No More Learning

269
Thomas, his own preference was for a mixed or constitutional
government. 1
We may finally ask whether Calvin's opinions or advice on
the actual events of his time throw any further light upon
his conception of government. It would seem that so far
as they go, they correspond very closely with the principles
which we have just set out. Calvin lived through the period
when the Protestant Princes of Germany, reluctantly in some
cases, took up arms against the authority of the Emperor,
Charles V. , and his letters show that he found no reason to
criticise their action; indeed, in a letter to Farel of 1539,
he seems formally to approve. 2
This contrasts with the tone of some letters of 1560, which
seem to refer to the conspiracy of Amboise, in France. To
Bullinger he says that he had acted rightly in repudiating
the charge of responsibility for the tumults in France. He
(Calvin) had known of the deliberations about this matter
eight months before, and had interposed his authority to
prevent them going any further. 3 And to another corre-
spondent he says that he had from the beginning anticipated
what would happen, but he had been unable to restrain them
(the conspirators). Formerly, they had allowed themselves
to be governed by bis advice, but when they saw that their
design was displeasing to him they had deceived him. He
never approved of the enterprise, for in his judgment they
were attempting more than God permitted. *
1 Of. vol. v. pp. 94-97.
? Calvin, 'Epistolao' (ed. 1575,
p. 18). (April 1539): "Foedus
Germanicum nihil habet quod debeat
piorum pectus oflendere. Cur enim,
quaeeo, quas dedit eia Dominus vires,
non conjungant ad oommunem Evan-
gelii defensionem. "
Cf. id. , page 6.
>> Id. id. , p. 229 (May 1560): "Quod
Gallici tumultus a nobis depellere non
dubitasti, tute id poteras. Quum ante
octo menses agitari consilia haeo
inciperent, meam auctoritatem inter-
posui ne longius progredi tentarent. "
1 Id. id. , p. 230 (June 1560): " Gallia
infeliciter cecisse inconsideratum suum
ardorem, ad vos perlatum esse non
dubito. Ab initio vaticinatus sum
quod accidit, sed nescio quo fascini
genere sic captae erant multorum
mentes, ut frustra impetum illorum
sodaro conatus sim. Ant oh meis con-
siliis se regi passi fuerant: sed quum in-
telligorent totam banc actionem mihi
non placere,nullum putarunt esse melius
compendium quam si me fallerent. . . .
Sicut autem earum expeditio nunquam
mihi probata fuit, quia plus meo judicio
tontabant quam Deus permitteret, ita
consilio destituti, rem non legitimam
stulte et pueriliter aggrossi sunt. "
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? 270
[PART III.
THE EARLIER SIXTEENTH CENTURY.
The difference between this and Calvin's judgment on the
action of the German Princes serves to illustrate his theory.
And our judgment is confirmed by that important letter to
Coligny, of 1861, which Professor Allen has cited in his learned
work, for, while Calvin condemns forcible resistance to per-
secution by the reformed party in France, he admits that
such action would be lawful if it were taken by the Princes
of the Blood and the Parlement. 1
We have then, we hope, said enough in this chapter to
make it clear that by some of the most important writers of
the earlier part of the sixteenth century, not in one country
only, but in all the great countries of Western Europe, the
mediffival principle of the limitation of the authority of the
ruler, Emperor, King, or Prince, was firmly and intelligently
maintained.
We have also pointed out that this coincides both with
the general evidence of constitutional practice and principles.
In the last section of this chapter, however, in discussing
the position of Calvin, we have referred to the question of
the Divine authority of the ruler, and while we are clear
that Calvin's own interpretation of this was not in any
way inconsistent with the principle of the constitutional
limitation of that authority, we must now turn to the con-
sideration of the reappearance in the sixteenth century of
the theory that the Divine authority of the ruler was un-
qualified and unlimited.
