knowledge about such crucial issues as the balance of militall'y power, tlhe danger of a pro-Iranian uprising among the Iraqi Shiites, and the
likelihood
that the Arabs of Khuzistan would welcome them.
Revolution and War_nodrm
This problem was exacerbated by the Iranians' fondness for conspiracy theories, which created fertile ground for the notion that the United States was still able manipulate events in Iran at will.
152 As a result, Iran blamed the United States for the assassinations of several leading clerics, the Iraqi invasion, and the activities of counterrevolutionary groups such as the Islamic Muja- hedin.
153 These accusations were either without foundation or greatly exag- gerated, but insofar as they reflected sincere Iranian beliefs rather than mere propaganda, they provide additional evidence of spiral dynamics at work.
154
Lastly, the climate of suspicion and hostility between the United States and Iran made improving relations especially difficult. The United States did make conciliatory gestures on occasion, but the bulk of U. S. policy was hostile (for example, its support for the gulf states and the Iranian exiles, its efforts to deny Iran arms, and its gradual tilt towards Iraq). Not surpris- ingly, actions contrary to Iranian interests were seen as evidence of true U. S. preferences, while less harmful ones appeared as signs of U. S. duplicilfy. Thus, when the Senate passed a resolution condemning the executions lby the Revolutionary Courts (an action that ran counter to the Carter adminis- tration's efforts to reach a modus vivendi with Iran), the clerics saw it as a direct challenge to the new regime. In the same way, when Rafsanjani a111. d other moderates recognized that Iran was partly responsible for its own iso- lation, their efforts to cooperate with the United States in the Iran-contra arms deal were thwarted by extremists within Iran and by the incompetent bungling of the U. S. officials responsible for the initiative. 155 Because inter-
? 152 On this pervasive Iranian tendency, see Abrahamian, Khomeinism, chap. 5; Sick, All Fall Down, 33-34, 48, 346 n. 4; Cottam, "Inside Revolutionary Iran," 16-17; Arjomand, Turban for the Crown, 1 2? 30; and Salinger, America Held Hostage, 7o-71 .
153 Infact,U. S. officialswereupsetbytheIraqiinvasionbecauseitinterruptednegotiations for the release of the U. S. hostages. See Sick, All Fall Down, 320; Jordan, Crisis, 347; Christo- pher et al, American Hostages in Iran, 306; Ramazani, "Iran's Foreign Policy," 57; and Bani- Sadr, My Turn to Speak, 70, 76.
154 Iran's suspicions were sometimes justified, as the United States did provide modest lev- els of aid to the mujahedin after they had been driven into exile and tilted toward Iraq in 19B2. These decisions are consistent with the logic of spiraling: the U. S. was responding to Iraruan behavior, but Iran interpreted its acts as evidence of intrinsic hostility rather than as a defen- sive reaction.
155 Among other things, the mishandling of the first arms shipment in November 1985 (in which the U. S. sent Iran an obsolete version of the Hawk missile) and Oliver North's decision
? ? The Iranian Revolution
nal disagreements on both sides made bridging the divide politically risky, attempts to "unwind" the spiral were confined to unofficial channels and unreliable intermediaries, whose deceptive conduct did nothing to dispel the mutual lack of trust.
Iran's relations with a number of other states indicate spiraling as well, al- though it is often difficult to distinguish between the results legitimate con- flicts of interest and the effects of misperception. The Soviet Union was no more successful in shedding its satanic image than the United States, and Iran accused it of supporting Kurdish rebels and the Tudeh Party and re- peatedly criticized Soviet support for Iraq. There was obviously some basis for each of these charges, but the tendency of Iranian leaders to equate the two superpowers suggests that they did not fully grasp the Soviet Union's genuine desire to improve relations.
Diplomacy with Britain and France also combined elements of spiraling with legitimate perceptions of hostility. On the one hand, there were very real conflicts of interest between these states and revolutionary Iran, based on six factors: Iran's support for terrorist activities on British and French soil; the kidnapping of British and French citizens by pro-Iranian forces in Lebanon; the attacks on British citizens in Iran by members of the Revolutionary Guards; British and French arms sales to Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war; French willingness to provide asylum for Bani-Sadr, Bazargan, and the leaders of the mujahedin; and European support for the U. S. -backed trade embargo during the hostage crisis. On the other hand, British and French moderation toward
Iran (most clearly revealed by their halfhearted participation in the U. S. trade embargo and Britain's willingness to permit Iran to conduct its private arms dealings through an office in London) failed to lead to cordial relations. In- stead, Iran's leaders saw British and French policy as fundamentally antago- nistic and never made a serious attempt to reach a lasting modus vivendi. Iran's propensity for assuming the worst about the intentions of other states is also apparent in its extraordinary sensitivity to issues of status or autonomy. Thus, the British arrest of an Iranian official on shoplifting charges brought a disproportionate response from Tehran, while Iran's intransigence during the Gordji affair with France reflects the Islamic Republic's insensitivity to the de- gree to which its own behavior provoked others. 156
tocharge Iran vastly inflated prices for U. S. weaponry reinforced Iranian beliefsthattheAmer- icans could not be trusted and undercut the alleged U. S. objective of cultivating better ties. See Draper, Very Thin Line, 195-97, 274-75, 311, 377-'79; and Bill, "U. S. Overture to Iran," 177.
136 Revolutionary states are especially sensitive to diplomatic slights, and to any other ac- tions that cast doubt on their legitimacy or status, perhaps because of their need to build a reputation. Specifically, as new members of the international system, revolutionary states may seek to deter future challenges by defending their prerogatives with particular vigilance. In addition, revolutionary elites may fear that a failure to respond could suggest a lack of rev- olutionary commitment and undermine their internal positions.
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Another example of spiraling was Iran's tendency to attribute opposition from states such as Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait to their internal corrup- tion, lack of true Islamic character, or dependence on the United States, rather than seeing it as a direct response to Iran's aggressive actions. With the partial exception of Iraq (whose 1980 invasion combined offensive and de- fensive motives), the anti-Iranian measures that these states took (such as the formation of the Gulf Cooperation Council or support for the Iraqi war ef- fort) were reactions to Iran's efforts to export its revolution and its escalating war with Iraq. Indeed, Iran's neighbors all genuinely tried to establish cor- dial relations with the new regime, but each shifted to policies of opposition once Iran's revisionist aims became clear. Thus, Iran's neighbors correctly read the impact of the revolution on Iranian intentions, and responded by joining forces to contain the threat.
By contrast, the mistaken belief that its neighbors were intrinsically hos- tile to the new regime seems to have played a key role in shaping Iran's for- eign policy. The close ties between the United States and the conservative gulf states alarmed the revolutionary government, and Khomeini's belief that these states were puppets of the "Great Satan" suggests a genuine fear of a well-orchestrated U. S. effort to reverse the revolution. 157 Convinced that
Iran's neighbors were inherently hostile, Khomeini could justify the export of revolution by saying, "If we remain in an enclosed environment we shall definitely face defeat. " These perceptions of threat were not entirely illusory, of course, but they were clearly exaggerated. Thus, the suspicion that shaped Iran's policies toward most of its neighbors was the result of a spii- ral, insofar as the leaders of the Islamic Republic failed to recognize their own role in provoking others' responses. 158
The revolution in Iran confirms that spirals may arise from at least two distinct causes. One potential source is cognitive: images of hostility may b:e so deeply ingrained in the minds of key elites that they view virtually any action by an opponent as evidence of malign intent. Another source is do- mestic politics, especially when authority is contested. Although Rafsanjani and others seem to have recognized Iran's own behavior as responsible f01r its isolation, the divisions within the revolutionary movement and the lack
1 57 As noted earlier, Iranian officials blamed the United States for the Iraqi invasion in 1! )8o and accused\ Saddam Hussein of acting as the U. S. "deputy" in the region. Iranian fears of a U. S. -led coalition were increased by the Carter doctrine, the establishment of the Rapid De- ployment Force and the related effort to forge closer security ties with a number of states in the region. The provision of AWACS aircraft to Saudi Arabia after the outbreak of the Iran- Iraq war was also seen as evidence of Arab collusion with the "Great Satan," as was the U. S. decision to reflag and escort Kuwaiti tankers in 1987. See Ramazani, "Iran's Resistance to U. S. Intervention," 38-39; Campbell and Darvich, "Global Implications of the Iranian Revolu- tion," 41-42 n. 39, and 47-48.
158 Ramazani,RevolutionaryIran,24? Significantly,thisstatementwasmadeinMarch1g8o, well before the Iraqi invasion.
? ? ? The Iranian Revolution
of an effective mechanism for resolving them prevented the more moderate or pragmatic elements from following through on their desire to improve relations. 159
These episodes underscore the difficulty of reversing a spiral when au- thority on either side is divided. In such circumstances, gestures toward ac- commodation are likely to be attacked as a betrayal of revolutionary principles or as a direct threat to the revolution itself. Poorly executed ef- forts to improve relations may actually harm the situation, and the failure of each attempt will merely confirm the mutual antipathy.
