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## p. 3036 (#614) ###########################################
## p. 3037 (#615) ###########################################
3037
CAIUS JULIUS CÆSAR
(100-44 B. C. )
BY J. H. WESTCOTT
seen.
RULY a wonderful man was Caius Julius Cæsar,” says Captain
Miles Standish. Truly wonderful he was on each of his
many sides: as soldier, statesman, orator, and author, all of
the first rank — and a respectable critic, man of science and poet
besides.
As a writer of Latin prose, and as an orator, he was second to
Cicero alone in the age that is called the Ciceronian; and no third is
to be named with these two. Yet among his contemporaries his lit-
erary power was an insignificant title to fame, compared with his
overwhelming military and political genius. Here he stood alone,
unrivaled, the most successful conqueror and civilizer of all history,
the founder of the most majestic political fabric the world has ever
There have been other generals, statesmen, authors, as great
as Cæsar; but the extraordinary combination of powers in this one
man goes very far toward making good the claim that he was the
most remarkable man in history.
He was born 100 B. C. , a member of the great Julian gens, which
claimed descent from Æneas and Venus, the glories of which are
celebrated in Vergil's immortal epic. Thus the future leader of the
turbulent democracy, and the future despot who was to humble the
nobles of Rome, was by birth an aristocrat of bluest blood. His life
might easily have come to an untimely end in the days of Sulla's
bloody ascendency, for he was connected by marriage with Marius
and Cinna. Sulla was persuaded to spare him, but clearly saw, even
then, that «in Cæsar there were many Mariuses. ”
All young Romans of rank were expected to go through a term
of at least nominal military service. Cæsar's apprenticeship was in
Asia Minor in 8o B. C. He distinguished himself at the storming of
Mytilene, and afterwards served in Cilicia. He began his political
and oratorical career by the prosecution of Cornelius Dolabella, one
of the nobility, on a charge of extortion. About 75 B. C. he was
continuing his studies at Rhodes, then a famous school of eloquence.
Obtaining the quæstorship in 67 B. C. , he was assigned to duty in the
province of Further Spain. Two years later he became ædile. At
the age of thirty-seven he was elected pontifex maximus over two
>>>
## p. 3038 (#616) ###########################################
3038
CAIUS JULIUS CÆSAR
powerful competitors. Entirely without religious belief, as far as we
can judge, he recognized the importance of this portion of the civil
order, and mastered the intricate lore of the established ceremonial.
In this office, which he held for life, he busied himself with a Digest
of the Auspices and wrote an essay on Divination.
After filling the prætorship in 62 B. C. , he obtained, as proprætor,
the governorship of his old province of Further Spain, which he was
destined to visit twice in later years as conqueror in civil war. His
military success at this time against the native tribes was such as to
entitle him to the honor of a triumph. This he was obliged to forego
in order to stand at once for the consulship, which office he held for
the year 59 B. C. He had previously entered into a private agree-
ment with Pompey and Crassus, known as the First Triumvirate.
Cæsar had always presented himself as the friend of the people;
Pompey was the most famous man of the time, covered with military
laurels, and regarded, though not with perfect confidence, as the
champion of the Senatorial party. Crassus, a man of ordinary ability,
was valuable to the other two on account of his enormous wealth.
These three men agreed to unite their interests and their influence.
In accordance with this arrangement Cæsar obtained the consulship,
and then the command for five years, afterward extended to ten, of
the provinces of Gaul and Illyricum. It was while proconsul of Gaul
in the years 58-50 B. C. that he subjugated and organized «All Gaul,”
which was far greater in extent than the country which is now
France; increased his own political and material resources; and above
all formed an army, the most highly trained and efficient the world
had yet seen, entirely faithful to himself, by means of which he was
able in the years 49-46 B. C. to defeat all his political antagonists and
to gain absolute power over the State.
He held the consulship again in 48 and 46 B. C. , and was consul
without a colleague in 45 and 44 B. C. , as well as dictator with
authority to remodel the Constitution. While his far-reaching plans
of organization and improvement were incomplete, and when he was
about to start upon a
war against the Parthians on the eastern
frontier of the empire, he was murdered March 15th, 44 B. C. , by a
band of conspirators headed by Brutus and Cassius.
For purposes of a literary judgment of Cæsar we have of his own
works in complete or nearly complete form his military memoirs
only. His specifically literary works have all perished. A few sen-
tences from his speeches, a few of his letters, a few wise or witty
sayings, an anecdote or two scattered about in the pages of other
authors, and six lines of hexameter verse, containing a critical esti-
mate of the dramatist Terence, are all that remain as specimens of
what is probably forever lost to us.
## p. 3039 (#617) ###########################################
CAIUS JULIUS CÆSAR
3039
we
An enumeration of his works, so far as their titles are known, is
the best evidence of his versatility. A bit of criticism here and
there shows the estimation in which Cæsar the writer and orator was
held by his countrymen and contemporaries. Besides the military
memoirs and the works spoken of above in connection with his
pontificate, may mention, as of a semi-official character, his
astronomical treatise On the Stars (De Astris), published in connec-
tion with his reform of the calendar, when dictator, shortly before
the end of his life.
Cicero alludes to a collection of witty sayings (Apophthegms) made
by Cæsar, with evident satisfaction at the latter's ability to distin-
guish the real and the false Ciceronian bons mots.
Like most Roman gentlemen, Cæsar wrote in youth several poems,
of which Tacitus grimly says that they were not better than Cice-
ro's. This list includes a tragedy, Edipus,' Laudes Herculis) (the
Praises of Hercules), and a metrical account of a journey into Spain
(Iter).
A grammatical treatise in two books (De Analogia), dedicated to
Cicero, to the latter's immense gratification, was written on one of the
numerous swift journeys from Italy to headquarters in Gaul. Pas-
sages from it are quoted by several subsequent writers, and an anec-
dote preserved by Aulus Gellius in his Noctes Atticæ I. 10. 4, wherein
a young man is warned by Cæsar to avoid unusual and far-fetched
language like a rock,” is supposed to be very characteristic of his
general attitude in matters of literary taste. The (Anticatones) were
a couple of political pamphlets ridiculing Cato, the idol of the repub-
licans. This was small business for Cæsar, but Cato had taken
rather mean advantage by his dramatic suicide at Utica, and
deprived Cæsar of the "pleasure of pardoning him. ”
Of Cæsar's orations we have none but the most insignificant frag-
ments — our judgment of them must be based on the testimony of
ancient critics. Quintilian speaks in the same paragraph (Quin-
tilian X. I, 114) of the wonderful elegance of his language and
of the “force” which made it “seem that he spoke with the same
spirit with which he fought. ” Cicero's phrase "magnifica et generosa”
(Cicero, Brutus, 261), and Fronto's "facultas dicendi imperatoria”
(Fronto, Ep. p. 123), indicate « some kind of severe magnificence. ”
Collections of his letters were extant in the second century, but
nothing now remains except a few brief notes to Cicero, copied by
the latter in his correspondence with Atticus. This loss is perhaps
the one most to be regretted. Letters reveal their author's person-
ality better than more formal species of composition, and Cæsar was
almost the last real letter-writer, the last who used in its perfection
the polished, cultivated, conversational language, the Sermo urbanus.
## p. 3040 (#618) ###########################################
3040
CAIUS JULIUS CÆSAR
But after all, we possess the most important of his writings,
the Commentaries on the Gallic and Civil Wars. The first may be
considered as a formal report to the Senate and the public on the
conduct of his Gallic campaigns; the latter, as primarily intended
for a defense of his constitutional position in the Civil War.
They are memoirs, half way between private notes and formal
history. Cicero says that while their author «desired to give others
the material out of which to create a history, he may perhaps have
done a kindness to conceited writers who wish to trick them out
with meretricious graces” (to "crimp with curling-irons "), but he
has deterred all men of sound taste from ever touching them. For
in history a pure and brilliant conciseness of style is the highest
attainable beauty. ” “They are worthy of all praise, for they are
simple, straightforward and elegant, with all rhetorical ornament
stripped from them as a garment is stripped. ” (Cicero, Brutus, 262. )
The seven books of the Gallic War are each the account of a
year's campaigning. They were written apparently in winter quar-
ters. When Cæsar entered on the administration of his province it
was threatened with invasion. The Romans had never lost their
dread of the northern barbarians, no orgotten the capture of Rome
three centuries before. Only a generation back, Marius had become
the national hero by destroying the invading hordes of Cimbri and
Teutones. Cæsar purposed to make the barbarians tremble at the
Roman name. This first book of the Commentaries tells how he
raised an army in haste, with which he outmarched, outmanæuvred
and defeated the Helvetian nation. This people, urged by pressure
behind and encouragement in front, had determined to leave its old
home in the Alpine valleys and to settle in the fairer regions of
southeastern France. Surprised and dismayed by Cæsar's terrific
reception of their supposed invincible host, they had to choose between
utter destruction and a tame return, with sadly diminished numbers,
to their old abodes. Nor was this all the work of the first year.
Ariovistus, a German king, also invited by a Gallic tribe, and rely-
ing on the terror of his nation's name, came to establish himself and
his people on the Gallic side of the Rhine. He too was astonished
at the tone with which Cæsar ordered him to depart, but soon found
himself forced to return far more quickly than he had come.
Having thus vindicated the Roman claim to the frontiers of Gaul
against other invaders, the proconsul devoted his second summer to
the subjugation of the Belgæ, the most warlike and the most remote
of the Gauls. The second book tells how this was accomplished.
There was one moment when the conqueror's career came near end-
ing prematurely. One of the Belgian tribes, the valiant Nervii, sur-
prised and nearly defeated the Roman army. But steady discipline
## p. 3041 (#619) ###########################################
CAIUS JULIUS CÆSAR
3041
and the dauntless courage of the commander, never so great as in
moments of mortal peril, saved the day, and the Nervii are immor-
talized as the people who nearly destroyed Cæsar.
These unprecedented successes all round the eastern and northern
frontiers thoroughly established Roman prestige and strengthened
Rome's supremacy over the central Gauls, who were already her
allies, at least in name. But much yet remained to do. The work
was but fairly begun. The third book tells of the conquest of the
western tribes. The most interesting episode is the creation of a
fleet and the naval victory over the Veněti on the far-away coast of
Brittany. In the fourth year Cæsar crossed the Rhine, after building
a wonderful wooden bridge in ten days, carried fire and sword
among the Germans on the further bank, and returned to his side of
the river, destroying the bridge behind him. Modern schoolboys
wish he had never built it. Later in the season he made an expe-
dition into Britain. This was followed in the fifth year by an
invasion of the island in greater force. To people of our race this
portion of the Commentaries is especially interesting. The southern
part of the country was overrun, the Thames was crossed some miles
above London, and several victories were gained, but no organized
conquest was attempted. That remained for the age of Claudius and
later emperors.
