No More Learning

The communications of the army were in the hands of the Pompeians ; in Italy the accounts from Spain suddenly ceased, and the suspicious rumours, which began to circu late there, were not so very remote from the truth. Had the Pompeians followed up their advantage with some energy, they could not have failed either to reduce under their power or at least to drive back towards Gaul the mass
CHAF. x PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS
223
scarcely capable of resistance which was crowded together on the left bank of the Sicoris, and to occupy this bank so completely that not a man could cross the river without their knowledge. But both points were neglected; those bands were doubtless pushed aside with loss but neither destroyed nor completely beaten back, and the prevention of the crossing of the river was left substantially to the river itself.
among the Britons and subsequently by the Saxons, to be prepared in the camp and transported in waggons to the point where the bridges had stood. On these frail barks the other bank was reached and, as it was found unoccupied, the bridge was re-established without much difficulty ; the road in connection with it was thereupon quickly cleared, and the eagerly -expected supplies were conveyed to the camp. Caesar's happy idea thus rescued the army from the immense peril in which it was placed. Then the cavalry of Caesar which in efficiency far surpassed that of the enemy began at once to scour the country on the left bank of the Sicoris ; the most considerable Spanish communities between the Pyrenees and the Ebro — Osca, Tarraco, Dertosa, and others—nay, even several to the south of the Ebro, passed over to Caesar's side.
The supplies of the Pompeians were now rendered scarce Retreat through the foraging parties of Caesar and the defection of °f tho . the neighbouring communities ; they resolved at length to from retire behind the line of the Ebro, and set themselves in all Ilerda- haste to form a bridge of boats over the Ebro below the
mouth of the Sicoris. Caesar sought to cut off the retreat
of his opponents over the Ebro and to detain them in
Ilerda ; but so long as the enemy remained in possession
of the bridge at Ilerda and he had control of neither ford
Thereupon Caesar formed his plaa He ordered port-
able boats of a light wooden frame and osier work lined «tablishes
°
Wlth leather, after the model of those used in the Channel munica-
Caesai re-
the com- tions-
Caesar follows.
nor bridge there, he could not distribute his army over both banks of the river and could not invest Ilerda. His soldiers therefore worked day and night to lower the depth of the river by means of canals drawing off the water, so that the infantry could wade through it. But the preparations of the Pompeians to pass the Ebro were sooner finished than the arrangements of the Caesarians for investing Ilerda; when the former after finishing the bridge of boats began their march towards the Ebro along the left bank of the Sicoris, the canals of the Caesarians seemed to the general not yet far enough advanced to make the ford available for the infantry ; he ordered only his cavalry to pass the stream and, by clinging to the rear of the enemy, at least to detain
and harass them.
But when Caesar's legions saw in the gray morning the
enemy's columns which had been retiring since midnight, they discerned with the sure instinct of experienced veterans the strategic importance of this retreat, which would compel them to follow their antagonists into distant and impracticable regions filled by hostile troops ; at their own request the general ventured to lead the infantry also into the river, and although the water reached up to the shoulders of the men, it was crossed without accident. It was high time. If the narrow plain, which separated the town of Ilerda from the mountains enclosing the Ebro were once traversed and the army of the Pompeians entered the mountains, their retreat to the Ebro could no longer be prevented. Already they had, notwithstanding the constant attacks of the enemy's cavalry which greatly delayed their march, approached within five miles of the mountains, when they, having been on the march since midnight and unspeakably exhausted, abandoned their original plan of traversing the whole plain on the same day, and pitched their camp. Here the infantry of Caesar
overtook them and encamped opposite to them in the
224
BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, book v
chap, x PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS
225
evening and during the night, as the nocturnal march which the Pompeians had at first contemplated was abandoned from fear of the night-attacks of the cavalry. On the following day also both armies remained immove able, occupied only in reconnoitring the country.
Early in the morning of the third day Caesar's infantry The route set out, that by a movement through the pathless mountains %£? alongside of the road they might turn the position of the closed, enemy and bar their route to the Ebro. The object of the
strange march, which seemed at first to turn back towards
the camp before Ilerda, was not at once perceived by the Pompeian officers. When they discerned they sacrificed
camp and baggage and advanced forced march along
the highway, to gain the crest of the ridge before the Caesarians. But was already too late when they came
up, the compact masses of the enemy were already posted
on the highway itself. A desperate attempt of the Pompeians to discover other routes to the Ebro over the
steep mountains was frustrated by Caesar's cavalry, which surrounded and cut to pieces the Lusitanian troops sent
forth for that purpose. Had battle taken place between
the Pompeian army—which had the enemy's cavalry in its
rear and their infantry in front, and was utterly demoralized
—and the Caesarians, the issue was scarcely doubtful, and
the opportunity for fighting several times presented itself;
but Caesar made no use of and, not without difficulty, restrained the impatient eagerness for the combat in his
soldiers sure of victory. The Pompeian army was at any
rate strategically lost Caesar avoided weakening his army
and still further envenoming the bitter feud by useless bloodshed. On the very day after he had succeeded in
cutting off the Pompeians from the Ebro, the soldiers of
the two armies had begun to fraternize and to negotiate respecting surrender; indeed the terms asked by the Pompeians, especially as to the sparing of their officers,
TOUT
I48
;
it, a
it
;
it,
by a
Capitula-
226 BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, book v
had been already conceded by Caesar, when Petreius with his escort consisting of slaves and Spaniards came upon the negotiators and caused the Caesarians, on whom he could lay hands, to be put to death. Caesar nevertheless sent the Pompeians who had come to his camp back un harmed, and persevered in seeking a peaceful solution. Ilerda, where the Pompeians had still a garrison and con siderable magazines, became now the point which they sought to reach ; but with the hostile army in front and the Sicoris between them and the fortress, they marched without coming nearer to their object. Their cavalry became gradually so afraid that the infantry had to take them into the centre and legions had to be set as the rear guard; the procuring of water and forage became more and more difficult ; they had already to kill the beasts of burden, because they could no longer feed them. At length the wandering army found itself formally inclosed, with the Sicoris in its rear and the enemy's force in front, which drew rampart and trench around It attempted to cross the river, but Caesar's German horsemen and light infantry anticipated in the occupation of the opposite bank.
No bravery and no fidelity could longer avert the in-
Pom- [49. evitable capitulation Aug. 705). Caesar granted to
peian*.
officers and soldiers their life and liberty, and the posses sion of the property which they still retained as well as the restoration of what had been already taken from them, the full value of which he undertook personally to make good to his soldiers and not only so, but while he had compul- sorily enrolled in his army the recruits captured in Italy, he honoured these old legionaries of Pompeius by the promise that no one should be compelled against his will to enter Caesar's army. He required only that each should give up his arms and repair to his home. Accordingly the soldiers who were natives of Spain, about third of the
a
it.
;
(2
it
chap, x PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS 8tf
army, were disbanded at once, while the Italian soldiers were discharged on the borders of Transalpine and Cis alpine Gaul.
Hither Spain on the breaking up of this army fell of Furthw itself into the power of the victor. In Further Spain, where ^Jiti. Marcus Varro held the chief command for Pompeius, it
seemed to him, when he learned the disaster of Ilerda,
most advisable that he should throw himself into the insular
town of Gades and should carry thither for safety the con siderable sums which he had collected by confiscating the treasures of the temples and the property of prominent Caesarians, the not inconsiderable fleet which he had
raised, and the two legions entrusted to him. But on the
mere rumour of Caesar's arrival the most notable towns of
the province which had been for long attached to Caesar declared for the latter and drove away the Pompeian garrisons or induced them to a similar revolt; such was
the case with Corduba, Carmo, and Gades itself. One of
the legions also set out of its own accord for Hispalis, and
passed over along with this town to Caesar's side. When
at length even Italica closed its gates against Varro, the
latter resolved to capitulate.
About the same time Massilia also submitted. With Siege of rare energy the Massiliots had not merely sustained a siege,
but had also kept the sea against Caesar; it was their
native element, and they might hope to obtain vigorous
support on it from Pompeius, who in fact had the exclusive command of it But Caesar's lieutenant, the able Decimus Brutus, the same who had achieved the first naval victory in the Atlantic over the Veneti /), managed rapidly to equip fleet and in spite of the brave resistance of the enemy's crews —consisting partly of Albioecian mercenaries of the Massiliots, partly of slave-herdsmen of Domitius — he vanquished by means of his brave marines selected from the legions the stronger Massiliot fleet, and sank or captured
a ;
(p.
