trade embargo and Britain's
willingness
to permit Iran to conduct its private arms dealings through an office in London) failed to lead to cordial relations.
Revolution and War_nodrm
140
Paradoxically, although both superpowers were concerned that the revo- lution in Iran might tempt the other to intervene, they were aware that such a step might provoke a major confrontation, and this knowledge probably discouraged either party from taking direct action. The fear of a Soviet re- sponse clearly inhibited the United States during the hostage crisis, for ex- ample, and the Soviets did nothing to aid the leftist Islamic Mujahedin and Tudeh Party as they were being decimated by the Islamic Republican Party. 141 The Iranians seemed to be well aware of the benefits they derived from this bitpolar stalemate, correctly inferring that each superpower would help protect them from the other. 142
Regional Responses. The effects of the revolution on the balance of power within the region were even more profound. Before the shah's departure, for
138 Quotations from Bill, "U. S. Overture to Iran," 169; and Ramazani, "Iran's Resistance to U. S. Influence," 37?
139 Brezhnev's first warning stated that "any interference, especially military, in the affairs of Iran, a state directly bordering on the Soviet Union, would be regarded by the Sovieft Union as a matter affecting its security interests. " Quoted in Martin Sicker, The Bear and the Lion: Soviet Imperialism and Iran (New York: Praeger, 1988), no. After the U. S. attempt to res- cue the embassy hostages, Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko declared, "We are against all measures of a military, or generally forcible, nature on the part of the United States or any- one else against Iran. " Similarly, Brezhnev declared, "We are not going to intervene . . . [in the Iran-Iraq war]. And we resolutely say to others: Hands off these events. " Quoted in Yodfaft, Soviet Union and Revolutionary Iran, 77-'79, 92.
140 See Hensel, "Moscow's Perspectives," 156-57; Dennis Ross, "Soviet Views towards the Gulf War," Orbis 28, no. 3 (1984), 438-39; and Zalmay Khalilzad, "Islamic Iran: Soviet Dilem- mas," Problems ofCommunism 33, no. 1 (1981).
141 See Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 488-89, 493-94; Salinger, America Held Hostage, 106; and Gary Sick, "Military Options and Constraints," in Christopher et a! . , American Hostages in Iran, 15o-55.
142 See Hunter, Iran and the World, 58-59.
? ? The Iranian Revolution
example, Crown Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia declared that "the Arab states will have to support Iran and the Shah, because the stability of that country is important to the [entire] region . . . and any radical change will upset its secu- rity balance. "143 The conservative oil monarchies also worried that shah's de- parture would tilt the regional balance in favor of radical or pro-Soviet forces. Similar concerns were evident in Israel, which provided direct aid to the Is- lamic Republic despite its overtly anti-Zionist rhetoric. For Israel, Iran was still an effective cotmter to the more immediate threat it faced from states such as
Iraq, and aiding the Iranian war effort was consistent with the same balance- of-power strategy that had inspired Israel's tacit alliance with the shah. 144
The revolution's impact on the regional balance of power was also appar- ent in Iraq's decision to invade Iran in September 1980. The apparent weak- ness and vulnerability created by the revolution was not the only reason Iraq attacked, but it was clearly a central factor in its calculations. Thus, the Iraqi invasion was a direct response to the window of opportunity created by the revolution, even if that window turned out to be smaller than Sad- dam Hussein expected. 145
Finally, although Khomeini criticized the state system as an illegitimate human invention and welcomed Iran's isolation from other states, the Is- lamic Republic was not immune from the competitive pressures of balance- of-power politics. Although Baathist Iraq was condemned as an atheistic state, Baathist Syria had become Iran's principal ally by 1982. Indeed, the pressure of war convinced Iran to purchase arms from a diverse array of suppliers-including Israel and the United States-solely for the purpose of improving its military capabilities. This does not deny ideology's effect on
Iran's foreign policy, but it does suggest that external constraints set limits on the regime's ideological purity.
Thus, the effects of the revolution on the balance of power exacerbated the security competition between Iran and a number of other states and were an important cause of the war between Iran and Iraq.
Perceptions ofIntent
The fall of the Pahlavi dynasty and its replacement by the Islamic Repub- lic affected virtually every aspect of Iran's foreign policy. Whereas the shah
143 Quoted in Menashri, Iran, 47?
144 On Israel's military aid to Iran, see Segev, Iranian Triangle; Cordesman, Gulfand Searchfor Stability, 717; Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 504; and Hiro, Longest War, 1 18.
145 See John W. Amos II, "The Iran-Iraq War: Conflict, Linkage, and Spillover in the Middle East," in GulfSecurity in the 19Bos: Perceptual and Strategic Dimensions, ed. Robert G. Darius, John W. Amos II, and Ralph H. Magnus (Stanford, Calif. : HooverInstitutePress, 1984), 58-60; Jack Levy and Mike Froelich, "Causes of the Iran-Iraq War," in The Regionalization ofWarfare, ed. James Brown and William P. Snyder (New Brunswick, N. J. : Transaction Books, 1985), 137-39?
? ? Revolution and War
. ad been oriented toward the West and closely allied with the United States,
he Islamic Republic was suspicious of both. Whereas the shah had main- rained cordial if guarded relations with the Soviet Union, Khomeini viewed it as the "lesser Satan," condemned its atheistic ideology, and denounced its invasion of Afghanistan. The shah had supported Israel and the conserva- tive gulf states and opposed the radical Arab regimes; by contrast, the Is- lamic Rep1lbl lic broke diplomatic relations with Israel, aided efforts to overthrow the gulf states, and aligned itself with Syria, South Yemen, Libya, and later Sudan. And where the shah's objectives vis-a-vis Iraq were limited (he sought to dominate the region but did not try to overthrow the Iraqi regime), revolutionary Iran was calling for the ouster of the Baath even be- fore the war began.
These changes cannot be explained solely by shifts in the balance of power. They were also products of the radically different worldview that in- spired the revolution itself. Apart from its specifically Islamic content, the ideology of revolutionary Iran arose from hostility to the shah and his poli- cies, especially to his pro-Western orientation. It is not surprising that the new regime therefore took steps that alarmed Iran's former allies.
Iran's foreign relations also support the hypothesis that revolutionary states are especially prone to spirals of hostility. In particular, both sides tended to take the very dimmest view of each other's actions and dis- counted the possibility that their own behavior might be responsible for the opposition they were facing.
As one would expect, the tendency to spiral was most apparent in Iran's diplomacy vis-a-vis the United States. Although both the Bazargan govern- ment and the Carter administration seemed genuinely interested in estab- lishing a new relationship after the shah's departure, relations between the United States and Iran soon deteriorated into a web of mutual suspicions. Throughout this period, each side's defensive responses and hostile infer- ences were reinforced by insensitive or unwitting actions by the other. 146 In the spring of 1979, for example, Iranian fears of a military coup inspired a series of purges and executions by the Revolutionary Courts, prompting the U. S. Senate to pass a condemnatory resolution. This action in turn derailed
an attempt to establish direct contact with Khomeini (who greeted the Sen- ate resolution by calling the United States a "defeated and wounded
146 In February 1979, Carter stated that the United States would "honor the will of the Iran- ian people" and expresdse his willingness to "work closely with the existing government of Iran. " Foreign Minister Karim Sanjavi replied that Iran still sought "friendly relations" with the United States, in the context of Iran's new policy of nonalignment. The United States agreed to resume military shipments to Iran in October, and Prime Minister Bazargan and Foreign Minister Ibrahim Yazdi (who had replaced Sanjavi in April) expressed their own hope that relations "would soon take a turn for the better. " See Menashri, Iran, 97; and Behrooz, "Trends in the Foreign Policy of Iran," 16-17.
[2541
? The Iranian Revolution
snake") and sparked mass demonstrations in Iran denouncing U. S. interfer- ence. The U. S. decision to permit the shah to enter the country for medical treatment in October angered the Iranian revolutionaries and raised new fears of a U. S. plot to place him back upon the throne; together, these events confirmed Iranian images of American aggressiveness and discredited the mote moderate forces, thereby helping the more extreme forces consolidate their control. r. 47 On the other side, the seizure of the U. S. embassy and the prolonged detention of the hostages cemented U. S. hostility and solidified perceptions of Iran as a fanatical and dangerous regime. 148
However, each side's interpretation was at least partly mistaken. Con- trary to Iranian fears of a U. S. -backed counterrevolution, the United States had no intention of trying to restore the terminally ill shah; he had been per- mitted to enter the United States only after repeated requests from influen- tial individuals such as David Rockefeller and Henry Kissinger. 149 And contrary to the U. S. image of unlimited Iranian bellicosity, the seizure of the embassy was inspired as much by conflicts within Iran as by an overt desire to harm the United States. 150 Although serious differences did exist, there- fore, probably neither side was as aggressive as the other believed it to be.