During the ensuing winter, on account of the scarcity of provis-
ions, the Roman troops had to be quartered in separate detachments
at long distances. One of these was treacherously destroyed by the
Gauls, and the others were saved only by the extraordinary quickness
with which Cæsar marched to their relief on hearing of their immi-
nent danger. The chief part in this rising had been taken by the
Eburones, led by their king Ambiorix. A large part of the sixth
book is occupied with the recital of Cæsar's vengeance upon these
people and their abettors, and with the vain pursuit of Ambiorix.
The remainder contains an elaborate contrast of the manners and
customs of the Gauls and Germans, which forms an important source
for the history of the primitive institutions of these nations. The
seventh book is the thrilling tale of the formidable rising of all the
Gauls against their conquerors, under the leadership of Vercingetorix,
an Arvernian chief. This man was a real hero, — brave, patriotic,
resourceful, perhaps the only worthy antagonist that Cæsar ever met.
This war strained to the utmost Cæsar's abilities and the disciplined
valor of his legions. The Gauls nearly succeeded in undoing all the
work of six years, in destroying the Roman army and in throwing off
the Roman yoke. In this campaign, more conspicuously than ever
before, Cæsar's success was due to the unexampled rapidity of his
movements. So perfect had become the training of his troops and
V-191
## p. 3042 (#620) ###########################################
3042
CAIUS JULIUS CÆSAR
their confidence in his ability to win under all circumstances, that
after a campaign of incredible exertions they triumphed over the
countless hosts of their gallant foes, and in the next two years the
last embers of Gaulish independence were finally stamped out. In
all his later wars, Cæsar never had anything to fear from Gaul. As
we read the story of Avaricum, of Gergovia, of Alesia, our sympathy
goes out to the brave barbarians who were fighting for liberty — but
we have to remember that though the cause of freedom failed, the
cause of civilization triumphed. The eighth book, containing the
account of the next two years, 51 and 50 B. C. , was written by one
of Cæsar's officers, Aulus Hirtius.
The first book of the Civil War begins with the year 49 B. C. ,
where the struggle between Cæsar and the Senatorial party opens
with his crossing of the Rubicon, attended by the advanced guard of
his legions. Pompey proved a broken reed to those who leaned upon
him, and Cæsar's conquest of the Italian peninsula was little else
than a triumphal progress through the country. The enemy retired
to the eastern shore of the Adriatic to muster the forces of the East
on the side of the aristocracy, leaving Cæsar in possession of the
capital and of the machinery of government. The latter part of the
book contains the account of the campaign against Pompey's lieu-
tenants in Spain, which was won almost without bloodshed, by mas-
terly strategy, and which ended with the complete possession of the
peninsula. The second book describes the capture of Marseilles after
a long siege, and the tragic defeat and death of Curio, a brave but
rash young officer sent by Cæsar to secure the African province. In
the third book (48 B. C. ) we have the story of the campaign against
Pompey; first the audacious blockade for months of Pompey's greatly
superior forces near Dyrrachium on the Illyrian coast: and when that
failed, of the long march into Thessaly, where Pompey was at last
forced into battle, against his judgment, by his own officers, on the
fatal plains of Pharsalia; of the annihilation of the Senatorial army;
of Pompey's flight to Egypt; of his treacherous murder there; of
Cæsar's pursuit. The books on the Alexandrian, the African, and the
Spanish wars, which continue the narrative down to Cæsar's final vic-
tory at Munda in southern Spain, are by other and inferior hands.
The question of their authorship has been the subject of much con-
troversy and conjecture.
Under this modest title of Commentaries,' in the guise of a
simple narrative of events, Cæsar puts forth at once an inimitable
nistory and a masterly apology. The author speaks of himself in
the third person, tells of the circumstances of each situation in a
quiet moderate way, which carries with it the conviction on the
reader's part of his entire truthfulness, accuracy, and candor. We
## p. 3043 (#621) ###########################################
CAIUS JULIUS CÆSAR
3043
are persuaded that the Cæsar about whom he tells could not have
acted otherwise than he did. In short, he exercises the same spell
over our minds that he cast over the hearts of men twenty centu-
ries ago.
There is nothing that so fascinates and enchains the imagination
of men
as power in another man. This man could captivate a
woman by his sweetness or tame an angry mob of soldiers with a
word; could mold the passions of a corrupt democracy or extermi-
nate a nation in a day; could organize an empire or polish an epi-
gram. His strength was terrible. But all this immense power was
marvelously balanced and under perfect control. Nothing was DO
small for his delicate tact. Nothing that he did was so difficult but
we feel he could have done more. Usually his means seemed inade-
quate to his ends. But it was Cæsar who used them.
The Commentaries show us this man at his work. They show
him as an organizer of armies and alliances, a wily diplomatist, an
intrepid soldier, an efficient administrator, a strategist of inspired
audacity, a tactician of endless resources, an engineer of infinite
inventiveness, an unerring judge of men. But he never boasts,
except in speeches to hearten discouraged troops. He does not vilify
or underrate his enemies.
His soldiers trusted him implicitly; there was no limit to their
zeal. They found in him a generous appreciation of their deeds.
Many a soldier and centurion has received immortality at his hands
as the guerdon of valor. He describes a victory of Labienus with as
much satisfaction as if it had been his own, and praises another
lieutenant for his prudent self-restraint when tempted by a prospect
of success. And he tells with hearty admiration of the devoted
Gauls who sacrificed their lives one after another in a post of danger
at Avaricum.
Even in the Civil War no officers deserted him
except Labienus and two Gaulish chiefs.
It was difficult to deceive him. His analysis of other men's
motives is as merciless as it is passionless. He makes us disapprove
the course of his antagonists with the same moderate but convincing
statement with which he recommends his own. Few men can have
had as few illusions as he. One would scarcely care to possess such
an insight into the hearts of others. He seems to feel little warmth
of indignation, and never indulges in invective. But woe to those
who stood in the way of the accomplishment of his objects. Dread-
ful was the punishment of those who revolted after making peace.
Still, even his vengeance seems dictated by policy rather than by
passion. He is charged with awful cruelty because he slew a million
men and sold another million into slavery. But he did not enjoy
human suffering. These were simply necessary incidents in the
## p. 3044 (#622) ###########################################
3044
CAIUS JULIUS CÆSAR
execution of his plans. It is hard to see how European civilization
could have proceeded without the conquest of Gaul, and it is surely
better to make a conquest complete, rapid, overpowering, that the
work may have to be done but once.
It is hard not to judge men by the standards of our own age.
The ancients rarely felt an international humanity, and in his own
time “Cæsar's clemency” was proverbial. As he was always careful
not to waste in useless fighting the lives of his soldiers, so he was
always true to his own precept, «Spare the citizens. ” The way in
which he repeatedly forgave his enemies when they were in his
power was an example to many a Christian conqueror. The best of
his antagonists showed themselves bloodthirsty in word or act; and
most of them, not excepting Cicero, were basely ungrateful for his
forbearance. His treatment of Cicero was certainly most handsome
our knowledge of it is derived mainly from Cicero's letters. Per-
haps this magnanimity was dashed with a tinge of kindly contempt
for his fellow-citizens; but whatever its motives, it was certainly wise
and benign at the beginning of the new era he was inaugurating.
He was no vulgar destroyer, and did not desire to ruin in order to
rule.
He is charged with ambition, the sin by which the angels fell. It
is not for us to fathom the depths of his mighty mind.
Let us
admit the charge. But it was not an ignoble ambition. Let us say
that he was so ambitious that he laid the foundations of the Roman
Empire and of modern France; that his services to civilization and
his plans for humanity were so broad that patriots were driven to
murder him.
Some of Casar's eulogists have claimed for him a moral greatness
corresponding to his transcendent mental power. This is mistaken
zeal. He may stand as the supreme representative of the race in the
way of practical executive intellect. It is poor praise to put him
into another order of men, with Plato or with Paul. Their greatness
was of another kind. We cannot speak of degrees. He is the expo-
nent of creative force in political history — not of speculative or
ethical power.
Moreover, with all his originality of conception and power of exe-
cution, Cæsar lacked that kind of imagination which makes the true
poet, the real creative artist in literature. Thus we observe the
entire absence of the pictorial element in his writings. There is no
trace of his ever being affected by the spectacular incidents of war-
fare nor by the grandeur of the natural scenes through which he
passed. The reason may be that his intellect was absorbed in the
contemplation of men and motives, of means and ends. We cannot
conceive of his ever having been carried out of himself by the
## p. 3045 (#623) ###########################################
CAIUS JULIUS CÆSAR
3045
rapture of inspiration. Such clearness of mental perception is natu-
rally accompanied by a certain coolness of temperament. A man of
superlative greatness must live more or less alone among his fellows.
With his immense grasp of the relations of things in the world,
Cæsar cannot have failed to regard men to some extent as the
counters in a great game - himself the player. So he used men,
finding them instruments efficient and zealous, often — of his far-
reaching plans. He was just in rewarding their services — more than
just: he was generous and kind. But he did not have real associ-
ates, real friends; therefore it is not surprising that he met with so
little gratitude. Even his diction shows this independence, this isola-
tion. It would be difficult to find an author of any nation in a
cultivated age so free from the influence of the language of his
predecessors. Cæsar was unique among the great Roman writers in
having been born at the capital. Appropriately he is the incarnation
of the specifically Roman spirit in literature, as Cicero was the em-
bodiment of the Italian, the Hellenic, the cosmopolitan spirit.
Toward the close of Cæsar's career there are some signs of weari-
ness observable — a certain loss of serenity, suspicion of vanity, a
dimming of his penetrating vision into the men about him. The
only wonder is that mind and body had not succumbed long before
to the prodigious strain put upon them. Perhaps it is well that he
died when he did, hardly past his prime. So he went to his setting,
like the other weary Titan,” leaving behind him a brightness which
lasted all through the night of the Dark Ages. Cæsar died, but the
imperial idea of which he was the first embodiment has proved the
central force of European political history even down to our time.