The Iranian case also suggests that the normal prescription for avoiding or unwinding a spiral-by making concessions and other gestures of friend- ship in order to reduce the opponent's insecurity-may not work with a revolutionary regime. When power is contested and foreign regimes are viewed with suspicion, premature efforts at accommodation may be inter- preted as an attempt to reestablish foreign control before the new regime consolidates Hself. Under the circumstances, the allies of the old regime will be better off allowing the revolutionary process to run its course rather than trying to forge a close relationship right after the seizure of power.
Offense, Defense, Contagion, and Counterrevolution
The Iranian experience also illustrates how revolutions intensify security competition by altering perceptions of the offense-defense balance, primarily through the belief that the revolution will be contagious. Khomeini and his followers clearly saw the Islamic Republic as a model for other societies and expected their revolution to spread throughout the Muslim world and be- yond. 160 Khomeini had long regarded existing state boundaries as artificial creations, and he repeatedly emphasized the importance of unifying the en-
tire Muslim community. After the revolution, he envisioned the Iranian model "spreading on a world wide scale and, God willing, . . . the way will be opened for the world government of the [twelfth imam]. " 161 The Constitution
159 In addition, hostility to the "Great Satan" was a central part of Khomeini's worldview and thus became deeply engrained in the ideology of the revolution. As a result, any serious effort to improve relations ran counter to the same set of beliefs that justified clerical rule.
160 One of Khomeini's aides said in 1979: "Be patient. . . . We will both see the fate of the Saudi rulers six months after our return to Iran. " Quoted in Menashri, "Khomeini's Vision," 5 1 .
161 According to the Shiite theory of occultation, the Twelfth Imam Is the chosen successor to the Prophet Muhammed. He is believed to have been in hiding since the ninth century, but is destined to reappear and establish justice in conformity with Islam. The founder of the Is- lamic Republican Party, Ayatollah Mohammed Beheshti, echoed Khomeini's view by declar- ing that "Islam recognizes no borders," and another prominent ayatollah (Hussein Montazeri) declared, "Under Islam there is no differentiation between an Arab, a Persian, and others, and the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran is duty bound . . . to make consistent efforts to realize the political, economic, and cultural union of the Islamic world. " Quoted in Ramazani, "Khumayni's Islam," 17; Behrooz, "Trends in Iran's Foreign Policy," 15;
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of the Islamic Republic endorsed this objective, and Iran backed Shiite funda- mentalists in Lebanon and the gulf states, broadcast revolutionary propa- ganda over Radio Tehran, and used the annual pilgrimage to Mecca to spread its message among other Muslims. 162 Although Khomeini often insisted that the export of revolution would be done by example and not ''by the sword," pro-Iranian groups in Lebanon and the gulf states relied upon terrorism and other violent acts with the apparent approval of the Iranian government.
Iran's leaders also believed that religious faith and revolutionary mobi- lization would enable them to gain victory even in the face of strong oppo- sition. Khomeini told the Revolutionary Guards that victory "is achieved by strength of faith. " Other Iranian officials offered similar assessments; for ex- ample, the commander of the Revolutionary Guards declared, "Only an ide- ologically motivated army like ours . . . [is] capable of mobilizing the people
. . . until the Iraqi regime falls. "163 Despite the internal chaos produced by the revolution and the fears of foreign intervention, the new regime adopted a highly bellicose foreign policy, apparently unconcerned by the costs such a policy might entaiL Combined with the possibility of ideological contagion, Iran's bellicose propaganda increased other states' perceptions of threat sig- nificantly.
These dynamics were most apparent in the Iran-Iraq war. A central cause of the war was the Iraqi fear that Khomeini's version of Islamic fundamen- talism would spread among Iraq's Shiite majority. Iran's leaders made no secret of their desire to overthrow the Baath regime, and their support for Al-Dawa intensified Iraqi concerns and made a preventive war more attrac- tive. 164 Iraq's decision to attack was also fueled by expectations that the pre- dominantly Arab population of Khuzistan would welcome its "liberation" by the Iraqi atmy. Unfortunately for Iraq, they proved woefully mistaken. The Arab population of Iran did not rise up to support them, and the Iraqi
invasion bogged down after less than two months. At the same time, the al- leged danger of a popular uprising by the Iraqi Shiites proved to be mini- mal, and the Baath regime was able to suppress the Al-Dawa movement with little difficulty. Thus, both of the assumptions underlying the Iraqi in- vasion, which were directly traceable to the revolution, turned out to be in- correct.
Similar misconceptions were at work on the Iranian side. Before the war, Iran's verbal and material support for the Iraqi Shi'ites reflected their belief
and Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: Middle East/North Africa, October 22, 1979, R-7.
163 Quoted in Chubin and Tripp, Iran and Iraq at War, 4o-42. 164 Karsh, "Iran-Iraq War Revisited," 87-88.
? ? ? 162 Tpe constitution states that the armed forces and Revolutionary Guards are responsible "not only for defending the borders but also for . . . fighting to expand the rule of God's Jaw in the world. " "Constitution of Islamic Republic," 185-86.
[26o]
? The Iranian Revolution
that the revolution would soon spread to other states, as well as their fear that Iran would be vulnerable to foreign pressure if it did not. 165 When Iraq withdrew from Iran in June 1982, the Iranian decision to cross the border into Iraq was based primarily on the belief that the invasion would cause the Shiite population in Iraq to rise up against the Baath regime. 166 This hope proved to be jl. llst as illusory as Iraq's earlier expectations. Thus, both Iran and Iraq learned that revolutionary regimes can be formidable military op- ponents, and foreign populations rarely welcome armed invaders.
Iran's relations with its other neighbors reveal similar results. The gulf states were worried by the ideological challenge created by the Islamic Re- public. Their concerns were exacerbated by hostile Iranian propaganda; its support for Shiite dissidents in Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and else- where; and its use of the annual pilgrimage to Mecca to spread its revolu- tionary message.
Yet the immediate danger seems to have been greatly overestimated.
Although the revolution did trigger mild responses within Iran's Arab neighbors and led to a number of acts of terrorism and subversion, the gov- ernments that were threatened by these developments were able to repress, expel, or coopt potential troublemakers fairly easily. And though the same forces of modernization and cultural alienation that helped cause the revo- lution in Iran have fed the Islamic resurgence in a number of other Arab states, Iran is still the only country to have experienced a mass-based Is- lamic revolution. Its support for foreign radicals is clearly irritating, but its ideological message has proven less compelling than many observers origi- nally feared. 167
This result confirms that even relatively weak states are usually stronger than most revolutionary movements. Events such as the Iranian Revolution are the product of particular domestic and international circumstances and specific historical contingencies, and thus they are relatively rare. Although conditions in other states may appear to be roughly similar, the circum- stances will never be identical and the protagonists unlikely to respond in precisely the same way. Governments facing a revolutionary challenge can usually keep their opponents at bay through a combination of coercion and cooptation (as the shah did for nearly twenty-five years), and endangered states can join forces against the spread of ideological infection (as the gulf
165 Thus Khomeini argued, "We must strive to export our Revolution throughout the world. . . . If we remain surrounded in a closed circle, we shall certainly be defeated. " Bani- Sadr offered a similar assessment: "If we do not go out of Iran to help the revolution, others will come to our country to plot against us. " Quoted in Hunter, Iran and the World, 41. The parallel between this view and Trotsky's justification for the export of revolution is striking.
lahs, 212-13.
? 167 Zonis and Brumberg, Khomeini, Iran, Arab World, 72.
? 166 See Abdulghani, Iraq and Iran, esp. 210; Hiro, Longest War, 86, and Iran under the Ayatol-
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states did by forming the Gulf Cooperation Council and backing Iraq). Given the asymmetry of power favoring existing regimes, it is not surpris- ing that revolutions seldom spread.
This interpretation helps explain why the revolution had its greatest im- pact among the Shiite population of Lebanon. The Lebanese state was a hol- low shell by 1979, so pro-Iranian groups such as Hezbollah were able to acquire considerable influence. Yet the fundamentalists in Lebanon proved to be no match for the Israeli and Syrian states, and their position deterio- rated as soon as Damascus abandoned them. Thus, the Lebanese experience actually confirms the rule: revolutions are likely to spread only when the target state has been gravely weakened or has ceased to exist already. 168 The growth of Islamic fundamentalism in several other states does not under- mine this conclusion significantly, as these groups continue to face stiff op- position from regimes whose performance in other areas is unimpressive. All things considered, the modest direct impact of the Iranian Revolution shows that these events do not travel very well.
Uncertainty and Misinformation
Iran's relations with other states were also affected by uncertainty. In ad- dition to bringing inexperienced and unfamiliar elites to power, the revolu- tion's effects on existing channels of communication and information mad! e it more difficult for either side to pursue its interests in a rational and well- informed manner.