Subsequent episodes heightened each side's paranoia. The abortive hostage rescue mission in April 1980 confirmed Iranian fears of U. S. military intervention and revealed that the United States still possessed an extensive intelligence network within their country, thereby reinforcing Iranian fears of U. S. -backed plots. 151 The trade embargo and the U. S. tilt toward Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war only strengthened the impression of U. S. aggression. To the extent that Iranians failed to recognize the role of their own actions in pro- voking these responses, they were more likely to view U. S. policy as evi- dence of innate U. S. hostility. Similarly, Americans who were unfamiliar with the history of U. S. involvement in Iran or who saw the prior U. S. role as ben- eficial would be inclined to consider Iranian actions as unjustifiedly hostile.
147 Prior to his return to Iran, Khomeini warned that "America is an accessory" to the shah, and he later ded? red, "We will not let the United States bring back the Shah. This is what the Shah wants. Wake up. Watch out. " Quoted in Hiro, Iran under the Ayatollahs, 315, 134-37. Meetings between U. S. general Robert Huyser and a group of Iranian military officers in Jan- uary 1979 probably intensified Iranian fears of a U. S. -backed coup. See Sick, All Fall Down, 131-32; Menashri, Iran, 97-98, 1 14, 146-47; and Wright, In the Name ofGod, 75-76.
148 In February 1979, a Gallup poll reported that 64 percent of all Americans held an "unfa- vorable" image of Iran, 21 percent expressed the most extreme negative rating, and 12 percent offered a mildly favorable view. In an identical poll taken after the seizure of the embassy, 90 percent reported an "unfavorable" image, with 6o percent giving Iran the most extreme nega- tive rating. Gallup Opinion Index, no. 169 (August 1979), 41, and no. 176 (March 1980), 29.
149 See Bill, Eagle and Lion, 321-40; and Sick, All Fall Down, 179"-81.
150 On the role of Iranian domestic politics in the seizure of the embassy, see Hiro, Iran under the Ayatollahs, 136-39; Wright, In the Name ofGod, 74-81; Sick, All Fall Down, 198-205; Abra- hamian, Iranian Mojahedin, 57; and Arjomand, Turban for the Crown, 139-40.
151 See Hiro, Iran under the Ayatollahs, 154-56, 319-20; Bill, Eagle and Lion, 302. [255]
? Revolution and War
Even worse, gestures of accommodation tended to backfire, because they were seen as nefarious attempts to reestablish U. S. influence. For example, the premature U. S. effort to cultivate moderate forces after the shah's depar- ture merely discredited these leaders and reinforced the radicals' belief that the United States was still trying to pull strings behind the scenes. Thus, Brzezinski's meeting with Bazargan in November 1979 helped force the lat- ter's resngnation, and Bani-Sadr's efforts to resolve the hostage crisis played a key role in discrediting him in the eyes of Khomeini and the clerics. This problem was exacerbated by the Iranians' fondness for conspiracy theories, which created fertile ground for the notion that the United States was still able manipulate events in Iran at will. 152 As a result, Iran blamed the United States for the assassinations of several leading clerics, the Iraqi invasion, and the activities of counterrevolutionary groups such as the Islamic Muja- hedin. 153 These accusations were either without foundation or greatly exag- gerated, but insofar as they reflected sincere Iranian beliefs rather than mere propaganda, they provide additional evidence of spiral dynamics at work. 154
Lastly, the climate of suspicion and hostility between the United States and Iran made improving relations especially difficult. The United States did make conciliatory gestures on occasion, but the bulk of U. S. policy was hostile (for example, its support for the gulf states and the Iranian exiles, its efforts to deny Iran arms, and its gradual tilt towards Iraq). Not surpris- ingly, actions contrary to Iranian interests were seen as evidence of true U. S. preferences, while less harmful ones appeared as signs of U. S. duplicilfy. Thus, when the Senate passed a resolution condemning the executions lby the Revolutionary Courts (an action that ran counter to the Carter adminis- tration's efforts to reach a modus vivendi with Iran), the clerics saw it as a direct challenge to the new regime. In the same way, when Rafsanjani a111. d other moderates recognized that Iran was partly responsible for its own iso- lation, their efforts to cooperate with the United States in the Iran-contra arms deal were thwarted by extremists within Iran and by the incompetent bungling of the U. S. officials responsible for the initiative. 155 Because inter-
? 152 On this pervasive Iranian tendency, see Abrahamian, Khomeinism, chap. 5; Sick, All Fall Down, 33-34, 48, 346 n. 4; Cottam, "Inside Revolutionary Iran," 16-17; Arjomand, Turban for the Crown, 1 2? 30; and Salinger, America Held Hostage, 7o-71 .
153 Infact,U. S. officialswereupsetbytheIraqiinvasionbecauseitinterruptednegotiations for the release of the U. S. hostages. See Sick, All Fall Down, 320; Jordan, Crisis, 347; Christo- pher et al, American Hostages in Iran, 306; Ramazani, "Iran's Foreign Policy," 57; and Bani- Sadr, My Turn to Speak, 70, 76.
154 Iran's suspicions were sometimes justified, as the United States did provide modest lev- els of aid to the mujahedin after they had been driven into exile and tilted toward Iraq in 19B2. These decisions are consistent with the logic of spiraling: the U. S. was responding to Iraruan behavior, but Iran interpreted its acts as evidence of intrinsic hostility rather than as a defen- sive reaction.
155 Among other things, the mishandling of the first arms shipment in November 1985 (in which the U. S. sent Iran an obsolete version of the Hawk missile) and Oliver North's decision
? ? The Iranian Revolution
nal disagreements on both sides made bridging the divide politically risky, attempts to "unwind" the spiral were confined to unofficial channels and unreliable intermediaries, whose deceptive conduct did nothing to dispel the mutual lack of trust.
Iran's relations with a number of other states indicate spiraling as well, al- though it is often difficult to distinguish between the results legitimate con- flicts of interest and the effects of misperception. The Soviet Union was no more successful in shedding its satanic image than the United States, and Iran accused it of supporting Kurdish rebels and the Tudeh Party and re- peatedly criticized Soviet support for Iraq. There was obviously some basis for each of these charges, but the tendency of Iranian leaders to equate the two superpowers suggests that they did not fully grasp the Soviet Union's genuine desire to improve relations.
Diplomacy with Britain and France also combined elements of spiraling with legitimate perceptions of hostility. On the one hand, there were very real conflicts of interest between these states and revolutionary Iran, based on six factors: Iran's support for terrorist activities on British and French soil; the kidnapping of British and French citizens by pro-Iranian forces in Lebanon; the attacks on British citizens in Iran by members of the Revolutionary Guards; British and French arms sales to Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war; French willingness to provide asylum for Bani-Sadr, Bazargan, and the leaders of the mujahedin; and European support for the U. S. -backed trade embargo during the hostage crisis. On the other hand, British and French moderation toward
Iran (most clearly revealed by their halfhearted participation in the U. S.
trade embargo and Britain's willingness to permit Iran to conduct its private arms dealings through an office in London) failed to lead to cordial relations. In- stead, Iran's leaders saw British and French policy as fundamentally antago- nistic and never made a serious attempt to reach a lasting modus vivendi. Iran's propensity for assuming the worst about the intentions of other states is also apparent in its extraordinary sensitivity to issues of status or autonomy. Thus, the British arrest of an Iranian official on shoplifting charges brought a disproportionate response from Tehran, while Iran's intransigence during the Gordji affair with France reflects the Islamic Republic's insensitivity to the de- gree to which its own behavior provoked others. 156
tocharge Iran vastly inflated prices for U. S. weaponry reinforced Iranian beliefsthattheAmer- icans could not be trusted and undercut the alleged U. S. objective of cultivating better ties. See Draper, Very Thin Line, 195-97, 274-75, 311, 377-'79; and Bill, "U. S. Overture to Iran," 177.
