovy geopolitiki, p. 261.
42. Konspirologiia, also online at www. arctoga-
ia. com/public/consp.
43. Evraziia prevyshe vsego, p. 4.
44. Osnovy evraziistva, p. 762.
45. The reference book on Traditionalism is:
Mark Sedgwick, Against the Modern World. Traditionalism and the Secret Intellectual History of the Twentieth Century, Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2004.
46. Introduction ge? ne? rale a` l'e? tude des doctrines hin- doues in 1921, Le the? osophisme, histoire d'une pseudo-religion in 1921, L'erreur spirite in 1923, Orient et Occident in 1924, La crise du monde moderne in 1927.
47. Tampliery proletariata, p. 128.
48. Filosofiia traditsionalizma, p. 11. 49. Milyi Angel, no. 1/1991, online at
www. angel. com. ru.
50. Filosofiia traditsionalizma, p. 11.
51. Puti absoliuta, republished in Absoliutnaia
rodina (Moscow, 1999), p. 174.
52. Metafizika blagoi vesti, republished in
Absoliutnaia rodina, p. 510.
53. Puti absoliuta, p. 152-153.
54. Osnovy geopolitiki, p. 255.
55. See for example his papers given at the 6th
World Russian People's Council in Osnovy
evraziistva, p. 704-715.
56. The Old Believers are a current of
Orthodoxy born after the Schism [Raskol], that is the separation, in the 17th century, of a significant portion of the Orthodox population from the official Russian church. They refused Patriarch Nikon's
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reforms of the Orthodox ritual and liturgy. They were repeatedly persecuted in czarist times and were at the origin of numerous religious and social revolts against the cen- tral authorities. Dugin sees himself as one of the so-called "united believers" who fol- low the Old Believers' rituals while recog- nizing the authority of the Patriarch. Other Old Believers, who have refused to acknowledge the Patriarchate in exchange for tolerance of their specific practice of worship, are in a minority today.
57. Russkaia veshch, vol . 1, p. 569.
58. Milyi Angel, no. 3/1996.
59.
