Sed quis
judicabit
eum hereticum.
Thomas Carlyle
handle.
net/2027/uc1.
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? CHAP. X. } BONIFACE VIII. AND PHILIP THE FAIR. 429
relating to the two swords he sets aside summarily on the
ground that these are merely allegories, and he cites Dionysius,
the Areopagite himself, as saying, " Mystica autem theologia
non est argumentativa nisi accipiatur probatio ex alia Scrip-
tura. " 1 He also summarily sets aside the argument based
on the words of Peter Damian, which he cites as from Pope
Nicolas, that Christ had committed to Peter " the laws both
of the heavenly and earthly empire," on the ground that a
statement of a Pope about his own power, unsupported by
the authority of Holy Scripture or canonical authority, was
not very good evidence. 2 The contention that Pope Zacharias
had deposed the King of the Franks he also sets aside. He
points out that there were various accounts of the incident
in the Chronicles, and that it might be better to say that
Pope Zacharias consented to the deposition, and that even if
it were true that he had deposed the king, it was not very
conclusive, for cases could be found where the emperor had
seemed to exercise ecclesiastical authority. No important
conclusion should be based on isolated cases. 3
More important, however, than these is his discussion of
the argument based upon the principle that material things
(corporalia) are ruled by the spiritual. The contention based
on this is, he says, ill-founded, for it assumes that the royal
authority is material and not spiritual, and has the care of
bodies only, not of souls. This is false, for its end is to set
forward the common good of the citizens--that is, above all,
a life which is according to virtue. Aristotle thus maintains
in the Ethics that the purpose of the legislator is to make
man good, and to lead him to virtue, and in the Politics
he says that as the soul is better than the body, the legislator
is better than the physician, for the legislator cares for the
souls of men, the physician for their bodies. *
1 Id. id. , 15, 19.
2 Id. id. , 15. "Christus Petro
ocelestis terrenique imperii jura con-
cessit. Respondeo, ubi quseritur de
potentate papse in temporalis, efficax
est testimonium imperatoris pro papa ;
et non est multum efficax testimonium
papse pro se ipso, nisi dictum papse
fulciatur auctoritate Scripture sacrse,
vel scripturse canonicse. "
* Id. id. , 15.
4 Id. id. , 18. " Quod autem arguitur
vigesimo quod corporalia reguntur
per spiritualia, et ab ipsis dependerent
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? 430 TEMPORAL AND SPIRITUAL POWERS. [pakt II.
He deals curtly with the argument that it was the Pope
who made laws, and that the prince could not make or
administer laws unless they were approved by the Pope.
This is false, and he first cites from Gratian a declaration
of Pope Leo IV. to the Emperor Lothair, in which he declared
his intention to keep and observe the imperial " capitula "
and commands. He then dogmatically asserts that the Pope
has no authority to abrogate any laws except those which
belong to his own jurisdiction, and that to maintain that
the Pope makes laws for the prince, or that the laws of the
prince require the Pope's approbation, is to destroy the whole
nature of authority, whether this is regal or political--that
is, whether the prince governs according to laws which he
makes himself or according to laws which are made by the
citizens. 1
ut a causa. Respondeo ; argumentum,
at sit factum, multiplieiter deficit.
Primo, quia supponit, quod potestas
regalis sit corporalis, et non spiritualis,
et habeat curam corporum, et non
animarum : quod falsum est; ut patot
ex supradictis, cum ordinetur ad
bonum commune civium non quod-
cunque, sed quod est vivere secundum
virtutem. Unde dicit philosophus in
Ethicis, quod intentio legislator-is est
homines bonos facere, et inducore ad
virtutem. Et etiam in Politicis dicit,
quod sicut anima melior est corpore,
sic legislator melior est medico : quia
legislator habet curam animarum,
mcdicus corporum. "
1 Id. id. , 18. "Quod autem dicitur
24, quod papa habet facere leges, eo
quod prince pa non potest facere leges,
vel eis uti quousque fuerint per papam
approbate : dico quod falsum est ut
dicit expresse Leo Papa, scribens
Lothario Augusto, distinct. 10 de
Capitulis di. (Gratian, Decretum, D.
10, 9) sic ' de capitulis et prseceptis
imperialibus vestris et pradecessorum
vestrorum irrefragabiliter custodiendis
et conservandis, quantum voluimus et
valemus, Christo propitio et nunc et in
jeternum conservaturos modis omnibus
profitemur ; et si forte quislibet vobis
alitor dixerit, vel dicturus fuerit, sciatis
ipsum pro certo mendacem ' : neo per
canones semper legibus derogatur nisi
quo ad casus spirituales. Nec papa
posset leges tollere, nisi quoad suum
forum ut dicit Io. et alii. Dioere
autem ut isti magistri dicunt, quod
papa tradit leges principibus, et quod
princeps non potest legem aliunde
sumere, nisi per papam fuerint appro-
bate, est omnino destruere regimen
regale et politician et incidere in
errorem Herodis timentis et putsntis
Christum regnum destruere terrenum.
Quia secundum Philosophum in 1
Politicorum, principatus tunc solum
dicitur regalis, quando quia preest
secundum leges quas ipse instituit.
Cum vero prseest non secundum
arbitrium suum, sed secundum leges,
quas cives vel alii instituerunt, dicitur
? ? principatus civilis vel politicus non
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? CHAP. X. ] BONIFACE VIII. AND PHILIP THE FAD2.
431
In another chapter he deals with the suggestion that ting-
ship is essentially evil, because it was written in the Scriptures
that God gave the Hebrews a king in his wrath. He explains
that this did not mean that kingship was in its own nature
evil and displeasing to God, but that God had chosen this
people as His own, and had given them a form of Government
better than the pure monarchy. For though, as John under-
stood him, Aristotle had said that the monarchy of the virtu-
ous man was the best of the pure forms of government, yet
the best form of all is one in which the aristocratic and demo-
cratic elements are combined with the monarchical; it was
a government of this kind which God had given to Israel
under Moses and Joshua. (This conception of the best kind
of government is interesting in the development of political
ideas, and we have dealt with it in a former chapter. 1) It
is noteworthy that John goes on to suggest that it would be
well if the same principle were applied to the government of
the Church. The anticipation of the Conciliar movement is
evident. 2
1 Cf. pp. 79 and 94.
* Id. id. , 20. " Sed quare ergo,
' indignatus concessit eis regem. ' Di-
cendum quod non ideo, quia regale
regimen ei displiceret simpliciter ut
TnnliiTTfi; sed ideo, quia ilium populum
sibi elegerat ut peculiarem, Deut. 6,
et instruxerat eis regimen melius puro
regali, saltem illi populo propter duo.
Primum est, quia licet regimon regium,
in quo unus simpliciter principatur
secundum virtutem, sit melius quolibet
alio regimine simplice, ut ostendit
Philosophus in 3 Politieorum : tamen
si fiat mixtum cum aristocratia et
democratic, melius est puro, in quan-
tum in regimine mixto omnes aliquam
partem habent in principatu-
Per hoc enim servatur pax populi,
et omnes talem dominationem amunt
et custodiunt, ut dicitur in 2 Politi-
eorum : et tale erat regimen a Deo
optime institutum in populo: quia
erat regale, in quantum unus praerat
simpliciter omnibus singulariter, ut
Moyses vel Joeua. Erat otiam aliquid
de aristocratia qui est principatus
aliquorum optimorum principantium
secundum virtutem, in quantum sub
illo viro eligebantur 72 seniores, Deut.
5 , Erant etiam ibi aliqui de democratia,
in principatu populi, in quantum 72
eligibantur a populo, et de toto populo,
ut dicitur ibidem : et sic erat optime
mixtum, in quantum omnes in regi-
mine illo aliquid habebant, sivo aliquam
partem. Et sic certe esset optimum
regimen Ecclesrise, si sub uno papa
eligerentur plures ab omni provincia,
et de omni provincia, ut sic in regimine
Ecclesise omnes haberent partem suam.
