Subtle mind in nirodhasamapatti and in
asamjnisamdpatti
(so too the Vibhajyavadins) {Kosa, ii.
Abhidharmakosabhasyam-Vol-1-Vasubandhu-Poussin-Pruden-1991
42); he has a particular theory on the non-contact of atoms (Wassiliew,
57
Pancavastukavibhdsd.
279), which Vasubandhu accepts and which Samghabhadra discusses (i. 43); admits three caittas (ii. 23, Add. ), a position which distinguishes him from the Darstantikas; like the Sarvastivadins, he denies that rupa is samanantarapratyaya (ii. 62); he admits the prolonged existence of antardbhava, against the Sarvasti- vadins (iii. 14); he has a particular opinion on pratityasamutpdda and samutpanna (iii. 28); he denies avijnapti, which is clearly anti-Sarvastivadin (iv. 4); on the four modes of kusala, he has a very orthodox doctrine (iv. 8); he holds to the "mortal" sin of intelligent animals (iv. 97): he gives an explanation of the word vimoksa
Poussin 33
he
? 34 Introduction
(viii. 33); he mixes the dhydnas and the suddhdvdsikas (Vibhdsd, p. 881c); he treats
the last thought of the arhat (p. 954a); on uccheda and faivata (p. 1003c); on the
meaning of alpa, sulabha, anavadya, and on the praise of his disciples by the 58
Buddha (p. 909a, and p. 900b, where he differs from Vasumitra).
59
The Bhadanta is very clear on vicdra-vitarka {Vibhdsd, p. 744b, and p. 269,
Kofa, ii. 33 and viii. 23): the author of the Jndnaprasthdna wants to refute what the Darstantika says. The latter says: "There is vitarka-vicddra from Kamadhatu up to Bhavagra. Why is this? Because the Sutra says that grossness of mind is vitarka and that subtlety of mind is vicdra: now grossness and subtlety of mind exist up to Bhavagra. " The Bhadanta says: "The masters of the Abhidharma say that vitarka- vicdra are grossness and subtlety of mind Now grossness and subtlety are relative things and exist up to Bhavagra. However, these masters only admit vitarka and vicdra in Kamadhatu and in Brahmaloka. This is poorly said, this is not well said. " The masters of the Abhidharma say, "What we say is well said, not poorly said. In fact. . . "
2. Vasubandhu {Kosa, vii. 31) attributes to the Bhadanta Dharmatrata (see the correction ad vii. 31) an opinion on the power of the Bhagavat which is an opinion of the Bhadanta according to Vibhdsd, p. 155c.
In the Vibhdsd (p. 61c) Dharmatrata says that visible matter is seen by the visual consciousness {caksurvijndna): an opinion that the Kosa attributes to a Vijnanavadin (i. 42), and which differs from that of the Bhadanta {Vibhdsd, p. 62b) who says that the eye sees by reason of light and the manas knows by reason of the act of attention.
3. Vibhdsd) p. 66lcl6: the Jndnaprasthdna wants to refute what the other masters say. In this school there are two masters, the first Buddhadeva and the second Dharmatrata.
Buddhadeva says that rupa is only the four mahdbhutas, that the caittas are citta. Derived rupa (updddyarupa) is only mahdbhutavi? esa\ the caittas are only cittavisesa. Sutras quoted in support of this theory: 1. "What is in the eye is solid . . . " (Kola, i. 35); 2. "Sarrufc/^* is cittaikdgrya . . . " (viii. 2). How does Buddhadeva prove the existence of dhdtus, dyatanas, skandhas? . . . The Abhi- dharmacaryas say, "The quoted sutras do not have this meaning . . . "
Dharmatrata admits the existence of derived rupa apart from primary rupa, and of the caittas apart from citta. But he holds that derived tangibles and the rupa which forms part of the dharmdyatana do not exist. He thus attempts to prove the existence of the dhdtus, dyatanas, skandhas, as does the Abhidharma system. But the derived tangibles exist separately, as do the other derived rupas; but if the rupa of the dharmdyatana does not exist, avijnapti does not exist {Kosa, i. 35, iv. 3).
? 4. Vibhdsd, p. 383b: The Abhidharma says, "What is rupaskandba? Ten rupdyatanas and the rupa included in the dharmayatana (that is to say the avijnapti). " What system does it want to refute? It wants to refute the Darstantikas, for they deny any rupa in the dharmayatana. And Dharmatrata also says, "Everything that is rupa is either support or the object of vijndna. How could there be rupa which is neither one or the other? " It is in order to refute these opinions that the above-mentioned definition of rupaskandba is givea But if the rupa which is included within the dharmayatana is real, how can one explain what Dharmatrata says? It is not necessary to explain it, for this is not in the Tripitaka. Or, if one should explain it, one can say . . . that the rupa included within the dharmayatana, arising from the mahdbhiUas which are the object of touch, can be considered as the object of touch consciousness. Thus the declaration of Dharmatrata is without error.
5. Vibhdsd) p. 730b: Among the twenty-two indriyas or "organs" (Kosa, i. 48), how many are separate things, and how many are only names? The Abhi- dharmikas say that for twenty-two names there are seventeen things, for the two sexual indriyas (parts of the organ of touch) and the three pure indriyas (combinations of faith, etc. ) are not separate things (Kosa,ii. 2,9).