5 5
228 BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, book v
the greater part of their ships. When therefore a small Pompeian squadron under Lucius Nasidius arrived from the east by way of Sicily and Sardinia in the port of Massilia, the Massiliots once more renewed their naval armament and sailed forth along with the ships of Nasidius against Brutus. The engagement which took place off Taurocis (La Ciotat to the east of Marseilles) might prob ably have had a different result, if the vessels of Nasidius had fought with the same desperate courage which the Massiliots displayed on that day; but the flight of the Nasidians decided the victory in favour of Brutus, and the remains of the Pompeian fleet fled to Spain. The besieged were completely driven from the sea. On the landward side, where Gaius Trebonius conducted the siege, the most resolute resistance was still continued ; but in spite of the frequent sallies of the Albioecian mercenaries and the skilful expenditure of the immense stores of projectiles accumu
lated in the city, the works of the besiegers were at length advanced up to the walls and one of the towers felL The Massiliots declared that they would give up the defence, but desired to conclude the capitulation with Caesar him self, and entreated the Roman commander to suspend the siege operations till Caesar's arrival. Trebonius had ex press orders from Caesar to spare the town as far as possible ; he granted the armistice desired. But when the Massiliots made use of it for an artful sally, in which they completely burnt the one-half of the almost unguarded Roman works, the struggle of the siege began anew and with increased exasperation. The vigorous commander of the Romans repaired with surprising rapidity the destroyed towers and the mound; soon the Massiliots were once more completely invested.
When Caesar on his return from the conquest of Spain partly by the enemy's attacks, partly by famine and pesti
Massilia
capitulate*, arrived before their city, he found it reduced to extremities
CHAr. x PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS
129
lence, and ready for the second time—on this occasion in right earnest —to surrender on any terms. Domitius alone, remembering the indulgence of the victor which he had shamefully misused, embarked in a boat and stole through the Roman fleet, to seek a third battle-field for his implac able resentment Caesar's soldiers had sworn to put to the sword the whole male population of the perfidious city, and vehemently demanded from the general the signal for
But Caesar, mindful here also of his great task of establishing Helleno-Italic civilization in the west, was not to be coerced into furnishing a sequel to the destruc tion of Corinth. Massilia —the most remote from the mother-country of all those cities, once so numerous, free, and powerful, that belonged to the old Ionic mariner- nation, and almost the last in which the Hellenic seafaring life had preserved itself fresh and pure, as in fact it was the last Greek city that fought at sea — Massilia had to surrender its magazines of arms and naval stores to the victor, and lost a portion of its territory and of its privi leges; but it retained its freedom and its nationality and continued, though with diminished proportions in a material point of view, to be still as before intellectually the centre of Hellenic culture in that distant Celtic country which at this very time was attaining a new historical significance.
While thus in the western provinces the war after Expedi- various critical vicissitudes was thoroughly decided at Caesar to length in favour of Caesar, Spain and Massilia were the corn- subdued, and the chief army of the enemy was captured
to the last man, the decision of arms had also taken place
on the second arena of warfare, on which Caesar had
found it necessary immediately after the conquest of Itaiy
to assume the offensive.
We have already mentioned that the Pompeians intended to reduce Italy to starvation. They had the
plunder.
Sardinia occupied.
Sicily occupied.
Landing of Cuno in
23°
BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA,
means of doing so in their hands. They had thorough command of the sea and laboured with great zeal every where — in Gades, Utica, Messana, above all in the east — to increase their fleet. They held moreover all the
from which the capital drew its means of subsistence : Sardinia and Corsica through Marcus Cotta,
provinces,
Marcus Cato, Africa through the self- nominated commander-in-chief Titus Attius Varus and
their ally Juba king of Numidia. It was indispensably needful for Caesar to thwart these plans of the enemy and to wrest from them the corn-provinces. Quintus Valerius was sent with a legion to Sardinia and compelled the Pompeian governor to evacuate the island. The more important enterprise of taking Sicily and Africa from the enemy was entrusted to the young Gaius Curio with the assistance of the able Gaius Caninius Rebilus, who possessed experience in war. Sicily was occupied by him without a blow; Cato, without a proper army and not a man of the sword, evacuated the island, after having in his straightforward manner previously warned the Siceliots not to compromise themselves uselessly by an ineffectual resistance.
Curio left behind half of his troops to protect this island s0 important for the capital, and embarked with the other half—two legions and 500 horsemen —for Africa. Here he might expect to encounter more serious resistance;
besides the considerable and in its own fashion efficient army of Juba, the governor Varus had formed two legions from the Romans settled in Africa and also fitted out a small squadron of ten sail. With the aid of his superior fleet, however, Curio effected without difficulty a landing between Hadrumetum, where the one legion of the enemy lay along with their ships of war, and Utica, in front of which town lay the second legion under Varus himself. Curio turned against the latter, and pitched his camp not
Sicily through
chap, X PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS
331
far from Utica, just where a century and a half before the elder Scipio had taken up his first winter-camp in Africa
Caesar, compelled to keep together his best troops for the Spanish war, had been obliged to make up the Sicilo-African army for the most part out of the legions taken over from the enemy, more especially the war- prisoners of Corfinium ; the officers of the Pompeian army in Africa, some of whom had served in the very legions that were conquered at Corfinium, now left no means untried to bring back their old soldiers who were now fighting against them to their first allegiance. But Caesar had not erred in the choice of his lieutenant Curio knew as well how to direct the movements of the army and of the fleet, as how to acquire personal influence over the soldiers ; the supplies were abundant, the conflicts without exception successful.
When Varus, presuming that the troops of Curio wanted Curio opportunity to pass over to his side, resolved to give battle atlittesL chiefly for the sake of affording them this opportunity, the
result did not justify his expectations. Animated by the
fiery appeal of their youthful leader, the cavalry of Curio put to flight the horsemen of the enemy, and in presence of the two armies cut down also the light infantry which had accompanied the horsemen ; and emboldened by this success and by Curio's personal example, his legions advanced through the difficult ravine separating the two lines to the attack, for which the Pompeians however did not wait, but disgracefully fled back to their camp and evacuated even this in the ensuing night The victory was so complete that Curio at once took steps to besiege Utica. When news arrived, however, that king Juba was advancing with all his forces to its relief, Curio resolved, just as Scipio had done on the arrival of Syphax, to raise the siege and to return to Scipio's former camp till rein forcements should arrive from Sicily. Soon afterwards
(". 3SS)-
Curio defeated
by Juba on the
Bagradas.
came a second report, that king Juba had been induced by the attacks of neighbouring princes to turn back with his main force and was sending to the aid of the besieged merely a moderate corps under Saburra. Curio, who from his lively temperament had only with great reluctance made up his mind to rest, now set out again at once to fight with Saburra before he could enter into communi cation with the garrison of Utica.
His cavalry, which had gone forward in the evening, actually succeeded in surprising the corps of Saburra on the Bagradas during the night and inflicting much damage upon it ; and on the news of this victory Curio hastened the march of the infantry, in order by their means to complete the defeat. Soon they perceived on the last slopes of the heights that sank towards the Bagradas the corps of Saburra, which was skirmishing with the Roman horsemen ; the legions coming up helped to drive it completely down into the plain. But here the combat changed its aspect. Saburra was not, as they supposed, destitute of support ; on the contrary he was not much more than five miles distant from the Numidian main force. Already the flower of the Numidian infantry and
2000 Gallic and Spanish horsemen had arrived on the field of battle to support Saburra, and the king in person with the bulk of the army and sixteen elephants was approaching. After the nocturnal march and the hot conflict there were at the moment not more than 200 of the Roman cavalry together, and these as well as the infantry, extremely exhausted by fatigue and fighting, were all surrounded, in the wide plain into which they had allowed themselves to be allured, by the continually increasing hosts of the enemy. Vainly Curio endeavoured to engage in close combat ; the Libyan horsemen retreated, as they were wont, so soon as a Roman division advanced, only to pursue it when it turned. In vain he attempted
232
BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, BOOK V
chap, x PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS
233
to regain the heights; they were occupied and foreclosed
by the enemy's horse. All was lost. The infantry was
cut down to the last man. Of the cavalry a few succeeded Death of in cutting their way through ; Curio too might have Cnria probably saved himself, but he could not bear to appear
alone before his master without the army entrusted to him,
and died sword in hand. Even the force which was collected in the camp before Utica, and that which
guarded the fleet — which might so easily have escaped to
Sicily — surrendered under the impression made by the
fearfully rapid catastrophe on the following day to Varus
(Aug. or Sept. 705). «.
