No More Learning

"The government we mean to erect is intended to last
for ages. The landed interest at present is prevalent; will
it not in time, by the operation of trade and manufactures,
be overbalanced in future elections? and, unless wisely pro-
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-20 03:43 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uva. x000275492 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 516 THE LIFE OF ,
vided against, what will become of your government? In
England, at this day, if elections were open to all classes
of people, the property of the landed proprietors would be
insecure; an agrarian law would soon take place. If
these observations be just, our government ought to secure
^he permanent interests of the country against innovation.
Landholders ought to have a share in the government to
Support these valuable interests, and to balance and check
the other. They ought lobe so constituted as to protect the
minority of the opulent against the majority. The senate,
therefore, ought to be this body; and, to answer these pur-
poses, ought to have permanency and stability. Various
have been the propositions; but my opinion is, the longer
they continue in office, the better will their view be an-
swered. "* "\
Sherman replied," that a bad government was the worse
for being long; that frequent elections give security and
permanency. That in Connecticut an annual government
had existed one hundred and thirty-two years, and as long
as a man behaves well he is never turned out of office.
Four years to the senate is quite sufficient with the rota-
tion proposed. "
Hamilton observed, "This question has already been
considered in several points of view. We are now form-
ing a republican government. Real liberty in neither found
in despotism, nor in the extremes of democracy, but in mode-
rate governments. Those" who mean to form a solid re-
publican government, ought to proceed to the confines of
another government^ As long as offices are open to all
* Yates, 169.
t It will be remarked that a similar opinion was expressed by Jefferson a
few months before. Writing from Paris, February 28,1787, to La Fayette,
then about to take part in the deliberations of France, he observed, " I wish
you success in your meeting, (the assembled des notables. ) I should form
better hopes of it, if it were divided into two houses instead of seven; keep.
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-20 03:43 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uva. x000275492 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? HAMILTON.
517'
men, and no constitutional rank is established, it is pure
republicanism. But if we incline too much to democracy, we
shall soon shoot into a monarchy. The difference of pro-
perty is already great among us. Commerce and industry
will stjll increase the disparity. Your government must
meet this state of things, or combinations will in process
of time undermine your system. What was the tribuni-
tial power of Rome? It was instituted by the plebeians as a
guard against the patricians. But was this a sufficient
check? No! The only distinction which remained at
Rome was, at last, between the rich and poor. The gen-
tleman from Connecticut forgets that the democratic body
is already secure in a representation. As to Connecticut,
what were the little objects of their government before the
revolution? Colonial concerns merely. They ought now
to act on a more extended scale; and dare they do this?
Dare they collect the taxes and requisitions of congress?
Such a government may do well if they do not tax, and
this is precisely their situation. "
Wilson remarked, " The motion is now for nine years, ?
and a triennial rotation. Every nation attends to its for-
eign intercourse to support its commerce, to prevent foreign
contempt, and to make war and peace. Our senate will
be possessed of these powers, and therefore ought to be
dignified and permanent. What is the reason that Great
Britain does not enter into a commercial treaty with us?
Because congress has not the powers to enforce its observ-
ance. But give them those powers, and give them the
stability proposed by the motion, and they will have more
ing the good model of your neighbouring country before your eyes, you may
get on step by step towards a good constitution. Though that model is not
perfect, yet, as it would unite more suffrages than any new one which could
be proposed, it is better to make that the object. If every advance is to be pur.
chased by filling the royal coffers with gold, it will be gold well employed"
--2 Jeff. Works, p. 101.
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-20 03:43 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uva. x000275492 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 518
THE LIFE OF
permanency than a monarchical government. The great
objection of many is, that this duration would give birth to
views inconsistent with the interests of the union. This
can have no weight if the triennial rotation is adopted,
and this plan may possibly tend to conciliate the mjnds of
the members of the convention on this subject, which have
varied more than on any other question. " Delaware, Penn-
sylvania, and Virginia, were in favour of nine years, but
it was agreed that it should be six, with a biennial rota-
tion.