1 Calvin, 'Lettres Francaisos,' ed.
Jules Bonnet, vol. ii. p. 382: "C'est
que sept ou huit moia auparavent
{i. e. , before the attempt at Amboise),
quelqu'un ayant charge de quelque
nombre de gens, me demanda conseil
s'il ne seroit pas licite de resistor a la
tyrannic dont les enfans de Dieu
estoyent pour lors opprimez, et quels
moyens il y auroit. . . . Je respondi
simploment a telles objections, que
s'il s'espandoit une seule goutte de
sang, les rivieres en de? coulleroyent
par toute l'Europe. Ainsi qu'il
valoit mieux que nous perissions
tous cent fois, que d'ostre cause que
le nom de Chrestiento et l'Evangile
fust expose? a tel opprobre. Bien lui
accorday-je que si les princes du sang
requerroyent d'estre maintenus en leur
droit pour le bien oommun, et que les
cours de Parlement so joignissent a
leur querelle, qu'il seroit licite a tous
bons subjects de leur preter mainforte. "
Cf. J. W. Allen, 'History of Political
Thought in the Sixteenth Century,'
p. 59.
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? 271
CHAPTER IV.
THE THEORY OF THE DIVINE RIGHT.
We have in the first volume of this work endeavoured to
trace the appearance in Western thought of the conception
that the Euler was in such a sense representative of God
that he could in no circumstances be resisted, however oppres-
sive and tyrannical he might be. We have pointed out that
while there may be some tendency towards this in earlier
Christian writers, it was St Gregory the Great who first
definitely formulated and enunciated this doctrine. We
have ventured to suggest, and we still think it is true, that
this conception was substantially alien to Western thought,
and that it was an orientalism which was derived from an
interpretation of some parts of the Old Testament. 1 We
have also pointed out that this must be quite clearly dis-
tinguished from the conception of St Paul, that political
authority is derived from God, because it exists for the main-
tenance of justice. 2
We have also pointed out that while the conception of St
Paul became the normal doctrine of mediaeval civilisation, the
doctrine of St Gregory the Great had no real place in the
political ideas of the Middle Ages, not only because, as the
cynic might say, the recurrent conflicts between the ecclesi-
astical and seeular powers made such a doctrine inconvenient,
but much more because it was completely incompatible with
the fundamental principle of the Middle Ages, that human
society was governed by law, which was the expression of
justice, and not by the arbitrary will of any ruler. There
>> Cf. vol. i. chap, 13. * Cf. vol. i. p. 90.
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? 272
THE EARLIER SIXTEENTH CENTURY. [PART III.
were indeed a few writers, such as especially Gregory of
Catino in the twelfth century, who reaffirmed the view of
St Gregory the Great, but they were insignificant in number
and in authority. In the first and second parts of this volume
we have cited the interesting but isolated restatements of
St Gregory the Great, by Wycliffe in the fourteenth century
and by the Cortes of Olmedo and by /Eneas Sylvius (Pope
Pius II. ) in the fifteenth century.
It was not till the sixteenth century that, as far as we can
see, this conception came to have any importance. How
far, indeed, it had any real importance even then we shall
have to consider, but we have first to endeavour to trace the
appearance and development of the conception, and to discuss
so far as possible what we are to understand by it.
As far as we have been able to discover, the first writer of
the sixteenth century of whom we can say that he, at one time,
held and affirmed the conception that the temporal ruler was
in such a sense representative of God that under no cir-
cumstances he could be resisted, was Luther. For there
can be no doubt that this was his conviction till about 1530.
We have, in spite of our best efforts, been quite unable to
discover how Luther came to entertain so eccentric
an opinion, whether directly from the tradition of Gregory
,the Great or from some other unknown influence. It is
no doubt obvious that he endeavoured to find sufficient
authority for it in the well-known words of St Paul in Eomans
xiii. and of St Peter in his first Epistle (iii. 13, 14), and like
St Gregory the Great he was also clearly influenced by the
conception of the king, the Lord's Anointed, as represented
Especially in the stories of the relation of David to Saul in
1 Samuel.
It is, however, difficult to imagine that these alone would
have induced him to adopt an attitude so extreme, and
which was so contrary, as we have seen, to the general
tendency of thought in Germany and in Western Europe,
not only in the Middle Ages, but in the fifteenth century.
We would begin by pointing out that it appears evident
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? CHAP. IV. ] THE THEORY OF THE DIVINE RIGHT.
273
that Luther was not a systematic political thinker, that
indeed he can hardly be described as a political thinker at all.