Such is the man who speaks to us from his pages still. He was a
man who did things rather than a man who said things. Yet who
could speak so well? His mastery of language was perfect, but in
the same way as his mastery of other instruments. Style with him
was a means rather than an end. He had the training which others
of his kind enjoyed. Every Roman noble had to learn oratory. But
Cæsar wrote and spoke with a faultless taste and a distinction that
no training could impart. So we find in his style a beauty which
does not depend upon ornament, but upon perfect proportion; a dic-
tion plain and severe almost to baldness; absolute temperateness of
expression. The descriptions are spirited, but never made so by
strained rhetoric; the speeches are brief, manly, business-like; the
arguments calm and convincing; always and everywhere the lan-
guage of a strong man well inside the limits of his power.
The chief ancient authorities for the life of Cæsar, besides his
own works, are Suetonius in Latin, Plutarch and Appian in Greek.
Among modern works of which he is made the subject may be
## p. 3046 (#624) ###########################################
3046
CAIUS JULIUS CÆSAR
mentioned Jules César,' by Napoleon III. (Paris, 1865); continued by
Colonel Stoffel, with an Atlas; Cæsar, a Sketch,' by J. A. Froude
(London, 1886); (Cæsar,' by A. Trollope (London, 1870); Cæsar,' by
T. A. Dodge, U. S. A. (Boston, 1893).
Jothest
esterst
THE DEFEAT OF ARIOVISTUS AND THE GERMANS
From The Gallic Wars)
Web
manner
HEN he had proceeded three days' journey, word was
brought to him that Ariovistus was hastening with all
his forces to seize on Vesontio,* which is the largest
town of the Sequani, and had advanced three days' journey from
his territories. Cæsar thought that he ought to take the greatest
precautions lest this should happen, for there was in that town
a most ample supply of everything which was serviceable for
war; and so fortified was it by the nature of the ground as to
afford a great facility for protracting the war, inasmuch as the
river Doubs almost surrounds the whole town, as though it were
traced round with a pair of compasses.
A mountain of great
height shuts in the remaining space, which is not more than six
hundred feet, where the river leaves a gap in such a
that the roots of that mountain extend to the river's bank on
either side. A wall thrown around it makes a citadel of this
mountain, and connects it with the town. Hither Cæsar hastens
by forced marches by night and day, and after having seized
the town, stations a garrison there.
Whilst he is tarrying a few days at Vesontio, on account of
corn and provisions; from the inquiries of our men and the
reports of the Gauls and traders (who asserted that the Ger-
mans were men of huge stature, of incredible valor and practice
in arms, – that ofttimes they, on encountering them, could not
bear even their countenance and the fierceness of their eyes),
so great
panic on a sudden seized the whole army, as to dis-
compose the minds and spirits of all in no slight degree. This
* Modern Besançon.
## p. 3047 (#625) ###########################################
CAIUS JULIUS CÆSAR
3047
first arose from the tribunes of the soldiers, the prefects and the
rest, who, having followed Cæsar from the city (Rome) from
motives of friendship, had no great experience in military affairs.
And alleging, some of them one reason, some another, which
they said made it necessary for them to depart, they requested
that by his consent they might be allowed to withdraw; some,
infuenced by shame, stayed behind in order that they might
avoid the suspicion of cowardice. These could neither compose
their countenance, nor even sometimes check their tears: but
hidden in their tents, either bewailed their fate or deplored with
their comrades the general danger. Wills were sealed universally
throughout the whole camp. By the expressions and cowardice
of these men, even those who possessed great experience in the
camp, both soldiers and centurions, and those [the decurions]
who were in command of the cavalry, were gradually discon-
certed. Such of them as wished to be considered less alarmed
said that they did not dread the enemy, but feared the narrow-
ness of the roads and the vastness of the forests which lay
between them and Ariovistus, or else that the supplies could not
be brought up readily enough. Some even declared to Cæsar
that when he gave orders for the camp to be moved and the
troops to advance, the soldiers would not be obedient to the
command nor advance, in consequence of their fear.
When Cæsar observed these things, having called a council,
and summoned to it the centurions of all the companies, he
severely reprimanded them, “particularly for supposing that it
belonged to them to inquire or conjecture either in what
direction they were marching or with what object. That Ario-
vistus during his [Cæsar's] consulship had most anxiously
sought after the friendship of the Roman people; why should
any one judge that he would so rashly depart from his duty ?
He for his part was persuaded that when his demands were
known and the fairness of the terms considered, he would reject
neither his nor the Roman people's favor. But even if, driven
on by rage and madness, he should make war upon them, what
after all were they afraid of ? - or why should they despair
either of their own valor or of his zeal? Of that enemy a trial
had been made within our fathers' recollection, when on the
defeat of the Cimbri and Teutones by Caius Marius, the army
was regarded as having deserved no less praise than their com-
mander himself. It had been made lately too in Italy, during
## p. 3048 (#626) ###########################################
3048
CAIUS JULIUS CÆSAR
the rebellion of the slaves, whom, however, the experience and
training which they had received from us assisted in some
respect. From which a judgment might be formed of the
advantages which resolution carries with it, - inasmuch as those
whom for some time they had groundlessly dreaded when
unarmed, they had afterwards vanquished when well armed and
flushed with success. In short, that these were the same men
whom the Helvetii, in frequent encounters, not only in their
own territories, but also in theirs [the German), have generally
vanquished, and yet cannot have been a match for our army. If
the unsuccessful battle and flight of the Gauls disquieted any,
these, if they made inquiries, might discover that when the
Gauls had been tired out by the long duration of the war, Ario-
vistus, after he had many months kept himself in his camp and
in the marshes, and had given no opportunity for an engage-
ment, fell suddenly upon them, by this time despairing of a
battle and scattered in all directions; and was victorious more
through stratagem and cunning than valor. But though there
had been room for such stratagem against savage and unskilled
men, not even Ariovistus himself expected that thereby our
armies could be entrapped. That those who ascribed their fear
to a pretense about the deficiency of supplies and the narrow-
ness of the roads acted presumptuously, as they seemed either
to distrust their general's discharge of his duty or to dictate
to him. That these things were his concern; that the Sequani,
the Leuci, and the Lingones were to furnish the corn; and that
it was already ripe in the fields; that as to the road, they
would soon be able to judge for themselves. As to its being
reported that the soldiers would not be obedient to command,
or advance, he was not at all disturbed at that; for he knew
that in the case of all those whose army had not been obedient
to command, either upon some mismanagement of an affair for-
tune had deserted them, or that upon some crime being discov-
ered covetousness had been clearly proved against them. His
integrity had been seen throughout his whole life, his good
fortune in the war with the Helvetii. That he would therefore
instantly set about what he had intended to put off till a more
distant day, and would break up his camp the next night in
the fourth watch, that he might ascertain as soon as possible
whether a sense of honor and duty, or whether fear, had more
infiuence with them. But that if no one else should follow, yet
## p. 3049 (#627) ###########################################
CAIUS JULIUS CÆSAR
3049
he would go with only the tenth legion, of which he had no
misgivings, and it should be his prætorian cohort. ”—This legion
Cæsar had both greatly favored, and in it, on account of its
valor, placed the greatest confidence.
Upon the delivery of this speech, the minds of all were
changed in a surprising manner, and the highest ardor and
eagerness for prosecuting the war were engendered; and the
tenth legion was the first to return thanks to him, through
their military tribunes, for his having expressed this most
favorable opinion of them; and assured him that they were
quite ready to prosecute the war. Then the other legions
endeavored, through their military tribunes and the centurions
of the principal companies, to excuse themselves to Cæsar,
saying that they had never either doubted or feared, or sup-
posed that the determination of the conduct of the war was
theirs and not their general's. Having accepted their excuse,
and having had the road carefully reconnoitred by Divitiacus,
because in him of all others he had the greatest faith, he found
that by a circuitous route of more than fifty miles he might
lead his army through open parts; he then set out in the fourth
watch, as he had said he would. On the seventh day, as he did
not discontinue his march, he was informed by scouts that the
forces of Ariovistus were only four-and-twenty miles distant
from ours.
Upon being apprised of Cæsar's arrival, Ariovistus sends am-
bassadors to him, saying that what he had before requested as
to a conference might now, as far as his permission went, take
place, since he [Cæsar) had approached nearer; and he considered
that he might now do it without danger. Cæsar did not reject
the proposal, and began to think that he was now returning to a
rational state of mind, as he voluntarily proffered that which he
had previously refused to him when he requested it; and was
in great hopes that, in consideration of his own and the Roman
people's great favors towards him, the issue would be that he
would desist from his obstinacy upon his demands being made
known. The fifth day after that was appointed as the day of
conference. Meanwhile, as ambassadors were being often sent to
and fro between them, Ariovistus demanded that Cæsar should
not bring any foot-soldier with him to the conference, saying
that "he was afraid of being ensnared by him through treachery,
that both should come accompanied by cavalry; that he would
## p. 3050 (#628) ###########################################
3050
CAIUS JULIUS CÆSAR
not come on any other condition. ” Cæsar, as he neither wished
that the conference should, by an excuse thrown in the way, be
set aside, nor durst trust his life to the cavalry of the Gauls,
decided that it would be most expedient to take away from the
Gallic cavalry all their horses, and thereon to mount the legionary
soldiers of the tenth legion, in which he placed the greatest con-
fidence; in order that he might have a body-guard as trustworthy
as possible, should there be any need for action. And when this
was done, one of the soldiers of the tenth legion said, not without
a touch of humor, «that Cæsar did more for them than he had
promised: he had proinised to have the tenth legion in place of
his prætorian cohort; but he now converted them into horse. ”
There was a large plain, and in it a mound of earth of consid-
erable size. This spot was at nearly an equal distance from both
camps. Thither, as had been appointed, they came for the confer-
ence. Cæsar stationed the legion which he had brought with
him on horseback, two hundred paces from this mound. The
cavalry of Ariovistus also took their stand at an equal distance.
Ariovistus then demanded that they should confer on horseback,
and that, besides themselves, they should bring with them ten
men each to the conference. When they were come to the place,
Cæsar, in the opening of his speech, detailed his own and the
Senate's favors towards him (Ariovistus], “in that he had been
styled king, in that he had been styled friend, by the Senate,–
in that very considerable presents had been sent him; which cir.
cumstance he informed him had both fallen to the lot of few, and
had usually been bestowed in consideration of important personal
services; that he, although he had neither an introduction, nor a
just ground for the request, had obtained these honors through
the kindness and munificence of himself [Cæsar] and the Senate.