136 Revolutionary states are especially sensitive to diplomatic slights, and to any other ac- tions that cast doubt on their legitimacy or status, perhaps because of their need to build a reputation. Specifically, as new members of the international system, revolutionary states may seek to deter future challenges by defending their prerogatives with particular vigilance. In addition, revolutionary elites may fear that a failure to respond could suggest a lack of rev- olutionary commitment and undermine their internal positions.
? [2571
? Revolution and War
Another example of spiraling was Iran's tendency to attribute opposition from states such as Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait to their internal corrup- tion, lack of true Islamic character, or dependence on the United States, rather than seeing it as a direct response to Iran's aggressive actions. With the partial exception of Iraq (whose 1980 invasion combined offensive and de- fensive motives), the anti-Iranian measures that these states took (such as the formation of the Gulf Cooperation Council or support for the Iraqi war ef- fort) were reactions to Iran's efforts to export its revolution and its escalating war with Iraq. Indeed, Iran's neighbors all genuinely tried to establish cor- dial relations with the new regime, but each shifted to policies of opposition once Iran's revisionist aims became clear. Thus, Iran's neighbors correctly read the impact of the revolution on Iranian intentions, and responded by joining forces to contain the threat.
By contrast, the mistaken belief that its neighbors were intrinsically hos- tile to the new regime seems to have played a key role in shaping Iran's for- eign policy. The close ties between the United States and the conservative gulf states alarmed the revolutionary government, and Khomeini's belief that these states were puppets of the "Great Satan" suggests a genuine fear of a well-orchestrated U. S. effort to reverse the revolution. 157 Convinced that
Iran's neighbors were inherently hostile, Khomeini could justify the export of revolution by saying, "If we remain in an enclosed environment we shall definitely face defeat. " These perceptions of threat were not entirely illusory, of course, but they were clearly exaggerated. Thus, the suspicion that shaped Iran's policies toward most of its neighbors was the result of a spii- ral, insofar as the leaders of the Islamic Republic failed to recognize their own role in provoking others' responses. 158
The revolution in Iran confirms that spirals may arise from at least two distinct causes. One potential source is cognitive: images of hostility may b:e so deeply ingrained in the minds of key elites that they view virtually any action by an opponent as evidence of malign intent. Another source is do- mestic politics, especially when authority is contested. Although Rafsanjani and others seem to have recognized Iran's own behavior as responsible f01r its isolation, the divisions within the revolutionary movement and the lack
1 57 As noted earlier, Iranian officials blamed the United States for the Iraqi invasion in 1! )8o and accused\ Saddam Hussein of acting as the U. S. "deputy" in the region. Iranian fears of a U. S. -led coalition were increased by the Carter doctrine, the establishment of the Rapid De- ployment Force and the related effort to forge closer security ties with a number of states in the region. The provision of AWACS aircraft to Saudi Arabia after the outbreak of the Iran- Iraq war was also seen as evidence of Arab collusion with the "Great Satan," as was the U. S. decision to reflag and escort Kuwaiti tankers in 1987. See Ramazani, "Iran's Resistance to U. S. Intervention," 38-39; Campbell and Darvich, "Global Implications of the Iranian Revolu- tion," 41-42 n. 39, and 47-48.
158 Ramazani,RevolutionaryIran,24? Significantly,thisstatementwasmadeinMarch1g8o, well before the Iraqi invasion.
? ? ? The Iranian Revolution
of an effective mechanism for resolving them prevented the more moderate or pragmatic elements from following through on their desire to improve relations. 159
These episodes underscore the difficulty of reversing a spiral when au- thority on either side is divided. In such circumstances, gestures toward ac- commodation are likely to be attacked as a betrayal of revolutionary principles or as a direct threat to the revolution itself. Poorly executed ef- forts to improve relations may actually harm the situation, and the failure of each attempt will merely confirm the mutual antipathy.
The Iranian case also suggests that the normal prescription for avoiding or unwinding a spiral-by making concessions and other gestures of friend- ship in order to reduce the opponent's insecurity-may not work with a revolutionary regime. When power is contested and foreign regimes are viewed with suspicion, premature efforts at accommodation may be inter- preted as an attempt to reestablish foreign control before the new regime consolidates Hself. Under the circumstances, the allies of the old regime will be better off allowing the revolutionary process to run its course rather than trying to forge a close relationship right after the seizure of power.
Offense, Defense, Contagion, and Counterrevolution
The Iranian experience also illustrates how revolutions intensify security competition by altering perceptions of the offense-defense balance, primarily through the belief that the revolution will be contagious. Khomeini and his followers clearly saw the Islamic Republic as a model for other societies and expected their revolution to spread throughout the Muslim world and be- yond. 160 Khomeini had long regarded existing state boundaries as artificial creations, and he repeatedly emphasized the importance of unifying the en-
tire Muslim community. After the revolution, he envisioned the Iranian model "spreading on a world wide scale and, God willing, . . . the way will be opened for the world government of the [twelfth imam]. " 161 The Constitution
159 In addition, hostility to the "Great Satan" was a central part of Khomeini's worldview and thus became deeply engrained in the ideology of the revolution. As a result, any serious effort to improve relations ran counter to the same set of beliefs that justified clerical rule.
160 One of Khomeini's aides said in 1979: "Be patient. . . . We will both see the fate of the Saudi rulers six months after our return to Iran. " Quoted in Menashri, "Khomeini's Vision," 5 1 .
161 According to the Shiite theory of occultation, the Twelfth Imam Is the chosen successor to the Prophet Muhammed. He is believed to have been in hiding since the ninth century, but is destined to reappear and establish justice in conformity with Islam. The founder of the Is- lamic Republican Party, Ayatollah Mohammed Beheshti, echoed Khomeini's view by declar- ing that "Islam recognizes no borders," and another prominent ayatollah (Hussein Montazeri) declared, "Under Islam there is no differentiation between an Arab, a Persian, and others, and the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran is duty bound . . . to make consistent efforts to realize the political, economic, and cultural union of the Islamic world. " Quoted in Ramazani, "Khumayni's Islam," 17; Behrooz, "Trends in Iran's Foreign Policy," 15;
[2591
? ? Revolution and War
of the Islamic Republic endorsed this objective, and Iran backed Shiite funda- mentalists in Lebanon and the gulf states, broadcast revolutionary propa- ganda over Radio Tehran, and used the annual pilgrimage to Mecca to spread its message among other Muslims. 162 Although Khomeini often insisted that the export of revolution would be done by example and not ''by the sword," pro-Iranian groups in Lebanon and the gulf states relied upon terrorism and other violent acts with the apparent approval of the Iranian government.
Iran's leaders also believed that religious faith and revolutionary mobi- lization would enable them to gain victory even in the face of strong oppo- sition. Khomeini told the Revolutionary Guards that victory "is achieved by strength of faith. " Other Iranian officials offered similar assessments; for ex- ample, the commander of the Revolutionary Guards declared, "Only an ide- ologically motivated army like ours . . . [is] capable of mobilizing the people
. . . until the Iraqi regime falls. "163 Despite the internal chaos produced by the revolution and the fears of foreign intervention, the new regime adopted a highly bellicose foreign policy, apparently unconcerned by the costs such a policy might entaiL Combined with the possibility of ideological contagion, Iran's bellicose propaganda increased other states' perceptions of threat sig- nificantly.
These dynamics were most apparent in the Iran-Iraq war. A central cause of the war was the Iraqi fear that Khomeini's version of Islamic fundamen- talism would spread among Iraq's Shiite majority. Iran's leaders made no secret of their desire to overthrow the Baath regime, and their support for Al-Dawa intensified Iraqi concerns and made a preventive war more attrac- tive. 164 Iraq's decision to attack was also fueled by expectations that the pre- dominantly Arab population of Khuzistan would welcome its "liberation" by the Iraqi atmy. Unfortunately for Iraq, they proved woefully mistaken. The Arab population of Iran did not rise up to support them, and the Iraqi
invasion bogged down after less than two months. At the same time, the al- leged danger of a popular uprising by the Iraqi Shiites proved to be mini- mal, and the Baath regime was able to suppress the Al-Dawa movement with little difficulty. Thus, both of the assumptions underlying the Iraqi in- vasion, which were directly traceable to the revolution, turned out to be in- correct.
Similar misconceptions were at work on the Iranian side. Before the war, Iran's verbal and material support for the Iraqi Shi'ites reflected their belief
and Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: Middle East/North Africa, October 22, 1979, R-7.