So ended the expedition arranged by Caesar to Sicily and Africa. It attained its object so far, since by the occupation of Sicily in connection with that of Sardinia at least the most urgent wants of the capital were relieved ; the miscarriage of the conquest of Africa—from which the victorious party drew no farther substantial gain—and the loss of two untrustworthy legions might be got over. But the early death of Curio was an irreparable loss for Caesar, and indeed for Rome. Not without reason had Caesar entrusted the most important independent command to this young man, although he had no military experience and
was notorious for his dissolute life ; there was a spark of Caesar's own spirit in the fiery youth. He resembled Caesar, inasmuch as he too had drained the cup of pleasure to the dregs ; inasmuch as he did not become a statesman because he was an officer, but on the contrary it was his political action that placed the sword in his hands ; inas much as his eloquence was not that of rounded periods, but the eloquence of deeply-felt thought; inasmuch as his mode of warfare was based on rapid action with slight means ; inasmuch as his character was marked by levity and often by frivolity, by pleasant frankness and thorough life in the moment. as his general says of him, youthful
If,
Pompeius'
'
campaign for 705.
How far these events of the war in 705 interfered with Pompeius' general plan for the campaign, and particularly what part in that plan was assigned after the loss of Italy to the important military corps in the west, can
234
BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, book v
fire and high courage carried him into incautious acts, and if he too proudly accepted death that he might not submit to be pardoned for a pardonable fault, traits of similar imprudence and similar pride are not wanting in Caesar's history also. We may regret that this exuberant nature was not permitted to work off its follies and to preserve itself for the following generation so miserably poor in talents, and so rapidly falling a prey to the dreadful rule of mediocrities.
only be determined by conjecture. That Pompeius had the intention of coming by way of Africa and Mauretania to
the aid of his army fighting in Spain, was simply a romantic, and beyond doubt altogether groundless, rumour circu lating in the camp of Ilerda. It is much more likely that he still kept by his earlier plan of attacking Caesar from both sides in Transalpine and Cisalpine Gaul (p. 206) even after the loss of Italy, and meditated a combined attack at once from Spain and Macedonia. It may be presumed that the Spanish army was meant to remain on the defensive at the Pyrenees till the Macedonian army in the course of organization was likewise ready to march ; whereupon both would then have started simultaneously and effected a junction according to circumstances either on the Rhone or on the Po, while the fleet, it may be conjectured, would have attempted at the same time to reconquer Italy proper. On this supposition apparently Caesar had first prepared himself to meet an attack on Italy. One of the ablest of his officers, the tribune of the people Marcus Antonius, commanded there with propraetorian powers. The south eastern ports — Sipus, Brundisium, Tarentum — where an attempt at landing was first to be expected, had received a garrison of three legions. Besides this Quintus Hortensius,
chap, X PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS
135
the degenerate son of the well-known orator, collected a fleet in the Tyrrhene Sea, and Publius Dolabella a second fleet in the Adriatic, which were to be employed partly to support the defence, partly to transport the intended expedition to Greece. In the event of Pompeius attempting to penetrate by land into Italy, Marcus Licinius Crassus, the eldest son of the old colleague of Caesar, was to conduct the defence of Cisalpine Gaul, Gaius the younger brother of Marcus Antonius that of Illyricum.
But the expected attack was long in coming. It was Caesar's not till the height of summer that the conflict began in ^^ Illyria. There Caesar's lieutenant Gaius Antonius with Illyricum
estrojr
his two legions lay in the island of Curicta (Veglia in the gulf of Quarnero), and Caesar's admiral Publius Dolabella with forty ships lay in the narrow arm of the sea between this island and the mainland. The admirals of Pompeius in the Adriatic, Marcus Octavius with the Greek, Lucius
Scribonius Libo with the Illyrian division of the fleet, attacked the squadron of Dolabella, destroyed all his ships, and cut off Antonius on his island. To rescue him, a corps under Basilus and Sallustius came from Italy and the squadron of Hortensius from the Tyrrhene Sea; but neither the former nor the latter were able to effect anything in presence of the far superior fleet of the enemy. The legions of Antonius had to be abandoned to their fate. Provisions came to an end, the troops became troublesome and mutinous ; with the exception of a few divisions, which succeeded in reaching the mainland on rafts, the corps, still fifteen cohorts strong, laid down their arms and were conveyed in the vessels of Libo to Macedonia to be there incorporated with the Pompeian army, while Octavius was left to complete the subjugation of the Illyrian coast now denuded of troops. The Dalmatae, now far the most powerful tribe in these regions (p. 103), the important insular town of Issa (Lissa), and other townships, embraced
Result
the party of Pompeius; but the adherents of Caesar maintained themselves in Salonae (Spalato) and Lissus (Alessio), and in the former town not merely sustained with courage a siege, but when they were reduced to extremities, made a sally with such effect that Octavius raised the siege and sailed off to Dyrrhachium to pass the winter there.
The success achieved in Illyricum by the Pompeian ^eet, alth°ugh of itself not inconsiderable, had yet but little influence on the issue of the campaign as a whole ; and it appears miserably small, when we consider that the performances of the land and naval forces under the supreme command of Pompeius during the whole eventful
campaign as a whole,
*3fi
BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, book v
40. year 705 were confined to this single feat of arms, and that from the east, where the general, the senate, the second great army, the principal fleet, the immense military and still more extensive financial resources of the antagon ists of Caesar were united, no intervention at all took place where it was needed in that all-decisive struggle in the west. The scattered condition of the forces in the eastern half of the empire, the method of the general never to operate except with superior masses, his cumbrous and tedious movements, and the discord of the coalition perhaps explain in some measure, though not excuse, the inactivity of the land-force ; but that the fleet, which commanded the Mediterranean without a rival, should have thus done nothing to influence the course of affairs — nothing for Spain, next to nothing for the faithful Massiliots, nothing to defend Sardinia, Sicily, Africa, or, if not to reoccupy Italy, at least to obstruct its supplies — this makes demands on our ideas of the confusion and per versity prevailing in the Pompeian camp, which we can
only with difficulty meet.
The aggregate result of this campaign was corresponding.
Caesar's double aggressive movement, against Spain and against Sicily and Africa, was successful in the former cue
may
chap, x PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS
sfi
completely, in the latter at least partially ; while Pompeius* plan of starving Italy was thwarted in the main by the taking away of Sicily, and his general plan of campaign was frustrated completely by the destruction of the Spanish army ; and in Italy only a very small portion of Caesar's defensive arrangements had come to be applied. Notwith standing the painfully -felt losses in Africa and Illyria, Caesar came forth from this first year of the war in the most decided and most decisive manner as victor.
however, nothing material was done from the east to obstruct Caesar in the subjugation of the west, efforts at ? ^L! ° least were made towards securing political and military donia. consolidation there during the respite so ignominiously obtained. The great rendezvous of the opponents of Caesar was Macedonia. Thither Pompeius himself and The the mass of the emigrants from Brundisium resorted; emgran thither came the other refugees from the west Marcus
Cato from Sicily, Lucius Domitius from Massilia, but more
especially
In Italy emigration gradually became question not of honour merely but obtained fresh impulse through
Varro at their head.
among the aristocrats
almost of fashion, and
the unfavourable accounts which arrived regarding Caesar's position before Ilerda noC few of the more lukewarm partisans and the political trimmers went over degrees, and even Marcus Cicero at last persuaded himself that he did not adequately discharge his duty as citizen
writing dissertation on concord. The senate of emigrants at
Thessalonica, where the official Rome pitched its interim* abode, numbered nearly 200 members, including many venerable old men and almost all the consulars. But emigrants indeed they were. This Roman Coblentz displayed pitiful spectacle in the high pretensions and paltry performances of the genteel world of Rome, their
Organln-
number of the best officers and soldiers of the broken-up army of Spain, with its generals Afranius and
a
a
a
a
by
by :
;
it a
a
a
If,
The hkewa1m.
unseasonable reminiscences and still more unseasonable recriminations, their political perversities and financial embarrassments. It was a matter of comparatively slight moment that, while the old structure was falling to pieces, they were with the most painstaking gravity watching over every old ornamental scroll and every speck of rust in the constitution ; after all it was simply ridiculous, when the genteel lords had scruples of conscience as to calling their deliberative assembly beyond the sacred soil of the city the senate, and cautiously gave it the title of the "three hundred " ; 1 or when they instituted tedious investigations in state law as to whether and how a curiate law could be legitimately enacted elsewhere than within the ring-wall of
Rome.