As discussed earlier, Iraq's decision to invade in 1980 was based on im- perfect !
knowledge about such crucial issues as the balance of militall'y power, tlhe danger of a pro-Iranian uprising among the Iraqi Shiites, and the likelihood that the Arabs of Khuzistan would welcome them. Although its armed forces appeared to have been gravely weakened by purges and de- fections, the explosion of martial enthusiasm unleashed by its opponent's revolution more than compensated for these deficiencies. And because nts military power rested in part on such new military institutionS as the Revo-
lutionary Guards, it is not surprising that outsiders failed to anticipate how well the new regime would fight. 169
In the same way, Iran's efforts to export its revolution (including its deci- sion to carry the war into Iraq in 1982) betrayed its ignorance about political
? ? 168 The formation of an Islamic government in Sudan supports this conclusion as well, in- sofar as the process of Islamization was actively promoted by the ruling elite itself.
169 Most experts underestimated Iran's military power. A CIA estimate predicted that Iran would lasft only three weeks after the Iraqi assault, Time magazine concluded that the war was unlikely to last long, and two U. S. experts concluded in 1981 that "Iran's prospects for victory can be termed simply as 'bleak. ' " See Wright, In the Name ofGod, 83-84; and MECS 1979-80, 4}
? ? The Iranian Revolution
conditions elsewhere in the Arab world. Although Khomeini had lived in Iraq for nearly fourteen years, his experience was limited primarily to reli- gious communities. As a result, his belief that the Iraqi Shiites would rise up against Hussein was based on a biased sample of Iraqi Shiites. The Iranian expectation that the revolution would soon spread to other Arab countries rested on equally inaccurate information about the revolutionary potential of these societies; instead of creating new Islamic republics, their efforts only encouraged potential victims to balance against them even more vigorously.
Iran's relationship with the United States also illustrates the obstacles that result from mutual ignorance. As a U. S. State Department desk officer com- plained after the shah's departure from Tehran, "We simply do not have the bios, inventory of political groups, or current picture of daily life as it evolves at various levels in Iran. Ignorance here of Iran is massive. "170 Pre- occupied by its fears of a leftist takeover, the U. S. government did not es- tablish direct contact with Khomeini during his first year in power, and efforts to contact other clerics were rare. Instead, the United States tried to cultivate the short-lived Bazargan government and conducted secret talks with Bani-Sadr without realizing that his authority was actually quite lim- ited. Gary Sick reports that for several months after the embassy was taken, U. S. officials did not even know the precise number of U. S. hostages, and Undersecretary of State Warren Christopher told a congressional hearing in May 1980 that information about the numbers, identity, and motives of the Iranians occupying the U. S. embassy was "still quite misty and vague. " At- tempts to resolve the crisis were further handicapped by the sheer difficulty of communicating with a regime in which any contact with the "Great Satan" could be attacked as an act of disloyalty. 171
Uncertainty and inaccurate information also played a crucial role in the Iran-contra imbroglio. The decision to provide arms to Iran was based on the following four beliefs: that Khomeini's regime was nearing collapse; that this collapse would make a Soviet takeover more likely; that the arms deal would strengthen the position of a group of Iranian "moderates" who were
170 Quoted in Bill, Eagle and Lion,. 276. U. S. ignorance is also revealed by Ambassador William Sullivan's prediction that Khomeini would play a "Gandhi-like" role in a post-shah Iran, by UN ambassador Andrew Young's commerit that Khomeini "would one day be hailed as somewhat of a saint," and by Princeton professor Richard Falk's claim that Khomeini's en- tourage was "uniformly composed of moderate progressive individuals" with "a notable record of concern for human rights. " Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 368; Wright, In the Name ofGod, 216; and Sick, All Fall Down, 166.
171 Intheabsenceofdiplomaticrelations,negotiationsforthereleaseofthehostageshadto be conducted via third parties or else covertly. Gary Sick relied heavily on information from an unidentified Iranian American with contacts among the revolutionary leaders and the exile community in the United States, and White House Chief of Staff Hamilton Jordan met secretly with Iranian representatives several times in February 198o. See Sick, All Fall Down, 246 and chap. 12; . Salinger, America Held Hostage, 245-46; and Jordan, Crisis, esp. 146-53, 15? 8.
? ? ? ? ? Revolution and War
eager to restore relations with the United States; and that Iran could per- suade the Lebanese Shiites to release the U. S. hostages. m These hopes were notbasedonhardinformation,however,butontestimonyfromself-serving "sources" such as Manucher Ghorbanifar, who managed to persuade gullible U. S. officials such as Oliver North that the sale of arms to Iran would pave the way for the release of the hostages in Lebanon and help bring about a U. S. -Iranian rapprochement. 173
States never understand each other perfectly, of course, but the Iranian Revolution confirms how much worse this problem can be after a revolu- tion. Lacking reliable information, Iran and its foreign adversaries relied on stereotypes, worst-case scenarios, and the testimony of self-interested exiles and sleazy middlemen. The result was a heightened sense of threat, a greater willingness to use force, and incompetent, doomed attempts to im- prove relations. 174
Socialization and Learning
The Iranian case offers partial-but hardly overwhelming-support for the neorealist claim that the constraints of international anarchy will force states with radical international goals to moderate their objectives. Iran's foreign policy objectives were extremely unrealistic at first, and its leaders did modify some of their goals in order to ensure the survival of the new regime. The Islamic Republic did not abandon all of its revolutionary aims, however, and it continues today to engage in bellicose policies toward a number of states despite the high cost these positions entail. This persis- tence was the result of internal divisions within Iran and the sacrosanct character of certain elements in Iran's revolutionary worldview.
As we have seen, the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic rested on a distinctly unrealistic set of ideologically inspired goals. Khomeini's ideol- ogy questioned the legitimacy of the existing state system. He initially welcomed Iran's international isolation as a means of preserving its inde- pendence and revolutionary purity. Although moderate leaders such as Bani-Sadr, Yazdi, and Qotbzadeh deplored the effects of these policies on
m Ironically,theoriginalCIAestimatethathelpedlaunchedtheentireinitiativewasaban- doned a year later. See Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Contras, 427; and "Soviet Threat toward Iran Overstated, Casey Concluded," Washington Post, January 13, 1987, A1, AS.
173 "MuchofthetroublethatbesettheAmericansinanyefforttoworkoutanewpolicyfor Iran, in order to achieve a 'strategic opening' or to liberate the hostages or both, resulted from an almost total American ignorance of what was going on in Iran. " Theodore Draper, Very Thin Line, 155.
174 As Rafsanjani put in 1986: "The Americans . . . despite their satellites, spies, the CIA, and the rest are so immensely uninformed about our region; uninformed about our internal af- fairs; how many half-baked analyses they tend to make. " Quoted in Chubin and Tripp, Iran and Iraq at War, 214.
? ? ? The Iranian Revolution
Iran's international position, Iran's behavior in the immediate aftermath of the revolution showed little sensitivity to the limits imposed by the interna- tional system. 175
As neorealism predicts, however, external constraints forced the Islamic Republic to moderate its conduct in several ways. One sign of learning was the growing professionalism of the Revolutionary Guards; over time, the war with Iraq forced Iran to worry more about military effectiveness and less about ideological purity. Similarly, Iran's willingness to obtain weapons from virtually any source-including the "Great Satan" and Israel-re- vealed its willingness to forgo its ideological scruples in order to deal with a serious external challenge. 176
Iran also abandoned its isolationist policy and began seeking diplomatic and commercial relations with a number of other states. It condemned Iraq's "atheistic" Baathist ideology but did not hesitate to align itself with Syria, which was governed by a rival branch of the same Baath movement. And having previously stated that "We must become isolated in order to become independent," by 1984 Khomeini had announced that Iran "wanted rela- tions with all countries" except the United States, Israel, and South Africa. Failure to establish such ties, he argued, "would mean defeat, annihilation, and being buried right to the end. " Khomeini now told his followers, "We should learn the good things from foreigners and reject the bad things," and Foreign Minister Velayati warned that "if Iran is not present on the world scene, then important issues wiU be decided without it. " President Khamenei called for "rational, sound, and healthy relations with all coun- tries," and some Iranian officials conceded that the revoiution was unlikely to spread anytime soon. As Prime Minister Musavi admitted in 1985, ini- tially "our view . . . was that the Islamic Revolution would spread within a year as a chain reaction. . . . But it seems we were wrong in our initial as- sessments. "177 Other officials acknowledged that Iran's own actions had contributed to its isolation; in Rafsanjani's words, "If Iran had demonstrated a little more tactfulness . . . [Saudi Arabia and Kuwait] would not have sup- ported Iraq. " The decision to end the war with Iraq was another triumph of necessity over ideological conviction, and the constitutional revisions that followed Khomeini's death and Khamenei's selection as supreme jurispru-
175 In November 1980, for example, former foreign minister Yazdi warned that the hostage issue "has not been handled well and politically we have lost in the world. " Quoted in Sick, All Fall Down, 33J
176 One source states that Iran obtained weapons from as many as forty-one different coun- tries, spending roughly $2-3 billion per year. See Farhad Kazemi and Jo-Anne Hart, "The Shi'i Praxis: Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy in Iran," in Menashri, Iranian Revolution and the Muslim World, 66.