163 Quoted in Chubin and Tripp, Iran and Iraq at War, 4o-42. 164 Karsh, "Iran-Iraq War Revisited," 87-88.
? ? ? 162 Tpe constitution states that the armed forces and Revolutionary Guards are responsible "not only for defending the borders but also for . . . fighting to expand the rule of God's Jaw in the world. " "Constitution of Islamic Republic," 185-86.
[26o]
? The Iranian Revolution
that the revolution would soon spread to other states, as well as their fear that Iran would be vulnerable to foreign pressure if it did not. 165 When Iraq withdrew from Iran in June 1982, the Iranian decision to cross the border into Iraq was based primarily on the belief that the invasion would cause the Shiite population in Iraq to rise up against the Baath regime. 166 This hope proved to be jl. llst as illusory as Iraq's earlier expectations. Thus, both Iran and Iraq learned that revolutionary regimes can be formidable military op- ponents, and foreign populations rarely welcome armed invaders.
Iran's relations with its other neighbors reveal similar results. The gulf states were worried by the ideological challenge created by the Islamic Re- public. Their concerns were exacerbated by hostile Iranian propaganda; its support for Shiite dissidents in Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and else- where; and its use of the annual pilgrimage to Mecca to spread its revolu- tionary message.
Yet the immediate danger seems to have been greatly overestimated.
Although the revolution did trigger mild responses within Iran's Arab neighbors and led to a number of acts of terrorism and subversion, the gov- ernments that were threatened by these developments were able to repress, expel, or coopt potential troublemakers fairly easily. And though the same forces of modernization and cultural alienation that helped cause the revo- lution in Iran have fed the Islamic resurgence in a number of other Arab states, Iran is still the only country to have experienced a mass-based Is- lamic revolution. Its support for foreign radicals is clearly irritating, but its ideological message has proven less compelling than many observers origi- nally feared. 167
This result confirms that even relatively weak states are usually stronger than most revolutionary movements. Events such as the Iranian Revolution are the product of particular domestic and international circumstances and specific historical contingencies, and thus they are relatively rare. Although conditions in other states may appear to be roughly similar, the circum- stances will never be identical and the protagonists unlikely to respond in precisely the same way. Governments facing a revolutionary challenge can usually keep their opponents at bay through a combination of coercion and cooptation (as the shah did for nearly twenty-five years), and endangered states can join forces against the spread of ideological infection (as the gulf
165 Thus Khomeini argued, "We must strive to export our Revolution throughout the world. . . . If we remain surrounded in a closed circle, we shall certainly be defeated. " Bani- Sadr offered a similar assessment: "If we do not go out of Iran to help the revolution, others will come to our country to plot against us. " Quoted in Hunter, Iran and the World, 41. The parallel between this view and Trotsky's justification for the export of revolution is striking.
lahs, 212-13.
? 167 Zonis and Brumberg, Khomeini, Iran, Arab World, 72.
? 166 See Abdulghani, Iraq and Iran, esp. 210; Hiro, Longest War, 86, and Iran under the Ayatol-
? Revolution and War
states did by forming the Gulf Cooperation Council and backing Iraq). Given the asymmetry of power favoring existing regimes, it is not surpris- ing that revolutions seldom spread.
This interpretation helps explain why the revolution had its greatest im- pact among the Shiite population of Lebanon. The Lebanese state was a hol- low shell by 1979, so pro-Iranian groups such as Hezbollah were able to acquire considerable influence. Yet the fundamentalists in Lebanon proved to be no match for the Israeli and Syrian states, and their position deterio- rated as soon as Damascus abandoned them. Thus, the Lebanese experience actually confirms the rule: revolutions are likely to spread only when the target state has been gravely weakened or has ceased to exist already. 168 The growth of Islamic fundamentalism in several other states does not under- mine this conclusion significantly, as these groups continue to face stiff op- position from regimes whose performance in other areas is unimpressive. All things considered, the modest direct impact of the Iranian Revolution shows that these events do not travel very well.
Uncertainty and Misinformation
Iran's relations with other states were also affected by uncertainty. In ad- dition to bringing inexperienced and unfamiliar elites to power, the revolu- tion's effects on existing channels of communication and information mad! e it more difficult for either side to pursue its interests in a rational and well- informed manner.
As discussed earlier, Iraq's decision to invade in 1980 was based on im- perfect ! knowledge about such crucial issues as the balance of militall'y power, tlhe danger of a pro-Iranian uprising among the Iraqi Shiites, and the likelihood that the Arabs of Khuzistan would welcome them. Although its armed forces appeared to have been gravely weakened by purges and de- fections, the explosion of martial enthusiasm unleashed by its opponent's revolution more than compensated for these deficiencies. And because nts military power rested in part on such new military institutionS as the Revo-
lutionary Guards, it is not surprising that outsiders failed to anticipate how well the new regime would fight. 169
In the same way, Iran's efforts to export its revolution (including its deci- sion to carry the war into Iraq in 1982) betrayed its ignorance about political
? ? 168 The formation of an Islamic government in Sudan supports this conclusion as well, in- sofar as the process of Islamization was actively promoted by the ruling elite itself.
169 Most experts underestimated Iran's military power. A CIA estimate predicted that Iran would lasft only three weeks after the Iraqi assault, Time magazine concluded that the war was unlikely to last long, and two U. S. experts concluded in 1981 that "Iran's prospects for victory can be termed simply as 'bleak. ' " See Wright, In the Name ofGod, 83-84; and MECS 1979-80, 4}
? ? The Iranian Revolution
conditions elsewhere in the Arab world. Although Khomeini had lived in Iraq for nearly fourteen years, his experience was limited primarily to reli- gious communities. As a result, his belief that the Iraqi Shiites would rise up against Hussein was based on a biased sample of Iraqi Shiites. The Iranian expectation that the revolution would soon spread to other Arab countries rested on equally inaccurate information about the revolutionary potential of these societies; instead of creating new Islamic republics, their efforts only encouraged potential victims to balance against them even more vigorously.
Iran's relationship with the United States also illustrates the obstacles that result from mutual ignorance. As a U. S. State Department desk officer com- plained after the shah's departure from Tehran, "We simply do not have the bios, inventory of political groups, or current picture of daily life as it evolves at various levels in Iran. Ignorance here of Iran is massive. "170 Pre- occupied by its fears of a leftist takeover, the U. S. government did not es- tablish direct contact with Khomeini during his first year in power, and efforts to contact other clerics were rare. Instead, the United States tried to cultivate the short-lived Bazargan government and conducted secret talks with Bani-Sadr without realizing that his authority was actually quite lim- ited. Gary Sick reports that for several months after the embassy was taken, U. S. officials did not even know the precise number of U. S. hostages, and Undersecretary of State Warren Christopher told a congressional hearing in May 1980 that information about the numbers, identity, and motives of the Iranians occupying the U. S. embassy was "still quite misty and vague. " At- tempts to resolve the crisis were further handicapped by the sheer difficulty of communicating with a regime in which any contact with the "Great Satan" could be attacked as an act of disloyalty. 171
Uncertainty and inaccurate information also played a crucial role in the Iran-contra imbroglio. The decision to provide arms to Iran was based on the following four beliefs: that Khomeini's regime was nearing collapse; that this collapse would make a Soviet takeover more likely; that the arms deal would strengthen the position of a group of Iranian "moderates" who were
170 Quoted in Bill, Eagle and Lion,. 276. U. S. ignorance is also revealed by Ambassador William Sullivan's prediction that Khomeini would play a "Gandhi-like" role in a post-shah Iran, by UN ambassador Andrew Young's commerit that Khomeini "would one day be hailed as somewhat of a saint," and by Princeton professor Richard Falk's claim that Khomeini's en- tourage was "uniformly composed of moderate progressive individuals" with "a notable record of concern for human rights. " Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 368; Wright, In the Name ofGod, 216; and Sick, All Fall Down, 166.
171 Intheabsenceofdiplomaticrelations,negotiationsforthereleaseofthehostageshadto be conducted via third parties or else covertly. Gary Sick relied heavily on information from an unidentified Iranian American with contacts among the revolutionary leaders and the exile community in the United States, and White House Chief of Staff Hamilton Jordan met secretly with Iranian representatives several times in February 198o. See Sick, All Fall Down, 246 and chap. 12; . Salinger, America Held Hostage, 245-46; and Jordan, Crisis, esp. 146-53, 15? 8.