The discussion of the powers of the legislature was de-
ferred in order to consider the proportionate suffrage of
the states in its choice. Martin urged with great vehe-
mence an equal representation of the states as their right,
and as most promotive of the general welfare; and after
a motion of Lansing, that the representation in the first
branch should be according to the rule of the confederation,
Madison supported earnestly a proportionate representa-
tion of the states. "Some gentlemen," he said,* "are
afraid that the plan is not sufficiently national, while others
apprehend that it is too much so. If this point of re-
presentation was once well fixed, we would come nearer
to one another in sentiment. The necessity would then
be discovered of circumscribing more effectually the state
governments, and enlarging the bounds of the general gov-
ernment. Some contend that the states are sovereign, when
in fact they are only political societies. There is a gra-
dation of power in all societies, from the lowest corpora-
tion to the highest sovereign. The states never possessed
the essential rights of sovereignty. -These were always
vested in congress. Their voting as states in congress is
no evidence of sovereignty. The state of Maryland voted
by counties. Did this make the counties sovereign? The
? Yates, p. 184-5.
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-20 03:43 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uva. x000275492 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? HAMILTON.
519
states at present are only great corporations, having the
power of making by-laws, and these are effectual only if
they are not contradictory to the general confederation.
The states ought to be placed under the control of the gen-
eral government, at least as much so as they formerly were
under the king and British parliament. The arguments,
I observe, have taken a different turn, and I hope may tend
to convince all of the necessity of a strong energetic gov-
ernment; which would equally tend to give energy to, and
protect the state governments. " He deprecated the jeal-
ousy of the states, and observed," If the power is not imme-
diately derived from the people, in proportion to their num-
bers, we make a paper confederacy, but that will be all! "
"I would have no objection," Judge Read observed, " if
the government was more national, but the proposed plan
is so great a mixture of both, that it is best to drop it alto-
gether. A state government is incompatible with a gen-
eral government. If it was more national, I would be for
a representation proportionate to population. The plan
of the gentleman from New-York (Hamilton) is certainly
the best. But the great evil is the unjust appropriation
of the public lands. If there was but one national govern-
ment, we would be all equally interested. "
Hamilton, in the progress of this discussion, remarked--
"The course of my experience in human affairs might,
perhaps, restrain me from saying much on this subject. I
shall, however, give utterance to some of the observations
I have made during the course of this debate. The gen-
tleman from Maryland has been at great pains to establish
positions which are not denied. Many of them, as drawn
from the best writers on government, are become self-
evident principles. But I doubt the propriety of his appli-
cation of those principles in the present discussion. He
deduces from them the necessity that states entering into
a confederacy must retain the equality of votes. This po-
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-20 03:43 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uva. x000275492 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 520
THE LIFE OF
sition cannot be correct. Facts contradict it. The par-
liament of Great Britain asserted a supremacy over the
whole empire, and the celebrated Judge Blackstone labours
for the legality of it, although many parts were not repre-
sented. This parliamentary power we opposed as con-
trary to our colonial rights. With that exception, through-
out that whole empire it is submitted to.
"May no"t the smaller and greater states so modify their
respective rights as to establish the general interest of the
whole without adhering to the right of equality? Strict
representation is not observed in any of the state govern-
ments. The senate of New-York are chosen by persons
of certain qualifications to the exclusion of others.
"The question after all is--Is it our interest, in modify-
ing this general government, to sacrifice individual rights
to the preservation of the rights of an artificial being, called
states? There can be no truer principle than this--That
every individual of the community at large has an equal rigid
to the protection of government. If, therefore, three states
contain a majority of the inhabitants of America, ought they
to be governed by a minority? Would the inhabitants of
the great states ever submit to this? If the smaller states
maintain this principle through a love of power, will not
the larger, from the same motives, be equally tenacious to
preserve their power? They are to surrender their rights
--for what 1 For the preservation of an artificial being.
We propose a free government. Can it be so, if partial
distinctions are maintained?
"I agree with the gentleman from Delaware, that if the
state governments are to act in the general government, it
affords the strongest reason for exclusion. In the state
of New-York five counties form a majority of representa-
tives, and yet the government is in no danger, because the
laws have a general operation. The small states exagger-
ate their danger, and on this ground contend for an undue
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-20 03:43 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uva. x000275492 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? HAMILTON.
proportion of power. But their danger is increased if the
larger states will not submit to it. Where will they form
new alliances for their support? Will they do this with
foreign powers? Foreigners are jealous of our increasing
greatness, and would rejoice in our distractions. Those
who have had opportunities of conversing with foreigners
respecting sovereigns in Europe, have discovered in them
an anxiety for the preservation of our democratic gov-
ernments, probably for no other reason but to keep us
weak. Unless your government is respectable, foreigners
will invade your rights--and to maintain tranquillity, it
must be respectable. Even to observe neutrality you must
have a strong government.