There are, however, some general conceptions expressed in
his writings which it may be well to notice, for they may
serve at least to indicate some of the presuppositions with
which he approached political questions.
In his treatise, 'Von Weltlicher Obrigkeit,' after citing St
Paul's words, "The powers that be are ordained of God"
and the parallel words in the first Epistle of Peter, he discusses
the apparent conflict between the Old Testament and the
Sermon on the Mount, with regard to the use of force to
maintain justice. He contends that the coercive authority of
society is required because men are not all true Christians;
if they were, there would be no need of kings and princes, of
law or of the sword. 1 If it is then asked why the Christian
man should be obedient to the coercive authority, the answer
is, that while the true Christian does not need this for himself,
he must obey it for the sake of his neighbours. 2
The same conception is expressed in different terms in
Luther's tract, written in July 1525, in defence of the harsh
and violent terms which he had used against the peasants,
in May of the same year. There are, he says, two kingdoms:
the one is the kingdom of God; the other, the kingdom of the
world. The kingdom of God is a kingdom of grace and mercy,
the kingdom of the world is a kingdom of wrath, of punishment,
and of judgment, to coerce the wicked and to defend the
godly, and therefore it has the sword; the prince represents
the wrath and the rod of God. 3
1 Luther: Works, vol. xi. , 'Von
Weltlicher Obrigkeit,' p. 247: "Und
wenn alio welt rechto Christen, das ist
rectgloubigen weren, so wore koyn
Faret, KUnig, Herr, Sohwerd, noch
Recht noth oder niitzo. "
>> Id. id. , p. 253: "Anttwortt;
itzt hab ichs gesagt, das die Christen
unter einander und bey sioh und fiir
sich selbs keyns Rechten und Schwerds
diirrffen, denn es ist yhn keyn noth
noch niitz, aber were eyn rechter
Christen aufl Erden, nicht yhm selbst
VOL. VI.
sondern seynen nehisten lebt und
dienet, sso thut er von art soyns
goystes auch das, des er nicht bedarfl,
sondern das seynen nehisten niitz und
noth ist. "
* Id. id. , vol. xviii. : "Ein send-
brief von der harten Bilchloin widder
die Bauern," p. 389.
"Es sind zweyerley Reich. Eyns
ist Gottis Reich, das ander ist der
wellt Reich . . . Gottis Beich ist eyn
Reich der gnaden und Barmhertzickeit,
und nicht eyn Reich des Zoms odder
S
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? 274
THE EARLIER SIXTEENTH CENTURY. [PART III.
The same principles are again set out by Luther in a Treatise
written in 1526, on the position of soldiers and their relation
to the Christian religion. This, he says, is the conclusion of
the whole matter: the office of the sword is lawful and a
godly and useful ordinance. For God has established two
governments in the world, the one is spiritual, the other is the
worldly government of the sword, which has been set up, that
those who will not live religiously and justly, and in obedience
to the word of God, may be compelled to be religious and just
in this world. God is the Founder and Lord of both forms
of righteousness, both of the Spiritual and of the Temporal;
they are not merely human ordinances, nor are they founded
merely upon human power, but they are Divine. 1
It is the same conception of the two kingdoms which is
expressed in the Tract which Luther wrote, apparently in
April 1525, in answer to the demands of the Suabian peasants,
when he deals with the question of serfdom. They wished,
he says, to make all men equal, but this would be to try to
convert the spiritual kingdom of Christ into a visible and
earthly kingdom, which was impossible. For the earthly
kingdom could not exist without inequality; some must
be free, others in bondage, some, lords and some, subjects. 2
Straffe. . . . Aber das welltlich Reich
ist eyn Reich dee zorns und ernsts,
derm daselbst iat eytel straffen, weren,
richten und urteylon, zu zwinge n
die bosen und zu schiitzen die fromen,
darumb hat es auch, und furet das
Sohwerd, und ein Furst odder Hexr
heyst Gotts zorn odder Gott's rute
ynn die Schrift. "
1 Id. , Works, vol. xir. : "Ob Kriegs
Leute auch in seligem Stande eein
kOnnen," p. 29.