Far worse traits were the indifference of the lukewarm
and the narrow-minded stubbornness of the ultras. The former could not be brought to act or even to keep silence. If they were asked to exert themselves in some definite way for the common good, with the inconsistency charac teristic of weak people they regarded any such suggestion as a malicious attempt to compromise them still further, and either did not do what they were ordered at all or did it with half heart. At the same time of course, with their affectation of knowing better when it was too late and their over-wise impracticabilities, they proved a perpetual clog to those who were acting ; their daily work consisted in criticizing, ridiculing, and bemoaning every occurrence great
1 As according to formal law the "legal deliberative assembly " undoubtedly, just like the "legal court," could only take place in the city ' itself or within the precincts, the assembly representing the senate in the African army called itself the "three hundred" (Bell. Afric. 88, 90; Appian, 95), not because consisted of 300 members, but because this was the ancient normal number of senators 98). very likely that
this assembly recruited Its ranks by equitcs of repute but, when Plutarch makes the three hundred to be Italian wholesale dealers (Cato Min. 59, 61), he has misunderstood his authority [Bell. Afr. 90). Of a similar kind must have been the arrangement as to the quasi-senate already in Thessalonica.
138
BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, book v
;
It
(i.
is
ii.
it
chap, x PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS
239
and small, and in unnerving and discouraging the multitude by their own sluggishness and hopelessness.
While these displayed the utter prostration of weakness, The ultra* the ultras on the other hand exhibited in full display its exaggerated action. With them there was no attempt to
conceal that the preliminary to any negotiation for peace
was the bringing over of Caesar's head ; every one of the attempts towards peace, which Caesar repeatedly made even now, was tossed aside without being examined, or employed only to cover insidious attempts on the lives of the commissioners of their opponent. That the declared partisans of Caesar had jointly and severally forfeited life and property, was a matter of course; but it fared little better with those more or less neutral. Lucius Domitius, the hero of Corfinium, gravely proposed in the council of war that those senators who had fought in the army of Pompeius should come to a vote on all who had either re mained neutral or had emigrated but not entered the army, and should according to their own pleasure individually acquit them or punish them by fine or even by the forfeiture of life and property. Another of these ultras formally lodged with Pompeius a charge of corruption and treason against Lucius Afranius for his defective defence of Spain. Among these deep-dyed republicans their political theory assumed almost the character of a confession of religious faith ; they accordingly hated their own more lukewarm partisans and Pompeius with his personal adherents, if possible, still more than their open opponents, and that with all the dull obstinacy of hatred which is wont to characterize orthodox theologians; and they were mainly to blame for the numberless and bitter separate quarrels which distracted the emigrant army and emigrant senate. But they did not confine themselves to words. Marcus Bibulus, Titus Labienus, and others of this coterie carried out their theory in practice, and caused such officers or soldiers of Caesar'a
The pre-
^^,n*
army as fell into their hands to be executed en masse; which, as may well be conceived, did not tend to make Caesar's troops fight with less energy. If the counter revolution in favour of the friends of the constitution, for which all the elements were in existence 216), did not break out in Italy during Caesar's absence, the reason, according to the assurance of discerning opponents of Caesar, lay chiefly in the general dread of the unbridled fury of the republican ultras after the restoration should have taken place. The better men in the Pompeian camp were in despair over this frantic behaviour. Pompeius, himself brave soldier, spared the prisoners as far as he might and could but he was too pusillanimous and in too awkward position to prevent or even to punish all atrocities of this sort, as became him as commander-in- chief to do. Marcus Cato, the only man who at least carried moral consistency 4nto the struggle, attempted with more energy to check such proceedings he induced the emigrant senate to prohibit special decree the pillage of subject towns and the putting to death of burgess otherwise than in battle. The able Marcus Marcellus had similar views. No one, indeed, knew better than Cato and Marcellus that the extreme party would carry out their saving deeds, necessary, in defiance of all decrees of the senate. But even now, when they had still to regard considerations of prudence, the rage of the ultras could not be tamed, people might prepare themselves after the victory for reign of terror from which Marius and Sulla themselves would have turned away with horror; and we can understand why Cato, according to his own confession, was more afraid of the victory than of the defeat of his own party.
The management of the military preparations in the Macedonian camp was in the hands of Pompeius the commander-in-chief. His position, always troublesome
340
BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, book v
a
if if
a a
a
by a
;
it
;
(p.
chap, x PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS
241
and galling, had become still worse through the unfortunate events of 705. In the eyes of his partisans he was mainly *•. to blame for this result. This judgment was in various respects not just. A considerable part of the misfortunes endured was to be laid to the account of the perversity and insubordination of the lieutenant-generals,
of the consul Lentulus and Lucius Domitius; from the moment when Pompeius took the head of the army, he had led it with skill and courage, and had saved at least very considerable forces from the shipwreck; that he was not a match for Caesar's altogether superior genius, which was now recognized by all, could not be
made matter of reproach to him. But the result alone decided men's judgment. Trusting to the general Pompeius,
the constitutional party had broken with Caesar; the pernicious consequences of this breach recoiled upon the general Pompeius; and, though owing to the notorious military incapacity of all the other chiefs no attempt was made to change the supreme command, yet confidence at
any rate in the commander-in-chief was paralyzed. To these painful consequences of the defeats endured were added the injurious influences of the emigration. Among the refugees who arrived there were certainly a number of efficient soldiers and capable officers, especially those belonging to the former Spanish army ; but the number of those who came to serve and fight was just as small as that of the generals of quality who called themselves pro consuls and imperators with as good title as Pompeius, and of the genteel lords who took part in active military service more or less reluctantly, was
alarmingly great. Through these the mode of life in the capital was introduced
into the camp, not at all to the advantage of the army ; the tents of such grandees were graceful bowers, the ground elegantly covered with fresh turf, the walls clothed with ivy; silver plate stood on the table, and the wine-cup
VOL V
149
especially
fairly
,
The
often circulated there even in broad daylight. Those fashionable warriors formed a singular contrast with Caesar's daredevils, who ate coarse bread from which the former recoiled, and who, when that failed, devoured even roots and swore that they would rather chew the bark of trees than desist from the enemy. While, moreover, the action of Pompeius was hampered by the necessity of having regard to the authority of a collegiate board personally disinclined to him, this embarrassment was singularly increased when the senate of emigrants took up its abode almost in his very headquarters and all the venom of the emigrants now found vent in these senatorial sittings. Lastly there was nowhere any man of mark, who could have thrown his own weight into the scale against all these preposterous doings. Pompeius himself was in tellectually far too secondary for that purpose, and far too hesitating, awkward, and reserved. Marcus Cato would have had at least the requisite moral authority, and would not have lacked the good will to support Pompeius with it ; but Pompeius, instead of calling him to his assistance, out of distrustful jealousy kept him in the background, and preferred for instance to commit the highly important chief command of the fleet to the in every respect incapable Marcus Bibulus rather than to Cato.
While Pompeius thus treated the political aspect of *"s position with his characteristic perversity, and did his best to make what was already bad in itself still worse, he devoted himself on the other hand with commendable zeal to his duty of giving military organization to the considerable but scattered forces of his party. The flower of his force was composed of the troops brought with him from Italy, out of which with the supplementary aid of the Illyrian prisoners of war and the Romans domiciled in Greece five legions in all were formed. Three others came from the east — the two Syrian legions formed from
pSnwdul Pompeius.
242
BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, book v
chap, X PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS
243
the remains of the army of Crassus, and one made up out of the two weak legions hitherto stationed in Cilicia. Nothing stood in the way of the withdrawal of these corps of occupation : because on the one hand the Pompeians had an understanding with the Parthians, and might even have had an alliance with them if Pompeius had not indignantly refused to pay them the price which they demanded for it—the cession of the Syrian province added by himself to the empire ; and on the other hand Caesar's plan of despatching two legions to Syria, and inducing the Jews once more to take up arms by means of the prince Aristobulus kept a prisoner in Rome, was frustrated partly by other causes, partly by the death of Aristobulus. New legions were moreover raised—one from the veteran soldiers settled in Crete and Macedonia, two from the Romans of Asia Minor. To all these fell to be added 2000 volunteers, who were derived from the remains of the Spanish select corps and other similar sources ; and, lastly, the contingents of the subjects. Pompeius like Caesar had disdained to make requisitions of infantry from them ; only the Epirot, Aetolian, and Thracian militia were called out
to guard the coast, and moreover 3000 archers from Greece
and Asia Minor and 1200 slingers were taken up as light
troops.