Dharmatrata only admits fourteen things: the first five indriyas, the jiviten-
driya, the upeksendriya, and the samddhindriya are not things. In fact the
jwitendrtya, the vital organ, is one of the viprayuktasamskdras (Kosa, ii. 45) and 60
these are not real. There are no sensations apart from the agreeable and the disagreeable: thus the sensation of indifference (upeksendriya) is not a thing. There is no samddhi, concentration, apart from the mind
Buddhadeva says that only a single indriya Is real, namely the mana-indriya, the mental organ: "The samskrtas, he says, are of two types: mahdbhutas and cittas . . . "
The index of proper names contains information, nearly complete, on the references to the Bhadanta in the Vibhdsd
61
a. Darstantikas and Sautrantikas.
The history of this school, though long, is not yet clear. The notes of K'uei-chi (Siddhi, 221-224; Masuda, "Sects," Asia Major, ii. 67; Levi, Drstdntapankti, p. 97) show that Hstian-tsang was not well informed with respect to them. Takakusu (Abhidharma Literature, 131) says that the Vibhdsd speaks of the Sautrantikas: rarely, in any case, for I have only found a single reference to the Sautrantikas; we can say that the Vibhdsd only knows the Darstantikas.
vi. Some Schools of the Vibhdsd.
Poussin 35
? 36 Introduction
We have reason to establish a relationship between this name and the book of
Kumaralata, the Drstdntapankti. We may ask if the Darstantikas are characterized
by the use of "comparisons," as the Tibetans say (Wassiliew, 274, according to
whom Sautrantika = Darstantika); however, the sense of the word drspdnta is not
proven with certainty. J. Przyluski thinks the Drspdnta is opposed to scripture.
This way of looking at it is confirmed, I believe, by the Vibhdsd (p. 782bl8). It is 61
said in traditional Drspdnta: "He who gives alms to a person who has left nirodhasamapdtti is endowed with an action which bears a result in this life. Why is this? There is no reason to explain this text. Why is this? Because this is neither in the Sutra, the Vinaya, nor the Abhidharma, but only in the traditional Drspdnta. That which is said in the traditional Drspdnta may be true or not true. If, however, one desires an explanation of this, one should say that this alms-giver obtains a result in this life or obtains great results. The text mentions only the first
62 alternative, because it is pleasing to people of the world. "
We can speak of a Darstantika-Sautrantika school: in looking at it more closely, the Vibhdsd assigns to its Darstantikas almost all of the theses that the Kosa assigns to the Sautrantikas.
Here are the more important disagreements between the Sarvastivadins and the Darstantikas-Sautrantikas.
1. The Abhidharmas of the Sarvastivadins are not authoritative {Kosa, i. 2, ii. l, villi).
2. The asamskrtas do not have any real existence (ii. 55).
3. The viprayuktas (ii. 35-36) do not have any real existence: negation of the prdptis, of the pvitendriya, etc.
4. The past and the future do not have any real existence (v. 25-26).
5. The existence of the past permits the Sarvastivadins to explain the play of causality; the prdptis serve the same function. Negating the past, the prdptis, etc. , the Darstantika-Sautrantika school admits a subtle mind, either of the btjas or of vdsand (perfuming), and thus takes into account the changes of the series (ii. 36, 50, iv. 79, ix ).
6. Extinction does not have a cause; things do not have any duration (sthiti): the ksana or moment, is of a size that tends to zero (iv. 2-3) (See Rocznik, vol. viii).
7. Notable divergence with respect to action: negation of the avijnapti (iv. 3), of bodily action (iv. 3), of the necessary character of retribution of an anantarya transgression (Vibhdsd, p. 359b20).
8. On the caittas and the bhautikas: opinions which depart from the Sarvastivadin system (ii. 23).
? 9. Explanation of the three rdsis (Kosa, iii. 44), which exist from hell to Bhavagra; beings having the dharmas of Nirvana; beings not having them; indeterminate beings {Vibhdsd, p. 930bl5; compare the Siddhi and its gotras).
10. The body of the Arhats is pure, being produced through "wisdom" (i. 4, Samghabhadra, p. 331b).
11. Simultaneity of the Buddha (iii. 95-96).
The references which follow, complete in the index of proper names (Darstantika-Sautrantika), are classified according to the material in the Kosa.
1. The Darstantika rejects certain sutras: how does he pretend to the name of Sautrantika? (Samghabhadra, p. 332a).
The vijndnas, including the manovijndna, have a special object {Kosa, ix, Vibhdsd, p. 449al6).
If the eye sees the visible {Kosa, i. 42, Vibhdsd, p. 6lbl9).
2. The Sthavira (=Snlata) and all the other Darstantika masters deny akasa (Samghabhadra, p. 347b).
Negation of prdpti, of apratisamkhyanirodha {Vibhdsd, p. 479al9, p. 796b6, p. 931b23).
The laksanas of "conditioned things"--Darstantikas, Vibhajyavadins, Sam- tanasabhagikas {Vibhdsd, p. 198al5 and foil. ).
Pratyayata is not real {Vibhdsd, p. 680b27).
There is no vipakahetu outside of the cetand, no vipdkaphala outside of the vedana (Vibhdsd, p. 96a26).
Rupa is not "a similar cause" of rupa--the opinion of the Darstantika according to the gloss of Kyokuga Saeki {Kosa, ii. 52), but, according to the Vibhdsd (p. 87c20), the opinion of the Bahirdesakas.