177 These quotations are from Rouhallah K. Ramazani, "Iran's Foreign Policy: Contending Orientations," in his edited Iran's Revolution, 6o; Menashri, "Khomeini's Vision," 52; and Shirin T. Hunter, "After the Ayatollah," Foreign Policy 66 (1987).
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dent were equally striking departures from Khomeini's original blueprint for Islamic government. 178
These signs of moderation should not obscure the durability of Iran's commitment to radical ends and revolutionary means, however. Iran has continued to violate a number of diplomatic norms, as revealed by its sup- port for terrorist groups, its efforts to assassinate anti-Khomeini activists in several foreign countries, and the abuse and detention of foreign diplomats in Tehran. 179 Iran repeatedly used the annual hajj to spread its revolutionary message and to undermine the Saudi regime, and it has shown scant inter- est in normalizing relations with the United States or Israel. The Rushdie af- fair has jeopardized ties with Great Britain and France, and despite the continued deterioration of the Iranian economy and the obvious costs of its confrontational stance, Iran continues to back fundamentalist groups in a number of states and maintains a doctrine that is fundamentally hostile to the West. In short, although there has been some evidence of socialization since the falll of the shah, the process must be regarded as partial at best.
Iran's deradicalization has been limited in part because the evidence in favor of such a development was ambiguous. After the regime had accom- plished a host of seemingly impossible feats during its first years in power (including the ouster of the shah, the successful defiance of the United States, and the repulse of the Iraqi invasion), the necessity for moderation was partialliy obscured by faith in Islam and trust in Khomeini's charismatic leadership. Events such as the U. S. withdrawal from Lebanon in 1983 may have reinforced this view as well, and the growth of Islamic activism throughout the Middle East undoubtedly helped sustain Iran's commitment to an ideologically oriented foreign policy. 180
Even more importantly, Iran's ability to learn and adapt has been con- strained by divisions within the revolutionary elite itself. Different factions have drawn differentlessons from Iran's postrevolutionary experience, and where Rafsanjani and others have sought to downplay the export of revolu- tion in order to cultivate diplomatic and commercial ties abroad, the hard-
178 Quoted in Menashri, "Khomeini's Vision," 52. Rafsanjani's pragmatism was also re- vealed by his statement that "by the use of an inappropriate method [the export of revolu- tion] . . . we have created enemies for our country," and he criticized Iranian extremists as "frozen in their beliefs. " In a remarkable display of candor, Rafsanjani also endorsed Khamenei's selection as supreme jurisprudent in 1989 by saying that "familiarity with na- tional issues" is "far more important than all other conditions such as [religious] knowledge [and even] justness. " Quoted in MECS 1988, 475, 480; and 1989, 352.
179 See "Iran's Use of International Terrorism: An Unclassified Paper and Chronology," (Washington, D. C. : U. S. Department of State, 1987); Alex von Domoch [pseud. ], "Iran's Vio- lent Diplomacy," Surviva/ 30, no. 3 (1988); and "Killing off Iranian Dissenters. "
1110 Khomeini remarked in 1983: "Were it not for divine assistance and for [Allah's] special blessing, we would never have possessed the strength to withstand a satanic regime [Iraq] armed to the teeth, which was dependent upon world powers. " Quoted in Richard Cottam, "Iran's Perception of the Superpowers," in Rosen, Iran since the Revolu tion, 142.
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? The Iranian Revolution
liners have remained firmly committed to a radical Islamic vision. Kho- meini contributed to this split by refusing to allow Rafsanjani and the prag- matists to either eliminate the hard-liners or move too far from the revolution's original ideals. Iranian foreign policy has remained erratic and inconsistent, therefore, and the Islamic Republic has failed to "learn" as rapidly as a unitary actor might. 181
Compounding the problem are the presence of numerous competing power centers and the relative weakness of the executive branch. Presiden- tial powers are limited by the constitution and subject to scrutiny by the supreme jurisprudent, while influential clerics control independent institu- tions whose actions are not subject to strict governmental controU82 Iran's costly commitment to a "revolutionary" foreign policy also underscores that a revolutionary regime is not a blank state; on the contrary, its leaders often take power with a clear set of expectations and objectives. The ideological visions that inspire a revolution set the standards by which the new regime will be judged and provide the moral justification for its rule. Having waged a violent struggle in order to implement a particular vision of soci-
ety, elites will find it difficult to reject these ideals openly (even if they de- part from them in practice), especially when the ruling ideology is regarded as sacrosanct and unchallengeable. Although important members of the Iranian elite have been willing to modify their principles in light of chang- ing conditions and new experiences, abandoning them completely would threaten the legitimacy of clerical rule and leave them open to the charge of betraying the revolution. As a result, core values such as anti-Americanism and the promotion of Islam in other countries remain central features of Iran's political agenda.
On the whole, the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic provides strong support for the main arguments of this book. The revolution in Iran raised concerns about the global balance of power and had even more profound ef- fects on the balance of power within the region. The revolution disrupted re- lations between Iran and most of its neighbors and exacerbated the competition between the United States and Soviet Union as well. Iran and its adversaries saw each other as aggressive and dangerous, and although these perceptions were justified, Iran's rulers exaggerated the true degree of Western animosity. The fear that the revolution would spread increased for-
181 Shahram Chubin, Iran 's National Security Policy: Capabilities, Intentions, and Impact (Wash- ington, D. C. : Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1994), esp. 71.
182 In 1992, for example, Iranian relations with Western Europe and the U. S. deteriorated after Ayatollah Hassan Sanei, the head of the Fifteenth Khordad Foundation, announced that he had increased the reward for killing Rushdie and would send his own men to assassinate the author.
? ? ? Revolution and War
eign perceptions of threat further, and these various forces combined to leave Iran isolated for most of the 1980s.
As the theory suggests, uncertainty and lack of information damaged Iran's relations with most other states. As Iran and its neighbors began to form more accurate estimates of each other's capabilities and intentions, however, the belief that the revolution might soon spread began to fade. Al- though Khomeini's ideological legacy and the enduring rivalry among his successors have prevented an explicit repudiation of Iran's revolutionary program, efforts to establish more normal foreign relations have already begun and are likely to increase.
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? [6]
The American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese Revolutions
"As revolutions have begun, it is natural to expect that other revolutions
will follow. "
-Thomas Paine, 1791
What were the international effects of the American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese revolutions? Although the evidence presented here is not de- finitive, these four cases support the basic claim that revolutions intensify security competition and increase the risk of war. Each of them exhibited some or all of the destabilizing dynamics found in the three previous cases, and each state approached the brink of war at least once.
Yet three of these revolutions did not lead to all-out war. The absence of war following the American, Mexican, and Turkish revolutions is best ex- plained by the participants' awareness that the use of force was likely to be costly and difficult. These revolutions did not foster powerful fears of con- tagion, and each took place in geopolitical circumstances that further dis- couraged the use of force. In other words, the relationship between these revolutionary states and foreign powers was characterized by a powerful condition of defense dominance. Thus, even when serious conflicts arose, the use of force was seen as neither necessary nor appealing. By contrast, fear of contagion and counterrevolution was widespread after the Chinese Revolu- tion, whose international consequences were similar to those of the French,
Russian, and Iranian cases.
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
At first glance, the American Revolution seems an obvious exception to the main argument of this book. Contemporaries saw the War of American Independence and the creation of the United States as an event with poten-
?
? ? Revolution and War
tially far-reaching implications. 1 Unlike the other revolutions examined here, however, the new nation remained formally at peace with the other great powers for nearly three decades. By demonstrating that revolutions do not necessarily lead to war, therefore, this case presents an anomaly re- quiring explanation.
Closer examination suggests that the anomaly is not as significant as it first appears. Like other revolutionary leaders, U. S. statesmen were ob- sessed with questions of national security and combined awareness of their own vulnerability with a profound sense of optimism. 2 U. S. relations with other states suffered from misperceptions similar to those that have accom- panied other revolutions, and the resulting tensions were exacerbated by in- ternal divisions, the fear of subversion, and poor communication. Finally, although the revolution did not lead to war, the United States was involved in several "militarized disputes" and came very close to war on at least three occasions. The absence of open warfare was largely the result of geo- graphic isolation, favorable timing, and the unique worldview of the revo- lutionaries themselves; war would have been far more likely under any
other circumstances.