Paradoxically, although both superpowers were concerned that the revo- lution in Iran might tempt the other to intervene, they were aware that such a step might provoke a major confrontation, and this knowledge probably discouraged either party from taking direct action. The fear of a Soviet re- sponse clearly inhibited the United States during the hostage crisis, for ex- ample, and the Soviets did nothing to aid the leftist Islamic Mujahedin and Tudeh Party as they were being decimated by the Islamic Republican Party. 141 The Iranians seemed to be well aware of the benefits they derived from this bitpolar stalemate, correctly inferring that each superpower would help protect them from the other. 142
Regional Responses. The effects of the revolution on the balance of power within the region were even more profound. Before the shah's departure, for
138 Quotations from Bill, "U. S. Overture to Iran," 169; and Ramazani, "Iran's Resistance to U. S. Influence," 37?
139 Brezhnev's first warning stated that "any interference, especially military, in the affairs of Iran, a state directly bordering on the Soviet Union, would be regarded by the Sovieft Union as a matter affecting its security interests. " Quoted in Martin Sicker, The Bear and the Lion: Soviet Imperialism and Iran (New York: Praeger, 1988), no. After the U. S. attempt to res- cue the embassy hostages, Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko declared, "We are against all measures of a military, or generally forcible, nature on the part of the United States or any- one else against Iran. " Similarly, Brezhnev declared, "We are not going to intervene . . . [in the Iran-Iraq war]. And we resolutely say to others: Hands off these events. " Quoted in Yodfaft, Soviet Union and Revolutionary Iran, 77-'79, 92.
140 See Hensel, "Moscow's Perspectives," 156-57; Dennis Ross, "Soviet Views towards the Gulf War," Orbis 28, no. 3 (1984), 438-39; and Zalmay Khalilzad, "Islamic Iran: Soviet Dilem- mas," Problems ofCommunism 33, no. 1 (1981).
141 See Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 488-89, 493-94; Salinger, America Held Hostage, 106; and Gary Sick, "Military Options and Constraints," in Christopher et a! . , American Hostages in Iran, 15o-55.
142 See Hunter, Iran and the World, 58-59.
? ? The Iranian Revolution
example, Crown Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia declared that "the Arab states will have to support Iran and the Shah, because the stability of that country is important to the [entire] region . . . and any radical change will upset its secu- rity balance. "143 The conservative oil monarchies also worried that shah's de- parture would tilt the regional balance in favor of radical or pro-Soviet forces. Similar concerns were evident in Israel, which provided direct aid to the Is- lamic Republic despite its overtly anti-Zionist rhetoric. For Israel, Iran was still an effective cotmter to the more immediate threat it faced from states such as
Iraq, and aiding the Iranian war effort was consistent with the same balance- of-power strategy that had inspired Israel's tacit alliance with the shah. 144
The revolution's impact on the regional balance of power was also appar- ent in Iraq's decision to invade Iran in September 1980. The apparent weak- ness and vulnerability created by the revolution was not the only reason Iraq attacked, but it was clearly a central factor in its calculations. Thus, the Iraqi invasion was a direct response to the window of opportunity created by the revolution, even if that window turned out to be smaller than Sad- dam Hussein expected. 145
Finally, although Khomeini criticized the state system as an illegitimate human invention and welcomed Iran's isolation from other states, the Is- lamic Republic was not immune from the competitive pressures of balance- of-power politics. Although Baathist Iraq was condemned as an atheistic state, Baathist Syria had become Iran's principal ally by 1982. Indeed, the pressure of war convinced Iran to purchase arms from a diverse array of suppliers-including Israel and the United States-solely for the purpose of improving its military capabilities. This does not deny ideology's effect on
Iran's foreign policy, but it does suggest that external constraints set limits on the regime's ideological purity.
Thus, the effects of the revolution on the balance of power exacerbated the security competition between Iran and a number of other states and were an important cause of the war between Iran and Iraq.
Perceptions ofIntent
The fall of the Pahlavi dynasty and its replacement by the Islamic Repub- lic affected virtually every aspect of Iran's foreign policy. Whereas the shah
143 Quoted in Menashri, Iran, 47?
144 On Israel's military aid to Iran, see Segev, Iranian Triangle; Cordesman, Gulfand Searchfor Stability, 717; Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 504; and Hiro, Longest War, 1 18.
145 See John W. Amos II, "The Iran-Iraq War: Conflict, Linkage, and Spillover in the Middle East," in GulfSecurity in the 19Bos: Perceptual and Strategic Dimensions, ed. Robert G. Darius, John W. Amos II, and Ralph H. Magnus (Stanford, Calif. : HooverInstitutePress, 1984), 58-60; Jack Levy and Mike Froelich, "Causes of the Iran-Iraq War," in The Regionalization ofWarfare, ed. James Brown and William P. Snyder (New Brunswick, N. J. : Transaction Books, 1985), 137-39?
? ? Revolution and War
. ad been oriented toward the West and closely allied with the United States,
he Islamic Republic was suspicious of both. Whereas the shah had main- rained cordial if guarded relations with the Soviet Union, Khomeini viewed it as the "lesser Satan," condemned its atheistic ideology, and denounced its invasion of Afghanistan. The shah had supported Israel and the conserva- tive gulf states and opposed the radical Arab regimes; by contrast, the Is- lamic Rep1lbl lic broke diplomatic relations with Israel, aided efforts to overthrow the gulf states, and aligned itself with Syria, South Yemen, Libya, and later Sudan. And where the shah's objectives vis-a-vis Iraq were limited (he sought to dominate the region but did not try to overthrow the Iraqi regime), revolutionary Iran was calling for the ouster of the Baath even be- fore the war began.
These changes cannot be explained solely by shifts in the balance of power. They were also products of the radically different worldview that in- spired the revolution itself. Apart from its specifically Islamic content, the ideology of revolutionary Iran arose from hostility to the shah and his poli- cies, especially to his pro-Western orientation. It is not surprising that the new regime therefore took steps that alarmed Iran's former allies.
Iran's foreign relations also support the hypothesis that revolutionary states are especially prone to spirals of hostility. In particular, both sides tended to take the very dimmest view of each other's actions and dis- counted the possibility that their own behavior might be responsible for the opposition they were facing.
As one would expect, the tendency to spiral was most apparent in Iran's diplomacy vis-a-vis the United States. Although both the Bazargan govern- ment and the Carter administration seemed genuinely interested in estab- lishing a new relationship after the shah's departure, relations between the United States and Iran soon deteriorated into a web of mutual suspicions. Throughout this period, each side's defensive responses and hostile infer- ences were reinforced by insensitive or unwitting actions by the other. 146 In the spring of 1979, for example, Iranian fears of a military coup inspired a series of purges and executions by the Revolutionary Courts, prompting the U. S. Senate to pass a condemnatory resolution. This action in turn derailed
an attempt to establish direct contact with Khomeini (who greeted the Sen- ate resolution by calling the United States a "defeated and wounded
146 In February 1979, Carter stated that the United States would "honor the will of the Iran- ian people" and expresdse his willingness to "work closely with the existing government of Iran. " Foreign Minister Karim Sanjavi replied that Iran still sought "friendly relations" with the United States, in the context of Iran's new policy of nonalignment. The United States agreed to resume military shipments to Iran in October, and Prime Minister Bazargan and Foreign Minister Ibrahim Yazdi (who had replaced Sanjavi in April) expressed their own hope that relations "would soon take a turn for the better. " See Menashri, Iran, 97; and Behrooz, "Trends in the Foreign Policy of Iran," 16-17.
[2541
? The Iranian Revolution
snake") and sparked mass demonstrations in Iran denouncing U. S. interfer- ence. The U. S. decision to permit the shah to enter the country for medical treatment in October angered the Iranian revolutionaries and raised new fears of a U. S. plot to place him back upon the throne; together, these events confirmed Iranian images of American aggressiveness and discredited the mote moderate forces, thereby helping the more extreme forces consolidate their control. r. 47 On the other side, the seizure of the U. S. embassy and the prolonged detention of the hostages cemented U. S. hostility and solidified perceptions of Iran as a fanatical and dangerous regime. 148
However, each side's interpretation was at least partly mistaken. Con- trary to Iranian fears of a U. S. -backed counterrevolution, the United States had no intention of trying to restore the terminally ill shah; he had been per- mitted to enter the United States only after repeated requests from influen- tial individuals such as David Rockefeller and Henry Kissinger. 149 And contrary to the U. S. image of unlimited Iranian bellicosity, the seizure of the embassy was inspired as much by conflicts within Iran as by an overt desire to harm the United States. 150 Although serious differences did exist, there- fore, probably neither side was as aggressive as the other believed it to be.