"Among the Sautrantikas, the Bhadanta Darstantika holds to the separate existence of vedana-sarhjnd-cetand', Buddhadeva adds sparsa and manasikdra: the other caittas are only citta\ the master Srllata holds that the asamskrtas and the viprayuktas have nominal existence" (Wassiliew, 281, 309, corrected).
Subtle mind in nirodhasamapatti and in asamjnisamdpatti (so too the Vibhajyavadins) {Kosa, ii. 44, viii. 33, Vibhdsd, p. 774al4, p. 772c21).
Negation of the reality of dreams {Vibhdsd, p. 193b5).
The caittas arise in succession, according to the Darstantikas and the same Bhadanta {Vibhdsd,p. 493c26, p. 745a7); the mind cannot be accompanied by
jnana or ajndna (p. 547).
Vitarka and vicdra in the Three Dhatus {Kosa, ii. 33, viii. 23, Vhibdsd, p. 269b9,
p. 744b9).
3. Antardbhava and nirmita (Vibhdsd, p. 700a 15).
Poussin 37
? 38 Introduction
Sparsa is not a thing in itself {Vibhdsd, p. I49a25).
4. Arising depends on hetupratyaya but not extinction; the Darstantikas as against the Abhidharmakas {Kofa, iv. 2-3; Vibhdsd,p. 105a27).
Negation of the dharmdyatanarupa (=avijnapti)\ Dharmatrata and the Dar- stantikas {Vibhdsd, p. 383bl6).
On the four and eight types of actions from the point of view of their determination, Darstantikas, or Sautrantikas according to Vydkhyd {Kosa, iv. 50-51; Vibhdsd, p. 593blO): all actions can be "reversed," aaion in antardbhava {Kosa, iii. 14), dnantaraya, aaion in Bhavagra, aaion in asamjnisamdpatti {Vibhdsd, p. 359b20, p. 773c29).
Whether abhidhyd, vydpdda, and mithyddrsti are aaions (opinion of the Darstantikas, Kosa, iv. 65, 78; of the Vibhajyavadinikaya, Vibhdsd, p. 587a9).
5. All the klesas are "bad" (Darstantikas, Vibhdsd, p. 259cll); contra, Kosa, v. 20-21).
Anusayana {Vibhdsd, p. 110a21; Kosa, v. 16).
In samvrtijndna, the prthagjana does not cut off the klefas (Darstantikas and the Bhadanta, Vibhdsd, p. 264bl9, p. 741c20).
The object of attachment and the pudgala are unreal, Darstantikas (compare the cittamdtravdda)', the objea of attachment and the pudgala are real, Vatsipu- triyas {Vibhdsd, p. 288bl5 and following).
Reincarnation solely by reason of desire and hatred {Vibhdsd, p. 309all)--in faa, by reason of any klesa.
On the time periods {Vibhdsd, p. 919bl2).
6-7. Definition of the Truths {Kosa, vi. 2; opinion of the Abhidharmikas, Darstantikas, Vibhajyavadins, Ghosaka, ParsVa . . . Vibhdsd, p. 397b4).
On ksdnti andjndna {Kosa, vii. 1,20,22; Darstantikas, the Bhadanta, Vibhdsd, p. 489bl6).
Purity of the body of the Arhat {Kofa, i. 4, iv. 4; Darstantikas, according to Samghabhadra, p. 331b25).
8. Doarine of dhydna (the Bhadanta, Darstantika-Sautrantika, Kosa, viii. 9). The samantakas are "good" (Darstantikas, Kosa, viii. 22, Vibhdsd, p 832a). Mixed dhydna {Ko/a, vi. 42, 58, vii. 23) explained by perfuming (Darstantikas
and Yogacarins, Vibhdsd, p. 879c26; compare Siddhi).
Falling away from asamjnisamdpatti (Darstantikas, Vibhdsd, p. 773c29. Nirmita is not real (Darstantikas and the Bhadanta, Vibhdsd, p. 700al5).
b. Vibhajyavadins.
They are clearly defined as "those who distinguish" and admit the existence of
? a certain kind of past and a certain kind of future (Kosa, v. 22, P'u-kuang quotes Kosa, v. 9, and Vinitadeva, Traits sur les Sectes).
However, the information that we possess on the Vibhajyavadins is confused: the Vibhajyavadins are the Mahasarhghikas, the Ekavyavaharikas, the Lokot- taravadins, or the Kaukkutikas (K'uei-chi, Siddhi, 109).
1. Vasumitra, in his Treatise on the Seas, does not mention them. Vinitadeva, presenting his theories concerning the history of the Sarvastivadins, makes them the seventh Sarvastivadin school. Bhavya (the Sthavira theory) makes them a division of the Sarvastivadins, and (the Mahasarhghika theory) the third original school. According to Bhiksvagra, they are the fourth Mahasarhghika school.
64 2. The note by Kyokuga Saeki (edition of the Kosa, xix, foL Ma-b).