Aliud etiam erat, propter quod tale
regimen erat melius illi populo, quam
primum regale: quia licot regimen
regale sit optimum in se, si non cor-
rumpatur, cum propter magnam potes-
tatem, qusi regi conceditur, de facili
regimen degeneret in tyrannidem, nisi
? ? sit pcrfecta virtus ejus cui talis potestas
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? 432 TEMPORAL AND SPIRITUAL POWERS. [PABT II.
Finally, he repudiates the contention that the Pope could
require the acceptance of his claims under the penalty of
excommunication. The Christian faith is catholic and universal,
and the Pope cannot establish an article as belonging to the
faith without a general council, for the world is greater than
Eome and the Pope, and a council is greater than the Pope
alone. 1
John's treatment of the Donation of Constantine is highly
important, and deserves a place by itself. We have already
observed that in the tenth chapter John of Paris had argued
that the contention that the Pope held all Temporal as well
as Spiritual Power from Christ Himself was not consistent
with the contention that it was Constantine who bestowed
universal authority upon him. 2 It is in the twenty-second
chapter, however, that he proceeds to a formal discussion of
the nature and validity of the Donation. He does not suggest
that it was spurious, but he argues that its nature had been
misrepresented, that in any case it had no relation to France,
and that it was legally invalid. It is sometimes, he says,
maintained that Constantine transferred to Pope Sylvester
the Western empire and the imperial insignia, and therefore
some held that in virtue of the Donation the Pope was emperor
and lord of the world, and could create and depose kings as the
emperor could. This, he says, is not in accordance with the
historians, or the terms of the Donation. What Constantine
transferred to the Pope was a certain territory--namely, Italy,
and some other provinces, in which France was not included,
and he transferred his empire to the Greeks and built the
new Eome. The Pope has therefore no political authority
over the King of France, first, because the Donation only
1 Id. id. , 21. " Et subditur, anathe-
matis poena. Et idem recitatur in
gestis concilii Chalcedonensis. Am-
plius, cum fides Christiana sit oatholica
et universalis, non potest summus
pontifex hoc ponere sub fide sine
concilio generali: quia papa non
potest discernero statuta consilii, di,
19 Anastasius (Gratian. Decretum, D.
9, 8 and 9). Nam licet concilium non
possit proprie legem imponere, extra
de electione, significasti (Decretals,
i. 6, 4) et 35 qusestione 6 veniam
(Gratian, Decretum, C. 35, 9, 5);
tamen non intelligitur in iis quse fidei
sunt, eo quod orbis major est urbe
et papa, concilium majus est papa
solo. "
? Cf. p. 424.
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? CHAP, x. ] BONIFACE Vm. AND PHILIP THE FAIR. 433
had reference to a limited territory in which France was not
included ; secondly, because the Donation was really, accord-
ing to the jurists, invalid for various reasons ; thirdly, because
even if it were valid and affected the whole empire, the Franks
were never under the domination of the Eoman empire. 1
It is plain that the Donation of Constantine did not appear
to John of Paris of much importance. He interpreted it in
accordance with what was probably its original significance,2
as a grant of authority in Italy and some other provinces,
and flatly denied that it had a general or universal significance,
and he argued that it was at least very doubtful if it had any
legal validity.
John of Paris had thus established to his own satisfaction
that the doctrine that the Papacy held the supreme Temporal
as well as Spiritual Power was indefensible. The arguments
which we have considered were, however, expressed in general
1 Id. id. , 22. " Dicunt enim quod
Sylvestro successoribusque dederit im-
perium occidentale et imperialia signa:
ut palatium suam, et coronam et alia
hujusmodi. Et ideo volunt aliqui,
quod ratione hujus doni summus
pontifex imperator est et dominus
mundi: et quod potest reges const i-
tuere et destituere, sicut Imperator,
et precipue imperio vacante. . . . Et
quidem sciendum de donatione prffl-
dicta, quod sicut accipitur ex chronicis
Hugonis Flaviacensis et in libro de
Cosmographia et ex epistola Constan-
tini ad episcopos, et ex testamento
ejusdem, ipse Constantinus non dedit
nisi certam provinciam, scilicet Italiam,
cum quibusdam aliis, ubi Francia non
includitur : et imperium transtulit ad
Grsecos ubi novam Romam sedificavit.
. . . Ex quibus ergo suppositis apparet,
quod ex dicta donatione et transla-
tione, papa nihil potest super regem
Franoiro, propter quatuor.
Primo quidem, quia dicta donatio
non fuit nisi de portione determinata,
in qua Francia non includebatur, nec
translatio fuit facta totius imperii sive
VOL. V.
monarchic mundi ad Germanos, cum
etiam post translationem predictam,
qua magis fuit divisio Imperii, vel
nova imperii appellatio, quam trans-
latio, remanserunt ad huo Imperatores
apud Greoos.
Secundo, quia dicta donatio nihil
valuit propter quatuor, quam in Glosa
juris civilis ponuntur. . . . Ex quibus
dicunt Juristic quod donatio non valet.
Tertio, apparet quod ex dicta
donatione nihil habet papa super regem
Franciss, da to etiam quod valuisset
et generalis de toto imperio fuisset:
quia licet Galiici inveniantur tempore
Octaviani Augusti imperio Romano
fuisse subjecti, tamen Franci nun-
quam. (Cf. id. id. , 16. )
Potest nihilominus dici, quod
Constantinus nunquam dedit imperium
Ecclesise simpliciter ; sed dedit urbem,
et quasdem provincias occidentales,
et signa imperialia, ut de ipsis pro-
? ? vinciis disponeret; sedemque suam
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? 434 TEMPORAL AND SPIRITUAL POWERS. [PART n.
terms, or at least without any direct reference to the circum-
stances of the time. In the concluding chapter he turns to
the question of the action which might legitimately be taken
against the Pope, and he is clearly considering the situation
which had arisen with regard to the relations of Boniface Viil.
and Philip the Pair.
If any dispute arise, he says, about the election of a Pope,
and if, in the judgment of the learned and other persons
who are concerned, there had been some unlawful action,
the Pope was to be admonished to retire. If he would not
do this, an appeal might be made to a general council; and
if he resisted with violence, the secular arm should be called
in to remove him from the Holy See, as was done in the case
of Benedict IX. and Cadalous and Constantine II. If the
Pope maintains any doctrine which is contrary to the faith
of the Church, he is already judged. If the Pope were sus-
pected of some fault which, however, was not clear and
manifest, he could not be judged, and even if the fault were
clear and manifest, as, for instance, incontinence or homicide,
he could not be judged by any one, " per modum auctoritatis,"
he could not be cited or excommunicated, for he had no
superior. 1
1 Id. id. , 23. "Sed circa hoc est
oonsiderandum, quod contra papain
potest intelligi esse quadrupliciter
discussio et judicium, scil: de statu,
de potestate, de potestatis abusu, et
personali defectu. . . . Si vero contra
personam, vel electionem summi pon?
tificis, post discussionem diligenter a
literatis et ab aliis, quorum interest,
faotam, inveniretur aliquid illegitimum
contra statute, non esset dissimu-
landum. Sed monendus cedere: et
si nolit, posset excipi, et generale con-
cilium peti, et ad ipsum concilium
appellari; imo in tali casu deberet,
si pertinax inveniretur cum violentia,
advocato brachio seculari a sede re-
moveri, ne prophanarentur Eoclesise
saoramenta. Sic enim legitur in
Chroniois Romanorum pontificum de
Benedicto nono, et Cadalo Portuensi
episcopo, Constantino socundo et aliis
quibusdam propter intrusionem per
brachium seculare commendabiliter a
sede depositis. . . .