"I confess our present situation is critical. We have just
finished a war which has established our independence, and
loaded us with a heavy debt. We have still every motive
to unite for our common defence. Our people are dis-
posed to have a good government, but this disposition may
not always prevail. It is difficult to amend confederations:
it has been attempted in vain, and it is perhaps a miracle
that we are now met. We must therefore improve the
opportunity, and render the present system as perfect as
possible. Their good sense, and, above all, the necessity
of their affairs, will induce the people to adopt it. "
Lansing's motion was negatived by six to four states,
Maryland being divided, and the original resolution passed.
Imperfect as these reports are, they are sufficient to
show the spirit in which Hamilton met the objections to
an energetic system, labouring to vindicate the cause of
an efficient moderate government.
Some private business calling him at this time to New-
York, he was absent from the convention a few davs.
From the influence of Washington he hoped much; and
soon after his departure he communicated to him his im-
pression of what he believed to be the opinion of the peo
66
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-20 03:43 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uva. x000275492 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 522
THE LIFE OF
pie, and his convictions as to the policy to be pursued. His
letter gives the important and interesting fact, that, previ-
ous to this moment, no disclosure of his sentiments had
been sought by Hamilton from Washington. Such was
the delicacy observed towards a personage to whom the
country looked as its probable head, if a general govern-
ment should be established.
HAMILTON TO WASHINGTON.
DEAR SIR,
In my passage through the Jerseys, and since my arrival
here, I have taken particular pains to discover the public
sentiment, and I am more and more convinced that this is
the critical opportunity for establishing the prosperity of
this country on a solid foundation. I have conversed with
men of information, not only of this city, but from differ-
ent parts of the state; and they agree that there has been
an astonishing revolution for the better in the minds of
the people.
The prevailing apprehension among thinking men is, that
the convention, from the fear of shocking the popular opin-
ion, will not go far enough. They seem to be convinced,
that a strong, well-mounted government will better suit the
popular palate, than one of a different complexion. Men
in office are, indeed, taking all possible pains to give an un-
favourable impression of the convention; but the current
seems to be moving strongly the other way.
A plain but sensible man, in a conversation I had with
him yesterday, expressed himself nearly in this manner:--
The people begin to be convinced that their " excellent
form of government," as they have been used to call it,
will not answer their purpose, and that they must substitute
something not very remote from that which they have
lately quitted.
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-20 03:43 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uva. x000275492 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? HAMILTON.
523
These appearances, though they will not warrant a con-
clusion that the people are yet ripe for such a plan as I advo-
cate, yet serve to prove that there is no reason to despair
of their adopting one equally energetic, if the convention
should think proper to propose it. They serve to prove
that we ought not to allow too much weight to objections,
drawn from the supposed repugnancy of the people to an
efficient constitution. I confess I am more and more in-
clined to believe that former habits of thinking are regain-
ing their influence with more rapidity than is generally
imagined.
Not having compared ideas with you, sir, I cannot judge
how far our sentiments agree; but, as I persuade myself,
the genuineness of my representations will receive credit
with you.
My anxiety for the event of the deliberations
of the convention, induces me to make this communication
of what appears to be the tendency of the public mind.
I own to you, sir, that I am seriously and deeply dis-
tressed at the aspect of the counsels which prevailed when
I left Philadelphia. I fear that we shall let slip the golden
opportunity of rescuing the American empire from dis-
union, anarchy, and misery.
No motley or feeble measure can answer the end, or will
finally receive the public support. Decision is true wis-
dom, and will be not less reputable to the convention, than
salutary to the community.
I shall of necessity remain here ten or twelve days. If
I have reason to believe that my attendance at Philadel-
phia will not be mere waste of time, I shall, after that
period, rejoin the convention.
New-York, July 3d, 1787.
The apprehensions entertained by Hamilton were con-
firmed by the temper evinced during the renewed discus-
sion of a proposition of Ellsworth that each state should
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-20 03:43 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uva. x000275492 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 524
THE LIFE Of
have an equal vote in the second branch of the legislature.