"Denn das ist summa eummarum
davon: Das amt des Schwerds ist
an yhm selber recht, und eine Gottliche
nutzliche ordnunge. . . . Denn er hat
zweierley Regiment unter den menschen
aufigericht. Eins geistlich . . . das
ander ist ein weltlich Regiment durch's
Sohwerd, auff das diejonigen eo
durch's wort, nicht wollen frum und
gerecht werden sum ewigen Leben,
dennooh duroh solch weltlich Regiment
gedrungen werden, frum und gerecht
zu sein fur der Welt. . . . Also ist Gott
solber, aller beyden gerechtickeit,
beide geistlicher und leiblicher, Stiflter,
Herr, Meister, Fddderer und Belohner.
Und ist keine menschliche ordnung
odder gewalt drinnen, sonder eytel
Gottlich ding. "
8 Id. , Works, vol. xviii. : "Erman-
nung zum Frieden, auf die zw61f
Artikel der Bauerschaft in Schwaben,"
p. 326.
"Es will disser artickol alle menschen
gleich machen, und aus dem goist lichen
Reich Christs eyn weltlich eusserlich
Reioh machen, wilchs unmuglich ist.
Denn welltlich Reich kann nicht
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? BTt CHAP. IV. ] THE THEORY OF THE DIVINE RIGHT. 275
It seems to us clear that while Luther's words have a
character of their own, he was, in principle, so far simply
restating the Stoic and Patristic doctrine, that the coercive
authority of the Political Society is a consequence of sin, that
it is made necessary by the moral infirmity and defect of
human nature. It is a consequence of sin, but also, as in the
Patristic tradition, a Divine remedy for sin, created by God,
and deriving its authority from Him. And we should con-
jecture that Luther's development of this, into the conception
of the two kingdoms, is probably derived, ultimately, from St
Augustine, and especially from the ' De Civitate Dei,' although
we have not actually observed any direct reference to this.
The Political Order, then, is the result of human sin, and is
appropriate to the sinful nature of man, but it is a Divine
institution, and its authority is a Divine Authority.
So far, we have nothing, or little more, than the
traditional conceptions of the Middle Ages. We can now
approach Luther's interpretation of the conception of the
Divine origin of political authority as meaning that the
Temporal Euler must always be obeyed, except in spiritual
matters, as holding the authority of God.
The first reference we have found to the subject of the
necessity of implicit obedience to the Supreme Euler, is in a
letter written by Luther to the Elector Frederic of Saxony
in 1522, after the decision of the Diet of Worms. Luther
proposes to return to Wittenberg, but he urges upon the
Elector that he must not resist any action taken by the Em-
peror, or attempt to defend Luther ; the only thing he suggests
that the Elector might do was to "leave the gates open,"
so that Luther might, if necessary, escape. 1 The impression
ate hen, wo nicht ungleyehheit ist ynn des Widerstands," published in the
Pereonen, dasa ettliche froy, ettliche Transactions of the Bavarian Academy
gefangen, ettliche Herren, ettliche for 1915.
Unterthan. " Without this most careful collection
1 Luther, 'Briefe,' &c. Ed. De and comment upon the many references
Wette, vol. ii. p. 140. to the subject which are to be found
We desire to acknowledge our very in Luther's works and correspondence,
great obligations to the admirable we should have had the greatest dim-
Essay of Professor K. Mullor, entitled oulty in dealing with them.
"Luther's Ausserungen iiber das Recht
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? 276
[pakt in.
THE EARLIER SIXTEENTH CENTURY.
which this leaves is confirmed by the more formal" Bedenken"
or opinion, -written by Luther in 1523, in which he very clearly
condemns all forcible resistance to the Emperor. 1
It is the same principle which is expressed in a letter of
1525 to the Count of Mansfeld, in answer to a question,
whether it would be lawful for the Eeformed princes to form
a league and defend themselves against the Emperor. Luther
answers unequivocally that this would be absolutely wrong, for
God requires men to honour the supreme authority, whether
it is good or bad. 2
For the full development of this conception we must,
however, turn to his pamphlets or tracts. We have already
cited some important passages from the tract, 'Von Weltlicher
Obrigkeit,' and we should observe that this tract not only
asserts the Divine origin of the Temporal Power, but also says
very emphatically that no prince may fight against his king
or emperor or his feudal lord, for the Supreme Lord must
not be resisted by force but only by confession of the
truth. 3
It was, however, in the tracts dealing with the Eising of the
Peasants that Luther developed this theory most completely.