Sed quis judicabit eum hereticum.
Responsio. Si dixerit et amrmando
tenuerit aliquid, quod est contra id
quod est in symbolo fidei per ecclesiam
alias approbato, jam dicitur judicatus.
Nam qui non credit jam judicatus est.
De potestatis vero sive abusu et
personali defectu suo . . . si non est
evidens aut manifestum, absque dubio
non licet judicare: sed semper in
meliorem partem interpretandum est
et trahendum, etiamsi prima facie
aliquid mali colons oocurrat. Et
minus est licitum de papa quam de
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? CHAP. X. ] BONIFACE Vm. AND PHTT. TP THE FADi.
435
What was to be done, however, if the Pope, without a general
council, declared a man to be a heretic for holding a view
about which there were " opiniones " (different opinions), or
if he were to declare a man to be a heretic because he asserted
that the King of France, or some other person in his position,
was not subject (i. e. , to the Pope). John replies that, in the
first place, the words of the Pope are always to be interpreted
as far as possible in a good sense, and this applies to such
a statement; the Pope might be taken to mean that the
King of France was subject to him in matters concerning sin,
and therefore such a claim should be endured as far as was
possible without danger to justice and truth.
If, however, there were danger to the commonwealth in
delay, and the Pope used his spiritual sword to the disturb-
ance of the people, and there was no hope that he would
desist, the Church should proceed against him, and the prince
might resist the violence of the sword of the Pope with his
own sword. In doing this he was acting not against the
Pope, but against the enemy of himself and of the common-
wealth, not against the Church, but for it. John concludes
by referring again to the traditional deposition of Pope Con-
stantine by the people, and the supposed deposition of Bene-
dict IX. , and the others by Henry II. 1
aliis quibuscunque. Si vero sit factum
ex genere suo malum, et manifestum
ut incontinentia vel homicidium, vel
ex lege prohibitum, non potest judicari
per modum auctoritatis ab aliquo,
citando vel excommnnicando, cum
superiorem non habeat. "
1 Id. id. id. " Sed quid si papa
dicat, quod reputat talem hereticum,
qui tenet aliquid de quo sunt opiniones,
et dicat hoc sine concilio generali :
vel si dicat quod reputat hsereticum
omnem hominem asserentem re gem
Francirc vel aliquem hujusmodi non
esse subjectum 7 Responsio : verba
summi pontificis indefinite dicta, sem-
per debent trahi ad aliquem sanum
sensum, quantum potest fieri: unde
dicta verba non debent accipi sic,
quod non possit ad eum appellari, vel
quod sit divinum habens in rebus
ipsis, vel quod papa se habeat intro-
mittere de tuo et meo. Hoc enim
esset manifeste contra scripturam et
contra omnem doctrinam, et novitas
qusedam : quam non proferret summus
pontifex, nisi cum magna maturitate,
et habito prius concilio generali, et
discussione facta ubique per literatos.
Et ideo debet intelligi in sano
sensu, scil. ratione delicti, ubi qusestio
movetur de peccato: vel debet in-
telligi in foro conscientise, ut dictum
est supra, quousque super hoc aperuerit
intentionem suam. Si vero finaliter
aperiat intentionem suam in tam novo
et injurioso sensu (quod absit) debet
cum patientia tolerari, quantum potest
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? 436 TEMPORAL AND SPIRITUAL POWERS. [pabt II.
Finally, he again discusses the question whether the Pope
could resign, or could be deposed. He maintains that the
Pope could undoubtedly resign, and that he could be deposed
by a general council. He gives it as his own opinion that
the College of Cardinals could depose him ; they act in the
place of the Church when they elect him, and it would seem
that in the same way they could depose him. He also quotes
a gloss on the famous passage in Gratian, ' Si Papa,' which
extends the grounds of the deposition of the Pope from heresy
to any other grave vice which he will not correct, even when
he has been admonished. 1
sine periculo justitise et veritatis,
juxta illud Matth. v. , ' Quicunque
angariaverit te mille passue, vade cum
illo et alia duo millia *: et debet ad
eum haberi refugium qui, sicut cor
regis, ita et cor papse habet in manu
sua: et potest ipsum quoque si voluerit
inclinare et vertere ad ipsum papam,
sicut et regem de sede amovere.
Si tamen periculum Reipublicse sit
in mora quia scilicet trahitur populus
ad malam opinionem, et papa com-
moveat populum indebite per abusum
gladii spiritualis- Ubi otiam non spera-
tur quod desistat alitor, puto quod in
hoc casu Ecclesia contra papum debet
moveri et agere in ipsum : princeps
vero violentiam gladii papse posset
repellere per gladium suum, cum mode-
ramine: nec in hoc ageret contra
papam, sed contra hostem suum, et
hostem reipublicse : sicut Aioth Judseus,
qui Eglon regem Moab interfecit,
sagitta infixa in femore ei, eo quod
gravi servitute populum Dei premebat,
non est reputatus interfecisse rectorem,
sed malum et hostem. Hoc enim agere,
non est contra Ecclesiam agere sed
pro Ecclesia.
Sic enim commendabiliter populus
zelo fidei commotus, Constantinum
papam, qui ecclesise in scandalum erat,
oculis privavit et deposuit. Sic et
Henricus Imperator, Romam vadens,
Benedictum nonum, et alios duos, qui
contentionibus suis scandalizabant ec-
clesiam, imperiali et canonica censura
deposuit, et Clementem secundum
Romanss ecclesise papam constituit,
ut legitur in Chronicis Romanorum. "
1 Id. id. , 24. "Sed ad deponendum
decet quod fiat per concilium generale.
. . . Credo tamen, quod simpliciter
sufficeret ad depositionem hujusmodi
collegium cardinalium: quia ex quo
consensus eorum tacit papam loco
ecclesiro, videtur quod similiter possit
eum deponere, si quidem fuerit causa
rationabilis, et deponunt eum meritorie.
Si vero non fuerit sufficiens, peccaret.
Ergo a simili, collegium cardinalium
vice totius Ecclesise poterit papam
invitum deponere. Item distinctio
40 c. si papa (Gratian, Dec retum, D.
40, 6) dicitur : ' Cunctos judications
a nemine judicandus, nisi deprehen-
deretur a fide devius. ' Ubi dicit
? ? glossa quod si deprehenderetur in
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? CHAT. X. ] BONIFACE Vm. AND PHILIP THE FATE. 437
This treatise of John of Paris deals more comprehensively
than any other with the whole question of the Temporal
Power of the Pope, and he emphatically repudiates all the
contentions on which it had been founded. He reasserts the
Gelasian tradition that Christ divided the two powers ; he
brushes aside arguments based on allegorical phrases as based
on a misconception of the place of allegory; he criticises the
historical arguments ; he treats the Donation of Constantine
as invalid and irrelevant to the case of France ; he sets aside
the argument that the Temporal Power only deals with
material things, and should therefore be controlled by the
Spiritual, for he maintains that the Temporal Power also
deals with the concerns of the soul; and he flatly asserts
that the Pope has no more power to depose the king than
the king has to depose the Pope. The king is entitled to
defend himself and his State against the violence of the Pope
by the use of his material power. He is in favour of a con-
stitutional Government for the State, and recommends it
also for the Church; and finally, he is clear that the Pope
can be, in certain cases at least, deposed by a general council.
The work is interesting to the historian, apart from the ques-
tion of its intrinsic merits, for it serves to represent the con-
fident and thorough-going temper in which the French king
and his advisers met the claims of Boniface VIH.
In the course of the conflict between Boniface VHI. and
Philip the Fair, the assertion of the Temporal authority of
the Papacy had been pushed to its furthest point. It may,
indeed, be said that the principles developed by Innocent IV.
and the Canonists who followed him were clear and emphatic ;
that the Temporal Power, properly speaking, belongs to the
Spiritual, and is derived from it; and that Boniface was only
reasserting these principles in the Bull " Unam Sanctam," and
that even Henry of Cremona and Egidius Colonna and James
of Viterbo were only dealing with the same position in detail.