K'uei-chi, commentating on the Siddhi [iv. l. 35, p. 179 of the French translation], says, "Those who were called Vibhajyavadins are now called Prajnaptivadins. " [This should be understood: Paramartha, in his version of the Treatise of Vasumitra, has written "Vibhajyavadin," whereas] Vasumitra [in the version of Hsuan-tsang] says, "In the second century, a school called the Prajnaptivada came out of the Mahasarhghikas. " In connection with this, the commentator Fa-pao says, "According to these two translations, the Vibhaj-
65
yavadins make up only one school [with the Prajnaptivadins"]. In the Vibhasa,
p. 116c5, the Mahasarhghikas, etc. , are called Vibhajyavadins [that is to say: the
Vibhasa attributes to the Vibhajyavadins an opinion that we know to be the
opinion of the Mahasarhghikas, see Kosa, iii. 28]. Consequently the Arthapradtpa,
p. 48, says, "The Vibhajyavadins are either some divergent Mahayana masters, or
all the schools of the HInayana are called Vibhajyavadins: they are not a definite
school. Consequently, in the Mahayanasamgraha (Taisho 1593), the Vibhaj- 66
yavadins are explained as Mahisasakas; in the Vibhasa, as Sammltiyas. "
3. In many texts, the meaning of the word Vibhajyavadin is clearly defined. a. Bhavya: We call [the Sarvastivadins] by the name of Vibhajyavadin when
they distinguish {vibhaj) by saying, "Among these things, some exist, namely the former action whose result has not occurred; some do not exist, namely the former action whose result has been consumed, and future things. "
b. Kosa, v. 25-26: Those who admit the existence of the present and a part of the past (namely the aaion which has not produced its result) and the non- existence of the future and a part of the past (namely the aaion which has produced its result), are held to be Vibhajyavadins; they do not belong to the Sarvastivadin school.
c. P'u-kuang, p. 310b23 (on Kosa, v. 25-26): They say that there is no opinion which is completely correct; that some part exists, and some part does not exist
Poussin 39
? 40 Introduction
[or: in part true, in part false]: one should thus distinguish. Thus they are called Vibhajyavadins.
d. The Kasyaplyas (Vasumitra, thesis 1 and 2) hold a clearly Vibhajyavadin position: "The action whose result has matured does not exist; the action whose result has not matured exists. " Now Buddhaghosa (Kathdvatthu, i. 8) attributes to the Kassapikas, a branch of the Sarvastivadins, the opinion that one part of the past and future exists: this is the second Vibhajyavadin thesis of the summary of ViriTtadeva. Now the Theravadin, which should be Vibhajyavadin like the Buddha, denies and refutes this.
4. Elsewhere: One calls Vibhajyavadins those who, distinguishing, admit that the skandhas are real, and that the dyatanas and the dhdtus have nominal existence.
5. Vibhdsd, p. 571c24 and elsewhere, opposes the Vibhajyavadin and the Y uktavadin.
6. Vinltadeva attributes to the Vibhajyavadins the following thesis:
a. The pudgala exists "absolutely"; b. the past does not exist, with the exception of the cause the result of which has not ripened; the future does not exist, with the exception of the result; the present rigs mi mthunpa (? ) does not exist; c. dhanna does not become an "immediate cause"; d. rupa does not have a "parallel cause," as the Darstantikas claim (Kosa, ii. 52).
7. More notable is the note of Hsiian-tsang (Siddhi, 179) which associates the Vibhajyavadins and the Sthaviras with belief in bhavdngavijndna.
And also: pure mind, Siddhi, 109-111; persistence of a subtle mind in nirodhasamapatti (with the Darstantikas), 207; see also 770.
8. References to Kosa-Vibhdsd:
a. Sound is of retribution (with the Vatslputrlyas) (Kosa, i. 37-38a, Vibhdsd p. 6l2cl3, Siddhi, 190).
The body of arising (janmakdya) of the Buddha is "pure" (with the Mahasarhghikas) (Vibhdsd, p. 871c2, Siddhi, 769-770).
b. Sraddha, etc. , are pure (Kosa, ii. 9, Vibhdsd, p. 7c3).
Life is cittdnuvartin (Kosa, ii. 50, Vibhdsd, p. 770c6--refuted by Vasumitra). Consequently, there is a subtle mind in asamjnisamdpatti, and in niro-
dhasamapatti (Kosa, viii. 33, Vibhdsd, p. 772c21, p. 774al4).
c. Negation of antardbhava (Kosa, iii. 10, Vibhdsd, p. 356cl5, p. 700al5. From
whence the complicated explanation of the antardparinirvdyin, Kosa, iii. 12, Vibhdsd, p. 357b9).
Pratityasamutpdda is asamskrta, like the Path (Kosa, iii. 28, Vibhdsd, p. 116c5, p. 479--like the Mahasarhghikas and the Mahlsasakas).
? d. Greed, anger, false views are "action" (Vibhdsd, p. 587a9, Kosa, iv. 65: Darstantikas).
Definition of "good by nature" (d&jfidna), "through association" (as vijndna), "in origin" (as action of the body . . . ) (Kosa, iv. 8, ix, Vibhdsd, p. 741al5).
T he mind of the Bhagavat is always absorbed (Kosa, iv. 12, Vibhdsd, p. 4l0b26).
e. The thirst for non-existence is abandoned through bhdvand (Kosa, v. 10-11, Vibhdsd, p. 138c3).
On the viparydsas {Kosa v. 9, Vibhdsd, p. 536c9).
f. Definition of the Truths (Kosa, vi. 2, Vibhdsd, p. 397b4).