He informed him, too, how old and how just were the grounds
of connection that existed between themselves [the Romans) and
the Ædui, what decrees of the Senate had been passed in their
favor, and how frequent and how honorable; how from time
immemorial the Ædui had held the supremacy of the whole of
Gaul; even, said Cæsar, before they had sought our friendship;
that it was the custom of the Roman people to desire not only
that its allies and friends should lose none of their property, but
be advanced in influence, dignity, and honor: who then could
endure that what they had brought with them to the friendship
of the Roman people should be torn from them ? ” He then
## p. 3051 (#629) ###########################################
CAIUS JULIUS CÆSAR
3051
made the same demands which he had commissioned the ambas-
sadors to make, that Ariovistus should not make war either
upon the Ædui or their allies; that he should restore the hostages;
that if he could not send back to their country any part of the
Germans, he should at all events suffer none of them any more
to cross the Rhine.
Ariovistus replied briefly to the demands of Cæsar, but expa-
tiated largely on his own virtues: “that he had crossed the Rhine
not of his own accord, but on being invited and sent for by the
Gauls; that he had not left home and kindred without great
expectations and great rewards; that he had settlements in Gaul,
granted by the Gauls themselves; that the hostages had been
given by their own good-will; that he took by right of war the
tribute which conquerors are accustomed to impose on the con-
quered; that he had not made war upon the Gauls, but the Gauls
upon him; that all the States of Gaul came to attack him, and
had encamped against him that all their forces had been routed
and beaten by him in a single battle; that if they chose to make
a second trial, he was ready to encounter them again; but if they
chose to enjoy peace, it was unfair to refuse the tribute which
of their own free-will they had paid up to that time. That the
friendship of the Roman people ought to prove to him an orna-
ment and a safeguard, not a detriment; and that he sought it
with that expectation. But if through the Roman people the
tribute was to be discontinued, and those who surrendered to be
seduced from him, he would renounce the friendship of the
Roman people no less heartily than he had sought it. As to his
leading over a host of Germans into Gaul, that he was doing this
with a view of securing himself, not of assaulting Gaul: that
there was evidence of this, in that he did not come without being
invited, and in that he did not make war, but merely warded it
off. That he had come into Gaul before the Roman people.
That never before this time did a Roman army go beyond the
frontiers of the province of Gaul. What, said he, does Cæsar
desire ? — why come into his [Ariovistus's] domains ? — that this
was his province of Gaul, just as that is ours. As it ought not
to be pardoned in him if he were to make an attack upon our
territories, so likewise that we were unjust to obstruct him in
his prerogative. As for Cæsar's saying that the Ædui had been
styled brethren' by the Senate, he was not so uncivilized nor
so ignorant of affairs as not to know that the Ædui in the
## p. 3052 (#630) ###########################################
3052
CAIUS JULIUS CÆSAR
very last war with the Allobroges had neither rendered assistance
to the Romans nor received any from the Roman people in the
struggles which the Ædui had been maintaining with him and
with the Sequani. He must feel suspicious that Cæsar, though
feigning friendship as the reason for his keeping an army in
Gaul, was keeping it with the view of crushing him. And that
unless he depart and withdraw his army from these parts, he
shall regard him not as a friend, but as a foe; and that even if
he should put him to death, he should do what would please
many of the nobles and leading men of the Roman people; he
had assurance of that from themselves through their messengers,
and could purchase the favor and the friendship of them all by
his [Cæsar's] death. But if he would depart and resign to him
the free possession of Gaul, he would recompense him with a
great reward, and would bring to a close whatever wars he wished
to be carried on, without any trouble or risk to him. ”
Many things were stated by Cæsar to the following effect:-
“That he could not waive the business, and that neither his nor
the Roman people's practice would suffer him to abandon most
meritorious allies; nor did he deem that Gaul belonged to Ario-
vistus rather than to the Roman people; that the Arverni* and
the Rutenif had been subdued in war by Quintus Fabius Max-
imus, and that the Roman people had pardoned them and had
not reduced them into a province or imposed a tribute upon
them. And if the most ancient period was to be regarded,
then was the sovereignty of the Roman people in Gaul most just:
if the decree of the Senate was to be observed, then ought Gaul
to be free, which they [the Romans) had conquered in war, and
had permitted to enjoy its own laws. ”
While these things were being transacted in the conference, it
was announced to Cæsar that the cavalry of Ariovistus were
approaching nearer the mound, and were riding up to our men
and casting stones and weapons at them. Cæsar made an end
of his speech and betook himself to his men; and commanded
them that they should by no means return a weapon upon the
enemy. For though he saw that an engagement with the cavalry
would be without any danger to his chosen legion, yet he did not
think proper to engage, lest after the enemy were routed it
might be said that they had been ensnared by him under the
* Modern Auvergne.
+ Modern Le Rouergue.
## p. 3053 (#631) ###########################################
CAIUS JULIUS CÆSAR
3053
sanction of a conference. When it was spread abroad among the
common soldiery with what haughtiness Ariovistus had behaved
at the conference, and how he had ordered the Romans to quit
Gaul, and how his cavalry had made an attack upon our men,
and how this had broken off the conference, a much greater
alacrity and eagerness for battle was infused into our army.
Two days after, Ariovistus sends ambassadors to Cæsar to
state that he wished to treat with him about those things which
had been begun to be treated of between them, but had not
been concluded ”; and to beg that “he would either again
appoint a day for a conference, or if he were not willing to do
that, that he would send one of his officers as an ambassador to
him. ” There did not appear to Cæsar any good reason for
holding a conference; and the more so as the day before, the
Germans could not be restrained from casting weapons at our
men. He thought he should not without great danger send to
him as ambassador one of his Roman officers, and should expose
him to savage men. It seemed therefore most proper to send
to him C. Valerius Procillus, the son of C. Valerius Caburus, a
young man of the highest courage and accomplishments (whose
father had been presented with the freedom of the city by C.
Valerius Flaccus), both on account of his fidelity and on account
of his knowledge of the Gallic language, - which Ariovistus, by
long practice, now spoke fluently, -- and because in his case the
Germans would have no motive for committing violence;* and
for his colleague, M. Mettius, who had shared the hospitality of
Ariovistus. He commissioned them to learn what Ariovistus had
to say, and to report to him. But when Ariovistus saw them
before him in his camp, he cried out in the presence of his
army, “Why were they come to him ? was it for the purpose of
acting as spies? ” He stopped them when attempting to speak,
and cast them into chains.
The same day he moved his camp forward and pitched under
a hill six miles from Cæsar's camp. The day following he led his
forces past Cæsar's camp, and encamped two miles beyond him;
with this design - that he might cut off Cæsar from the corn
and provisions which might be conveyed to him from the Se-
quani and the Ædui. For five successive days from that day
Cæsar drew out his forces before the camp and put them in
* Inasmuch as he was not a Roman, but a Gaul.
## p. 3054 (#632) ###########################################
3054
CAIUS JULIUS CÆSAR
battle order, that if Ariovistus should be willing to engage in
battle, an opportunity might not be wanting to him. Ariovistus
all this time kept his army in camp, but engaged daily in cavalry
skirmishes. The method of battle in which the Germans had
practiced themselves was this: There were six thousand horse,
and as many very active and courageous foot, one of whom each
of the horse selected out of the whole army for his own protec-
tion. By these men they were constantly accompanied in their
engagements; to these the horse retired; these on any emer-
gency rushed forward; if any one, upon receiving a very severe
wound, had fallen from his horse, they stood around him; if it
was necessary to advance farther than usual or to retreat more
rapidly, so great, from practice, was their swiftness, that sup-
ported by the manes of the horses they could keep pace with
their speed.
Perceiving that Ariovistus kept himself in camp, Cæsar, that
he might not any longer be cut off from provisions, chose a
convenient position for a camp beyond that place in which the
Germans had encamped, at about six hundred paces from them,
and having drawn up his army in three lines, marched to that
place. He ordered the first and second lines to be under arms;
the third to fortify the camp. This place was distant from the
enemy about six hundred paces, as has been stated. Thither
Ariovistus sent light troops, about sixteen thousand men in num-
ber, with all his cavalry; which forces were to intimidate our
men and hinder them in their fortification. Cæsar nevertheless,
as he had before arranged, ordered two lines to drive off the
enemy; the third to execute the work. The camp being fortified,
he left there two legions and a portion of the auxiliaries, and led
back the other four legions into the larger camp.
The next day, according to his custom, Cæsar led out his
forces from both camps, and having advanced a little from the
larger one, drew up his line of battle, and gave the enemy an
opportunity of fighting. When he found that they did not even
then come out from their intrenchments, he led back his army
into camp about noon. Then at last Ariovistus sent part of his
forces to attack the lesser camp.
The battle was vigorously
maintained on both sides till the evening. At sunset, after
many wounds had been inflicted and received, Ariovistus led back
his forces into camp. When Cæsar inquired of his prisoners
wherefore Ariovistus did not come to an engagement, he dis-
## p. 3055 (#633) ###########################################
CAIUS JULIUS CÆSAR
3055
covered this to be the reason that among the Germans it was
the custom for their matrons to pronounce from lots and divi-
nation whether it were expedient that the battle should be
engaged in or not; that they had said that “it was not the will
of heaven that the Germans should conquer, if they engaged in
battle before the new moon. ”
The day following, Cæsar left what seemed sufficient as a
guard for both camps; and then drew up all the auxiliaries in
sight of the enemy, before the lesser camp, because he was not
very powerful in the number of legionary soldiers, considering
the number of the enemy; that thereby he might make use of
his auxiliaries for appearance. He himself, having drawn up his
army in three lines, advanced to the camp of the enemy. Then
at last of necessity the Germans drew their forces out of camp
and disposed them canton by canton, at equal distances, the
Harudes, Marcomanni, Tribocci, Vangiones, Nemetes, Sedusii,
Suevi; and surrounded their whole army with their chariots and
wagons, that no hope might be left in flight. On these they
placed their women, who, with disheveled hair and in tears,
entreated the soldiers, as they went forward to battle, not to
deliver them into slavery to the Romans.
Cæsar appointed over each legion a lieutenant and a quæstor,
that every one might have them as witnesses of his valor.
He
himself began the battle at the head of the right wing, because
he had observed that part of the enemy to be the least strong.
Accordingly our men, upon the signal being given, vigorously
made an attack upon the enemy, and the enemy so suddenly
and rapidly rushed forward that there was no time for casting
the javelins at them. Throwing aside, therefore, their javelins,
they fought with swords hand to hand. But the Germans,
according to their custom, rapidly forming a phalanx, sustained
the attack of our swords.