The Diplomacy ofthe "New Republic"
TheWarofIndependence(1775-1783). ThediplomacyoftheWarofInde- pendence supports several familiar propositions about the international ef- fects of revolutionary change. Foreign powers saw the revolution largely in terms of the balance of power; France supported the rebellious colonies in order to weaken England and avenge the losses it had suffered in the Seven Years War, and Spain took advantage of England's defeat to improve i. ts
own position in the Western Hemisphere.
Lastly, the climate of suspicion and hostility between the United States and Iran made improving relations especially difficult. The United States did make conciliatory gestures on occasion, but the bulk of U. S. policy was hostile (for example, its support for the gulf states and the Iranian exiles, its efforts to deny Iran arms, and its gradual tilt towards Iraq). Not surpris- ingly, actions contrary to Iranian interests were seen as evidence of true U. S. preferences, while less harmful ones appeared as signs of U. S. duplicilfy. Thus, when the Senate passed a resolution condemning the executions lby the Revolutionary Courts (an action that ran counter to the Carter adminis- tration's efforts to reach a modus vivendi with Iran), the clerics saw it as a direct challenge to the new regime. In the same way, when Rafsanjani a111. d other moderates recognized that Iran was partly responsible for its own iso- lation, their efforts to cooperate with the United States in the Iran-contra arms deal were thwarted by extremists within Iran and by the incompetent bungling of the U. S. officials responsible for the initiative. 155 Because inter-
? 152 On this pervasive Iranian tendency, see Abrahamian, Khomeinism, chap. 5; Sick, All Fall Down, 33-34, 48, 346 n. 4; Cottam, "Inside Revolutionary Iran," 16-17; Arjomand, Turban for the Crown, 1 2? 30; and Salinger, America Held Hostage, 7o-71 .
153 Infact,U. S. officialswereupsetbytheIraqiinvasionbecauseitinterruptednegotiations for the release of the U. S. hostages. See Sick, All Fall Down, 320; Jordan, Crisis, 347; Christo- pher et al, American Hostages in Iran, 306; Ramazani, "Iran's Foreign Policy," 57; and Bani- Sadr, My Turn to Speak, 70, 76.
154 Iran's suspicions were sometimes justified, as the United States did provide modest lev- els of aid to the mujahedin after they had been driven into exile and tilted toward Iraq in 19B2. These decisions are consistent with the logic of spiraling: the U. S. was responding to Iraruan behavior, but Iran interpreted its acts as evidence of intrinsic hostility rather than as a defen- sive reaction.
155 Among other things, the mishandling of the first arms shipment in November 1985 (in which the U. S. sent Iran an obsolete version of the Hawk missile) and Oliver North's decision
? ? The Iranian Revolution
nal disagreements on both sides made bridging the divide politically risky, attempts to "unwind" the spiral were confined to unofficial channels and unreliable intermediaries, whose deceptive conduct did nothing to dispel the mutual lack of trust.
Iran's relations with a number of other states indicate spiraling as well, al- though it is often difficult to distinguish between the results legitimate con- flicts of interest and the effects of misperception. The Soviet Union was no more successful in shedding its satanic image than the United States, and Iran accused it of supporting Kurdish rebels and the Tudeh Party and re- peatedly criticized Soviet support for Iraq. There was obviously some basis for each of these charges, but the tendency of Iranian leaders to equate the two superpowers suggests that they did not fully grasp the Soviet Union's genuine desire to improve relations.
Diplomacy with Britain and France also combined elements of spiraling with legitimate perceptions of hostility. On the one hand, there were very real conflicts of interest between these states and revolutionary Iran, based on six factors: Iran's support for terrorist activities on British and French soil; the kidnapping of British and French citizens by pro-Iranian forces in Lebanon; the attacks on British citizens in Iran by members of the Revolutionary Guards; British and French arms sales to Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war; French willingness to provide asylum for Bani-Sadr, Bazargan, and the leaders of the mujahedin; and European support for the U. S. -backed trade embargo during the hostage crisis. On the other hand, British and French moderation toward
Iran (most clearly revealed by their halfhearted participation in the U. S. trade embargo and Britain's willingness to permit Iran to conduct its private arms dealings through an office in London) failed to lead to cordial relations. In- stead, Iran's leaders saw British and French policy as fundamentally antago- nistic and never made a serious attempt to reach a lasting modus vivendi. Iran's propensity for assuming the worst about the intentions of other states is also apparent in its extraordinary sensitivity to issues of status or autonomy. Thus, the British arrest of an Iranian official on shoplifting charges brought a disproportionate response from Tehran, while Iran's intransigence during the Gordji affair with France reflects the Islamic Republic's insensitivity to the de- gree to which its own behavior provoked others. 156
tocharge Iran vastly inflated prices for U. S. weaponry reinforced Iranian beliefsthattheAmer- icans could not be trusted and undercut the alleged U. S. objective of cultivating better ties. See Draper, Very Thin Line, 195-97, 274-75, 311, 377-'79; and Bill, "U. S. Overture to Iran," 177.
136 Revolutionary states are especially sensitive to diplomatic slights, and to any other ac- tions that cast doubt on their legitimacy or status, perhaps because of their need to build a reputation. Specifically, as new members of the international system, revolutionary states may seek to deter future challenges by defending their prerogatives with particular vigilance. In addition, revolutionary elites may fear that a failure to respond could suggest a lack of rev- olutionary commitment and undermine their internal positions.
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? Revolution and War
Another example of spiraling was Iran's tendency to attribute opposition from states such as Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait to their internal corrup- tion, lack of true Islamic character, or dependence on the United States, rather than seeing it as a direct response to Iran's aggressive actions. With the partial exception of Iraq (whose 1980 invasion combined offensive and de- fensive motives), the anti-Iranian measures that these states took (such as the formation of the Gulf Cooperation Council or support for the Iraqi war ef- fort) were reactions to Iran's efforts to export its revolution and its escalating war with Iraq. Indeed, Iran's neighbors all genuinely tried to establish cor- dial relations with the new regime, but each shifted to policies of opposition once Iran's revisionist aims became clear. Thus, Iran's neighbors correctly read the impact of the revolution on Iranian intentions, and responded by joining forces to contain the threat.
By contrast, the mistaken belief that its neighbors were intrinsically hos- tile to the new regime seems to have played a key role in shaping Iran's for- eign policy. The close ties between the United States and the conservative gulf states alarmed the revolutionary government, and Khomeini's belief that these states were puppets of the "Great Satan" suggests a genuine fear of a well-orchestrated U. S. effort to reverse the revolution. 157 Convinced that
Iran's neighbors were inherently hostile, Khomeini could justify the export of revolution by saying, "If we remain in an enclosed environment we shall definitely face defeat. " These perceptions of threat were not entirely illusory, of course, but they were clearly exaggerated. Thus, the suspicion that shaped Iran's policies toward most of its neighbors was the result of a spii- ral, insofar as the leaders of the Islamic Republic failed to recognize their own role in provoking others' responses. 158
The revolution in Iran confirms that spirals may arise from at least two distinct causes. One potential source is cognitive: images of hostility may b:e so deeply ingrained in the minds of key elites that they view virtually any action by an opponent as evidence of malign intent. Another source is do- mestic politics, especially when authority is contested. Although Rafsanjani and others seem to have recognized Iran's own behavior as responsible f01r its isolation, the divisions within the revolutionary movement and the lack
1 57 As noted earlier, Iranian officials blamed the United States for the Iraqi invasion in 1! )8o and accused\ Saddam Hussein of acting as the U. S. "deputy" in the region. Iranian fears of a U. S. -led coalition were increased by the Carter doctrine, the establishment of the Rapid De- ployment Force and the related effort to forge closer security ties with a number of states in the region. The provision of AWACS aircraft to Saudi Arabia after the outbreak of the Iran- Iraq war was also seen as evidence of Arab collusion with the "Great Satan," as was the U. S. decision to reflag and escort Kuwaiti tankers in 1987. See Ramazani, "Iran's Resistance to U. S. Intervention," 38-39; Campbell and Darvich, "Global Implications of the Iranian Revolu- tion," 41-42 n. 39, and 47-48.
158 Ramazani,RevolutionaryIran,24? Significantly,thisstatementwasmadeinMarch1g8o, well before the Iraqi invasion.
? ? ? The Iranian Revolution
of an effective mechanism for resolving them prevented the more moderate or pragmatic elements from following through on their desire to improve relations. 159
These episodes underscore the difficulty of reversing a spiral when au- thority on either side is divided. In such circumstances, gestures toward ac- commodation are likely to be attacked as a betrayal of revolutionary principles or as a direct threat to the revolution itself. Poorly executed ef- forts to improve relations may actually harm the situation, and the failure of each attempt will merely confirm the mutual antipathy.