Comprehension of the Truths at once (Kosa, vi. 27, Vibhdsd, p. 532a).
The Arhat does not fall (Kosa, vi.
57
Pancavastukavibhdsd.
279), which Vasubandhu accepts and which Samghabhadra discusses (i. 43); admits three caittas (ii. 23, Add. ), a position which distinguishes him from the Darstantikas; like the Sarvastivadins, he denies that rupa is samanantarapratyaya (ii. 62); he admits the prolonged existence of antardbhava, against the Sarvasti- vadins (iii. 14); he has a particular opinion on pratityasamutpdda and samutpanna (iii. 28); he denies avijnapti, which is clearly anti-Sarvastivadin (iv. 4); on the four modes of kusala, he has a very orthodox doctrine (iv. 8); he holds to the "mortal" sin of intelligent animals (iv. 97): he gives an explanation of the word vimoksa
Poussin 33
he
? 34 Introduction
(viii. 33); he mixes the dhydnas and the suddhdvdsikas (Vibhdsd, p. 881c); he treats
the last thought of the arhat (p. 954a); on uccheda and faivata (p. 1003c); on the
meaning of alpa, sulabha, anavadya, and on the praise of his disciples by the 58
Buddha (p. 909a, and p. 900b, where he differs from Vasumitra).
59
The Bhadanta is very clear on vicdra-vitarka {Vibhdsd, p. 744b, and p. 269,
Kofa, ii. 33 and viii. 23): the author of the Jndnaprasthdna wants to refute what the Darstantika says. The latter says: "There is vitarka-vicddra from Kamadhatu up to Bhavagra. Why is this? Because the Sutra says that grossness of mind is vitarka and that subtlety of mind is vicdra: now grossness and subtlety of mind exist up to Bhavagra. " The Bhadanta says: "The masters of the Abhidharma say that vitarka- vicdra are grossness and subtlety of mind Now grossness and subtlety are relative things and exist up to Bhavagra. However, these masters only admit vitarka and vicdra in Kamadhatu and in Brahmaloka. This is poorly said, this is not well said. " The masters of the Abhidharma say, "What we say is well said, not poorly said. In fact. . . "
2. Vasubandhu {Kosa, vii. 31) attributes to the Bhadanta Dharmatrata (see the correction ad vii. 31) an opinion on the power of the Bhagavat which is an opinion of the Bhadanta according to Vibhdsd, p. 155c.
In the Vibhdsd (p. 61c) Dharmatrata says that visible matter is seen by the visual consciousness {caksurvijndna): an opinion that the Kosa attributes to a Vijnanavadin (i. 42), and which differs from that of the Bhadanta {Vibhdsd, p. 62b) who says that the eye sees by reason of light and the manas knows by reason of the act of attention.
3. Vibhdsd) p. 66lcl6: the Jndnaprasthdna wants to refute what the other masters say. In this school there are two masters, the first Buddhadeva and the second Dharmatrata.
Buddhadeva says that rupa is only the four mahdbhutas, that the caittas are citta. Derived rupa (updddyarupa) is only mahdbhutavi? esa\ the caittas are only cittavisesa. Sutras quoted in support of this theory: 1. "What is in the eye is solid . . . " (Kola, i. 35); 2. "Sarrufc/^* is cittaikdgrya . . . " (viii. 2). How does Buddhadeva prove the existence of dhdtus, dyatanas, skandhas? . . . The Abhi- dharmacaryas say, "The quoted sutras do not have this meaning . . . "
Dharmatrata admits the existence of derived rupa apart from primary rupa, and of the caittas apart from citta. But he holds that derived tangibles and the rupa which forms part of the dharmdyatana do not exist. He thus attempts to prove the existence of the dhdtus, dyatanas, skandhas, as does the Abhidharma system. But the derived tangibles exist separately, as do the other derived rupas; but if the rupa of the dharmdyatana does not exist, avijnapti does not exist {Kosa, i. 35, iv. 3).
? 4. Vibhdsd, p. 383b: The Abhidharma says, "What is rupaskandba? Ten rupdyatanas and the rupa included in the dharmayatana (that is to say the avijnapti). " What system does it want to refute? It wants to refute the Darstantikas, for they deny any rupa in the dharmayatana. And Dharmatrata also says, "Everything that is rupa is either support or the object of vijndna. How could there be rupa which is neither one or the other? " It is in order to refute these opinions that the above-mentioned definition of rupaskandba is givea But if the rupa which is included within the dharmayatana is real, how can one explain what Dharmatrata says? It is not necessary to explain it, for this is not in the Tripitaka. Or, if one should explain it, one can say . . . that the rupa included within the dharmayatana, arising from the mahdbhiUas which are the object of touch, can be considered as the object of touch consciousness. Thus the declaration of Dharmatrata is without error.
5. Vibhdsd) p. 730b: Among the twenty-two indriyas or "organs" (Kosa, i. 48), how many are separate things, and how many are only names? The Abhi- dharmikas say that for twenty-two names there are seventeen things, for the two sexual indriyas (parts of the organ of touch) and the three pure indriyas (combinations of faith, etc. ) are not separate things (Kosa,ii. 2,9).