Subsequent episodes heightened each side's paranoia. The abortive hostage rescue mission in April 1980 confirmed Iranian fears of U. S. military intervention and revealed that the United States still possessed an extensive intelligence network within their country, thereby reinforcing Iranian fears of U. S. -backed plots. 151 The trade embargo and the U. S. tilt toward Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war only strengthened the impression of U. S. aggression. To the extent that Iranians failed to recognize the role of their own actions in pro- voking these responses, they were more likely to view U. S. policy as evi- dence of innate U. S. hostility. Similarly, Americans who were unfamiliar with the history of U. S. involvement in Iran or who saw the prior U. S. role as ben- eficial would be inclined to consider Iranian actions as unjustifiedly hostile.
147 Prior to his return to Iran, Khomeini warned that "America is an accessory" to the shah, and he later ded? red, "We will not let the United States bring back the Shah. This is what the Shah wants. Wake up. Watch out. " Quoted in Hiro, Iran under the Ayatollahs, 315, 134-37. Meetings between U. S. general Robert Huyser and a group of Iranian military officers in Jan- uary 1979 probably intensified Iranian fears of a U. S. -backed coup. See Sick, All Fall Down, 131-32; Menashri, Iran, 97-98, 1 14, 146-47; and Wright, In the Name ofGod, 75-76.
148 In February 1979, a Gallup poll reported that 64 percent of all Americans held an "unfa- vorable" image of Iran, 21 percent expressed the most extreme negative rating, and 12 percent offered a mildly favorable view. In an identical poll taken after the seizure of the embassy, 90 percent reported an "unfavorable" image, with 6o percent giving Iran the most extreme nega- tive rating. Gallup Opinion Index, no. 169 (August 1979), 41, and no. 176 (March 1980), 29.
149 See Bill, Eagle and Lion, 321-40; and Sick, All Fall Down, 179"-81.
150 On the role of Iranian domestic politics in the seizure of the embassy, see Hiro, Iran under the Ayatollahs, 136-39; Wright, In the Name ofGod, 74-81; Sick, All Fall Down, 198-205; Abra- hamian, Iranian Mojahedin, 57; and Arjomand, Turban for the Crown, 139-40.
151 See Hiro, Iran under the Ayatollahs, 154-56, 319-20; Bill, Eagle and Lion, 302. [255]
? Revolution and War
Even worse, gestures of accommodation tended to backfire, because they were seen as nefarious attempts to reestablish U. S. influence. For example, the premature U. S. effort to cultivate moderate forces after the shah's depar- ture merely discredited these leaders and reinforced the radicals' belief that the United States was still trying to pull strings behind the scenes. Thus, Brzezinski's meeting with Bazargan in November 1979 helped force the lat- ter's resngnation, and Bani-Sadr's efforts to resolve the hostage crisis played a key role in discrediting him in the eyes of Khomeini and the clerics. This problem was exacerbated by the Iranians' fondness for conspiracy theories, which created fertile ground for the notion that the United States was still able manipulate events in Iran at will. 152 As a result, Iran blamed the United States for the assassinations of several leading clerics, the Iraqi invasion, and the activities of counterrevolutionary groups such as the Islamic Muja- hedin. 153 These accusations were either without foundation or greatly exag- gerated, but insofar as they reflected sincere Iranian beliefs rather than mere propaganda, they provide additional evidence of spiral dynamics at work. 154
Lastly, the climate of suspicion and hostility between the United States and Iran made improving relations especially difficult. The United States did make conciliatory gestures on occasion, but the bulk of U. S. policy was hostile (for example, its support for the gulf states and the Iranian exiles, its efforts to deny Iran arms, and its gradual tilt towards Iraq). Not surpris- ingly, actions contrary to Iranian interests were seen as evidence of true U. S. preferences, while less harmful ones appeared as signs of U. S. duplicilfy. Thus, when the Senate passed a resolution condemning the executions lby the Revolutionary Courts (an action that ran counter to the Carter adminis- tration's efforts to reach a modus vivendi with Iran), the clerics saw it as a direct challenge to the new regime. In the same way, when Rafsanjani a111. d other moderates recognized that Iran was partly responsible for its own iso- lation, their efforts to cooperate with the United States in the Iran-contra arms deal were thwarted by extremists within Iran and by the incompetent bungling of the U. S. officials responsible for the initiative. 155 Because inter-
? 152 On this pervasive Iranian tendency, see Abrahamian, Khomeinism, chap. 5; Sick, All Fall Down, 33-34, 48, 346 n. 4; Cottam, "Inside Revolutionary Iran," 16-17; Arjomand, Turban for the Crown, 1 2? 30; and Salinger, America Held Hostage, 7o-71 .
153 Infact,U. S. officialswereupsetbytheIraqiinvasionbecauseitinterruptednegotiations for the release of the U. S. hostages. See Sick, All Fall Down, 320; Jordan, Crisis, 347; Christo- pher et al, American Hostages in Iran, 306; Ramazani, "Iran's Foreign Policy," 57; and Bani- Sadr, My Turn to Speak, 70, 76.
154 Iran's suspicions were sometimes justified, as the United States did provide modest lev- els of aid to the mujahedin after they had been driven into exile and tilted toward Iraq in 19B2. These decisions are consistent with the logic of spiraling: the U. S. was responding to Iraruan behavior, but Iran interpreted its acts as evidence of intrinsic hostility rather than as a defen- sive reaction.
155 Among other things, the mishandling of the first arms shipment in November 1985 (in which the U. S. sent Iran an obsolete version of the Hawk missile) and Oliver North's decision
? ? The Iranian Revolution
nal disagreements on both sides made bridging the divide politically risky, attempts to "unwind" the spiral were confined to unofficial channels and unreliable intermediaries, whose deceptive conduct did nothing to dispel the mutual lack of trust.
Iran's relations with a number of other states indicate spiraling as well, al- though it is often difficult to distinguish between the results legitimate con- flicts of interest and the effects of misperception. The Soviet Union was no more successful in shedding its satanic image than the United States, and Iran accused it of supporting Kurdish rebels and the Tudeh Party and re- peatedly criticized Soviet support for Iraq. There was obviously some basis for each of these charges, but the tendency of Iranian leaders to equate the two superpowers suggests that they did not fully grasp the Soviet Union's genuine desire to improve relations.
Diplomacy with Britain and France also combined elements of spiraling with legitimate perceptions of hostility. On the one hand, there were very real conflicts of interest between these states and revolutionary Iran, based on six factors: Iran's support for terrorist activities on British and French soil; the kidnapping of British and French citizens by pro-Iranian forces in Lebanon; the attacks on British citizens in Iran by members of the Revolutionary Guards; British and French arms sales to Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war; French willingness to provide asylum for Bani-Sadr, Bazargan, and the leaders of the mujahedin; and European support for the U. S. -backed trade embargo during the hostage crisis. On the other hand, British and French moderation toward
Iran (most clearly revealed by their halfhearted participation in the U. S.
trade embargo and Britain's willingness to permit Iran to conduct its private arms dealings through an office in London) failed to lead to cordial relations. In- stead, Iran's leaders saw British and French policy as fundamentally antago- nistic and never made a serious attempt to reach a lasting modus vivendi. Iran's propensity for assuming the worst about the intentions of other states is also apparent in its extraordinary sensitivity to issues of status or autonomy. Thus, the British arrest of an Iranian official on shoplifting charges brought a disproportionate response from Tehran, while Iran's intransigence during the Gordji affair with France reflects the Islamic Republic's insensitivity to the de- gree to which its own behavior provoked others. 156
tocharge Iran vastly inflated prices for U. S. weaponry reinforced Iranian beliefsthattheAmer- icans could not be trusted and undercut the alleged U. S. objective of cultivating better ties. See Draper, Very Thin Line, 195-97, 274-75, 311, 377-'79; and Bill, "U. S. Overture to Iran," 177.