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## p. 3036 (#614) ###########################################
## p. 3037 (#615) ###########################################
3037
CAIUS JULIUS CÆSAR
(100-44 B. C. )
BY J. H. WESTCOTT
seen.
RULY a wonderful man was Caius Julius Cæsar,” says Captain
Miles Standish. Truly wonderful he was on each of his
many sides: as soldier, statesman, orator, and author, all of
the first rank — and a respectable critic, man of science and poet
besides.
As a writer of Latin prose, and as an orator, he was second to
Cicero alone in the age that is called the Ciceronian; and no third is
to be named with these two. Yet among his contemporaries his lit-
erary power was an insignificant title to fame, compared with his
overwhelming military and political genius. Here he stood alone,
unrivaled, the most successful conqueror and civilizer of all history,
the founder of the most majestic political fabric the world has ever
There have been other generals, statesmen, authors, as great
as Cæsar; but the extraordinary combination of powers in this one
man goes very far toward making good the claim that he was the
most remarkable man in history.
He was born 100 B. C. , a member of the great Julian gens, which
claimed descent from Æneas and Venus, the glories of which are
celebrated in Vergil's immortal epic. Thus the future leader of the
turbulent democracy, and the future despot who was to humble the
nobles of Rome, was by birth an aristocrat of bluest blood. His life
might easily have come to an untimely end in the days of Sulla's
bloody ascendency, for he was connected by marriage with Marius
and Cinna. Sulla was persuaded to spare him, but clearly saw, even
then, that «in Cæsar there were many Mariuses. ”
All young Romans of rank were expected to go through a term
of at least nominal military service. Cæsar's apprenticeship was in
Asia Minor in 8o B. C. He distinguished himself at the storming of
Mytilene, and afterwards served in Cilicia. He began his political
and oratorical career by the prosecution of Cornelius Dolabella, one
of the nobility, on a charge of extortion. About 75 B. C. he was
continuing his studies at Rhodes, then a famous school of eloquence.
Obtaining the quæstorship in 67 B. C. , he was assigned to duty in the
province of Further Spain. Two years later he became ædile. At
the age of thirty-seven he was elected pontifex maximus over two
>>>
## p. 3038 (#616) ###########################################
3038
CAIUS JULIUS CÆSAR
powerful competitors. Entirely without religious belief, as far as we
can judge, he recognized the importance of this portion of the civil
order, and mastered the intricate lore of the established ceremonial.
In this office, which he held for life, he busied himself with a Digest
of the Auspices and wrote an essay on Divination.
After filling the prætorship in 62 B. C. , he obtained, as proprætor,
the governorship of his old province of Further Spain, which he was
destined to visit twice in later years as conqueror in civil war. His
military success at this time against the native tribes was such as to
entitle him to the honor of a triumph. This he was obliged to forego
in order to stand at once for the consulship, which office he held for
the year 59 B. C. He had previously entered into a private agree-
ment with Pompey and Crassus, known as the First Triumvirate.
Cæsar had always presented himself as the friend of the people;
Pompey was the most famous man of the time, covered with military
laurels, and regarded, though not with perfect confidence, as the
champion of the Senatorial party. Crassus, a man of ordinary ability,
was valuable to the other two on account of his enormous wealth.
These three men agreed to unite their interests and their influence.
In accordance with this arrangement Cæsar obtained the consulship,
and then the command for five years, afterward extended to ten, of
the provinces of Gaul and Illyricum. It was while proconsul of Gaul
in the years 58-50 B. C. that he subjugated and organized «All Gaul,”
which was far greater in extent than the country which is now
France; increased his own political and material resources; and above
all formed an army, the most highly trained and efficient the world
had yet seen, entirely faithful to himself, by means of which he was
able in the years 49-46 B. C. to defeat all his political antagonists and
to gain absolute power over the State.
He held the consulship again in 48 and 46 B. C. , and was consul
without a colleague in 45 and 44 B. C. , as well as dictator with
authority to remodel the Constitution. While his far-reaching plans
of organization and improvement were incomplete, and when he was
about to start upon a
war against the Parthians on the eastern
frontier of the empire, he was murdered March 15th, 44 B. C. , by a
band of conspirators headed by Brutus and Cassius.
For purposes of a literary judgment of Cæsar we have of his own
works in complete or nearly complete form his military memoirs
only. His specifically literary works have all perished. A few sen-
tences from his speeches, a few of his letters, a few wise or witty
sayings, an anecdote or two scattered about in the pages of other
authors, and six lines of hexameter verse, containing a critical esti-
mate of the dramatist Terence, are all that remain as specimens of
what is probably forever lost to us.
## p. 3039 (#617) ###########################################
CAIUS JULIUS CÆSAR
3039
we
An enumeration of his works, so far as their titles are known, is
the best evidence of his versatility. A bit of criticism here and
there shows the estimation in which Cæsar the writer and orator was
held by his countrymen and contemporaries. Besides the military
memoirs and the works spoken of above in connection with his
pontificate, may mention, as of a semi-official character, his
astronomical treatise On the Stars (De Astris), published in connec-
tion with his reform of the calendar, when dictator, shortly before
the end of his life.
Cicero alludes to a collection of witty sayings (Apophthegms) made
by Cæsar, with evident satisfaction at the latter's ability to distin-
guish the real and the false Ciceronian bons mots.
Like most Roman gentlemen, Cæsar wrote in youth several poems,
of which Tacitus grimly says that they were not better than Cice-
ro's. This list includes a tragedy, Edipus,' Laudes Herculis) (the
Praises of Hercules), and a metrical account of a journey into Spain
(Iter).
A grammatical treatise in two books (De Analogia), dedicated to
Cicero, to the latter's immense gratification, was written on one of the
numerous swift journeys from Italy to headquarters in Gaul. Pas-
sages from it are quoted by several subsequent writers, and an anec-
dote preserved by Aulus Gellius in his Noctes Atticæ I. 10. 4, wherein
a young man is warned by Cæsar to avoid unusual and far-fetched
language like a rock,” is supposed to be very characteristic of his
general attitude in matters of literary taste. The (Anticatones) were
a couple of political pamphlets ridiculing Cato, the idol of the repub-
licans. This was small business for Cæsar, but Cato had taken
rather mean advantage by his dramatic suicide at Utica, and
deprived Cæsar of the "pleasure of pardoning him. ”
Of Cæsar's orations we have none but the most insignificant frag-
ments — our judgment of them must be based on the testimony of
ancient critics. Quintilian speaks in the same paragraph (Quin-
tilian X. I, 114) of the wonderful elegance of his language and
of the “force” which made it “seem that he spoke with the same
spirit with which he fought. ” Cicero's phrase "magnifica et generosa”
(Cicero, Brutus, 261), and Fronto's "facultas dicendi imperatoria”
(Fronto, Ep. p. 123), indicate « some kind of severe magnificence. ”
Collections of his letters were extant in the second century, but
nothing now remains except a few brief notes to Cicero, copied by
the latter in his correspondence with Atticus. This loss is perhaps
the one most to be regretted. Letters reveal their author's person-
ality better than more formal species of composition, and Cæsar was
almost the last real letter-writer, the last who used in its perfection
the polished, cultivated, conversational language, the Sermo urbanus.
## p. 3040 (#618) ###########################################
3040
CAIUS JULIUS CÆSAR
But after all, we possess the most important of his writings,
the Commentaries on the Gallic and Civil Wars. The first may be
considered as a formal report to the Senate and the public on the
conduct of his Gallic campaigns; the latter, as primarily intended
for a defense of his constitutional position in the Civil War.
They are memoirs, half way between private notes and formal
history. Cicero says that while their author «desired to give others
the material out of which to create a history, he may perhaps have
done a kindness to conceited writers who wish to trick them out
with meretricious graces” (to "crimp with curling-irons "), but he
has deterred all men of sound taste from ever touching them. For
in history a pure and brilliant conciseness of style is the highest
attainable beauty. ” “They are worthy of all praise, for they are
simple, straightforward and elegant, with all rhetorical ornament
stripped from them as a garment is stripped. ” (Cicero, Brutus, 262. )
The seven books of the Gallic War are each the account of a
year's campaigning. They were written apparently in winter quar-
ters. When Cæsar entered on the administration of his province it
was threatened with invasion. The Romans had never lost their
dread of the northern barbarians, no orgotten the capture of Rome
three centuries before. Only a generation back, Marius had become
the national hero by destroying the invading hordes of Cimbri and
Teutones. Cæsar purposed to make the barbarians tremble at the
Roman name. This first book of the Commentaries tells how he
raised an army in haste, with which he outmarched, outmanæuvred
and defeated the Helvetian nation. This people, urged by pressure
behind and encouragement in front, had determined to leave its old
home in the Alpine valleys and to settle in the fairer regions of
southeastern France. Surprised and dismayed by Cæsar's terrific
reception of their supposed invincible host, they had to choose between
utter destruction and a tame return, with sadly diminished numbers,
to their old abodes. Nor was this all the work of the first year.
Ariovistus, a German king, also invited by a Gallic tribe, and rely-
ing on the terror of his nation's name, came to establish himself and
his people on the Gallic side of the Rhine. He too was astonished
at the tone with which Cæsar ordered him to depart, but soon found
himself forced to return far more quickly than he had come.
Having thus vindicated the Roman claim to the frontiers of Gaul
against other invaders, the proconsul devoted his second summer to
the subjugation of the Belgæ, the most warlike and the most remote
of the Gauls. The second book tells how this was accomplished.
There was one moment when the conqueror's career came near end-
ing prematurely. One of the Belgian tribes, the valiant Nervii, sur-
prised and nearly defeated the Roman army. But steady discipline
## p. 3041 (#619) ###########################################
CAIUS JULIUS CÆSAR
3041
and the dauntless courage of the commander, never so great as in
moments of mortal peril, saved the day, and the Nervii are immor-
talized as the people who nearly destroyed Cæsar.
These unprecedented successes all round the eastern and northern
frontiers thoroughly established Roman prestige and strengthened
Rome's supremacy over the central Gauls, who were already her
allies, at least in name. But much yet remained to do. The work
was but fairly begun. The third book tells of the conquest of the
western tribes. The most interesting episode is the creation of a
fleet and the naval victory over the Veněti on the far-away coast of
Brittany. In the fourth year Cæsar crossed the Rhine, after building
a wonderful wooden bridge in ten days, carried fire and sword
among the Germans on the further bank, and returned to his side of
the river, destroying the bridge behind him. Modern schoolboys
wish he had never built it. Later in the season he made an expe-
dition into Britain. This was followed in the fifth year by an
invasion of the island in greater force. To people of our race this
portion of the Commentaries is especially interesting. The southern
part of the country was overrun, the Thames was crossed some miles
above London, and several victories were gained, but no organized
conquest was attempted. That remained for the age of Claudius and
later emperors.