The cavalry on the other hand — with the exception of Hb
a noble guard, more respectable than militarily important, CAy**f- formed from the young aristocracy of Rome, and of the Apulian slave - herdsmen whom Pompeius had mounted
205)—consisted exclusively of the contingents of the subjects and clients of Rome.
The flower of consisted of the Celts, partly from the garrison of Alexandria (iv. 452), partly the contingents of king Deiotarus who in spite of his great age had appeared person at the head of his
and of the other Galatian dynasts. With them were associated the excellent Thracian horsemen, who
troops,
in
it
(p.
Fleet.
were partly brought up by their princes Sadala and Rhascuporis, partly enlisted by Pompeius in the Mace donian province ; the Cappadocian cavalry ; the mounted archers sent by Antiochus king of Commagene ; the con tingents of the Armenians from the west side of the Euphrates under Taxiles, and from the other side under Megabates, and the Numidian bands sent by king Juba —the whole body amounted to 7000 horsemen.
Lastly the fleet of Pompeius was very considerable. It was formed partly of the Roman transports brought from Brundisium or subsequently built, partly of the war vessels of the king of Egypt, of the Colchian princes, of the Cilician dynast Tarcondimotus, of the cities of Tyre, Rhodes, Athens, Corcyra, and generally of all the Asiatic and Greek maritime states; and it numbered nearly 500 sail, of which the Roman vessels formed a fifth. Immense magazines of corn and military stores were accumulated in Dyrrhachium. The war-chest was well filled, for the Pompeians found themselves in possession of the principal sources of the public revenue and turned to their own account the moneyed resources of the client-princes, of the senators of distinction, of the farmers of the taxes, and generally of the whole Roman and non-Roman
lation within their reach. Every appliance that the reputation of the legitimate government and the much- renowned protectorship of Pompeius over kings and peoples could move in Africa, Egypt, Macedonia, Greece, Western Asia and Syria, had been put in motion for the protection of the Roman republic; the report which circulated in Italy that Pompeius was arming the Getae, Colchians, and Armenians against Rome, and the designation of " king of kings" given to Pompeius in the camp, could hardly be called exaggerations. On the whole he had command over an army of 7000 cavalry and eleven legions, of whicht it is true, but five at the most could be described as
244
BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, book v
popu
chap, x PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS
845
accustomed to war, and over a fleet of 500 saiL The temper of the soldiers, for whose provisioning and pay Pompeius manifested adequate care, and to whom in the event of victory the most abundant rewards were promised, was throughout good, in several—and these precisely the most efficient — divisions even excellent; but a great part of the army consisted of newly-raised troops, the formation and training of which, however zealously it was prosecuted, necessarily required time. The force altogether was imposing, but at the same time of a some what motley character.
According to the design of the commander-in-chief the Junction army and fleet were to be in substance completely united p,,,,TM^ by the winter of 705-706 along the coast and in the waters [49-48.
of Epirus. The admiral Bibulus had already arrived with
1 10 ships at his new headquarters, Corcyra. On the other hand the land-army, the headquarters of which had been during the summer at Berrhoea on the Haliacmon, had not yet come up ; the mass of it was moving slowly along the great highway from Thessalonica towards the west coast to the future headquarters Dyrrhachium ; the two legions, which Metellus Scipio was bringing up from Syria, remained at Pergamus in Asia for winter quarters and were expected in Europe only towards spring. They were taking time in fact for their movements. For the moment the ports of Epirus were guarded, over and above the fleet, merely by their own civic defences and the levies of the adjoining districts.
Tt thus remained possible for Caesar, notwithstanding Caesar the intervention of the Spanish war, to assume the offensive p^^u,, also in Macedonia ; and he at least was not slow to act
He had long ago ordered the collection of vessels of war
and transports in Brundisium, and after the capitulation
of the Spanish army and the fall of Massilia had directed
the greater portion of the select troops employed there
coast of Epirus.
*|£
BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, book v
to proceed to that destination. The unparalleled exer tions no doubt, which were thus required by Caesar from his soldiers, thinned the ranks more than their conflicts had done, and the mutiny of one of the four oldest legions, the ninth, on its march through Placentia was a dangerous indication of the temper prevailing in the army ; but Caesar's presence of mind and personal authority gained the mastery, and from this quarter nothing impeded the embarkation. But the want of ships, through which the
48. pursuit of Pompeius had failed in March 705, threatened also to frustrate this expedition. The war-vessels, which Caesar had given orders to build in the Gallic, Sicilian, and Italian ports, were not yet ready or at any rate not on the spot ; his squadron in the Adriatic had been in the previous year destroyed at Curicta 235) he found at Brundisium not more than twelve ships of war and scarcely transports enough to convey over at once the third part of his army — of twelve legions and 10,000 cavalry — destined for Greece. The considerable fleet of the enemy exclusively commanded the Adriatic and especially all the harbours of the mainland and islands on its eastern coast. Under such circumstances the question presents itself, why Caesar did not instead of the maritime route choose the land route through Illyria, which relieved him from all the perils threatened the fleet and besides was shorter for his troops, who mostly came from Gaul, than the route by Brundisium. It true that the regions of Illyria were rugged and poor beyond description but they were traversed by other armies not long afterwards, and this obstacle can hardly have appeared insurmountable to the conqueror of Gaul. Perhaps he apprehended that during the troublesome march through
Illyria Pompeius might convey his whole force over the Adriatic, whereby their parts might come at once to be changed — with Caesar in Macedonia, and Pompeius in
;
is
by
(p.
;
chap, x PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS
a47
Italy ; although such a rapid change was scarcely to be expected from his slow-moving antagonist Perhaps Caesar had decided for the mariume route on the supposition that his fleet would meanwhile be brought into a condi tion to command respect, and, when after his return from Spain he became aware of the true state of things in the Adriatic, it might be too late to change the plan of campaign. Perhaps —and, in accordance with Caesar's quick temperament always urging him to decision, we may even say in all probability —he found himself irre sistibly tempted by the circumstance that the Epirot coast was still at the moment unoccupied but would certainly be covered in a few days by the enemy, to thwart once more by a bold stroke the whole plan of his antagonist
However this may be, on the 4th Jan. 706 1 Caesar set 48.
sail with six legions greatly thinned by toil and sickness lancJ^n and 600 horsemen from Brundisium for the coast of Epirui. Epirus. It was a counterpart to the foolhardy Britannic expedition ; but at least the first throw was fortunate.
The coast was reached in the middle of the Acrocer-
aunian (Chimara) cliffs, at the little-frequented roadstead
of Paleassa (Paljassa). The transports were seen both
from the harbour of Oricum (creek of Avlona) where a Pompeian squadron of eighteen sail was lying, and from
the headquarters of the hostile fleet at Corcyra ; but in
the one quarter they deemed themselves too weak, in the
other they were not ready to sail, so that the first freight
was landed without hindrance. While the vessels at
once returned to bring over the second, Caesar on that
same evening scaled the Acroceraunian mountains. His First
success*
1 According to the rectified calendar on the 5th Nov. 705. 49.
first successes were as great as the surprise of his enemies. The Epirot militia nowhere offered resistance ; the import ant seaport towns of Oricum and Apollonia along with a
Caesar cut Italy.
number of smaller townships were taken, and Dyrrhachium, selected by the Pompeians as their chief arsenal and filled with stores of all sorts, but only feebly garrisoned, was in the utmost danger.