JTo doubt, however, it was the fact that these claims were
now related to an actual and violent dispute between the
King of France and the Papacy which gave them a new
significance. They might hitherto have been regarded as
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? 438
[PABT II.
TEMPORAL AND SPIRITUAL POWERS.
matters of merely academic interest, but they had now be-
come of practical importance. As such, they were imme-
diately and unhesitatingly repudiated by the Temporal Power,
as represented by the King of France and by those who spoke
for France.
It is not within the scope of this work to deal with the last
stages of the conflict between Boniface VIII. and Philip the
Fair. It is enough for our purpose to observe that with the
death of Boniface the claim that the Spiritual Power also
possessed the Temporal ceased to have any great practical
meaning. It is, indeed, true that during the earlier part of
the fourteenth century those claims were sometimes expressed
in the most dogmatic terms, but they had no longer the
same significance. 1
We have in this and the previous volumes endeavoured to
give some reasoned account of the principles of the relations
between the Temporal and the Spiritual Powers from the
time of the conversion of Constantine down to the fall of
Boniface VIII. , and have endeavoured to do this in some
relation to the actual circumstances of these centuries. We
have already said, and we should like to repeat it with some
emphasis, that in our judgment these relations and the fre-
quent conflicts between the two Powers had very little intrinsic
relation to the development of the general political principles
of the Middle Ages. These principles, the supremacy of law,
the community as the source of political authority, the limited
authority of the ruler, and the contractual nature of the rela-
tions between the ruler and the community, were not save
incidentally related to the disputes between the two Powers.
This does not, however, mean that these disputes were
unimportant, or that the principle which lay behind them was
insignificant. On the contrary, we should not hesitate to say
that the two principles in which we most clearly recognise the
difference between the ancient world and the modern are, first,
the recognition of the essential equality of men in virtue of
their common powers of reason and morality, and secondly,
1 We hope, however, to de>>l with this in the next volume.
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? ChAP. X. ] BONIFACE VHI. AND PHILIP THE FAIR. 439
the principle which arises out of this, the necessary freedom
of the moral and spiritual life. Men must be free because they
are equal, they are equal and free because the moral and
spiritual personality of one cannot be measured against that
of another, and must not be coerced by it.
It is no doubt true that the Spiritual Power in the Middle
Ages had little sense of the liberty of human personality as
against itself, but at least it did assert the freedom of the
moral and spiritual elements in human society as against
the Temporal Power ; and in doing this the Church prepared
the way for the great movement of the modern world against
its own use of the coercive power of the State.
It is, then, this fact, that the conflicts of the Temporal and
Spiritual Powers in the Middle Ages are forms of the secular
process of the liberation of humanity, which gives them their
significance. It was fortunate for mediseval and modern
society that the Western Church as represented by Pope
Gelasius I. had, as early as the fifth century, formulated in
such clear terms the principle of the autonomy of the two
great Powers. To that principle the Middle Ages were, on
the whole, faithful. It is no doubt true that the translation
of this dualistic principle into the terms of the common life
proved immensely difficult, but the difficulty has no more
been completely overcome by us than by the men of the
Middle Ages.
It was no great wonder if the reforming kings and emperors
sometimes laid violent hands upon those who represented,
but in evil fashion, the Spiritual Power. It was no great
wonder if Hildebrand, in his persistent determination to
secure the reformation and the liberty of the spiritual life,
should have pressed the spiritual authority to a point where
it came into conflict with the equally necessary freedom of
the Temporal Power. Men are but mortal, and they are not
to be over severely blamed if, in the ardent pursuit of some
great end, they sometimes forget the infinite complexity of
life.
It is possible to suggest that Hildebrand and Innocent III.
may have sometimes dreamed of a theocracy, may have at
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? 440
TEMPORAL AND SPIRITUAL POWERS. [PAET rr.
least thought of a world directed and, if need be, ruled by
the representative of the Spiritual Power. But, if they did
so, it was but a dream, not necessarily an ignoble dream, but
it had no relation to the actual character of mediseval society,
or to its normal principles. The notion that mediseval society
tended to something like a theocracy is, indeed, not now
maintained by any serious student, but it is to be regretted
that it still lingers in the popular mind. We have said enough,
we hope, to make it clear that if at any time the Spiritual
Power seemed to make the claim to a supreme Temporal
authority, the claim was repudiated; and when, as in the
thirteenth century, a theoretical principle was converted into
something which at least resembled a practical policy, the
Papacy, which seemed to be pursuing such a policy, was
broken, as far as its political power was concerned.
The Middle Ages remained faithful to the Gelasian principle,
that each Power, the Temporal and the Spiritual, derives its
authority from God, and that neither Power has authority
over the other in matters which belong to its own sphere.
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? PAKT III.
THE PRINCIPAL ELEMENTS IN THE POLITICAL THEORY
OF THE MIDDLE AGES.
CHAPTER I.
THE INHERITANCE FROM THE ANCIENT WORLD.
From the first century of the Christian era until the later
years of the eighteenth century, political theory presents itself
to us as dominated in form by the conception that the great
institutions of society, and especially the institution of govern-
ment, were artificial or conventional, not " natural " or primi-
tive. The writers of the seventeenth, and even most of the
writers of the eighteenth, century continually contrast the
original " state of nature " with the conditions of organised
society, which they conceived of as being the result of some
more or less deliberate creation of the human will. This
conception, which was also the normal conception of the
Middle Ages, can be traced back to the Christian Fathers
and the Eoman Jurists, and appears to have come to them
from some at least of the post-Aristotelian philosophers.
Seneca, in one well-known letter,1 attributes it to Posidonius,
and we may infer from the fact that it was common to the
Fathers and to many, at least, of the Jurists, that it was a
generally received opinion in the later centuries of the ancient
world.
1 Seneca, ' Epistles,' jriv. 2.
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? 442 POLITICAL THEORY OF THE MIDDLE AGES. [PAST in.
It is true that in the middle of the thirteenth century St
Thomas Aquinas rediscovered the Aristotelian politics, and
as we have seen in this volume, recognised that the organised
society of the State was a " natural " institution--" natural "
in the sense that it had always formed an integral part of
human life, and was the normal instrument of human progress.
It is, however, also clear that the recovery of the Aristotelian
conception was not permanent, that by the seventeenth cen-
tury it had again given place to the post-Aristotelian, and it
was not till Montesquieu and Eousseau's ' Contrat Social' 1
that the Aristotelian conception really came back to dominate
political theory, as it has done ever since. It would appear
that the post-Aristotelian conception was too firmly fixed in
men's minds to be removed even by the great authority of
St Thomas Aquinas.