Dharmatrata only admits fourteen things: the first five indriyas, the jiviten-
driya, the upeksendriya, and the samddhindriya are not things. In fact the
jwitendrtya, the vital organ, is one of the viprayuktasamskdras (Kosa, ii. 45) and 60
these are not real. There are no sensations apart from the agreeable and the disagreeable: thus the sensation of indifference (upeksendriya) is not a thing. There is no samddhi, concentration, apart from the mind
Buddhadeva says that only a single indriya Is real, namely the mana-indriya, the mental organ: "The samskrtas, he says, are of two types: mahdbhutas and cittas . . . "
The index of proper names contains information, nearly complete, on the references to the Bhadanta in the Vibhdsd
61
a. Darstantikas and Sautrantikas.
The history of this school, though long, is not yet clear. The notes of K'uei-chi (Siddhi, 221-224; Masuda, "Sects," Asia Major, ii. 67; Levi, Drstdntapankti, p. 97) show that Hstian-tsang was not well informed with respect to them. Takakusu (Abhidharma Literature, 131) says that the Vibhdsd speaks of the Sautrantikas: rarely, in any case, for I have only found a single reference to the Sautrantikas; we can say that the Vibhdsd only knows the Darstantikas.
vi. Some Schools of the Vibhdsd.
Poussin 35
? 36 Introduction
We have reason to establish a relationship between this name and the book of
Kumaralata, the Drstdntapankti. We may ask if the Darstantikas are characterized
by the use of "comparisons," as the Tibetans say (Wassiliew, 274, according to
whom Sautrantika = Darstantika); however, the sense of the word drspdnta is not
proven with certainty. J. Przyluski thinks the Drspdnta is opposed to scripture.
This way of looking at it is confirmed, I believe, by the Vibhdsd (p. 782bl8). It is 61
said in traditional Drspdnta: "He who gives alms to a person who has left nirodhasamapdtti is endowed with an action which bears a result in this life. Why is this? There is no reason to explain this text. Why is this? Because this is neither in the Sutra, the Vinaya, nor the Abhidharma, but only in the traditional Drspdnta. That which is said in the traditional Drspdnta may be true or not true. If, however, one desires an explanation of this, one should say that this alms-giver obtains a result in this life or obtains great results. The text mentions only the first
62 alternative, because it is pleasing to people of the world. "
We can speak of a Darstantika-Sautrantika school: in looking at it more closely, the Vibhdsd assigns to its Darstantikas almost all of the theses that the Kosa assigns to the Sautrantikas.
Here are the more important disagreements between the Sarvastivadins and the Darstantikas-Sautrantikas.
1. The Abhidharmas of the Sarvastivadins are not authoritative {Kosa, i. 2, ii. l, villi).
2. The asamskrtas do not have any real existence (ii. 55).
3. The viprayuktas (ii. 35-36) do not have any real existence: negation of the prdptis, of the pvitendriya, etc.
4. The past and the future do not have any real existence (v. 25-26).
5. The existence of the past permits the Sarvastivadins to explain the play of causality; the prdptis serve the same function. Negating the past, the prdptis, etc. , the Darstantika-Sautrantika school admits a subtle mind, either of the btjas or of vdsand (perfuming), and thus takes into account the changes of the series (ii. 36, 50, iv. 79, ix ).
6. Extinction does not have a cause; things do not have any duration (sthiti): the ksana or moment, is of a size that tends to zero (iv. 2-3) (See Rocznik, vol. viii).
7. Notable divergence with respect to action: negation of the avijnapti (iv. 3), of bodily action (iv. 3), of the necessary character of retribution of an anantarya transgression (Vibhdsd, p. 359b20).
8. On the caittas and the bhautikas: opinions which depart from the Sarvastivadin system (ii. 23).
? 9. Explanation of the three rdsis (Kosa, iii. 44), which exist from hell to Bhavagra; beings having the dharmas of Nirvana; beings not having them; indeterminate beings {Vibhdsd, p. 930bl5; compare the Siddhi and its gotras).
10. The body of the Arhats is pure, being produced through "wisdom" (i. 4, Samghabhadra, p. 331b).
11. Simultaneity of the Buddha (iii. 95-96).
The references which follow, complete in the index of proper names (Darstantika-Sautrantika), are classified according to the material in the Kosa.
1. The Darstantika rejects certain sutras: how does he pretend to the name of Sautrantika? (Samghabhadra, p. 332a).
The vijndnas, including the manovijndna, have a special object {Kosa, ix, Vibhdsd, p. 449al6).
If the eye sees the visible {Kosa, i. 42, Vibhdsd, p. 6lbl9).
2. The Sthavira (=Snlata) and all the other Darstantika masters deny akasa (Samghabhadra, p. 347b).
Negation of prdpti, of apratisamkhyanirodha {Vibhdsd, p. 479al9, p. 796b6, p. 931b23).
The laksanas of "conditioned things"--Darstantikas, Vibhajyavadins, Sam- tanasabhagikas {Vibhdsd, p. 198al5 and foil. ).
Pratyayata is not real {Vibhdsd, p. 680b27).
There is no vipakahetu outside of the cetand, no vipdkaphala outside of the vedana (Vibhdsd, p. 96a26).
Rupa is not "a similar cause" of rupa--the opinion of the Darstantika according to the gloss of Kyokuga Saeki {Kosa, ii. 52), but, according to the Vibhdsd (p. 87c20), the opinion of the Bahirdesakas.