During the ensuing winter, on account of the scarcity of provis-
ions, the Roman troops had to be quartered in separate detachments
at long distances. One of these was treacherously destroyed by the
Gauls, and the others were saved only by the extraordinary quickness
with which Cæsar marched to their relief on hearing of their immi-
nent danger. The chief part in this rising had been taken by the
Eburones, led by their king Ambiorix. A large part of the sixth
book is occupied with the recital of Cæsar's vengeance upon these
people and their abettors, and with the vain pursuit of Ambiorix.
The remainder contains an elaborate contrast of the manners and
customs of the Gauls and Germans, which forms an important source
for the history of the primitive institutions of these nations. The
seventh book is the thrilling tale of the formidable rising of all the
Gauls against their conquerors, under the leadership of Vercingetorix,
an Arvernian chief. This man was a real hero, — brave, patriotic,
resourceful, perhaps the only worthy antagonist that Cæsar ever met.
This war strained to the utmost Cæsar's abilities and the disciplined
valor of his legions. The Gauls nearly succeeded in undoing all the
work of six years, in destroying the Roman army and in throwing off
the Roman yoke. In this campaign, more conspicuously than ever
before, Cæsar's success was due to the unexampled rapidity of his
movements. So perfect had become the training of his troops and
V-191
## p. 3042 (#620) ###########################################
3042
CAIUS JULIUS CÆSAR
their confidence in his ability to win under all circumstances, that
after a campaign of incredible exertions they triumphed over the
countless hosts of their gallant foes, and in the next two years the
last embers of Gaulish independence were finally stamped out. In
all his later wars, Cæsar never had anything to fear from Gaul. As
we read the story of Avaricum, of Gergovia, of Alesia, our sympathy
goes out to the brave barbarians who were fighting for liberty — but
we have to remember that though the cause of freedom failed, the
cause of civilization triumphed. The eighth book, containing the
account of the next two years, 51 and 50 B. C. , was written by one
of Cæsar's officers, Aulus Hirtius.
The first book of the Civil War begins with the year 49 B. C. ,
where the struggle between Cæsar and the Senatorial party opens
with his crossing of the Rubicon, attended by the advanced guard of
his legions. Pompey proved a broken reed to those who leaned upon
him, and Cæsar's conquest of the Italian peninsula was little else
than a triumphal progress through the country. The enemy retired
to the eastern shore of the Adriatic to muster the forces of the East
on the side of the aristocracy, leaving Cæsar in possession of the
capital and of the machinery of government. The latter part of the
book contains the account of the campaign against Pompey's lieu-
tenants in Spain, which was won almost without bloodshed, by mas-
terly strategy, and which ended with the complete possession of the
peninsula. The second book describes the capture of Marseilles after
a long siege, and the tragic defeat and death of Curio, a brave but
rash young officer sent by Cæsar to secure the African province. In
the third book (48 B. C. ) we have the story of the campaign against
Pompey; first the audacious blockade for months of Pompey's greatly
superior forces near Dyrrachium on the Illyrian coast: and when that
failed, of the long march into Thessaly, where Pompey was at last
forced into battle, against his judgment, by his own officers, on the
fatal plains of Pharsalia; of the annihilation of the Senatorial army;
of Pompey's flight to Egypt; of his treacherous murder there; of
Cæsar's pursuit. The books on the Alexandrian, the African, and the
Spanish wars, which continue the narrative down to Cæsar's final vic-
tory at Munda in southern Spain, are by other and inferior hands.
The question of their authorship has been the subject of much con-
troversy and conjecture.
Under this modest title of Commentaries,' in the guise of a
simple narrative of events, Cæsar puts forth at once an inimitable
nistory and a masterly apology. The author speaks of himself in
the third person, tells of the circumstances of each situation in a
quiet moderate way, which carries with it the conviction on the
reader's part of his entire truthfulness, accuracy, and candor. We
## p. 3043 (#621) ###########################################
CAIUS JULIUS CÆSAR
3043
are persuaded that the Cæsar about whom he tells could not have
acted otherwise than he did. In short, he exercises the same spell
over our minds that he cast over the hearts of men twenty centu-
ries ago.
There is nothing that so fascinates and enchains the imagination
of men
as power in another man. This man could captivate a
woman by his sweetness or tame an angry mob of soldiers with a
word; could mold the passions of a corrupt democracy or extermi-
nate a nation in a day; could organize an empire or polish an epi-
gram. His strength was terrible. But all this immense power was
marvelously balanced and under perfect control. Nothing was DO
small for his delicate tact. Nothing that he did was so difficult but
we feel he could have done more. Usually his means seemed inade-
quate to his ends. But it was Cæsar who used them.
The Commentaries show us this man at his work. They show
him as an organizer of armies and alliances, a wily diplomatist, an
intrepid soldier, an efficient administrator, a strategist of inspired
audacity, a tactician of endless resources, an engineer of infinite
inventiveness, an unerring judge of men. But he never boasts,
except in speeches to hearten discouraged troops. He does not vilify
or underrate his enemies.
His soldiers trusted him implicitly; there was no limit to their
zeal. They found in him a generous appreciation of their deeds.
Many a soldier and centurion has received immortality at his hands
as the guerdon of valor. He describes a victory of Labienus with as
much satisfaction as if it had been his own, and praises another
lieutenant for his prudent self-restraint when tempted by a prospect
of success. And he tells with hearty admiration of the devoted
Gauls who sacrificed their lives one after another in a post of danger
at Avaricum.
Even in the Civil War no officers deserted him
except Labienus and two Gaulish chiefs.
It was difficult to deceive him. His analysis of other men's
motives is as merciless as it is passionless. He makes us disapprove
the course of his antagonists with the same moderate but convincing
statement with which he recommends his own. Few men can have
had as few illusions as he. One would scarcely care to possess such
an insight into the hearts of others. He seems to feel little warmth
of indignation, and never indulges in invective. But woe to those
who stood in the way of the accomplishment of his objects. Dread-
ful was the punishment of those who revolted after making peace.
Still, even his vengeance seems dictated by policy rather than by
passion. He is charged with awful cruelty because he slew a million
men and sold another million into slavery. But he did not enjoy
human suffering. These were simply necessary incidents in the
## p. 3044 (#622) ###########################################
3044
CAIUS JULIUS CÆSAR
execution of his plans. It is hard to see how European civilization
could have proceeded without the conquest of Gaul, and it is surely
better to make a conquest complete, rapid, overpowering, that the
work may have to be done but once.
It is hard not to judge men by the standards of our own age.
The ancients rarely felt an international humanity, and in his own
time “Cæsar's clemency” was proverbial. As he was always careful
not to waste in useless fighting the lives of his soldiers, so he was
always true to his own precept, «Spare the citizens. ” The way in
which he repeatedly forgave his enemies when they were in his
power was an example to many a Christian conqueror. The best of
his antagonists showed themselves bloodthirsty in word or act; and
most of them, not excepting Cicero, were basely ungrateful for his
forbearance. His treatment of Cicero was certainly most handsome
our knowledge of it is derived mainly from Cicero's letters. Per-
haps this magnanimity was dashed with a tinge of kindly contempt
for his fellow-citizens; but whatever its motives, it was certainly wise
and benign at the beginning of the new era he was inaugurating.
He was no vulgar destroyer, and did not desire to ruin in order to
rule.
He is charged with ambition, the sin by which the angels fell. It
is not for us to fathom the depths of his mighty mind.
Let us
admit the charge. But it was not an ignoble ambition. Let us say
that he was so ambitious that he laid the foundations of the Roman
Empire and of modern France; that his services to civilization and
his plans for humanity were so broad that patriots were driven to
murder him.
Some of Casar's eulogists have claimed for him a moral greatness
corresponding to his transcendent mental power. This is mistaken
zeal. He may stand as the supreme representative of the race in the
way of practical executive intellect. It is poor praise to put him
into another order of men, with Plato or with Paul. Their greatness
was of another kind. We cannot speak of degrees. He is the expo-
nent of creative force in political history — not of speculative or
ethical power.
Moreover, with all his originality of conception and power of exe-
cution, Cæsar lacked that kind of imagination which makes the true
poet, the real creative artist in literature. Thus we observe the
entire absence of the pictorial element in his writings. There is no
trace of his ever being affected by the spectacular incidents of war-
fare nor by the grandeur of the natural scenes through which he
passed. The reason may be that his intellect was absorbed in the
contemplation of men and motives, of means and ends. We cannot
conceive of his ever having been carried out of himself by the
## p. 3045 (#623) ###########################################
CAIUS JULIUS CÆSAR
3045
rapture of inspiration. Such clearness of mental perception is natu-
rally accompanied by a certain coolness of temperament. A man of
superlative greatness must live more or less alone among his fellows.
With his immense grasp of the relations of things in the world,
Cæsar cannot have failed to regard men to some extent as the
counters in a great game - himself the player. So he used men,
finding them instruments efficient and zealous, often — of his far-
reaching plans. He was just in rewarding their services — more than
just: he was generous and kind. But he did not have real associ-
ates, real friends; therefore it is not surprising that he met with so
little gratitude. Even his diction shows this independence, this isola-
tion. It would be difficult to find an author of any nation in a
cultivated age so free from the influence of the language of his
predecessors. Cæsar was unique among the great Roman writers in
having been born at the capital. Appropriately he is the incarnation
of the specifically Roman spirit in literature, as Cicero was the em-
bodiment of the Italian, the Hellenic, the cosmopolitan spirit.
Toward the close of Cæsar's career there are some signs of weari-
ness observable — a certain loss of serenity, suspicion of vanity, a
dimming of his penetrating vision into the men about him. The
only wonder is that mind and body had not succumbed long before
to the prodigious strain put upon them. Perhaps it is well that he
died when he did, hardly past his prime. So he went to his setting,
like the other weary Titan,” leaving behind him a brightness which
lasted all through the night of the Dark Ages. Cæsar died, but the
imperial idea of which he was the first embodiment has proved the
central force of European political history even down to our time.