The Iranian case also suggests that the normal prescription for avoiding or unwinding a spiral-by making concessions and other gestures of friend- ship in order to reduce the opponent's insecurity-may not work with a revolutionary regime. When power is contested and foreign regimes are viewed with suspicion, premature efforts at accommodation may be inter- preted as an attempt to reestablish foreign control before the new regime consolidates Hself. Under the circumstances, the allies of the old regime will be better off allowing the revolutionary process to run its course rather than trying to forge a close relationship right after the seizure of power.
Offense, Defense, Contagion, and Counterrevolution
The Iranian experience also illustrates how revolutions intensify security competition by altering perceptions of the offense-defense balance, primarily through the belief that the revolution will be contagious. Khomeini and his followers clearly saw the Islamic Republic as a model for other societies and expected their revolution to spread throughout the Muslim world and be- yond. 160 Khomeini had long regarded existing state boundaries as artificial creations, and he repeatedly emphasized the importance of unifying the en-
tire Muslim community. After the revolution, he envisioned the Iranian model "spreading on a world wide scale and, God willing, . . . the way will be opened for the world government of the [twelfth imam]. " 161 The Constitution
159 In addition, hostility to the "Great Satan" was a central part of Khomeini's worldview and thus became deeply engrained in the ideology of the revolution. As a result, any serious effort to improve relations ran counter to the same set of beliefs that justified clerical rule.
160 One of Khomeini's aides said in 1979: "Be patient. . . . We will both see the fate of the Saudi rulers six months after our return to Iran. " Quoted in Menashri, "Khomeini's Vision," 5 1 .
161 According to the Shiite theory of occultation, the Twelfth Imam Is the chosen successor to the Prophet Muhammed. He is believed to have been in hiding since the ninth century, but is destined to reappear and establish justice in conformity with Islam. The founder of the Is- lamic Republican Party, Ayatollah Mohammed Beheshti, echoed Khomeini's view by declar- ing that "Islam recognizes no borders," and another prominent ayatollah (Hussein Montazeri) declared, "Under Islam there is no differentiation between an Arab, a Persian, and others, and the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran is duty bound . . . to make consistent efforts to realize the political, economic, and cultural union of the Islamic world. " Quoted in Ramazani, "Khumayni's Islam," 17; Behrooz, "Trends in Iran's Foreign Policy," 15;
[2591
? ? Revolution and War
of the Islamic Republic endorsed this objective, and Iran backed Shiite funda- mentalists in Lebanon and the gulf states, broadcast revolutionary propa- ganda over Radio Tehran, and used the annual pilgrimage to Mecca to spread its message among other Muslims. 162 Although Khomeini often insisted that the export of revolution would be done by example and not ''by the sword," pro-Iranian groups in Lebanon and the gulf states relied upon terrorism and other violent acts with the apparent approval of the Iranian government.
Iran's leaders also believed that religious faith and revolutionary mobi- lization would enable them to gain victory even in the face of strong oppo- sition. Khomeini told the Revolutionary Guards that victory "is achieved by strength of faith. " Other Iranian officials offered similar assessments; for ex- ample, the commander of the Revolutionary Guards declared, "Only an ide- ologically motivated army like ours . . . [is] capable of mobilizing the people
. . . until the Iraqi regime falls. "163 Despite the internal chaos produced by the revolution and the fears of foreign intervention, the new regime adopted a highly bellicose foreign policy, apparently unconcerned by the costs such a policy might entaiL Combined with the possibility of ideological contagion, Iran's bellicose propaganda increased other states' perceptions of threat sig- nificantly.
These dynamics were most apparent in the Iran-Iraq war. A central cause of the war was the Iraqi fear that Khomeini's version of Islamic fundamen- talism would spread among Iraq's Shiite majority. Iran's leaders made no secret of their desire to overthrow the Baath regime, and their support for Al-Dawa intensified Iraqi concerns and made a preventive war more attrac- tive. 164 Iraq's decision to attack was also fueled by expectations that the pre- dominantly Arab population of Khuzistan would welcome its "liberation" by the Iraqi atmy. Unfortunately for Iraq, they proved woefully mistaken. The Arab population of Iran did not rise up to support them, and the Iraqi
invasion bogged down after less than two months. At the same time, the al- leged danger of a popular uprising by the Iraqi Shiites proved to be mini- mal, and the Baath regime was able to suppress the Al-Dawa movement with little difficulty. Thus, both of the assumptions underlying the Iraqi in- vasion, which were directly traceable to the revolution, turned out to be in- correct.
Similar misconceptions were at work on the Iranian side. Before the war, Iran's verbal and material support for the Iraqi Shi'ites reflected their belief
and Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: Middle East/North Africa, October 22, 1979, R-7.
163 Quoted in Chubin and Tripp, Iran and Iraq at War, 4o-42. 164 Karsh, "Iran-Iraq War Revisited," 87-88.
? ? ? 162 Tpe constitution states that the armed forces and Revolutionary Guards are responsible "not only for defending the borders but also for . . . fighting to expand the rule of God's Jaw in the world. " "Constitution of Islamic Republic," 185-86.
[26o]
? The Iranian Revolution
that the revolution would soon spread to other states, as well as their fear that Iran would be vulnerable to foreign pressure if it did not. 165 When Iraq withdrew from Iran in June 1982, the Iranian decision to cross the border into Iraq was based primarily on the belief that the invasion would cause the Shiite population in Iraq to rise up against the Baath regime. 166 This hope proved to be jl. llst as illusory as Iraq's earlier expectations. Thus, both Iran and Iraq learned that revolutionary regimes can be formidable military op- ponents, and foreign populations rarely welcome armed invaders.
Iran's relations with its other neighbors reveal similar results. The gulf states were worried by the ideological challenge created by the Islamic Re- public. Their concerns were exacerbated by hostile Iranian propaganda; its support for Shiite dissidents in Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and else- where; and its use of the annual pilgrimage to Mecca to spread its revolu- tionary message.
Yet the immediate danger seems to have been greatly overestimated.
Although the revolution did trigger mild responses within Iran's Arab neighbors and led to a number of acts of terrorism and subversion, the gov- ernments that were threatened by these developments were able to repress, expel, or coopt potential troublemakers fairly easily. And though the same forces of modernization and cultural alienation that helped cause the revo- lution in Iran have fed the Islamic resurgence in a number of other Arab states, Iran is still the only country to have experienced a mass-based Is- lamic revolution. Its support for foreign radicals is clearly irritating, but its ideological message has proven less compelling than many observers origi- nally feared. 167
This result confirms that even relatively weak states are usually stronger than most revolutionary movements. Events such as the Iranian Revolution are the product of particular domestic and international circumstances and specific historical contingencies, and thus they are relatively rare. Although conditions in other states may appear to be roughly similar, the circum- stances will never be identical and the protagonists unlikely to respond in precisely the same way. Governments facing a revolutionary challenge can usually keep their opponents at bay through a combination of coercion and cooptation (as the shah did for nearly twenty-five years), and endangered states can join forces against the spread of ideological infection (as the gulf
165 Thus Khomeini argued, "We must strive to export our Revolution throughout the world. . . . If we remain surrounded in a closed circle, we shall certainly be defeated. " Bani- Sadr offered a similar assessment: "If we do not go out of Iran to help the revolution, others will come to our country to plot against us. " Quoted in Hunter, Iran and the World, 41. The parallel between this view and Trotsky's justification for the export of revolution is striking.
lahs, 212-13.
? 167 Zonis and Brumberg, Khomeini, Iran, Arab World, 72.
? 166 See Abdulghani, Iraq and Iran, esp. 210; Hiro, Longest War, 86, and Iran under the Ayatol-
? Revolution and War
states did by forming the Gulf Cooperation Council and backing Iraq). Given the asymmetry of power favoring existing regimes, it is not surpris- ing that revolutions seldom spread.
This interpretation helps explain why the revolution had its greatest im- pact among the Shiite population of Lebanon. The Lebanese state was a hol- low shell by 1979, so pro-Iranian groups such as Hezbollah were able to acquire considerable influence. Yet the fundamentalists in Lebanon proved to be no match for the Israeli and Syrian states, and their position deterio- rated as soon as Damascus abandoned them. Thus, the Lebanese experience actually confirms the rule: revolutions are likely to spread only when the target state has been gravely weakened or has ceased to exist already. 168 The growth of Islamic fundamentalism in several other states does not under- mine this conclusion significantly, as these groups continue to face stiff op- position from regimes whose performance in other areas is unimpressive. All things considered, the modest direct impact of the Iranian Revolution shows that these events do not travel very well.
Uncertainty and Misinformation
Iran's relations with other states were also affected by uncertainty. In ad- dition to bringing inexperienced and unfamiliar elites to power, the revolu- tion's effects on existing channels of communication and information mad! e it more difficult for either side to pursue its interests in a rational and well- informed manner.