The great institutions of human society were then con-
ceived of as being artificial or conventional. It is important
also to understand that this transition from a natural to
a conventional condition of human life was conceived of
as being the result of a great and primitive catastrophe, for
it was the result of the appearance of evil in the world. It
was not only the Christian Fathers, but also Stoics like Posi-
donius and Seneca who thought of man as having been origin-
ally good or at least innocent. The tradition of a Golden Age,
a condition before men fell from their primseval innocence,
was common to some philosophers as well as to the Christian
writers. This is the origin of that curious ambiguity in
mediseval writers regarding the nature of human institutions
which has caused so much confusion to the unwary. For
sometimes these writers speak of government as though it
had a sinful origin, and modern historical critics have not
infrequently misconstrued this, not observing that these
mediseval writers at other times speak of it as a divine institu-
tion. We have endeavoured in the course of this work to
clear up this ambiguity, and we hope that we have said
enough to correct the mistaken interpretation which has been
sometimes imposed upon the words of St Augustine and
1 Cf. especially Rousseau, ' Contrat Social,' i. 8.
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? CHAP. X. } BONIFACE VIII. AND PHILIP THE FAIR. 429
relating to the two swords he sets aside summarily on the
ground that these are merely allegories, and he cites Dionysius,
the Areopagite himself, as saying, " Mystica autem theologia
non est argumentativa nisi accipiatur probatio ex alia Scrip-
tura. " 1 He also summarily sets aside the argument based
on the words of Peter Damian, which he cites as from Pope
Nicolas, that Christ had committed to Peter " the laws both
of the heavenly and earthly empire," on the ground that a
statement of a Pope about his own power, unsupported by
the authority of Holy Scripture or canonical authority, was
not very good evidence. 2 The contention that Pope Zacharias
had deposed the King of the Franks he also sets aside. He
points out that there were various accounts of the incident
in the Chronicles, and that it might be better to say that
Pope Zacharias consented to the deposition, and that even if
it were true that he had deposed the king, it was not very
conclusive, for cases could be found where the emperor had
seemed to exercise ecclesiastical authority. No important
conclusion should be based on isolated cases. 3
More important, however, than these is his discussion of
the argument based upon the principle that material things
(corporalia) are ruled by the spiritual. The contention based
on this is, he says, ill-founded, for it assumes that the royal
authority is material and not spiritual, and has the care of
bodies only, not of souls. This is false, for its end is to set
forward the common good of the citizens--that is, above all,
a life which is according to virtue. Aristotle thus maintains
in the Ethics that the purpose of the legislator is to make
man good, and to lead him to virtue, and in the Politics
he says that as the soul is better than the body, the legislator
is better than the physician, for the legislator cares for the
souls of men, the physician for their bodies. *
1 Id. id. , 15, 19.
2 Id. id. , 15. "Christus Petro
ocelestis terrenique imperii jura con-
cessit. Respondeo, ubi quseritur de
potentate papse in temporalis, efficax
est testimonium imperatoris pro papa ;
et non est multum efficax testimonium
papse pro se ipso, nisi dictum papse
fulciatur auctoritate Scripture sacrse,
vel scripturse canonicse. "
* Id. id. , 15.
4 Id. id. , 18. " Quod autem arguitur
vigesimo quod corporalia reguntur
per spiritualia, et ab ipsis dependerent
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? 430 TEMPORAL AND SPIRITUAL POWERS. [pakt II.
He deals curtly with the argument that it was the Pope
who made laws, and that the prince could not make or
administer laws unless they were approved by the Pope.
This is false, and he first cites from Gratian a declaration
of Pope Leo IV. to the Emperor Lothair, in which he declared
his intention to keep and observe the imperial " capitula "
and commands. He then dogmatically asserts that the Pope
has no authority to abrogate any laws except those which
belong to his own jurisdiction, and that to maintain that
the Pope makes laws for the prince, or that the laws of the
prince require the Pope's approbation, is to destroy the whole
nature of authority, whether this is regal or political--that
is, whether the prince governs according to laws which he
makes himself or according to laws which are made by the
citizens. 1
ut a causa. Respondeo ; argumentum,
at sit factum, multiplieiter deficit.
Primo, quia supponit, quod potestas
regalis sit corporalis, et non spiritualis,
et habeat curam corporum, et non
animarum : quod falsum est; ut patot
ex supradictis, cum ordinetur ad
bonum commune civium non quod-
cunque, sed quod est vivere secundum
virtutem. Unde dicit philosophus in
Ethicis, quod intentio legislator-is est
homines bonos facere, et inducore ad
virtutem. Et etiam in Politicis dicit,
quod sicut anima melior est corpore,
sic legislator melior est medico : quia
legislator habet curam animarum,
mcdicus corporum. "
1 Id. id. , 18. "Quod autem dicitur
24, quod papa habet facere leges, eo
quod prince pa non potest facere leges,
vel eis uti quousque fuerint per papam
approbate : dico quod falsum est ut
dicit expresse Leo Papa, scribens
Lothario Augusto, distinct. 10 de
Capitulis di. (Gratian, Decretum, D.
10, 9) sic ' de capitulis et prseceptis
imperialibus vestris et pradecessorum
vestrorum irrefragabiliter custodiendis
et conservandis, quantum voluimus et
valemus, Christo propitio et nunc et in
jeternum conservaturos modis omnibus
profitemur ; et si forte quislibet vobis
alitor dixerit, vel dicturus fuerit, sciatis
ipsum pro certo mendacem ' : neo per
canones semper legibus derogatur nisi
quo ad casus spirituales. Nec papa
posset leges tollere, nisi quoad suum
forum ut dicit Io. et alii. Dioere
autem ut isti magistri dicunt, quod
papa tradit leges principibus, et quod
princeps non potest legem aliunde
sumere, nisi per papam fuerint appro-
bate, est omnino destruere regimen
regale et politician et incidere in
errorem Herodis timentis et putsntis
Christum regnum destruere terrenum.
Quia secundum Philosophum in 1
Politicorum, principatus tunc solum
dicitur regalis, quando quia preest
secundum leges quas ipse instituit.
Cum vero prseest non secundum
arbitrium suum, sed secundum leges,
quas cives vel alii instituerunt, dicitur
? ? principatus civilis vel politicus non
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? CHAP. X. ] BONIFACE VIII. AND PHILIP THE FAD2.
431
In another chapter he deals with the suggestion that ting-
ship is essentially evil, because it was written in the Scriptures
that God gave the Hebrews a king in his wrath. He explains
that this did not mean that kingship was in its own nature
evil and displeasing to God, but that God had chosen this
people as His own, and had given them a form of Government
better than the pure monarchy. For though, as John under-
stood him, Aristotle had said that the monarchy of the virtu-
ous man was the best of the pure forms of government, yet
the best form of all is one in which the aristocratic and demo-
cratic elements are combined with the monarchical; it was
a government of this kind which God had given to Israel
under Moses and Joshua. (This conception of the best kind
of government is interesting in the development of political
ideas, and we have dealt with it in a former chapter. 1) It
is noteworthy that John goes on to suggest that it would be
well if the same principle were applied to the government of
the Church. The anticipation of the Conciliar movement is
evident. 2
1 Cf. pp. 79 and 94.
* Id. id. , 20. " Sed quare ergo,
' indignatus concessit eis regem. ' Di-
cendum quod non ideo, quia regale
regimen ei displiceret simpliciter ut
TnnliiTTfi; sed ideo, quia ilium populum
sibi elegerat ut peculiarem, Deut. 6,
et instruxerat eis regimen melius puro
regali, saltem illi populo propter duo.
Primum est, quia licet regimon regium,
in quo unus simpliciter principatur
secundum virtutem, sit melius quolibet
alio regimine simplice, ut ostendit
Philosophus in 3 Politieorum : tamen
si fiat mixtum cum aristocratia et
democratic, melius est puro, in quan-
tum in regimine mixto omnes aliquam
partem habent in principatu-
Per hoc enim servatur pax populi,
et omnes talem dominationem amunt
et custodiunt, ut dicitur in 2 Politi-
eorum : et tale erat regimen a Deo
optime institutum in populo: quia
erat regale, in quantum unus praerat
simpliciter omnibus singulariter, ut
Moyses vel Joeua. Erat otiam aliquid
de aristocratia qui est principatus
aliquorum optimorum principantium
secundum virtutem, in quantum sub
illo viro eligebantur 72 seniores, Deut.
5 , Erant etiam ibi aliqui de democratia,
in principatu populi, in quantum 72
eligibantur a populo, et de toto populo,
ut dicitur ibidem : et sic erat optime
mixtum, in quantum omnes in regi-
mine illo aliquid habebant, sivo aliquam
partem. Et sic certe esset optimum
regimen Ecclesrise, si sub uno papa
eligerentur plures ab omni provincia,
et de omni provincia, ut sic in regimine
Ecclesise omnes haberent partem suam.