Such is the man who speaks to us from his pages still. He was a
man who did things rather than a man who said things. Yet who
could speak so well? His mastery of language was perfect, but in
the same way as his mastery of other instruments. Style with him
was a means rather than an end. He had the training which others
of his kind enjoyed. Every Roman noble had to learn oratory. But
Cæsar wrote and spoke with a faultless taste and a distinction that
no training could impart. So we find in his style a beauty which
does not depend upon ornament, but upon perfect proportion; a dic-
tion plain and severe almost to baldness; absolute temperateness of
expression. The descriptions are spirited, but never made so by
strained rhetoric; the speeches are brief, manly, business-like; the
arguments calm and convincing; always and everywhere the lan-
guage of a strong man well inside the limits of his power.
The chief ancient authorities for the life of Cæsar, besides his
own works, are Suetonius in Latin, Plutarch and Appian in Greek.
Among modern works of which he is made the subject may be
## p. 3046 (#624) ###########################################
3046
CAIUS JULIUS CÆSAR
mentioned Jules César,' by Napoleon III. (Paris, 1865); continued by
Colonel Stoffel, with an Atlas; Cæsar, a Sketch,' by J. A. Froude
(London, 1886); (Cæsar,' by A. Trollope (London, 1870); Cæsar,' by
T. A. Dodge, U. S. A. (Boston, 1893).
Jothest
esterst
THE DEFEAT OF ARIOVISTUS AND THE GERMANS
From The Gallic Wars)
Web
manner
HEN he had proceeded three days' journey, word was
brought to him that Ariovistus was hastening with all
his forces to seize on Vesontio,* which is the largest
town of the Sequani, and had advanced three days' journey from
his territories. Cæsar thought that he ought to take the greatest
precautions lest this should happen, for there was in that town
a most ample supply of everything which was serviceable for
war; and so fortified was it by the nature of the ground as to
afford a great facility for protracting the war, inasmuch as the
river Doubs almost surrounds the whole town, as though it were
traced round with a pair of compasses.
A mountain of great
height shuts in the remaining space, which is not more than six
hundred feet, where the river leaves a gap in such a
that the roots of that mountain extend to the river's bank on
either side. A wall thrown around it makes a citadel of this
mountain, and connects it with the town. Hither Cæsar hastens
by forced marches by night and day, and after having seized
the town, stations a garrison there.
Whilst he is tarrying a few days at Vesontio, on account of
corn and provisions; from the inquiries of our men and the
reports of the Gauls and traders (who asserted that the Ger-
mans were men of huge stature, of incredible valor and practice
in arms, – that ofttimes they, on encountering them, could not
bear even their countenance and the fierceness of their eyes),
so great
panic on a sudden seized the whole army, as to dis-
compose the minds and spirits of all in no slight degree. This
* Modern Besançon.
## p. 3047 (#625) ###########################################
CAIUS JULIUS CÆSAR
3047
first arose from the tribunes of the soldiers, the prefects and the
rest, who, having followed Cæsar from the city (Rome) from
motives of friendship, had no great experience in military affairs.
And alleging, some of them one reason, some another, which
they said made it necessary for them to depart, they requested
that by his consent they might be allowed to withdraw; some,
infuenced by shame, stayed behind in order that they might
avoid the suspicion of cowardice. These could neither compose
their countenance, nor even sometimes check their tears: but
hidden in their tents, either bewailed their fate or deplored with
their comrades the general danger. Wills were sealed universally
throughout the whole camp. By the expressions and cowardice
of these men, even those who possessed great experience in the
camp, both soldiers and centurions, and those [the decurions]
who were in command of the cavalry, were gradually discon-
certed. Such of them as wished to be considered less alarmed
said that they did not dread the enemy, but feared the narrow-
ness of the roads and the vastness of the forests which lay
between them and Ariovistus, or else that the supplies could not
be brought up readily enough. Some even declared to Cæsar
that when he gave orders for the camp to be moved and the
troops to advance, the soldiers would not be obedient to the
command nor advance, in consequence of their fear.
When Cæsar observed these things, having called a council,
and summoned to it the centurions of all the companies, he
severely reprimanded them, “particularly for supposing that it
belonged to them to inquire or conjecture either in what
direction they were marching or with what object. That Ario-
vistus during his [Cæsar's] consulship had most anxiously
sought after the friendship of the Roman people; why should
any one judge that he would so rashly depart from his duty ?
He for his part was persuaded that when his demands were
known and the fairness of the terms considered, he would reject
neither his nor the Roman people's favor. But even if, driven
on by rage and madness, he should make war upon them, what
after all were they afraid of ? - or why should they despair
either of their own valor or of his zeal? Of that enemy a trial
had been made within our fathers' recollection, when on the
defeat of the Cimbri and Teutones by Caius Marius, the army
was regarded as having deserved no less praise than their com-
mander himself. It had been made lately too in Italy, during
## p. 3048 (#626) ###########################################
3048
CAIUS JULIUS CÆSAR
the rebellion of the slaves, whom, however, the experience and
training which they had received from us assisted in some
respect. From which a judgment might be formed of the
advantages which resolution carries with it, - inasmuch as those
whom for some time they had groundlessly dreaded when
unarmed, they had afterwards vanquished when well armed and
flushed with success. In short, that these were the same men
whom the Helvetii, in frequent encounters, not only in their
own territories, but also in theirs [the German), have generally
vanquished, and yet cannot have been a match for our army. If
the unsuccessful battle and flight of the Gauls disquieted any,
these, if they made inquiries, might discover that when the
Gauls had been tired out by the long duration of the war, Ario-
vistus, after he had many months kept himself in his camp and
in the marshes, and had given no opportunity for an engage-
ment, fell suddenly upon them, by this time despairing of a
battle and scattered in all directions; and was victorious more
through stratagem and cunning than valor. But though there
had been room for such stratagem against savage and unskilled
men, not even Ariovistus himself expected that thereby our
armies could be entrapped. That those who ascribed their fear
to a pretense about the deficiency of supplies and the narrow-
ness of the roads acted presumptuously, as they seemed either
to distrust their general's discharge of his duty or to dictate
to him. That these things were his concern; that the Sequani,
the Leuci, and the Lingones were to furnish the corn; and that
it was already ripe in the fields; that as to the road, they
would soon be able to judge for themselves. As to its being
reported that the soldiers would not be obedient to command,
or advance, he was not at all disturbed at that; for he knew
that in the case of all those whose army had not been obedient
to command, either upon some mismanagement of an affair for-
tune had deserted them, or that upon some crime being discov-
ered covetousness had been clearly proved against them. His
integrity had been seen throughout his whole life, his good
fortune in the war with the Helvetii. That he would therefore
instantly set about what he had intended to put off till a more
distant day, and would break up his camp the next night in
the fourth watch, that he might ascertain as soon as possible
whether a sense of honor and duty, or whether fear, had more
infiuence with them. But that if no one else should follow, yet
## p. 3049 (#627) ###########################################
CAIUS JULIUS CÆSAR
3049
he would go with only the tenth legion, of which he had no
misgivings, and it should be his prætorian cohort. ”—This legion
Cæsar had both greatly favored, and in it, on account of its
valor, placed the greatest confidence.
Upon the delivery of this speech, the minds of all were
changed in a surprising manner, and the highest ardor and
eagerness for prosecuting the war were engendered; and the
tenth legion was the first to return thanks to him, through
their military tribunes, for his having expressed this most
favorable opinion of them; and assured him that they were
quite ready to prosecute the war. Then the other legions
endeavored, through their military tribunes and the centurions
of the principal companies, to excuse themselves to Cæsar,
saying that they had never either doubted or feared, or sup-
posed that the determination of the conduct of the war was
theirs and not their general's. Having accepted their excuse,
and having had the road carefully reconnoitred by Divitiacus,
because in him of all others he had the greatest faith, he found
that by a circuitous route of more than fifty miles he might
lead his army through open parts; he then set out in the fourth
watch, as he had said he would. On the seventh day, as he did
not discontinue his march, he was informed by scouts that the
forces of Ariovistus were only four-and-twenty miles distant
from ours.
Upon being apprised of Cæsar's arrival, Ariovistus sends am-
bassadors to him, saying that what he had before requested as
to a conference might now, as far as his permission went, take
place, since he [Cæsar) had approached nearer; and he considered
that he might now do it without danger. Cæsar did not reject
the proposal, and began to think that he was now returning to a
rational state of mind, as he voluntarily proffered that which he
had previously refused to him when he requested it; and was
in great hopes that, in consideration of his own and the Roman
people's great favors towards him, the issue would be that he
would desist from his obstinacy upon his demands being made
known. The fifth day after that was appointed as the day of
conference. Meanwhile, as ambassadors were being often sent to
and fro between them, Ariovistus demanded that Cæsar should
not bring any foot-soldier with him to the conference, saying
that "he was afraid of being ensnared by him through treachery,
that both should come accompanied by cavalry; that he would
## p. 3050 (#628) ###########################################
3050
CAIUS JULIUS CÆSAR
not come on any other condition. ” Cæsar, as he neither wished
that the conference should, by an excuse thrown in the way, be
set aside, nor durst trust his life to the cavalry of the Gauls,
decided that it would be most expedient to take away from the
Gallic cavalry all their horses, and thereon to mount the legionary
soldiers of the tenth legion, in which he placed the greatest con-
fidence; in order that he might have a body-guard as trustworthy
as possible, should there be any need for action. And when this
was done, one of the soldiers of the tenth legion said, not without
a touch of humor, «that Cæsar did more for them than he had
promised: he had proinised to have the tenth legion in place of
his prætorian cohort; but he now converted them into horse. ”
There was a large plain, and in it a mound of earth of consid-
erable size. This spot was at nearly an equal distance from both
camps. Thither, as had been appointed, they came for the confer-
ence. Cæsar stationed the legion which he had brought with
him on horseback, two hundred paces from this mound. The
cavalry of Ariovistus also took their stand at an equal distance.
Ariovistus then demanded that they should confer on horseback,
and that, besides themselves, they should bring with them ten
men each to the conference. When they were come to the place,
Cæsar, in the opening of his speech, detailed his own and the
Senate's favors towards him (Ariovistus], “in that he had been
styled king, in that he had been styled friend, by the Senate,–
in that very considerable presents had been sent him; which cir.
cumstance he informed him had both fallen to the lot of few, and
had usually been bestowed in consideration of important personal
services; that he, although he had neither an introduction, nor a
just ground for the request, had obtained these honors through
the kindness and munificence of himself [Cæsar] and the Senate.