In the first of these, written in April 1525, Luther said that the
peasants in Suabia claimed to be defending their religion and
to be Christian men, but he replied that they were taking
God's name in vain. St Paul had bidden every man to be
subject to the authority (Oberkeit), the man who resists
God's Ordinance will be damned. They may say that the
authority was wicked and intolerable, that it endeavoured
to take the Gospel from them and oppressed them in body
1 Luther, 'Brief - wechsel,' Ed.
Enders, vol. iv. No. 76.
>> Luther, 'Briefe,' &c. Ed. De
Wette, vol. iii. p. 73: "Das ander,
ob man sich verbinden mOge outer,
hinter, oder wider die Oberkeit, Oder
wie ihm zu thun sey, dass man solchsn
Tyrannen widerstehe. Aufs ersto
weisa er wohl, dass wider die Oberkeit,
kein Verbindung gilt. Denn Gott
will die Oberherren, sie seyn bO<<e
oder gut, geehret habeu, Rom. xiii. 1,
1 Peter v. "
? Id. , Works, vol. ia. , 'Von Welt-
licher Obrigkeit,' p. 276: "Das kein
Furst, wider sein Oberherrn, als den
KOnig und Kaiser oder sonst seynen
Lehenherrn kriegen soil, sondern lassen
nehmen, was da nympt. Denn die
Oberkeyt soil man nicht widerstehen
mit gewalt, sondern nur mit bekenntniss
der wahrheit. "
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? CHAP. IV. ] THE THEORY OF THE DIVINE RIGHT. 277
and soul, but this was no excuse, for to punish the wicked was
not the right of any man but only of the Temporal Authority. 1
If every man took the law into his own hands, there would
be no law or order in the world, but only slaughter and blood-
shed,2 and Luther bids them remember that Christ taught
men not to resist evil but to submit to injuries; the only right
of the Christian is suffering and the Cross. 3 Luther does not,
indeed, deny that the Lords had behaved like tyrants, and
would be judged by God, but the peasants had transgressed
against God by their insurrection. *
So far, Luther's theory was extreme, but his language was
moderate; in two later tracts of the same year he seems to
lose all sense of proportion and restraint and decency. In
one of these, written in May 1525, he says that the peasants
had broken their oath of obedience to the authorities; they
had robbed and plundered, they had made the Gospel a cloke
for their sin, and he calls upon the princes and lords to take
the most violent and ruthless measures against them. 5 And
1 Id. , Works, vol. xviii. , 'Ermah-
nung zum Frieden, auf die zwolf
Artikel der Bauornschaft in Schwaben,'
p. 303: "Sondern, wie S. Paulus
sagt, Ein igliche Seele solle der Ober-
keit untertan sein, mit furcht und
ehren.
Wie kindet yhr doch fiir diesen
Gottes spriichen und Rechten uber,
die yhr euch rhiimet, GOttlichen Rocht
nachzufahren, und nehmet doch das
schwerd selbst, und lohnet euch aufl
widder die Oberkeit von Gotta recht
geordnet? Meynet yhr nicht, das
urtheil S. Pauli werde euch troffen.
'Wer Gott's ordnung widdorstrebt,
den wird das vordamnis uber-
kommen. . . . Zum dritteni Ja,
sprechet ibr, die Oberkeit ist zu biise
und unleidlich. Denn sie das Evan-
gelion uns nicht lassen wollen, und
drucken uns ailzu hart van zeitlicher
guter Beschwerung, und verderben uns
also an Leyb und Seele. Autworte ich;
Dasa die Oberkeit bose und unrecht
ist, entschuldigt keyn rotterey noch
aufruhr, denn die bosheit zu straffen,
das geburt nicht eym iglichen, sondern
der weltichen oberkeyt, die das Schwerd
furet. '"
>> Id. id. , p. 306.