But the further course of the campaign did not cor- respond to this brilliant beginning. Bibulus subsequently made up in some measure for the negligence, of which he had allowed himself to be guilty, by redoubling his exer tions. He not only captured nearly thirty of the trans ports returning home, and caused them with every living thing on board to be burnt, but he also established along the whole district of coast occupied by Caesar, from the island Sason (Saseno) as far as the ports of Corcyra, a most careful watch, however troublesome it was rendered by the inclement season of the year and the necessity of bringing everything necessary for the guard-ships, even wood and water, from Corcyra ; in fact his successor Libo —for he himself soon succumbed to the unwonted fatigues —even blockaded for a time the port of Brundisium, till the want of water again dislodged him from the little island in front of it on which he had established himself. It was not possible for Caesar's officers to convey the second
of the army over to their general. As little did he himself succeed in the capture of Dyrrhachium. Pom- peius learned through one of Caesar's peace envoys as to his preparations for the voyage to the Epirot coast, and, thereupon accelerating his march, threw himself just at the right time into that important arsenal. The situation of Caesar was critical. Although he extended his range in Epirus as far as with his slight strength was at all possible, the subsistence of his army remained difficult and precari ous, while the enemy, in possession of the magazines of Dyrrhachium and masters of the sea, had abundance of
248
BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, book ^
portion
With his army presumably little above 20,000 strong he could not offer battle to that of Pompeius at
everything.
chap, x PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS
949
least twice as numerous, but had to deem himself fortunate that Pompeius went methodically to work and, instead of immediately forcing a battle, took up his winter quarters between Dyrrhachium and Apollonia on the right bank of the Apsus, facing Caesar on the left, in order that after the arrival of the legions from Pergamus in the spring he might annihilate the enemy with an irresistibly superior force. Thus months passed. If the arrival of the better season, which brought to the enemy a strong additional force and the free use of his fleet, found Caesar still in the same position, he was to all appearance lost, with his weak band wedged in among the rocks of Epirus between the immense fleet and the three times superior land army of the enemy; and already the winter was drawing to a close. His sole hope still depended on the transport fleet ; that it should steal or fight its way through the blockade was hardly to be hoped for; but after the first voluntary foolhardiness this second venture was enjoined by necessity. How desperate his situation appeared to Caesar himself, is shown by his resolution —when the fleet still came not— to sail alone in a fisherman's boat across the Adriatic to Brundisium in order to fetch it; which, in reality, was only abandoned because no mariner was found to under take the daring voyage.
But his appearance in person was not needed to induce Antonha the faithful officer who commanded in Italy, Marcus jjpLnu? * Antonius, to make this last effort for the saving of his
master. Once more the transport fleet, with four legions
and 800 horsemen on board, sailed from the harbour of Brundisium, and fortunately a strong south wind carried it
past Libo's galleys. But the same wind, which thus saved
the fleet, rendered it impossible for it to land as it was
directed on the coast of Apollonia, and compelled it to
sail past the camps of Caesar and Pompeius and to steer
to the north of Dyrrhachium towards Lissus, which town
Junction
85o
BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, book v
fortunately still adhered to Caesar 236). When sailed past the harbour of Dyrrhachium, the Rhodian galleys started in pursuit, and hardly had the ships of Antonius entered the port of Lissus when the enemy's squadron appeared before But just at this moment the wind suddenly veered, and drove the pursuing galleys back into the open sea and partly on the rocky coast Through the most marvellous good fortune the landing of the second freight had also been successful.
Antonius and Caesar were no doubt still some four armr"" days' march from each other, separated by Dyrrhachium
and the whole army of the enemy but Antonius happily effected the perilous march round about Dyrrhachium through the passes of the Graba Balkan, and was received by Caesar, who had gone to meet him, on the right bank of the Apsus. Pompeius, after having vainly attempted to prevent the junction of the two armies of the enemy and to force the corps of Antonius to fight itself, took up new position at Asparagium on the river Genusus (Skumbi), which flows parallel to the Apsus between the latter and the town of Dyrrhachium, and here remained once more immoveable. Caesar felt himself now strong enough to give battle but Pompeius declined it On the other hand Caesar succeeded in deceiving his adversary and throwing himself unawares with his better marching troops, just as at Ilerda, between the enemy's camp and the fortress of Dyrrhachium on which rested as basis. The chain of the Graba Balkan, which stretching in direction from east to west ends on the Adriatic the narrow tongue of land at Dyrrhachium, sends off—fourteen miles to the east of Dyrrhachium —in south-westerly direc tion lateral branch which likewise turns in the form of crescent towards the sea, and the main chain and lateral branch of the mountains enclose between themselves small plain extending round cliff on the seashore. Here
a
it
a
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a5i
Pompeius now took up his camp, and, although Caesar's army kept the land route to Dyrrhachium closed against him, he yet with the aid of his fleet remained constantly in communication with the town and was amply and easily provided from it with everything needful ; while among the Caesarians, notwithstanding strong detachments to the country lying behind, and notwithstanding all the exertions of the general to bring about an organized system of con veyance and thereby a regular supply, there was more than scarcity, and flesh, barley, nay even roots had very fre quently to take the place of the wheat to which they were accustomed.
As his phlegmatic opponent persevered in his inaction, Caesar Caesar undertook to occupy the circle of heights which J^? *0^"
enclosed the plain on the shore held by Pompeius, with the view of being able at least to arrest the movements of the superior cavalry of the enemy and to operate with more freedom against Dyrrhachium, and if possible to compel his opponent either to battle or to embarkation. Nearly the half of Caesar's troops was detached to the interior; it seemed almost Quixotic to propose with the rest virtually to besiege an army perhaps twice as strong, concentrated in position, and resting on the sea and the fleet. Yet Caesar's veterans by infinite exertions invested the Pom- peian camp with a chain of posts sixteen miles long, and afterwards added, just as before Alesia, to this inner line a second outer one, to protect themselves against attacks from Dyrrhachium and against attempts to turn their position which could so easily be executed with the aid of the fleet. Pompeius attacked more than once portions of these entrenchments with a view to break if possible the enemy's line, but he did not attempt to prevent the invest ment by a battle ; he preferred to construct in his turn a number of entrenchments around his camp, and to connect them with one another by lines. Both sides exerted
Pompeius.
Caesar,! broken.
themselves to push forward their trenches as far as possible, and the earthworks advanced but slowly amidst constant conflicts. At the same time skirmishing went on on the opposite side of Caesar's camp with the garrison of Dyrrhachium ; Caesar hoped to get the fortress into his power by means of an understanding with some of its inmates, but was prevented by the enemy's fleet. There was incessant fighting at very different points —on one of the hottest days at six places simultaneously —and, as a rule, the tried valour of the Caesarians had the advantage in these skirmishes; once, for instance, a single cohort maintained itself in its entrenchments against four legions for several hours, till support came up. No prominent success was attained on either side ; yet the effects of the investment came by degrees to be oppressively felt by the
Pompeians. The stopping of the rivulets flowing from the heights into the plain compelled them to be content with scanty and bad well-water. Still more severely felt was the want of fodder for the beasts of burden and the horses, which the fleet was unable adequately to remedy ; numbers of them died, and it was of but little avail that the horses were conveyed by the fleet to Dyrrhachium, because there also they did not find sufficient fodder.
Pompeius could not much longer delay to free himself ^rom n's disagreeable position by a blow struck against the enemy. He was informed by Celtic deserters that the enemy had neglected to secure the beach between his two chains of entrenchments 600 feet distant from each other by a cross-wall, and on this he formed his plaa While he caused the inner line of Caesar's entrenchments to be attacked by the legions from the camp, and the outer line by the light troops placed in vessels and landed beyond the enemy's entrenchments, a third division landed in the space left between the two lines and attacked in the rear their already sufficiently occupied defenders. The entrenchment
251
BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, book v
chap, x PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS
353
next to the sea was taken, and the garrison fled in wild confusion ; with difficulty the commander of the next trench
Marcus Antonius succeeded in maintaining it and in setting
a limit for the moment to the advance of the Pompeians ;
but, apart from the considerable loss, the outermost entrenchment along the sea remained in the hands of the Pompeians and the line was broken through. Caesar the Caesar more eagerly seized the opportunity, which soon after d^tei* presented itself, of attacking a Pompeian legion, which had incautiously become isolated, with the bulk of his infantry.
But the attacked offered valiant resistance, and, as the ground on which the fight took place had been several times employed for the encampment of larger and lesser divisions and was intersected in various directions by mounds and ditches, Caesar's right wing along with the cavalry entirely missed its way ; instead of supporting the left in attacking the Pompeian legion, it got into a narrow trench that led from one of the old camps towards the river. So Pompeius, who came up in all haste with five legions to the aid of his troops, found the two wings of the enemy separated from each other, and one of them in an utterly forlorn position. When the Caesarians saw him advance, a panic seized them ; the whole plunged into disorderly flight ; and, if the matter ended with the loss of 1000 of the best soldiers and Caesar's army did not sustain a complete defeat, this was due simply to the circumstance that Pompeius also could not freely develop his force on the broken ground, and to the further fact that, fearing a stratagem, he at first held back his troops.
But, even as it was, these days were fraught with mischief. Not only had Caesar endured the most serious losses and forfeited at a blow his entrenchments, the result of four months of gigantic labour ; he was by the recent engagements thrown back again exactly to the point from which he had set out From the sea he was more com pletely driven than ever, since Pompeius' elder son Gnaeus
Conie-
5,uence" °* Caesars
defeats.