He informed him, too, how old and how just were the grounds
of connection that existed between themselves [the Romans) and
the Ædui, what decrees of the Senate had been passed in their
favor, and how frequent and how honorable; how from time
immemorial the Ædui had held the supremacy of the whole of
Gaul; even, said Cæsar, before they had sought our friendship;
that it was the custom of the Roman people to desire not only
that its allies and friends should lose none of their property, but
be advanced in influence, dignity, and honor: who then could
endure that what they had brought with them to the friendship
of the Roman people should be torn from them ? ” He then
## p. 3051 (#629) ###########################################
CAIUS JULIUS CÆSAR
3051
made the same demands which he had commissioned the ambas-
sadors to make, that Ariovistus should not make war either
upon the Ædui or their allies; that he should restore the hostages;
that if he could not send back to their country any part of the
Germans, he should at all events suffer none of them any more
to cross the Rhine.
Ariovistus replied briefly to the demands of Cæsar, but expa-
tiated largely on his own virtues: “that he had crossed the Rhine
not of his own accord, but on being invited and sent for by the
Gauls; that he had not left home and kindred without great
expectations and great rewards; that he had settlements in Gaul,
granted by the Gauls themselves; that the hostages had been
given by their own good-will; that he took by right of war the
tribute which conquerors are accustomed to impose on the con-
quered; that he had not made war upon the Gauls, but the Gauls
upon him; that all the States of Gaul came to attack him, and
had encamped against him that all their forces had been routed
and beaten by him in a single battle; that if they chose to make
a second trial, he was ready to encounter them again; but if they
chose to enjoy peace, it was unfair to refuse the tribute which
of their own free-will they had paid up to that time. That the
friendship of the Roman people ought to prove to him an orna-
ment and a safeguard, not a detriment; and that he sought it
with that expectation. But if through the Roman people the
tribute was to be discontinued, and those who surrendered to be
seduced from him, he would renounce the friendship of the
Roman people no less heartily than he had sought it. As to his
leading over a host of Germans into Gaul, that he was doing this
with a view of securing himself, not of assaulting Gaul: that
there was evidence of this, in that he did not come without being
invited, and in that he did not make war, but merely warded it
off. That he had come into Gaul before the Roman people.
That never before this time did a Roman army go beyond the
frontiers of the province of Gaul. What, said he, does Cæsar
desire ? — why come into his [Ariovistus's] domains ? — that this
was his province of Gaul, just as that is ours. As it ought not
to be pardoned in him if he were to make an attack upon our
territories, so likewise that we were unjust to obstruct him in
his prerogative. As for Cæsar's saying that the Ædui had been
styled brethren' by the Senate, he was not so uncivilized nor
so ignorant of affairs as not to know that the Ædui in the
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3052
CAIUS JULIUS CÆSAR
very last war with the Allobroges had neither rendered assistance
to the Romans nor received any from the Roman people in the
struggles which the Ædui had been maintaining with him and
with the Sequani. He must feel suspicious that Cæsar, though
feigning friendship as the reason for his keeping an army in
Gaul, was keeping it with the view of crushing him. And that
unless he depart and withdraw his army from these parts, he
shall regard him not as a friend, but as a foe; and that even if
he should put him to death, he should do what would please
many of the nobles and leading men of the Roman people; he
had assurance of that from themselves through their messengers,
and could purchase the favor and the friendship of them all by
his [Cæsar's] death. But if he would depart and resign to him
the free possession of Gaul, he would recompense him with a
great reward, and would bring to a close whatever wars he wished
to be carried on, without any trouble or risk to him. ”
Many things were stated by Cæsar to the following effect:-
“That he could not waive the business, and that neither his nor
the Roman people's practice would suffer him to abandon most
meritorious allies; nor did he deem that Gaul belonged to Ario-
vistus rather than to the Roman people; that the Arverni* and
the Rutenif had been subdued in war by Quintus Fabius Max-
imus, and that the Roman people had pardoned them and had
not reduced them into a province or imposed a tribute upon
them. And if the most ancient period was to be regarded,
then was the sovereignty of the Roman people in Gaul most just:
if the decree of the Senate was to be observed, then ought Gaul
to be free, which they [the Romans) had conquered in war, and
had permitted to enjoy its own laws. ”
While these things were being transacted in the conference, it
was announced to Cæsar that the cavalry of Ariovistus were
approaching nearer the mound, and were riding up to our men
and casting stones and weapons at them. Cæsar made an end
of his speech and betook himself to his men; and commanded
them that they should by no means return a weapon upon the
enemy. For though he saw that an engagement with the cavalry
would be without any danger to his chosen legion, yet he did not
think proper to engage, lest after the enemy were routed it
might be said that they had been ensnared by him under the
* Modern Auvergne.
+ Modern Le Rouergue.
## p. 3053 (#631) ###########################################
CAIUS JULIUS CÆSAR
3053
sanction of a conference. When it was spread abroad among the
common soldiery with what haughtiness Ariovistus had behaved
at the conference, and how he had ordered the Romans to quit
Gaul, and how his cavalry had made an attack upon our men,
and how this had broken off the conference, a much greater
alacrity and eagerness for battle was infused into our army.
Two days after, Ariovistus sends ambassadors to Cæsar to
state that he wished to treat with him about those things which
had been begun to be treated of between them, but had not
been concluded ”; and to beg that “he would either again
appoint a day for a conference, or if he were not willing to do
that, that he would send one of his officers as an ambassador to
him. ” There did not appear to Cæsar any good reason for
holding a conference; and the more so as the day before, the
Germans could not be restrained from casting weapons at our
men. He thought he should not without great danger send to
him as ambassador one of his Roman officers, and should expose
him to savage men. It seemed therefore most proper to send
to him C. Valerius Procillus, the son of C. Valerius Caburus, a
young man of the highest courage and accomplishments (whose
father had been presented with the freedom of the city by C.
Valerius Flaccus), both on account of his fidelity and on account
of his knowledge of the Gallic language, - which Ariovistus, by
long practice, now spoke fluently, -- and because in his case the
Germans would have no motive for committing violence;* and
for his colleague, M. Mettius, who had shared the hospitality of
Ariovistus. He commissioned them to learn what Ariovistus had
to say, and to report to him. But when Ariovistus saw them
before him in his camp, he cried out in the presence of his
army, “Why were they come to him ? was it for the purpose of
acting as spies? ” He stopped them when attempting to speak,
and cast them into chains.
The same day he moved his camp forward and pitched under
a hill six miles from Cæsar's camp. The day following he led his
forces past Cæsar's camp, and encamped two miles beyond him;
with this design - that he might cut off Cæsar from the corn
and provisions which might be conveyed to him from the Se-
quani and the Ædui. For five successive days from that day
Cæsar drew out his forces before the camp and put them in
* Inasmuch as he was not a Roman, but a Gaul.
## p. 3054 (#632) ###########################################
3054
CAIUS JULIUS CÆSAR
battle order, that if Ariovistus should be willing to engage in
battle, an opportunity might not be wanting to him. Ariovistus
all this time kept his army in camp, but engaged daily in cavalry
skirmishes. The method of battle in which the Germans had
practiced themselves was this: There were six thousand horse,
and as many very active and courageous foot, one of whom each
of the horse selected out of the whole army for his own protec-
tion. By these men they were constantly accompanied in their
engagements; to these the horse retired; these on any emer-
gency rushed forward; if any one, upon receiving a very severe
wound, had fallen from his horse, they stood around him; if it
was necessary to advance farther than usual or to retreat more
rapidly, so great, from practice, was their swiftness, that sup-
ported by the manes of the horses they could keep pace with
their speed.
Perceiving that Ariovistus kept himself in camp, Cæsar, that
he might not any longer be cut off from provisions, chose a
convenient position for a camp beyond that place in which the
Germans had encamped, at about six hundred paces from them,
and having drawn up his army in three lines, marched to that
place. He ordered the first and second lines to be under arms;
the third to fortify the camp. This place was distant from the
enemy about six hundred paces, as has been stated. Thither
Ariovistus sent light troops, about sixteen thousand men in num-
ber, with all his cavalry; which forces were to intimidate our
men and hinder them in their fortification. Cæsar nevertheless,
as he had before arranged, ordered two lines to drive off the
enemy; the third to execute the work. The camp being fortified,
he left there two legions and a portion of the auxiliaries, and led
back the other four legions into the larger camp.
The next day, according to his custom, Cæsar led out his
forces from both camps, and having advanced a little from the
larger one, drew up his line of battle, and gave the enemy an
opportunity of fighting. When he found that they did not even
then come out from their intrenchments, he led back his army
into camp about noon. Then at last Ariovistus sent part of his
forces to attack the lesser camp.
The battle was vigorously
maintained on both sides till the evening. At sunset, after
many wounds had been inflicted and received, Ariovistus led back
his forces into camp. When Cæsar inquired of his prisoners
wherefore Ariovistus did not come to an engagement, he dis-
## p. 3055 (#633) ###########################################
CAIUS JULIUS CÆSAR
3055
covered this to be the reason that among the Germans it was
the custom for their matrons to pronounce from lots and divi-
nation whether it were expedient that the battle should be
engaged in or not; that they had said that “it was not the will
of heaven that the Germans should conquer, if they engaged in
battle before the new moon. ”
The day following, Cæsar left what seemed sufficient as a
guard for both camps; and then drew up all the auxiliaries in
sight of the enemy, before the lesser camp, because he was not
very powerful in the number of legionary soldiers, considering
the number of the enemy; that thereby he might make use of
his auxiliaries for appearance. He himself, having drawn up his
army in three lines, advanced to the camp of the enemy. Then
at last of necessity the Germans drew their forces out of camp
and disposed them canton by canton, at equal distances, the
Harudes, Marcomanni, Tribocci, Vangiones, Nemetes, Sedusii,
Suevi; and surrounded their whole army with their chariots and
wagons, that no hope might be left in flight. On these they
placed their women, who, with disheveled hair and in tears,
entreated the soldiers, as they went forward to battle, not to
deliver them into slavery to the Romans.
Cæsar appointed over each legion a lieutenant and a quæstor,
that every one might have them as witnesses of his valor.
He
himself began the battle at the head of the right wing, because
he had observed that part of the enemy to be the least strong.
Accordingly our men, upon the signal being given, vigorously
made an attack upon the enemy, and the enemy so suddenly
and rapidly rushed forward that there was no time for casting
the javelins at them. Throwing aside, therefore, their javelins,
they fought with swords hand to hand. But the Germans,
according to their custom, rapidly forming a phalanx, sustained
the attack of our swords.