"Among the Sautrantikas, the Bhadanta Darstantika holds to the separate existence of vedana-sarhjnd-cetand', Buddhadeva adds sparsa and manasikdra: the other caittas are only citta\ the master Srllata holds that the asamskrtas and the viprayuktas have nominal existence" (Wassiliew, 281, 309, corrected).
Subtle mind in nirodhasamapatti and in asamjnisamdpatti (so too the Vibhajyavadins) {Kosa, ii. 44, viii. 33, Vibhdsd, p. 774al4, p. 772c21).
Negation of the reality of dreams {Vibhdsd, p. 193b5).
The caittas arise in succession, according to the Darstantikas and the same Bhadanta {Vibhdsd,p. 493c26, p. 745a7); the mind cannot be accompanied by
jnana or ajndna (p. 547).
Vitarka and vicdra in the Three Dhatus {Kosa, ii. 33, viii. 23, Vhibdsd, p. 269b9,
p. 744b9).
3. Antardbhava and nirmita (Vibhdsd, p. 700a 15).
Poussin 37
? 38 Introduction
Sparsa is not a thing in itself {Vibhdsd, p. I49a25).
4. Arising depends on hetupratyaya but not extinction; the Darstantikas as against the Abhidharmakas {Kofa, iv. 2-3; Vibhdsd,p. 105a27).
Negation of the dharmdyatanarupa (=avijnapti)\ Dharmatrata and the Dar- stantikas {Vibhdsd, p. 383bl6).
On the four and eight types of actions from the point of view of their determination, Darstantikas, or Sautrantikas according to Vydkhyd {Kosa, iv. 50-51; Vibhdsd, p. 593blO): all actions can be "reversed," aaion in antardbhava {Kosa, iii. 14), dnantaraya, aaion in Bhavagra, aaion in asamjnisamdpatti {Vibhdsd, p. 359b20, p. 773c29).
Whether abhidhyd, vydpdda, and mithyddrsti are aaions (opinion of the Darstantikas, Kosa, iv. 65, 78; of the Vibhajyavadinikaya, Vibhdsd, p. 587a9).
5. All the klesas are "bad" (Darstantikas, Vibhdsd, p. 259cll); contra, Kosa, v. 20-21).
Anusayana {Vibhdsd, p. 110a21; Kosa, v. 16).
In samvrtijndna, the prthagjana does not cut off the klefas (Darstantikas and the Bhadanta, Vibhdsd, p. 264bl9, p. 741c20).
The object of attachment and the pudgala are unreal, Darstantikas (compare the cittamdtravdda)', the objea of attachment and the pudgala are real, Vatsipu- triyas {Vibhdsd, p. 288bl5 and following).
Reincarnation solely by reason of desire and hatred {Vibhdsd, p. 309all)--in faa, by reason of any klesa.
On the time periods {Vibhdsd, p. 919bl2).
6-7. Definition of the Truths {Kosa, vi. 2; opinion of the Abhidharmikas, Darstantikas, Vibhajyavadins, Ghosaka, ParsVa . . . Vibhdsd, p. 397b4).
On ksdnti andjndna {Kosa, vii. 1,20,22; Darstantikas, the Bhadanta, Vibhdsd, p. 489bl6).
Purity of the body of the Arhat {Kofa, i. 4, iv. 4; Darstantikas, according to Samghabhadra, p. 331b25).
8. Doarine of dhydna (the Bhadanta, Darstantika-Sautrantika, Kosa, viii. 9). The samantakas are "good" (Darstantikas, Kosa, viii. 22, Vibhdsd, p 832a). Mixed dhydna {Ko/a, vi. 42, 58, vii. 23) explained by perfuming (Darstantikas
and Yogacarins, Vibhdsd, p. 879c26; compare Siddhi).
Falling away from asamjnisamdpatti (Darstantikas, Vibhdsd, p. 773c29. Nirmita is not real (Darstantikas and the Bhadanta, Vibhdsd, p. 700al5).
b. Vibhajyavadins.
They are clearly defined as "those who distinguish" and admit the existence of
? a certain kind of past and a certain kind of future (Kosa, v. 22, P'u-kuang quotes Kosa, v. 9, and Vinitadeva, Traits sur les Sectes).
However, the information that we possess on the Vibhajyavadins is confused: the Vibhajyavadins are the Mahasarhghikas, the Ekavyavaharikas, the Lokot- taravadins, or the Kaukkutikas (K'uei-chi, Siddhi, 109).
1. Vasumitra, in his Treatise on the Seas, does not mention them. Vinitadeva, presenting his theories concerning the history of the Sarvastivadins, makes them the seventh Sarvastivadin school. Bhavya (the Sthavira theory) makes them a division of the Sarvastivadins, and (the Mahasarhghika theory) the third original school. According to Bhiksvagra, they are the fourth Mahasarhghika school.
64 2. The note by Kyokuga Saeki (edition of the Kosa, xix, foL Ma-b).