Aliud etiam erat, propter quod tale
regimen erat melius illi populo, quam
primum regale: quia licot regimen
regale sit optimum in se, si non cor-
rumpatur, cum propter magnam potes-
tatem, qusi regi conceditur, de facili
regimen degeneret in tyrannidem, nisi
? ? sit pcrfecta virtus ejus cui talis potestas
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? 432 TEMPORAL AND SPIRITUAL POWERS. [PABT II.
Finally, he repudiates the contention that the Pope could
require the acceptance of his claims under the penalty of
excommunication. The Christian faith is catholic and universal,
and the Pope cannot establish an article as belonging to the
faith without a general council, for the world is greater than
Eome and the Pope, and a council is greater than the Pope
alone. 1
John's treatment of the Donation of Constantine is highly
important, and deserves a place by itself. We have already
observed that in the tenth chapter John of Paris had argued
that the contention that the Pope held all Temporal as well
as Spiritual Power from Christ Himself was not consistent
with the contention that it was Constantine who bestowed
universal authority upon him. 2 It is in the twenty-second
chapter, however, that he proceeds to a formal discussion of
the nature and validity of the Donation. He does not suggest
that it was spurious, but he argues that its nature had been
misrepresented, that in any case it had no relation to France,
and that it was legally invalid. It is sometimes, he says,
maintained that Constantine transferred to Pope Sylvester
the Western empire and the imperial insignia, and therefore
some held that in virtue of the Donation the Pope was emperor
and lord of the world, and could create and depose kings as the
emperor could. This, he says, is not in accordance with the
historians, or the terms of the Donation. What Constantine
transferred to the Pope was a certain territory--namely, Italy,
and some other provinces, in which France was not included,
and he transferred his empire to the Greeks and built the
new Eome. The Pope has therefore no political authority
over the King of France, first, because the Donation only
1 Id. id. , 21. " Et subditur, anathe-
matis poena. Et idem recitatur in
gestis concilii Chalcedonensis. Am-
plius, cum fides Christiana sit oatholica
et universalis, non potest summus
pontifex hoc ponere sub fide sine
concilio generali: quia papa non
potest discernero statuta consilii, di,
19 Anastasius (Gratian. Decretum, D.
9, 8 and 9). Nam licet concilium non
possit proprie legem imponere, extra
de electione, significasti (Decretals,
i. 6, 4) et 35 qusestione 6 veniam
(Gratian, Decretum, C. 35, 9, 5);
tamen non intelligitur in iis quse fidei
sunt, eo quod orbis major est urbe
et papa, concilium majus est papa
solo. "
? Cf. p. 424.
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? CHAP, x. ] BONIFACE Vm. AND PHILIP THE FAIR. 433
had reference to a limited territory in which France was not
included ; secondly, because the Donation was really, accord-
ing to the jurists, invalid for various reasons ; thirdly, because
even if it were valid and affected the whole empire, the Franks
were never under the domination of the Eoman empire. 1
It is plain that the Donation of Constantine did not appear
to John of Paris of much importance. He interpreted it in
accordance with what was probably its original significance,2
as a grant of authority in Italy and some other provinces,
and flatly denied that it had a general or universal significance,
and he argued that it was at least very doubtful if it had any
legal validity.
John of Paris had thus established to his own satisfaction
that the doctrine that the Papacy held the supreme Temporal
as well as Spiritual Power was indefensible. The arguments
which we have considered were, however, expressed in general
1 Id. id. , 22. " Dicunt enim quod
Sylvestro successoribusque dederit im-
perium occidentale et imperialia signa:
ut palatium suam, et coronam et alia
hujusmodi. Et ideo volunt aliqui,
quod ratione hujus doni summus
pontifex imperator est et dominus
mundi: et quod potest reges const i-
tuere et destituere, sicut Imperator,
et precipue imperio vacante. . . . Et
quidem sciendum de donatione prffl-
dicta, quod sicut accipitur ex chronicis
Hugonis Flaviacensis et in libro de
Cosmographia et ex epistola Constan-
tini ad episcopos, et ex testamento
ejusdem, ipse Constantinus non dedit
nisi certam provinciam, scilicet Italiam,
cum quibusdam aliis, ubi Francia non
includitur : et imperium transtulit ad
Grsecos ubi novam Romam sedificavit.
. . . Ex quibus ergo suppositis apparet,
quod ex dicta donatione et transla-
tione, papa nihil potest super regem
Franoiro, propter quatuor.
Primo quidem, quia dicta donatio
non fuit nisi de portione determinata,
in qua Francia non includebatur, nec
translatio fuit facta totius imperii sive
VOL. V.
monarchic mundi ad Germanos, cum
etiam post translationem predictam,
qua magis fuit divisio Imperii, vel
nova imperii appellatio, quam trans-
latio, remanserunt ad huo Imperatores
apud Greoos.
Secundo, quia dicta donatio nihil
valuit propter quatuor, quam in Glosa
juris civilis ponuntur. . . . Ex quibus
dicunt Juristic quod donatio non valet.
Tertio, apparet quod ex dicta
donatione nihil habet papa super regem
Franciss, da to etiam quod valuisset
et generalis de toto imperio fuisset:
quia licet Galiici inveniantur tempore
Octaviani Augusti imperio Romano
fuisse subjecti, tamen Franci nun-
quam. (Cf. id. id. , 16. )
Potest nihilominus dici, quod
Constantinus nunquam dedit imperium
Ecclesise simpliciter ; sed dedit urbem,
et quasdem provincias occidentales,
et signa imperialia, ut de ipsis pro-
? ? vinciis disponeret; sedemque suam
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? 434 TEMPORAL AND SPIRITUAL POWERS. [PART n.
terms, or at least without any direct reference to the circum-
stances of the time. In the concluding chapter he turns to
the question of the action which might legitimately be taken
against the Pope, and he is clearly considering the situation
which had arisen with regard to the relations of Boniface Viil.
and Philip the Pair.
If any dispute arise, he says, about the election of a Pope,
and if, in the judgment of the learned and other persons
who are concerned, there had been some unlawful action,
the Pope was to be admonished to retire. If he would not
do this, an appeal might be made to a general council; and
if he resisted with violence, the secular arm should be called
in to remove him from the Holy See, as was done in the case
of Benedict IX. and Cadalous and Constantine II. If the
Pope maintains any doctrine which is contrary to the faith
of the Church, he is already judged. If the Pope were sus-
pected of some fault which, however, was not clear and
manifest, he could not be judged, and even if the fault were
clear and manifest, as, for instance, incontinence or homicide,
he could not be judged by any one, " per modum auctoritatis,"
he could not be cited or excommunicated, for he had no
superior. 1
1 Id. id. , 23. "Sed circa hoc est
oonsiderandum, quod contra papain
potest intelligi esse quadrupliciter
discussio et judicium, scil: de statu,
de potestate, de potestatis abusu, et
personali defectu. . . . Si vero contra
personam, vel electionem summi pon?
tificis, post discussionem diligenter a
literatis et ab aliis, quorum interest,
faotam, inveniretur aliquid illegitimum
contra statute, non esset dissimu-
landum. Sed monendus cedere: et
si nolit, posset excipi, et generale con-
cilium peti, et ad ipsum concilium
appellari; imo in tali casu deberet,
si pertinax inveniretur cum violentia,
advocato brachio seculari a sede re-
moveri, ne prophanarentur Eoclesise
saoramenta. Sic enim legitur in
Chroniois Romanorum pontificum de
Benedicto nono, et Cadalo Portuensi
episcopo, Constantino socundo et aliis
quibusdam propter intrusionem per
brachium seculare commendabiliter a
sede depositis. . . .
Sed quis judicabit eum hereticum.