136 Revolutionary states are especially sensitive to diplomatic slights, and to any other ac- tions that cast doubt on their legitimacy or status, perhaps because of their need to build a reputation. Specifically, as new members of the international system, revolutionary states may seek to deter future challenges by defending their prerogatives with particular vigilance. In addition, revolutionary elites may fear that a failure to respond could suggest a lack of rev- olutionary commitment and undermine their internal positions.
? [2571
? Revolution and War
Another example of spiraling was Iran's tendency to attribute opposition from states such as Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait to their internal corrup- tion, lack of true Islamic character, or dependence on the United States, rather than seeing it as a direct response to Iran's aggressive actions. With the partial exception of Iraq (whose 1980 invasion combined offensive and de- fensive motives), the anti-Iranian measures that these states took (such as the formation of the Gulf Cooperation Council or support for the Iraqi war ef- fort) were reactions to Iran's efforts to export its revolution and its escalating war with Iraq. Indeed, Iran's neighbors all genuinely tried to establish cor- dial relations with the new regime, but each shifted to policies of opposition once Iran's revisionist aims became clear. Thus, Iran's neighbors correctly read the impact of the revolution on Iranian intentions, and responded by joining forces to contain the threat.
By contrast, the mistaken belief that its neighbors were intrinsically hos- tile to the new regime seems to have played a key role in shaping Iran's for- eign policy. The close ties between the United States and the conservative gulf states alarmed the revolutionary government, and Khomeini's belief that these states were puppets of the "Great Satan" suggests a genuine fear of a well-orchestrated U. S. effort to reverse the revolution. 157 Convinced that
Iran's neighbors were inherently hostile, Khomeini could justify the export of revolution by saying, "If we remain in an enclosed environment we shall definitely face defeat. " These perceptions of threat were not entirely illusory, of course, but they were clearly exaggerated. Thus, the suspicion that shaped Iran's policies toward most of its neighbors was the result of a spii- ral, insofar as the leaders of the Islamic Republic failed to recognize their own role in provoking others' responses. 158
The revolution in Iran confirms that spirals may arise from at least two distinct causes. One potential source is cognitive: images of hostility may b:e so deeply ingrained in the minds of key elites that they view virtually any action by an opponent as evidence of malign intent. Another source is do- mestic politics, especially when authority is contested. Although Rafsanjani and others seem to have recognized Iran's own behavior as responsible f01r its isolation, the divisions within the revolutionary movement and the lack
1 57 As noted earlier, Iranian officials blamed the United States for the Iraqi invasion in 1! )8o and accused\ Saddam Hussein of acting as the U. S. "deputy" in the region. Iranian fears of a U. S. -led coalition were increased by the Carter doctrine, the establishment of the Rapid De- ployment Force and the related effort to forge closer security ties with a number of states in the region. The provision of AWACS aircraft to Saudi Arabia after the outbreak of the Iran- Iraq war was also seen as evidence of Arab collusion with the "Great Satan," as was the U. S. decision to reflag and escort Kuwaiti tankers in 1987. See Ramazani, "Iran's Resistance to U. S. Intervention," 38-39; Campbell and Darvich, "Global Implications of the Iranian Revolu- tion," 41-42 n. 39, and 47-48.
158 Ramazani,RevolutionaryIran,24? Significantly,thisstatementwasmadeinMarch1g8o, well before the Iraqi invasion.
? ? ? The Iranian Revolution
of an effective mechanism for resolving them prevented the more moderate or pragmatic elements from following through on their desire to improve relations. 159
These episodes underscore the difficulty of reversing a spiral when au- thority on either side is divided. In such circumstances, gestures toward ac- commodation are likely to be attacked as a betrayal of revolutionary principles or as a direct threat to the revolution itself. Poorly executed ef- forts to improve relations may actually harm the situation, and the failure of each attempt will merely confirm the mutual antipathy.
The Iranian case also suggests that the normal prescription for avoiding or unwinding a spiral-by making concessions and other gestures of friend- ship in order to reduce the opponent's insecurity-may not work with a revolutionary regime. When power is contested and foreign regimes are viewed with suspicion, premature efforts at accommodation may be inter- preted as an attempt to reestablish foreign control before the new regime consolidates Hself. Under the circumstances, the allies of the old regime will be better off allowing the revolutionary process to run its course rather than trying to forge a close relationship right after the seizure of power.
Offense, Defense, Contagion, and Counterrevolution
The Iranian experience also illustrates how revolutions intensify security competition by altering perceptions of the offense-defense balance, primarily through the belief that the revolution will be contagious. Khomeini and his followers clearly saw the Islamic Republic as a model for other societies and expected their revolution to spread throughout the Muslim world and be- yond. 160 Khomeini had long regarded existing state boundaries as artificial creations, and he repeatedly emphasized the importance of unifying the en-
tire Muslim community. After the revolution, he envisioned the Iranian model "spreading on a world wide scale and, God willing, . . . the way will be opened for the world government of the [twelfth imam]. " 161 The Constitution
159 In addition, hostility to the "Great Satan" was a central part of Khomeini's worldview and thus became deeply engrained in the ideology of the revolution. As a result, any serious effort to improve relations ran counter to the same set of beliefs that justified clerical rule.
160 One of Khomeini's aides said in 1979: "Be patient. . . . We will both see the fate of the Saudi rulers six months after our return to Iran. " Quoted in Menashri, "Khomeini's Vision," 5 1 .
161 According to the Shiite theory of occultation, the Twelfth Imam Is the chosen successor to the Prophet Muhammed. He is believed to have been in hiding since the ninth century, but is destined to reappear and establish justice in conformity with Islam. The founder of the Is- lamic Republican Party, Ayatollah Mohammed Beheshti, echoed Khomeini's view by declar- ing that "Islam recognizes no borders," and another prominent ayatollah (Hussein Montazeri) declared, "Under Islam there is no differentiation between an Arab, a Persian, and others, and the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran is duty bound . . . to make consistent efforts to realize the political, economic, and cultural union of the Islamic world. " Quoted in Ramazani, "Khumayni's Islam," 17; Behrooz, "Trends in Iran's Foreign Policy," 15;
[2591
? ? Revolution and War
of the Islamic Republic endorsed this objective, and Iran backed Shiite funda- mentalists in Lebanon and the gulf states, broadcast revolutionary propa- ganda over Radio Tehran, and used the annual pilgrimage to Mecca to spread its message among other Muslims. 162 Although Khomeini often insisted that the export of revolution would be done by example and not ''by the sword," pro-Iranian groups in Lebanon and the gulf states relied upon terrorism and other violent acts with the apparent approval of the Iranian government.
Iran's leaders also believed that religious faith and revolutionary mobi- lization would enable them to gain victory even in the face of strong oppo- sition. Khomeini told the Revolutionary Guards that victory "is achieved by strength of faith. " Other Iranian officials offered similar assessments; for ex- ample, the commander of the Revolutionary Guards declared, "Only an ide- ologically motivated army like ours . . . [is] capable of mobilizing the people
. . . until the Iraqi regime falls. "163 Despite the internal chaos produced by the revolution and the fears of foreign intervention, the new regime adopted a highly bellicose foreign policy, apparently unconcerned by the costs such a policy might entaiL Combined with the possibility of ideological contagion, Iran's bellicose propaganda increased other states' perceptions of threat sig- nificantly.
These dynamics were most apparent in the Iran-Iraq war. A central cause of the war was the Iraqi fear that Khomeini's version of Islamic fundamen- talism would spread among Iraq's Shiite majority. Iran's leaders made no secret of their desire to overthrow the Baath regime, and their support for Al-Dawa intensified Iraqi concerns and made a preventive war more attrac- tive. 164 Iraq's decision to attack was also fueled by expectations that the pre- dominantly Arab population of Khuzistan would welcome its "liberation" by the Iraqi atmy. Unfortunately for Iraq, they proved woefully mistaken. The Arab population of Iran did not rise up to support them, and the Iraqi
invasion bogged down after less than two months. At the same time, the al- leged danger of a popular uprising by the Iraqi Shiites proved to be mini- mal, and the Baath regime was able to suppress the Al-Dawa movement with little difficulty. Thus, both of the assumptions underlying the Iraqi in- vasion, which were directly traceable to the revolution, turned out to be in- correct.
Similar misconceptions were at work on the Iranian side. Before the war, Iran's verbal and material support for the Iraqi Shi'ites reflected their belief
and Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: Middle East/North Africa, October 22, 1979, R-7.