K'uei-chi, commentating on the Siddhi [iv. l. 35, p. 179 of the French translation], says, "Those who were called Vibhajyavadins are now called Prajnaptivadins. " [This should be understood: Paramartha, in his version of the Treatise of Vasumitra, has written "Vibhajyavadin," whereas] Vasumitra [in the version of Hsuan-tsang] says, "In the second century, a school called the Prajnaptivada came out of the Mahasarhghikas. " In connection with this, the commentator Fa-pao says, "According to these two translations, the Vibhaj-
65
yavadins make up only one school [with the Prajnaptivadins"]. In the Vibhasa,
p. 116c5, the Mahasarhghikas, etc. , are called Vibhajyavadins [that is to say: the
Vibhasa attributes to the Vibhajyavadins an opinion that we know to be the
opinion of the Mahasarhghikas, see Kosa, iii. 28]. Consequently the Arthapradtpa,
p. 48, says, "The Vibhajyavadins are either some divergent Mahayana masters, or
all the schools of the HInayana are called Vibhajyavadins: they are not a definite
school. Consequently, in the Mahayanasamgraha (Taisho 1593), the Vibhaj- 66
yavadins are explained as Mahisasakas; in the Vibhasa, as Sammltiyas. "
3. In many texts, the meaning of the word Vibhajyavadin is clearly defined. a. Bhavya: We call [the Sarvastivadins] by the name of Vibhajyavadin when
they distinguish {vibhaj) by saying, "Among these things, some exist, namely the former action whose result has not occurred; some do not exist, namely the former action whose result has been consumed, and future things. "
b. Kosa, v. 25-26: Those who admit the existence of the present and a part of the past (namely the aaion which has not produced its result) and the non- existence of the future and a part of the past (namely the aaion which has produced its result), are held to be Vibhajyavadins; they do not belong to the Sarvastivadin school.
c. P'u-kuang, p. 310b23 (on Kosa, v. 25-26): They say that there is no opinion which is completely correct; that some part exists, and some part does not exist
Poussin 39
? 40 Introduction
[or: in part true, in part false]: one should thus distinguish. Thus they are called Vibhajyavadins.
d. The Kasyaplyas (Vasumitra, thesis 1 and 2) hold a clearly Vibhajyavadin position: "The action whose result has matured does not exist; the action whose result has not matured exists. " Now Buddhaghosa (Kathdvatthu, i. 8) attributes to the Kassapikas, a branch of the Sarvastivadins, the opinion that one part of the past and future exists: this is the second Vibhajyavadin thesis of the summary of ViriTtadeva. Now the Theravadin, which should be Vibhajyavadin like the Buddha, denies and refutes this.
4. Elsewhere: One calls Vibhajyavadins those who, distinguishing, admit that the skandhas are real, and that the dyatanas and the dhdtus have nominal existence.
5. Vibhdsd, p. 571c24 and elsewhere, opposes the Vibhajyavadin and the Y uktavadin.
6. Vinltadeva attributes to the Vibhajyavadins the following thesis:
a. The pudgala exists "absolutely"; b. the past does not exist, with the exception of the cause the result of which has not ripened; the future does not exist, with the exception of the result; the present rigs mi mthunpa (? ) does not exist; c. dhanna does not become an "immediate cause"; d. rupa does not have a "parallel cause," as the Darstantikas claim (Kosa, ii. 52).
7. More notable is the note of Hsiian-tsang (Siddhi, 179) which associates the Vibhajyavadins and the Sthaviras with belief in bhavdngavijndna.
And also: pure mind, Siddhi, 109-111; persistence of a subtle mind in nirodhasamapatti (with the Darstantikas), 207; see also 770.
8. References to Kosa-Vibhdsd:
a. Sound is of retribution (with the Vatslputrlyas) (Kosa, i. 37-38a, Vibhdsd p. 6l2cl3, Siddhi, 190).
The body of arising (janmakdya) of the Buddha is "pure" (with the Mahasarhghikas) (Vibhdsd, p. 871c2, Siddhi, 769-770).
b. Sraddha, etc. , are pure (Kosa, ii. 9, Vibhdsd, p. 7c3).
Life is cittdnuvartin (Kosa, ii. 50, Vibhdsd, p. 770c6--refuted by Vasumitra). Consequently, there is a subtle mind in asamjnisamdpatti, and in niro-
dhasamapatti (Kosa, viii. 33, Vibhdsd, p. 772c21, p. 774al4).
c. Negation of antardbhava (Kosa, iii. 10, Vibhdsd, p. 356cl5, p. 700al5. From
whence the complicated explanation of the antardparinirvdyin, Kosa, iii. 12, Vibhdsd, p. 357b9).
Pratityasamutpdda is asamskrta, like the Path (Kosa, iii. 28, Vibhdsd, p. 116c5, p. 479--like the Mahasarhghikas and the Mahlsasakas).
? d. Greed, anger, false views are "action" (Vibhdsd, p. 587a9, Kosa, iv. 65: Darstantikas).
Definition of "good by nature" (d&jfidna), "through association" (as vijndna), "in origin" (as action of the body . . . ) (Kosa, iv. 8, ix, Vibhdsd, p. 741al5).
T he mind of the Bhagavat is always absorbed (Kosa, iv. 12, Vibhdsd, p. 4l0b26).
e. The thirst for non-existence is abandoned through bhdvand (Kosa, v. 10-11, Vibhdsd, p. 138c3).
On the viparydsas {Kosa v. 9, Vibhdsd, p. 536c9).
f. Definition of the Truths (Kosa, vi. 2, Vibhdsd, p. 397b4).
Comprehension of the Truths at once (Kosa, vi. 27, Vibhdsd, p. 532a).
The Arhat does not fall (Kosa, vi.