As discussed earlier, Iraq's decision to invade in 1980 was based on im- perfect !
knowledge about such crucial issues as the balance of militall'y power, tlhe danger of a pro-Iranian uprising among the Iraqi Shiites, and the likelihood that the Arabs of Khuzistan would welcome them. Although its armed forces appeared to have been gravely weakened by purges and de- fections, the explosion of martial enthusiasm unleashed by its opponent's revolution more than compensated for these deficiencies. And because nts military power rested in part on such new military institutionS as the Revo-
lutionary Guards, it is not surprising that outsiders failed to anticipate how well the new regime would fight. 169
In the same way, Iran's efforts to export its revolution (including its deci- sion to carry the war into Iraq in 1982) betrayed its ignorance about political
? ? 168 The formation of an Islamic government in Sudan supports this conclusion as well, in- sofar as the process of Islamization was actively promoted by the ruling elite itself.
169 Most experts underestimated Iran's military power. A CIA estimate predicted that Iran would lasft only three weeks after the Iraqi assault, Time magazine concluded that the war was unlikely to last long, and two U. S. experts concluded in 1981 that "Iran's prospects for victory can be termed simply as 'bleak. ' " See Wright, In the Name ofGod, 83-84; and MECS 1979-80, 4}
? ? The Iranian Revolution
conditions elsewhere in the Arab world. Although Khomeini had lived in Iraq for nearly fourteen years, his experience was limited primarily to reli- gious communities. As a result, his belief that the Iraqi Shiites would rise up against Hussein was based on a biased sample of Iraqi Shiites. The Iranian expectation that the revolution would soon spread to other Arab countries rested on equally inaccurate information about the revolutionary potential of these societies; instead of creating new Islamic republics, their efforts only encouraged potential victims to balance against them even more vigorously.
Iran's relationship with the United States also illustrates the obstacles that result from mutual ignorance. As a U. S. State Department desk officer com- plained after the shah's departure from Tehran, "We simply do not have the bios, inventory of political groups, or current picture of daily life as it evolves at various levels in Iran. Ignorance here of Iran is massive. "170 Pre- occupied by its fears of a leftist takeover, the U. S. government did not es- tablish direct contact with Khomeini during his first year in power, and efforts to contact other clerics were rare. Instead, the United States tried to cultivate the short-lived Bazargan government and conducted secret talks with Bani-Sadr without realizing that his authority was actually quite lim- ited. Gary Sick reports that for several months after the embassy was taken, U. S. officials did not even know the precise number of U. S. hostages, and Undersecretary of State Warren Christopher told a congressional hearing in May 1980 that information about the numbers, identity, and motives of the Iranians occupying the U. S. embassy was "still quite misty and vague. " At- tempts to resolve the crisis were further handicapped by the sheer difficulty of communicating with a regime in which any contact with the "Great Satan" could be attacked as an act of disloyalty. 171
Uncertainty and inaccurate information also played a crucial role in the Iran-contra imbroglio. The decision to provide arms to Iran was based on the following four beliefs: that Khomeini's regime was nearing collapse; that this collapse would make a Soviet takeover more likely; that the arms deal would strengthen the position of a group of Iranian "moderates" who were
170 Quoted in Bill, Eagle and Lion,. 276. U. S. ignorance is also revealed by Ambassador William Sullivan's prediction that Khomeini would play a "Gandhi-like" role in a post-shah Iran, by UN ambassador Andrew Young's commerit that Khomeini "would one day be hailed as somewhat of a saint," and by Princeton professor Richard Falk's claim that Khomeini's en- tourage was "uniformly composed of moderate progressive individuals" with "a notable record of concern for human rights. " Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 368; Wright, In the Name ofGod, 216; and Sick, All Fall Down, 166.
171 Intheabsenceofdiplomaticrelations,negotiationsforthereleaseofthehostageshadto be conducted via third parties or else covertly. Gary Sick relied heavily on information from an unidentified Iranian American with contacts among the revolutionary leaders and the exile community in the United States, and White House Chief of Staff Hamilton Jordan met secretly with Iranian representatives several times in February 198o. See Sick, All Fall Down, 246 and chap. 12; . Salinger, America Held Hostage, 245-46; and Jordan, Crisis, esp. 146-53, 15? 8.
? ? ? ? ? Revolution and War
eager to restore relations with the United States; and that Iran could per- suade the Lebanese Shiites to release the U. S. hostages. m These hopes were notbasedonhardinformation,however,butontestimonyfromself-serving "sources" such as Manucher Ghorbanifar, who managed to persuade gullible U. S. officials such as Oliver North that the sale of arms to Iran would pave the way for the release of the hostages in Lebanon and help bring about a U. S. -Iranian rapprochement. 173
States never understand each other perfectly, of course, but the Iranian Revolution confirms how much worse this problem can be after a revolu- tion. Lacking reliable information, Iran and its foreign adversaries relied on stereotypes, worst-case scenarios, and the testimony of self-interested exiles and sleazy middlemen. The result was a heightened sense of threat, a greater willingness to use force, and incompetent, doomed attempts to im- prove relations. 174
Socialization and Learning
The Iranian case offers partial-but hardly overwhelming-support for the neorealist claim that the constraints of international anarchy will force states with radical international goals to moderate their objectives. Iran's foreign policy objectives were extremely unrealistic at first, and its leaders did modify some of their goals in order to ensure the survival of the new regime. The Islamic Republic did not abandon all of its revolutionary aims, however, and it continues today to engage in bellicose policies toward a number of states despite the high cost these positions entail. This persis- tence was the result of internal divisions within Iran and the sacrosanct character of certain elements in Iran's revolutionary worldview.
As we have seen, the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic rested on a distinctly unrealistic set of ideologically inspired goals. Khomeini's ideol- ogy questioned the legitimacy of the existing state system. He initially welcomed Iran's international isolation as a means of preserving its inde- pendence and revolutionary purity. Although moderate leaders such as Bani-Sadr, Yazdi, and Qotbzadeh deplored the effects of these policies on
m Ironically,theoriginalCIAestimatethathelpedlaunchedtheentireinitiativewasaban- doned a year later. See Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Contras, 427; and "Soviet Threat toward Iran Overstated, Casey Concluded," Washington Post, January 13, 1987, A1, AS.
173 "MuchofthetroublethatbesettheAmericansinanyefforttoworkoutanewpolicyfor Iran, in order to achieve a 'strategic opening' or to liberate the hostages or both, resulted from an almost total American ignorance of what was going on in Iran. " Theodore Draper, Very Thin Line, 155.
174 As Rafsanjani put in 1986: "The Americans . . . despite their satellites, spies, the CIA, and the rest are so immensely uninformed about our region; uninformed about our internal af- fairs; how many half-baked analyses they tend to make. " Quoted in Chubin and Tripp, Iran and Iraq at War, 214.
? ? ? The Iranian Revolution
Iran's international position, Iran's behavior in the immediate aftermath of the revolution showed little sensitivity to the limits imposed by the interna- tional system. 175
As neorealism predicts, however, external constraints forced the Islamic Republic to moderate its conduct in several ways. One sign of learning was the growing professionalism of the Revolutionary Guards; over time, the war with Iraq forced Iran to worry more about military effectiveness and less about ideological purity. Similarly, Iran's willingness to obtain weapons from virtually any source-including the "Great Satan" and Israel-re- vealed its willingness to forgo its ideological scruples in order to deal with a serious external challenge. 176
Iran also abandoned its isolationist policy and began seeking diplomatic and commercial relations with a number of other states. It condemned Iraq's "atheistic" Baathist ideology but did not hesitate to align itself with Syria, which was governed by a rival branch of the same Baath movement. And having previously stated that "We must become isolated in order to become independent," by 1984 Khomeini had announced that Iran "wanted rela- tions with all countries" except the United States, Israel, and South Africa. Failure to establish such ties, he argued, "would mean defeat, annihilation, and being buried right to the end. " Khomeini now told his followers, "We should learn the good things from foreigners and reject the bad things," and Foreign Minister Velayati warned that "if Iran is not present on the world scene, then important issues wiU be decided without it. " President Khamenei called for "rational, sound, and healthy relations with all coun- tries," and some Iranian officials conceded that the revoiution was unlikely to spread anytime soon. As Prime Minister Musavi admitted in 1985, ini- tially "our view . . . was that the Islamic Revolution would spread within a year as a chain reaction. . . . But it seems we were wrong in our initial as- sessments. "177 Other officials acknowledged that Iran's own actions had contributed to its isolation; in Rafsanjani's words, "If Iran had demonstrated a little more tactfulness . . . [Saudi Arabia and Kuwait] would not have sup- ported Iraq. " The decision to end the war with Iraq was another triumph of necessity over ideological conviction, and the constitutional revisions that followed Khomeini's death and Khamenei's selection as supreme jurispru-
175 In November 1980, for example, former foreign minister Yazdi warned that the hostage issue "has not been handled well and politically we have lost in the world. " Quoted in Sick, All Fall Down, 33J
176 One source states that Iran obtained weapons from as many as forty-one different coun- tries, spending roughly $2-3 billion per year. See Farhad Kazemi and Jo-Anne Hart, "The Shi'i Praxis: Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy in Iran," in Menashri, Iranian Revolution and the Muslim World, 66.