Responsio. Si dixerit et amrmando
tenuerit aliquid, quod est contra id
quod est in symbolo fidei per ecclesiam
alias approbato, jam dicitur judicatus.
Nam qui non credit jam judicatus est.
De potestatis vero sive abusu et
personali defectu suo . . . si non est
evidens aut manifestum, absque dubio
non licet judicare: sed semper in
meliorem partem interpretandum est
et trahendum, etiamsi prima facie
aliquid mali colons oocurrat. Et
minus est licitum de papa quam de
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? CHAP. X. ] BONIFACE Vm. AND PHTT. TP THE FADi.
435
What was to be done, however, if the Pope, without a general
council, declared a man to be a heretic for holding a view
about which there were " opiniones " (different opinions), or
if he were to declare a man to be a heretic because he asserted
that the King of France, or some other person in his position,
was not subject (i. e. , to the Pope). John replies that, in the
first place, the words of the Pope are always to be interpreted
as far as possible in a good sense, and this applies to such
a statement; the Pope might be taken to mean that the
King of France was subject to him in matters concerning sin,
and therefore such a claim should be endured as far as was
possible without danger to justice and truth.
If, however, there were danger to the commonwealth in
delay, and the Pope used his spiritual sword to the disturb-
ance of the people, and there was no hope that he would
desist, the Church should proceed against him, and the prince
might resist the violence of the sword of the Pope with his
own sword. In doing this he was acting not against the
Pope, but against the enemy of himself and of the common-
wealth, not against the Church, but for it. John concludes
by referring again to the traditional deposition of Pope Con-
stantine by the people, and the supposed deposition of Bene-
dict IX. , and the others by Henry II. 1
aliis quibuscunque. Si vero sit factum
ex genere suo malum, et manifestum
ut incontinentia vel homicidium, vel
ex lege prohibitum, non potest judicari
per modum auctoritatis ab aliquo,
citando vel excommnnicando, cum
superiorem non habeat. "
1 Id. id. id. " Sed quid si papa
dicat, quod reputat talem hereticum,
qui tenet aliquid de quo sunt opiniones,
et dicat hoc sine concilio generali :
vel si dicat quod reputat hsereticum
omnem hominem asserentem re gem
Francirc vel aliquem hujusmodi non
esse subjectum 7 Responsio : verba
summi pontificis indefinite dicta, sem-
per debent trahi ad aliquem sanum
sensum, quantum potest fieri: unde
dicta verba non debent accipi sic,
quod non possit ad eum appellari, vel
quod sit divinum habens in rebus
ipsis, vel quod papa se habeat intro-
mittere de tuo et meo. Hoc enim
esset manifeste contra scripturam et
contra omnem doctrinam, et novitas
qusedam : quam non proferret summus
pontifex, nisi cum magna maturitate,
et habito prius concilio generali, et
discussione facta ubique per literatos.
Et ideo debet intelligi in sano
sensu, scil. ratione delicti, ubi qusestio
movetur de peccato: vel debet in-
telligi in foro conscientise, ut dictum
est supra, quousque super hoc aperuerit
intentionem suam. Si vero finaliter
aperiat intentionem suam in tam novo
et injurioso sensu (quod absit) debet
cum patientia tolerari, quantum potest
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? 436 TEMPORAL AND SPIRITUAL POWERS. [pabt II.
Finally, he again discusses the question whether the Pope
could resign, or could be deposed. He maintains that the
Pope could undoubtedly resign, and that he could be deposed
by a general council. He gives it as his own opinion that
the College of Cardinals could depose him ; they act in the
place of the Church when they elect him, and it would seem
that in the same way they could depose him. He also quotes
a gloss on the famous passage in Gratian, ' Si Papa,' which
extends the grounds of the deposition of the Pope from heresy
to any other grave vice which he will not correct, even when
he has been admonished. 1
sine periculo justitise et veritatis,
juxta illud Matth. v. , ' Quicunque
angariaverit te mille passue, vade cum
illo et alia duo millia *: et debet ad
eum haberi refugium qui, sicut cor
regis, ita et cor papse habet in manu
sua: et potest ipsum quoque si voluerit
inclinare et vertere ad ipsum papam,
sicut et regem de sede amovere.
Si tamen periculum Reipublicse sit
in mora quia scilicet trahitur populus
ad malam opinionem, et papa com-
moveat populum indebite per abusum
gladii spiritualis- Ubi otiam non spera-
tur quod desistat alitor, puto quod in
hoc casu Ecclesia contra papum debet
moveri et agere in ipsum : princeps
vero violentiam gladii papse posset
repellere per gladium suum, cum mode-
ramine: nec in hoc ageret contra
papam, sed contra hostem suum, et
hostem reipublicse : sicut Aioth Judseus,
qui Eglon regem Moab interfecit,
sagitta infixa in femore ei, eo quod
gravi servitute populum Dei premebat,
non est reputatus interfecisse rectorem,
sed malum et hostem. Hoc enim agere,
non est contra Ecclesiam agere sed
pro Ecclesia.
Sic enim commendabiliter populus
zelo fidei commotus, Constantinum
papam, qui ecclesise in scandalum erat,
oculis privavit et deposuit. Sic et
Henricus Imperator, Romam vadens,
Benedictum nonum, et alios duos, qui
contentionibus suis scandalizabant ec-
clesiam, imperiali et canonica censura
deposuit, et Clementem secundum
Romanss ecclesise papam constituit,
ut legitur in Chronicis Romanorum. "
1 Id. id. , 24. "Sed ad deponendum
decet quod fiat per concilium generale.
. . . Credo tamen, quod simpliciter
sufficeret ad depositionem hujusmodi
collegium cardinalium: quia ex quo
consensus eorum tacit papam loco
ecclesiro, videtur quod similiter possit
eum deponere, si quidem fuerit causa
rationabilis, et deponunt eum meritorie.
Si vero non fuerit sufficiens, peccaret.
Ergo a simili, collegium cardinalium
vice totius Ecclesise poterit papam
invitum deponere. Item distinctio
40 c. si papa (Gratian, Dec retum, D.
40, 6) dicitur : ' Cunctos judications
a nemine judicandus, nisi deprehen-
deretur a fide devius. ' Ubi dicit
? ? glossa quod si deprehenderetur in
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? CHAT. X. ] BONIFACE Vm. AND PHILIP THE FATE. 437
This treatise of John of Paris deals more comprehensively
than any other with the whole question of the Temporal
Power of the Pope, and he emphatically repudiates all the
contentions on which it had been founded. He reasserts the
Gelasian tradition that Christ divided the two powers ; he
brushes aside arguments based on allegorical phrases as based
on a misconception of the place of allegory; he criticises the
historical arguments ; he treats the Donation of Constantine
as invalid and irrelevant to the case of France ; he sets aside
the argument that the Temporal Power only deals with
material things, and should therefore be controlled by the
Spiritual, for he maintains that the Temporal Power also
deals with the concerns of the soul; and he flatly asserts
that the Pope has no more power to depose the king than
the king has to depose the Pope. The king is entitled to
defend himself and his State against the violence of the Pope
by the use of his material power. He is in favour of a con-
stitutional Government for the State, and recommends it
also for the Church; and finally, he is clear that the Pope
can be, in certain cases at least, deposed by a general council.
The work is interesting to the historian, apart from the ques-
tion of its intrinsic merits, for it serves to represent the con-
fident and thorough-going temper in which the French king
and his advisers met the claims of Boniface VIH.
In the course of the conflict between Boniface VHI. and
Philip the Fair, the assertion of the Temporal authority of
the Papacy had been pushed to its furthest point. It may,
indeed, be said that the principles developed by Innocent IV.
and the Canonists who followed him were clear and emphatic ;
that the Temporal Power, properly speaking, belongs to the
Spiritual, and is derived from it; and that Boniface was only
reasserting these principles in the Bull " Unam Sanctam," and
that even Henry of Cremona and Egidius Colonna and James
of Viterbo were only dealing with the same position in detail.