>> Id. id. , p. 301: "Leyden, Leyden,
Ereutz, Kreutz is des Christen Recht,
das, und keyn anders. ''
4 Id. id. , p. 329.
? Id. id. , vol. xviii. 'Wider die
Raliberischen und MOrdorischen Rotten
der Bauern,' p. 358: "Drumb sol hie
zuschmeyssen, wurgen und stechen
heymlich oder offentliob, wer da kann,
und gedencken, das nicht gifitigers,
schedlichers, teuffelisohers seyn kan,
denn eyn auflrurischer mensch, gleich
als wenn man eynen tollen hund
todschlahen mus, schlegstu nicht, so
schlegt er dich und ein gantz land
mit dyr. "
Id. id. , p. 361: "Drumb, Uebe
Herren, loset hie, rettet hie, helfft hie,
erbarmt euch der arracn Leute, steche
? ? schlahe hie, wer da kann, bleybstu
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? 278
[PABT m.
THE EARLIER SIXTEENTH CENTURY.
in another tract, written probably in July 1525, he attempted
to defend the language and attitude of the first, especially
by means of that distinction between the two kingdoms--
God's kingdom of mercy and the earthly kingdom of wrath
and punishment, which we have already discussed. 1
We come back to a more restrained tone of discussion in
in the little work, 'Ob Kriegsleute anch im Seligen Stande
sein konnen,' written in 1526, to which we have already
referred. Here he discusses the principles of political obedience
with greater fulness, but with equal decision. He admits
that in the ancient world men had not hesitated to depose
and even to kill useless or wicked rulers. The Greeks set up
monuments to the Tyrannicides, the Eomans murdered many
of their emperors; but these, he says,' were heathen who did
not know God, and that the temporal authority was God's
Ordinance. 2 This was incompatible with the Christian Faith;
even if the rulers do what is unjust it is not lawful to be dis-
obedient to them, and to destroy the Ordinance of God;
men must endure injustice. 3 Luther was aware of the
fact that the 8wiss had emancipated themselves, and that,
not long before, the Danes had deposed their king, but, he
says, he is not speaking of what had been done, but of what
ought to be doners Men must submit to the tyrant, they must
fndt~resistilim, they must leave him to God's judgment, and
he cites the example of David's conduct to Saul. 5
This is sufficiently clear, but it is not all. Luther was
aware, even then, of what we may call constitutional tradition,
but he sets this aside. It may be contended, he says, that a
king or lord had sworn to his subjects to reign according to
definite conditions, and that, if he violated these, he forfeited
his authority, as it is said that the King of France must reign
in accordance with the judgment of his Farlement, and that
>> Cf. p. 273, note 3.
* Id. id. , vol. xix. , 'Ob Kriegsleute,'
&o. , p. 633.
>> Id. id. id. , p. 634: "Aber ich hab
? olche verantwortet, dass obgleich die
Hcrrn unrecht daran theten, were
drumb nicht biliig noch recht, auch
unrecht zu thun, das ist ungehorsam
sein und zerstoron Gotte Ordnung, die
nicht unser ist, sondeTM man solle
das unrecht leiden. "
? Id. id. id. , pp. 635 to 637.
5 Id. id. id. , p. 640.
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? CHAP. IV. ] THE THEORY OF THE DIVINE RIGHT. 279
the King of Denmark had sworn to observe certain consti-
tutional articles. Luther answers that it is good and reasonable
that the Supreme Euler should reign according to law, and
not merely according to his capricious will, and should swear
to do this. But, if he did not do so, are his subjects to
attack him and sit in judgment on him? Who, he says, has
commanded this? This could only be done by some superior
power who could hear both parties and condemn the guilty. 1
He adds, in reply to those who might say that he was flattering
the princes, that this was not true, for what he had said
applied to all alike, peasants, burghers, nobles, lords, counts,
and princes, for they all have a superior lord to whom they
are subordinate. 2
Luther's conception is thus far perfectly clear and unam-
biguous. 'Die Obrigkeit' has an absolute authority, and God
requires of men an unconditional obedience to it, for it is
God Who has set it up. It would no doubt be well that the
ruler should govern justly and according to law, but if he
does not do so, his subjects must still submit and leave it to
God to punish him. The principle is clear and unqualified,
but we have made no progress in tracing the sources of
Luther's opinion. It may be suggested that it was in the main
1 Id. id. id. , p.