177 These quotations are from Rouhallah K. Ramazani, "Iran's Foreign Policy: Contending Orientations," in his edited Iran's Revolution, 6o; Menashri, "Khomeini's Vision," 52; and Shirin T. Hunter, "After the Ayatollah," Foreign Policy 66 (1987).
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dent were equally striking departures from Khomeini's original blueprint for Islamic government. 178
These signs of moderation should not obscure the durability of Iran's commitment to radical ends and revolutionary means, however. Iran has continued to violate a number of diplomatic norms, as revealed by its sup- port for terrorist groups, its efforts to assassinate anti-Khomeini activists in several foreign countries, and the abuse and detention of foreign diplomats in Tehran. 179 Iran repeatedly used the annual hajj to spread its revolutionary message and to undermine the Saudi regime, and it has shown scant inter- est in normalizing relations with the United States or Israel. The Rushdie af- fair has jeopardized ties with Great Britain and France, and despite the continued deterioration of the Iranian economy and the obvious costs of its confrontational stance, Iran continues to back fundamentalist groups in a number of states and maintains a doctrine that is fundamentally hostile to the West. In short, although there has been some evidence of socialization since the falll of the shah, the process must be regarded as partial at best.
Iran's deradicalization has been limited in part because the evidence in favor of such a development was ambiguous. After the regime had accom- plished a host of seemingly impossible feats during its first years in power (including the ouster of the shah, the successful defiance of the United States, and the repulse of the Iraqi invasion), the necessity for moderation was partialliy obscured by faith in Islam and trust in Khomeini's charismatic leadership. Events such as the U. S. withdrawal from Lebanon in 1983 may have reinforced this view as well, and the growth of Islamic activism throughout the Middle East undoubtedly helped sustain Iran's commitment to an ideologically oriented foreign policy. 180
Even more importantly, Iran's ability to learn and adapt has been con- strained by divisions within the revolutionary elite itself. Different factions have drawn differentlessons from Iran's postrevolutionary experience, and where Rafsanjani and others have sought to downplay the export of revolu- tion in order to cultivate diplomatic and commercial ties abroad, the hard-
178 Quoted in Menashri, "Khomeini's Vision," 52. Rafsanjani's pragmatism was also re- vealed by his statement that "by the use of an inappropriate method [the export of revolu- tion] . . . we have created enemies for our country," and he criticized Iranian extremists as "frozen in their beliefs. " In a remarkable display of candor, Rafsanjani also endorsed Khamenei's selection as supreme jurisprudent in 1989 by saying that "familiarity with na- tional issues" is "far more important than all other conditions such as [religious] knowledge [and even] justness. " Quoted in MECS 1988, 475, 480; and 1989, 352.
179 See "Iran's Use of International Terrorism: An Unclassified Paper and Chronology," (Washington, D. C. : U. S. Department of State, 1987); Alex von Domoch [pseud. ], "Iran's Vio- lent Diplomacy," Surviva/ 30, no. 3 (1988); and "Killing off Iranian Dissenters. "
1110 Khomeini remarked in 1983: "Were it not for divine assistance and for [Allah's] special blessing, we would never have possessed the strength to withstand a satanic regime [Iraq] armed to the teeth, which was dependent upon world powers. " Quoted in Richard Cottam, "Iran's Perception of the Superpowers," in Rosen, Iran since the Revolu tion, 142.
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? The Iranian Revolution
liners have remained firmly committed to a radical Islamic vision. Kho- meini contributed to this split by refusing to allow Rafsanjani and the prag- matists to either eliminate the hard-liners or move too far from the revolution's original ideals. Iranian foreign policy has remained erratic and inconsistent, therefore, and the Islamic Republic has failed to "learn" as rapidly as a unitary actor might. 181
Compounding the problem are the presence of numerous competing power centers and the relative weakness of the executive branch. Presiden- tial powers are limited by the constitution and subject to scrutiny by the supreme jurisprudent, while influential clerics control independent institu- tions whose actions are not subject to strict governmental controU82 Iran's costly commitment to a "revolutionary" foreign policy also underscores that a revolutionary regime is not a blank state; on the contrary, its leaders often take power with a clear set of expectations and objectives. The ideological visions that inspire a revolution set the standards by which the new regime will be judged and provide the moral justification for its rule. Having waged a violent struggle in order to implement a particular vision of soci-
ety, elites will find it difficult to reject these ideals openly (even if they de- part from them in practice), especially when the ruling ideology is regarded as sacrosanct and unchallengeable. Although important members of the Iranian elite have been willing to modify their principles in light of chang- ing conditions and new experiences, abandoning them completely would threaten the legitimacy of clerical rule and leave them open to the charge of betraying the revolution. As a result, core values such as anti-Americanism and the promotion of Islam in other countries remain central features of Iran's political agenda.
On the whole, the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic provides strong support for the main arguments of this book. The revolution in Iran raised concerns about the global balance of power and had even more profound ef- fects on the balance of power within the region. The revolution disrupted re- lations between Iran and most of its neighbors and exacerbated the competition between the United States and Soviet Union as well. Iran and its adversaries saw each other as aggressive and dangerous, and although these perceptions were justified, Iran's rulers exaggerated the true degree of Western animosity. The fear that the revolution would spread increased for-
181 Shahram Chubin, Iran 's National Security Policy: Capabilities, Intentions, and Impact (Wash- ington, D. C. : Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1994), esp. 71.
182 In 1992, for example, Iranian relations with Western Europe and the U. S. deteriorated after Ayatollah Hassan Sanei, the head of the Fifteenth Khordad Foundation, announced that he had increased the reward for killing Rushdie and would send his own men to assassinate the author.
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eign perceptions of threat further, and these various forces combined to leave Iran isolated for most of the 1980s.
As the theory suggests, uncertainty and lack of information damaged Iran's relations with most other states. As Iran and its neighbors began to form more accurate estimates of each other's capabilities and intentions, however, the belief that the revolution might soon spread began to fade. Al- though Khomeini's ideological legacy and the enduring rivalry among his successors have prevented an explicit repudiation of Iran's revolutionary program, efforts to establish more normal foreign relations have already begun and are likely to increase.
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The American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese Revolutions
"As revolutions have begun, it is natural to expect that other revolutions
will follow. "
-Thomas Paine, 1791
What were the international effects of the American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese revolutions? Although the evidence presented here is not de- finitive, these four cases support the basic claim that revolutions intensify security competition and increase the risk of war. Each of them exhibited some or all of the destabilizing dynamics found in the three previous cases, and each state approached the brink of war at least once.
Yet three of these revolutions did not lead to all-out war. The absence of war following the American, Mexican, and Turkish revolutions is best ex- plained by the participants' awareness that the use of force was likely to be costly and difficult. These revolutions did not foster powerful fears of con- tagion, and each took place in geopolitical circumstances that further dis- couraged the use of force. In other words, the relationship between these revolutionary states and foreign powers was characterized by a powerful condition of defense dominance. Thus, even when serious conflicts arose, the use of force was seen as neither necessary nor appealing. By contrast, fear of contagion and counterrevolution was widespread after the Chinese Revolu- tion, whose international consequences were similar to those of the French,
Russian, and Iranian cases.
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
At first glance, the American Revolution seems an obvious exception to the main argument of this book. Contemporaries saw the War of American Independence and the creation of the United States as an event with poten-
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tially far-reaching implications. 1 Unlike the other revolutions examined here, however, the new nation remained formally at peace with the other great powers for nearly three decades. By demonstrating that revolutions do not necessarily lead to war, therefore, this case presents an anomaly re- quiring explanation.
Closer examination suggests that the anomaly is not as significant as it first appears. Like other revolutionary leaders, U. S. statesmen were ob- sessed with questions of national security and combined awareness of their own vulnerability with a profound sense of optimism. 2 U. S. relations with other states suffered from misperceptions similar to those that have accom- panied other revolutions, and the resulting tensions were exacerbated by in- ternal divisions, the fear of subversion, and poor communication. Finally, although the revolution did not lead to war, the United States was involved in several "militarized disputes" and came very close to war on at least three occasions. The absence of open warfare was largely the result of geo- graphic isolation, favorable timing, and the unique worldview of the revo- lutionaries themselves; war would have been far more likely under any
other circumstances.
The Diplomacy ofthe "New Republic"
TheWarofIndependence(1775-1783). ThediplomacyoftheWarofInde- pendence supports several familiar propositions about the international ef- fects of revolutionary change. Foreign powers saw the revolution largely in terms of the balance of power; France supported the rebellious colonies in order to weaken England and avenge the losses it had suffered in the Seven Years War, and Spain took advantage of England's defeat to improve i. ts
own position in the Western Hemisphere.