163 Quoted in Chubin and Tripp, Iran and Iraq at War, 4o-42. 164 Karsh, "Iran-Iraq War Revisited," 87-88.
? ? ? 162 Tpe constitution states that the armed forces and Revolutionary Guards are responsible "not only for defending the borders but also for . . . fighting to expand the rule of God's Jaw in the world. " "Constitution of Islamic Republic," 185-86.
[26o]
? The Iranian Revolution
that the revolution would soon spread to other states, as well as their fear that Iran would be vulnerable to foreign pressure if it did not. 165 When Iraq withdrew from Iran in June 1982, the Iranian decision to cross the border into Iraq was based primarily on the belief that the invasion would cause the Shiite population in Iraq to rise up against the Baath regime. 166 This hope proved to be jl. llst as illusory as Iraq's earlier expectations. Thus, both Iran and Iraq learned that revolutionary regimes can be formidable military op- ponents, and foreign populations rarely welcome armed invaders.
Iran's relations with its other neighbors reveal similar results. The gulf states were worried by the ideological challenge created by the Islamic Re- public. Their concerns were exacerbated by hostile Iranian propaganda; its support for Shiite dissidents in Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and else- where; and its use of the annual pilgrimage to Mecca to spread its revolu- tionary message.
Yet the immediate danger seems to have been greatly overestimated.
Although the revolution did trigger mild responses within Iran's Arab neighbors and led to a number of acts of terrorism and subversion, the gov- ernments that were threatened by these developments were able to repress, expel, or coopt potential troublemakers fairly easily. And though the same forces of modernization and cultural alienation that helped cause the revo- lution in Iran have fed the Islamic resurgence in a number of other Arab states, Iran is still the only country to have experienced a mass-based Is- lamic revolution. Its support for foreign radicals is clearly irritating, but its ideological message has proven less compelling than many observers origi- nally feared. 167
This result confirms that even relatively weak states are usually stronger than most revolutionary movements. Events such as the Iranian Revolution are the product of particular domestic and international circumstances and specific historical contingencies, and thus they are relatively rare. Although conditions in other states may appear to be roughly similar, the circum- stances will never be identical and the protagonists unlikely to respond in precisely the same way. Governments facing a revolutionary challenge can usually keep their opponents at bay through a combination of coercion and cooptation (as the shah did for nearly twenty-five years), and endangered states can join forces against the spread of ideological infection (as the gulf
165 Thus Khomeini argued, "We must strive to export our Revolution throughout the world. . . . If we remain surrounded in a closed circle, we shall certainly be defeated. " Bani- Sadr offered a similar assessment: "If we do not go out of Iran to help the revolution, others will come to our country to plot against us. " Quoted in Hunter, Iran and the World, 41. The parallel between this view and Trotsky's justification for the export of revolution is striking.
lahs, 212-13.
? 167 Zonis and Brumberg, Khomeini, Iran, Arab World, 72.
? 166 See Abdulghani, Iraq and Iran, esp. 210; Hiro, Longest War, 86, and Iran under the Ayatol-
? Revolution and War
states did by forming the Gulf Cooperation Council and backing Iraq). Given the asymmetry of power favoring existing regimes, it is not surpris- ing that revolutions seldom spread.
This interpretation helps explain why the revolution had its greatest im- pact among the Shiite population of Lebanon. The Lebanese state was a hol- low shell by 1979, so pro-Iranian groups such as Hezbollah were able to acquire considerable influence. Yet the fundamentalists in Lebanon proved to be no match for the Israeli and Syrian states, and their position deterio- rated as soon as Damascus abandoned them. Thus, the Lebanese experience actually confirms the rule: revolutions are likely to spread only when the target state has been gravely weakened or has ceased to exist already. 168 The growth of Islamic fundamentalism in several other states does not under- mine this conclusion significantly, as these groups continue to face stiff op- position from regimes whose performance in other areas is unimpressive. All things considered, the modest direct impact of the Iranian Revolution shows that these events do not travel very well.
Uncertainty and Misinformation
Iran's relations with other states were also affected by uncertainty. In ad- dition to bringing inexperienced and unfamiliar elites to power, the revolu- tion's effects on existing channels of communication and information mad! e it more difficult for either side to pursue its interests in a rational and well- informed manner.
As discussed earlier, Iraq's decision to invade in 1980 was based on im- perfect ! knowledge about such crucial issues as the balance of militall'y power, tlhe danger of a pro-Iranian uprising among the Iraqi Shiites, and the likelihood that the Arabs of Khuzistan would welcome them. Although its armed forces appeared to have been gravely weakened by purges and de- fections, the explosion of martial enthusiasm unleashed by its opponent's revolution more than compensated for these deficiencies. And because nts military power rested in part on such new military institutionS as the Revo-
lutionary Guards, it is not surprising that outsiders failed to anticipate how well the new regime would fight. 169
In the same way, Iran's efforts to export its revolution (including its deci- sion to carry the war into Iraq in 1982) betrayed its ignorance about political
? ? 168 The formation of an Islamic government in Sudan supports this conclusion as well, in- sofar as the process of Islamization was actively promoted by the ruling elite itself.
169 Most experts underestimated Iran's military power. A CIA estimate predicted that Iran would lasft only three weeks after the Iraqi assault, Time magazine concluded that the war was unlikely to last long, and two U. S. experts concluded in 1981 that "Iran's prospects for victory can be termed simply as 'bleak. ' " See Wright, In the Name ofGod, 83-84; and MECS 1979-80, 4}
? ? The Iranian Revolution
conditions elsewhere in the Arab world. Although Khomeini had lived in Iraq for nearly fourteen years, his experience was limited primarily to reli- gious communities. As a result, his belief that the Iraqi Shiites would rise up against Hussein was based on a biased sample of Iraqi Shiites. The Iranian expectation that the revolution would soon spread to other Arab countries rested on equally inaccurate information about the revolutionary potential of these societies; instead of creating new Islamic republics, their efforts only encouraged potential victims to balance against them even more vigorously.
Iran's relationship with the United States also illustrates the obstacles that result from mutual ignorance. As a U. S. State Department desk officer com- plained after the shah's departure from Tehran, "We simply do not have the bios, inventory of political groups, or current picture of daily life as it evolves at various levels in Iran. Ignorance here of Iran is massive. "170 Pre- occupied by its fears of a leftist takeover, the U. S. government did not es- tablish direct contact with Khomeini during his first year in power, and efforts to contact other clerics were rare. Instead, the United States tried to cultivate the short-lived Bazargan government and conducted secret talks with Bani-Sadr without realizing that his authority was actually quite lim- ited. Gary Sick reports that for several months after the embassy was taken, U. S. officials did not even know the precise number of U. S. hostages, and Undersecretary of State Warren Christopher told a congressional hearing in May 1980 that information about the numbers, identity, and motives of the Iranians occupying the U. S. embassy was "still quite misty and vague. " At- tempts to resolve the crisis were further handicapped by the sheer difficulty of communicating with a regime in which any contact with the "Great Satan" could be attacked as an act of disloyalty. 171
Uncertainty and inaccurate information also played a crucial role in the Iran-contra imbroglio. The decision to provide arms to Iran was based on the following four beliefs: that Khomeini's regime was nearing collapse; that this collapse would make a Soviet takeover more likely; that the arms deal would strengthen the position of a group of Iranian "moderates" who were
170 Quoted in Bill, Eagle and Lion,. 276. U. S. ignorance is also revealed by Ambassador William Sullivan's prediction that Khomeini would play a "Gandhi-like" role in a post-shah Iran, by UN ambassador Andrew Young's commerit that Khomeini "would one day be hailed as somewhat of a saint," and by Princeton professor Richard Falk's claim that Khomeini's en- tourage was "uniformly composed of moderate progressive individuals" with "a notable record of concern for human rights. " Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 368; Wright, In the Name ofGod, 216; and Sick, All Fall Down, 166.
171 Intheabsenceofdiplomaticrelations,negotiationsforthereleaseofthehostageshadto be conducted via third parties or else covertly. Gary Sick relied heavily on information from an unidentified Iranian American with contacts among the revolutionary leaders and the exile community in the United States, and White House Chief of Staff Hamilton Jordan met secretly with Iranian representatives several times in February 198o. See Sick, All Fall Down, 246 and chap. 12; . Salinger, America Held Hostage, 245-46; and Jordan, Crisis, esp. 146-53, 15? 8.