JTo doubt, however, it was the fact that these claims were
now related to an actual and violent dispute between the
King of France and the Papacy which gave them a new
significance. They might hitherto have been regarded as
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? 438
[PABT II.
TEMPORAL AND SPIRITUAL POWERS.
matters of merely academic interest, but they had now be-
come of practical importance. As such, they were imme-
diately and unhesitatingly repudiated by the Temporal Power,
as represented by the King of France and by those who spoke
for France.
It is not within the scope of this work to deal with the last
stages of the conflict between Boniface VIII. and Philip the
Fair. It is enough for our purpose to observe that with the
death of Boniface the claim that the Spiritual Power also
possessed the Temporal ceased to have any great practical
meaning. It is, indeed, true that during the earlier part of
the fourteenth century those claims were sometimes expressed
in the most dogmatic terms, but they had no longer the
same significance. 1
We have in this and the previous volumes endeavoured to
give some reasoned account of the principles of the relations
between the Temporal and the Spiritual Powers from the
time of the conversion of Constantine down to the fall of
Boniface VIII. , and have endeavoured to do this in some
relation to the actual circumstances of these centuries. We
have already said, and we should like to repeat it with some
emphasis, that in our judgment these relations and the fre-
quent conflicts between the two Powers had very little intrinsic
relation to the development of the general political principles
of the Middle Ages. These principles, the supremacy of law,
the community as the source of political authority, the limited
authority of the ruler, and the contractual nature of the rela-
tions between the ruler and the community, were not save
incidentally related to the disputes between the two Powers.
This does not, however, mean that these disputes were
unimportant, or that the principle which lay behind them was
insignificant. On the contrary, we should not hesitate to say
that the two principles in which we most clearly recognise the
difference between the ancient world and the modern are, first,
the recognition of the essential equality of men in virtue of
their common powers of reason and morality, and secondly,
1 We hope, however, to de>>l with this in the next volume.
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? ChAP. X. ] BONIFACE VHI. AND PHILIP THE FAIR. 439
the principle which arises out of this, the necessary freedom
of the moral and spiritual life. Men must be free because they
are equal, they are equal and free because the moral and
spiritual personality of one cannot be measured against that
of another, and must not be coerced by it.
It is no doubt true that the Spiritual Power in the Middle
Ages had little sense of the liberty of human personality as
against itself, but at least it did assert the freedom of the
moral and spiritual elements in human society as against
the Temporal Power ; and in doing this the Church prepared
the way for the great movement of the modern world against
its own use of the coercive power of the State.
It is, then, this fact, that the conflicts of the Temporal and
Spiritual Powers in the Middle Ages are forms of the secular
process of the liberation of humanity, which gives them their
significance. It was fortunate for mediseval and modern
society that the Western Church as represented by Pope
Gelasius I. had, as early as the fifth century, formulated in
such clear terms the principle of the autonomy of the two
great Powers. To that principle the Middle Ages were, on
the whole, faithful. It is no doubt true that the translation
of this dualistic principle into the terms of the common life
proved immensely difficult, but the difficulty has no more
been completely overcome by us than by the men of the
Middle Ages.
It was no great wonder if the reforming kings and emperors
sometimes laid violent hands upon those who represented,
but in evil fashion, the Spiritual Power. It was no great
wonder if Hildebrand, in his persistent determination to
secure the reformation and the liberty of the spiritual life,
should have pressed the spiritual authority to a point where
it came into conflict with the equally necessary freedom of
the Temporal Power. Men are but mortal, and they are not
to be over severely blamed if, in the ardent pursuit of some
great end, they sometimes forget the infinite complexity of
life.
It is possible to suggest that Hildebrand and Innocent III.
may have sometimes dreamed of a theocracy, may have at
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? 440
TEMPORAL AND SPIRITUAL POWERS. [PAET rr.
least thought of a world directed and, if need be, ruled by
the representative of the Spiritual Power. But, if they did
so, it was but a dream, not necessarily an ignoble dream, but
it had no relation to the actual character of mediseval society,
or to its normal principles. The notion that mediseval society
tended to something like a theocracy is, indeed, not now
maintained by any serious student, but it is to be regretted
that it still lingers in the popular mind. We have said enough,
we hope, to make it clear that if at any time the Spiritual
Power seemed to make the claim to a supreme Temporal
authority, the claim was repudiated; and when, as in the
thirteenth century, a theoretical principle was converted into
something which at least resembled a practical policy, the
Papacy, which seemed to be pursuing such a policy, was
broken, as far as its political power was concerned.
The Middle Ages remained faithful to the Gelasian principle,
that each Power, the Temporal and the Spiritual, derives its
authority from God, and that neither Power has authority
over the other in matters which belong to its own sphere.
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? PAKT III.
THE PRINCIPAL ELEMENTS IN THE POLITICAL THEORY
OF THE MIDDLE AGES.
CHAPTER I.
THE INHERITANCE FROM THE ANCIENT WORLD.
From the first century of the Christian era until the later
years of the eighteenth century, political theory presents itself
to us as dominated in form by the conception that the great
institutions of society, and especially the institution of govern-
ment, were artificial or conventional, not " natural " or primi-
tive. The writers of the seventeenth, and even most of the
writers of the eighteenth, century continually contrast the
original " state of nature " with the conditions of organised
society, which they conceived of as being the result of some
more or less deliberate creation of the human will. This
conception, which was also the normal conception of the
Middle Ages, can be traced back to the Christian Fathers
and the Eoman Jurists, and appears to have come to them
from some at least of the post-Aristotelian philosophers.
Seneca, in one well-known letter,1 attributes it to Posidonius,
and we may infer from the fact that it was common to the
Fathers and to many, at least, of the Jurists, that it was a
generally received opinion in the later centuries of the ancient
world.
1 Seneca, ' Epistles,' jriv. 2.
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? 442 POLITICAL THEORY OF THE MIDDLE AGES. [PAST in.
It is true that in the middle of the thirteenth century St
Thomas Aquinas rediscovered the Aristotelian politics, and
as we have seen in this volume, recognised that the organised
society of the State was a " natural " institution--" natural "
in the sense that it had always formed an integral part of
human life, and was the normal instrument of human progress.
It is, however, also clear that the recovery of the Aristotelian
conception was not permanent, that by the seventeenth cen-
tury it had again given place to the post-Aristotelian, and it
was not till Montesquieu and Eousseau's ' Contrat Social' 1
that the Aristotelian conception really came back to dominate
political theory, as it has done ever since. It would appear
that the post-Aristotelian conception was too firmly fixed in
men's minds to be removed even by the great authority of
St Thomas Aquinas.
The great institutions of human society were then con-
ceived of as being artificial or conventional. It is important
also to understand that this transition from a natural to
a conventional condition of human life was conceived of
as being the result of a great and primitive catastrophe, for
it was the result of the appearance of evil in the world. It
was not only the Christian Fathers, but also Stoics like Posi-
donius and Seneca who thought of man as having been origin-
ally good or at least innocent. The tradition of a Golden Age,
a condition before men fell from their primseval innocence,
was common to some philosophers as well as to the Christian
writers. This is the origin of that curious ambiguity in
mediseval writers regarding the nature of human institutions
which has caused so much confusion to the unwary. For
sometimes these writers speak of government as though it
had a sinful origin, and modern historical critics have not
infrequently misconstrued this, not observing that these
mediseval writers at other times speak of it as a divine institu-
tion. We have endeavoured in the course of this work to
clear up this ambiguity, and we hope that we have said
enough to correct the mistaken interpretation which has been
sometimes imposed upon the words of St Augustine and
1 Cf. especially Rousseau, ' Contrat Social,' i. 8.
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