2<4
BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, book v
had by a bold attack partly burnt, partly carried off, Caesar's few ships of war lying in the port of Oricum, and had soon afterwards also set fire to the transport fleet that was left behind in Lissus ; all possibility of bringing up fresh reinforcements to Caesar by sea from Brundisium was thu: lost The numerous Pompeian cavalry, now released from their confinement, poured themselves over the adjacent country and threatened to render the provisioning of Caesar's army, which had always been difficult, utterly impossible. Caesar's daring enterprise of carrying on offensive operations without ships against an enemy in command of the sea and resting on his fleet had totally failed. On what had hitherto been the theatre of war he found himself in presence of an impregnable defensive position, and unable to strike a serious blow either against Dyrrhachium or against the hostile army; on the other hand it depended now solely on Pompeius whether he should proceed to attack under the most favourable cir cumstances an antagonist already in grave danger as to his means of subsistence. The war had arrived at a crisis. Hitherto Pompeius had, to all appearance, played the game of war without special plan, and only adjusted his defence according to the exigencies of each attack ; and this was not to be censured, for the protraction of the war gave him opportunity of making his recruits capable of fighting, of bringing up his reserves, and of bringing more fully into play the superiority of his fleet in the Adriatic. Caesar was beaten not merely in tactics but also in strategy. This defeat had not, it is true, that effect which Pompeius not without reason expected ; the eminent soldierly energy of Caesar's veterans did not allow matters to come to an immediate and total breaking up of the army by hunger and mutiny. But yet it seemed as if it depended solely on his opponent by judiciously following up his victory to reap its full fruits.
chap, x PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS
255
It was for Pompeius to assume the aggressive ; and he War
was resolved to do so. Three different ways of rendering P^P*0 his victory fruitful presented themselves to him. The first Pompeiu* and simplest was not to desist from assailing the vanquished
army, and, if it departed, to pursue it Secondly, Pompeius
might leave Caesar himself and his best troops in Greece,
and might cross in person, as he had long been making preparations for doing, with the main army to Italy, where
the feeling was decidedly antimonarchical and the forces of
Caesar, after the despatch of the best troops and their brave
and trustworthy commandant to the Greek army, would not
be of very much moment Lastly, the victor might turn Sdpio and inland, effect a junction with the legions of Metellus Scipio, Calvinns- and attempt to capture the troops of Caesar stationed in
the interior. The latter forsooth had, immediately after
the arrival of the second freight from Italy, on the one hand despatched strong detachments to Aetolia and Thessaly to
procure means of subsistence for his army, and on the other
had ordered a corps of two legions under Gnaeus Domitius
Calvinus to advance on the Egnatian highway towards Macedonia, with the view of intercepting and if possible
defeating in detail the corps of Scipio advancing on the same
road from Thessalonica. Calvinus and Scipio had already approached within a few miles of each other, when Scipio
suddenly turned southward and, rapidly crossing the Haliacmon (Inje Karasu) and leaving his baggage there
under Marcus Favonius, penetrated into Thessaly, in order
to attack with superior force Caesar's legion of recruits
employed in the reduction of the country under Lucius
Cassius Longinus. But Longinus retired over the mountains towards Ambracia to join the detachment under
Gnaeus Calvisius Sabinus sent by Caesar to Aetolia, and
Scipio could only cause him to be pursued by his Thracian
cavalry, for Calvinus threatened his reserve left behind
under Favonius on the Haliacmon with the same fate which
Caesar's
jr*"6*' Dyrrha-
he had himself destined for Longinus. So Calvinus and Scipio met again on the Haliacmon, and encamped there for a considerable time opposite to each other.
Pompeius might choose among these plans ; no choice was left to Caesar. After that unfortunate engagement he entered on his retreat to Apollonia. Pompeius followed. ^he marcn fr°m Dyrrhachium to Apollonia along a difficult road crossed by several rivers was no easy task for a defeated army pursued by the enemy; but the dexterous leadership of their general and the indestructible marching energy of the soldiers compelled Pompeius after four days' pursuit to suspend it as useless. He had now to decide between the Italian expedition and the march into the interior. However advisable and attractive the former might seem, and though various voices were raised in its favour, he preferred not to abandon the corps of Scipio, the more especially as he hoped by this march to ^et the corps of Calvinus into his hands. Calvinus lay at the moment on the Egnatian road at Heraclea Lyncestis, between Pompeius and Scipio, and, after Caesar had re treated to Apollonia, farther distant from the latter than from the great army of Pompeius ; without knowledge, moreover, of the events at Dyrrhachium and of his hazardous position, since after the successes achieved at Dyrrhachium the whole country inclined to Pompeius and the messengers of Caesar were everywhere seized. It was not till the enemy's main force had approached within a few hours of him that Calvinus learned from the accounts of the enemy's advanced posts themselves the state of things. A quick departure in a southerly direction towards Thessaly withdrew him at the last moment from imminent destruction ; Pompeius had to content himself with having liberated Scipio from his position of peril. Caesar had meanwhile arrived unmolested at Apollonia. Immediately after the disaster of Dyrrhachium he had resolved if possible to transfer the struggle from the
Theoaly
•56
BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, book v
chap, x PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS
257
coast away into the interior, with the view of getting beyond the reach of the enemy's fleet —the ultimate cause of the failure of his previous exertions. The march to Apollonia had only been intended to place his wounded in safety and to pay his soldiers there, where his depots were stationed ; as soon as this was done, he set out for Thessaly, leaving behind garrisons in Apollonia, Oricum, and Lissus. The corps of Calvinus had also put itself in motion towards Thessaly; and Caesar could effect a junction with the reinforcements coming up from Italy, this time by the land- route through Illyria—two legions under Quintus Cornificius —still more easily in Thessaly than in Epirus. Ascending by difficult paths in the valley of the Aous and crossing the mountain-chain which separates Epirus from Thessaly, he arrived at the Peneius; Calvinus was likewise directed thither, and the junction of the two armies was thus accomplished by the shortest route and that which was least exposed to the enemy. It took place at Aeginium not far from the source of the Peneius. The first Thessalian town before which the now united army appeared, Gomphi, closed its gates against it ; it was quickly stormed and given up to pillage, and the other towns of Thessaly terrified by this example submitted, so soon as Caesar's legions merely appeared before the walls. Amidst these marches and conflicts, and with the help of the supplies—albeit not too ample — which the region on the Peneius afforded, the traces and recollections of the calamitous days through which they had passed gradually vanished.
The victories of Dyrrhachium had thus borne not much immediate fruit for the victors. Pompeius with his unwieldy army and his numerous cavalry had not been able to follow his versatile enemy into the mountains ; Caesar like Calvinus had escaped from pursuit, and the two stood united and in full security in Thessaly. Perhaps it would have been the best course, if Pompeius had now without delay embarked
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The Pharsalus.
with his main force for Italy, where success was scarcely doubtful. But in the meantime only a division of the fleet departed for Sicily and Italy. In the camp of the coalition the contest with Caesar was looked on as so completely decided by the battles of Dyrrhachium that it only remained to reap the fruits of victory, in other words, to seek out and capture the defeated army. Their former over-cautious reserve was succeeded by an arrogance still less justified by the circumstances ; they gave no heed to the facts, that they had, strictly speaking, failed in the pursuit, that they had to hold themselves in readiness to encounter a completely re freshed and reorganized army in Thessaly, and that there was no small risk in moving away from the sea, renouncing the support of the fleet, and following their antagonist to the battle-field chosen by himself. They were simply resolved at any price to fight with Caesar, and therefore to get at him as soon as possible and by the most convenient way. Cato took up the command in Dyrrhachium, where a garrison was left behind of eighteen cohorts, and in Corcyra, where 300 ships of war were left ; Pompeius and Scipio proceeded —the former, apparently, following the Egnatian way as far as Fella and then striking into the great road to the south, the latter from the Haliacmon through the passes of Olympus —to the lower Peneius and met at Larisa.
Caesar lay to the south of Larisa in the plain—which extends between the hill-country of Cynoscephalae and the chain of Othrys and is intersected by a tributary of the Peneius, the Enipeus —on the left bank of the latter stream near the town of Pharsalus ; Pompeius pitched his camp opposite to him on the right bank of the Enipeus along the slope of the heights of Cynoscephalae. 1 The entire army
1 The exact determination of the field of battle Is difficult. Appian (h. 75) expressly place* it between (New) Pharsalus (now Fersala) and the Enipeus. Of the two streams, which alone are of any Importance in the
2S»
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of Pompeius was assembled; Caesar on the other hand still expected the corps of nearly two legions formerly
question, and are undoubtedly the Apidanus and Enipeus of the ancients— the Sofadhitiko and the Fersaliti — the former has its sources in the mountains of Thaumaci (Dhomoko) and the Dolopian heights, the latter in mount Othrys, and the Fersaliti alone flows past Pharsalus ; now as the Enipeus according to Strabo (be p. 432) springs from mount Othrys and flows past Pharsalus, the Fersaliti has been most justly pronounced by Leake (Northern Greece, iv. 320) to be the Enipeus, and the hypothesis followed by Goler that the Fersaliti is the Apidanus is untenable. With this all the other statements of the ancients as to the two rivers agree. Only we must doubtless assume with Leake, that the river of Vlokho formed by the union of the Fersaliti and the Sofadhitiko and going to the Peneius was called by the ancients Apidanus as well as the Sofadhitiko ; which, however, is the more natural, as while the Sofadhitiko probably has, the Fersaliti has not, constantly water (Leake, iv. 321). Old Pharsalus, from which the battle takes its name, must therefore have been situated between Fersala and the Fersaliti. Accordingly the battle was fought on
the left bank of the Fersaliti, and in such a way that the Pompeians, standing with their faces towards Pharsalus, leaned their right wing on the river (Caesar, B. C. iii. 83 ; Frontinus, Strut, ii. 3, 22). The camp of the Pompeians, however, cannot have stood here, but only on the slope of the heights of Cynoscephalae, on the right bank of the Enipeus, partly because they barred the route of Caesar to Scotussa, partly because their line of retreat evidently went over the mountains that were to be found above the camp towards Larisa ; if they had, according to Leake's hypothesis (iv. 482), encamped to the east of Pharsalus on the left bank of the Enipeus, they could never have got to the northward through this stream, which at this very point has a deeply cut bed (Leake, iv. 469), and Pompeius must have fled to Lamia instead of Larisa. Probably therefore the Pompeians pitched their camp on the right bank of the Fersaliti, and passed the river both in order to fight and in order, after the battle, to regain their camp, whence they then moved up the slopes of Crannon and Scotussa, which culminate above the latter place in the heights of Cynoscephalae. This was not impossible. The Enipeus is a narrow slow-flowing rivulet, which Leake found two feet deep in November, and which in the hot
season often lies quite dry (Leake, i. 448, and iv. 472 ; comp. Lucan, vi. 373), and the battle was fought in the height of summer. Further the armies before the battle lay three miles and a half from each other (Appian, II. C. ii. 65), so that the Pompeians could make all preparations and also properly secure the communication with their camp by bridges. Had the battle terminated in a complete rout, no doubt the retreat to and over the river could not have been executed, and doubtless for this reason Pompeius only reluctantly agreed to fight here. The left wing of the Pompeians which was the most remote from the base of retreat felt this ; but the
retreat at least of their centre and their right wing was not accomplished in such haste as to be impracticable under the given conditions. Caesar and his copyists are silent as to the crossing of the river, because this would place in too clear a light the eagerness for battle of the Pompeians apparent otherwise from the whole narrative, and they are also silent as to the conditions of retreat favoui abi" for these.
26o
BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, BOOK v
detached to Aetolia and Thessaly, now stationed under Quintus Fufius Calenus in Greece, and the two legions of Cornificius which were sent after him by the land-route from Italy and had already arrived in Illyria. The army of Pompeius, numbering eleven legions or 47,000 men and 7000 horse, was more than double that of Caesar in infantry, and seven times as numerous in cavalry; fatigue and conflicts had so decimated Caesar's troops, that his eight legions did not number more than 22,000 men under arms, consequently not nearly the half of their normal amount. The victorious army of Pompeius provided with a countless cavalry and good magazines had provisions in abundance,
while the troops of Caesar had difficulty in keeping them selves alive and only hoped for better supplies from the corn-harvest not far distant. The Pompeian soldiers, who had learned in the last campaign to know war and trust their leader, were in the best of humour. All military reasons on the side of Pompeius favoured the view, that the decisive battle should not be long delayed, seeing that they now confronted Caesar in Thessaly ; and the emigrant impatience of the many genteel officers and others accompanying the army doubtless had more weight than even such reasons in the council of war. Since the events of Dyrrhachium these lords regarded the triumph of their party as an ascertained fact ; already there was eager strife as to the filling up of Caesar's supreme pontificate, and instructions were sent to Rome to hire houses at the Forum for the next elections. When Pompeius hesitated on his part to cross the rivule* which separated the two armies, and which Caesar with his much weaker army did not venture to pass, this excited great indignation ; Pompeius, it was alleged, only delayed the battle in order to rule somewhat longer over so many consulars and praetorians and to perpetuate his part of Agamemnon. Pompeius yielded; and Caesar, who under the impression that matters would not come to a battle, had
chap, x PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS 261
just projected a mode of turning the enemy's army and for that purpose was on the point of setting out towards Scotussa, likewise arrayed his legions for battle, when he saw the Pompeians preparing to offer it to him on his bank.
Thus the battle of Pharsalus was fought on the 9th August 706, almost on the same field where a hundred and fifty years before the Romans had laid the foundation of their dominion in the east 433). Pompeius rested his right wing on the Enipeus Caesar opposite to him rested his left on the broken ground stretching in front of the Enipeus; the two other wings were stationed out in the plain, covered each case by the cavalry and the light troops. The intention of Pompeius was to keep his infantry on the defensive, but with bis cavalry to scatter the weak band of horsemen which, mixed after the German fashion with light infantry, confronted him, and then to take Caesar's right wing in rear. His infantry courageously sustained the first charge of that of the enemy, and the
there came to stand. Labienus likewise dispersed the enemy's cavalry after brave but short resist ance, and deployed his force to the left with the view of turning the infantry. But Caesar, foreseeing the defeat of his cavalry, had stationed behind on the threatened flank of his right wing some 2000 of his best legionaries. As the enemy's horsemen, driving those of Caesar before them, galloped along and around the line, they suddenly came upon this select corps advancing intrepidly against them and, rapidly thrown into confusion the unexpected and unusual infantry attack,1 they galloped at full speed from
With this connected the well-known direction of Caesar to his sol diers to strike at the faces of the enemy's horsemen. The infantry —which here in an altogether irregular way acted on the offensive against cavalry, who were not to be reached with the sabres —were not to throw their pila, but to use them as hand-spears against the cavalry and, in order to defend themselves better against these, to thrust at their faces (Plutarch, Pomp.
The battle. 48.
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the field of battle. The victorious legionaries cut to pieces the enemy's archers now unprotected, then rushed at the left wing of the enemy, and began now on their part to turn it At the same time Caesar's third division hitherto re served advanced along the whole line to the attack. The unexpected defeat of the best arm of the Pompeian army, as it raised the courage of their opponents, broke that of the army and above all that of the general. When Pompeius, who from the outset did not trust his infantry, saw the horsemen gallop off, he rode back at once from the field of battle to the camp, without even awaiting the issue of the general attack ordered by Caesar. His legions began to waver and soon to retire over the brook into the camp, which was not accomplished without severe loss.
The day was thus lost and many an able soldier had fallen, but the army was still substantially intact, and the situation of Pompeius was far less perilous than that of Caesar after the defeat of Dyrrhachium. But while Caesar in the vicissitudes of his destiny had learned that fortune
loves to withdraw herself at certain moments even from her favourites in order to be once more won back through their perseverance, Pompeius knew fortune hitherto only as the constant goddess, and despaired of himself and of her when she withdrew from him ; and, while in Caesar's grander
nature despair only developed yet mightier energies, the inferior soul of Pompeius under similar pressure sank into the infinite abyss of despondency. As once in the war with Sertorius he had been on the point of abandoning the office
69, 71 ; Caa. 45 ; Appian, ii. 76, 78 ; Flor. 12 Oros. vi. 15 erron eously Frontinus, iv. 7, 32). The anecdotical turn given to this instruction, that the Pompeian horsemen were to be brought to run away by the fear of receiving scars in their faces, and that they actually galloped off " hold ing their hands before their eyes " (Plutarch), collapses of itself for has point only on the supposition that the Pompeian cavalry had consisted principally of the young nobility of Rome, the " graceful dancers" and this was not the case (p. 224).