At its termination the increased strength of the states right
party was shown by an equal division of the votes--five
states being in favour of the proposition and five in the ne-
gative--Maryland divided.
The pertinacity with which the claims to an equal par-
ticipation in the second branch were pressed, following the
warmth previously exhibited on the question of electing
the first branch by the people, threatened an utter prostra-
tion of all hope of concurring in a plan of government.
Under these circumstances, General Cotesworth Pinck-
ney proposed to appoint a committee to adjust the embar-
rassing controversy.
Martin objected to the measure as an attempt to com-
promise, and, feeling the strength of his party, declared,
"You must give each state an equal suffrage, or our business
is at an end. " Sherman replied, that "we had reached a
point from which we cannot move in either direction," and
urged the committee.
Gouverneur Morris followed, insisting on the necessity of
an aristocracy " of men of great and established property"
in the second branch, to be checked by the democratic
branch, and thus give stability to the government. "A
senate for seven years, excluded from office, would be," he
observed, "one of the baubles of the general government.
A government by compact is no government. While I
avow myself," he said, " the advocate of a strong govern-
ment, I admit that the influence of the rich must be guard-
ed: and a pure democracy is equally oppressive to the
lower orders of the community. " He threw out these re-
marks for the consideration of the committee to be ap-
pointed. Wilson did not approve of this expedient. If
adopted, he was for a smaller committee. Madison ob-
jected to it as only a source of delay. If appointed " from
each state, we shall have in it the whole force of state pre-
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-20 03:43 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uva. x000275492 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? HAMILTON.
525
judices. " "The great difficulty is to conquer former opin-
ions. The motion can as well be decided here as in com-
mittee. " Gerry urged accommodation as absolutely neces-
sary, hoping that the defects might be amended by a future
convention. The motion was carried by nine states, Jer-
sey and Delaware dissenting, and a committee of a mem-
ber from each state was chosen by ballot, composed chiefly
of the advocates of the Jersey plan.
On the fifth of July a compromise was reported. It
proposed to give to each state one representative for every
forty thousand inhabitants, computing three-fifths of the
slaves as one white, and to a state containing a less num-
ber, one representative,- to compose the first branch; vest-
ing in that branch the exclusive origin and control of
money bills;--that in the second branch, each state should
have one vote. ,
The advocates of a strong government opposed the pro-
position. Wilson insisted upon a division of the question.
Madison declared that the originating money bills was no
concession on the part of the smaller states, as seven states
combining in the second branch, could control the first; it
being small in number and well connected, will ever pre-
vail. No provision is made as to the regulation of trade,
imposts, treaties. We are driven to an unhappy dilemma
Two-thirds of the inhabitants of the union are to please
the remaining third by sacrificing their essential rights.
In behalf of this compromise it was asserted, that the
power over money bills was an equivalent for the equal
representation in the senate. That it properly belonged to
the democratic branch. The senate being farther removed
from the people, would be less attentive to economy. It
was analogous to the parliamentary usage of England. *
The members most strenuous for retaining power in the
? Geny's State of Facts.
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-20 03:43 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uva. x000275492 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 526
THE LIFE OF
states wished to postpone the consideration of the first
proposition in order to enter upon the second, which was
not acceded to; and the question, whether numbers or rela-
tive contribution should determine the proportion of suf-
frage, was referred to a special committee. It was then
proposed to consider the constitution of the second branch.
This was postponed by the vote of six states--Massachu-
setts and New-York divided.
Having given a vote in favour of conferring on the first
branch the originating money bills, and thus fulfilling that
part of the proposed compromise, it was moved that in the
second branch the states should have an equal vote, which
was approved. On the ninth of July the special commit-
tee reported an apportionment of the members of the first
branch among the states, and that the legislature be au-
thorized to augment the number from time to time, and in
case a state be divided, or two or more united, or a new
state be created within the limits of the United States, it
be empowered to regulate the number of representatives
upon the principles of their wealth and number of inhabit-
ants; the provisional clause was approved, the equal vote
in the second branch temporarily sanctioned, and the ratio
was established on a conjectural basis. An objection being
taken to the small number of representatives, this sub-
ject was referred to the grand committee from each state. *
The following day King reported a new Scale of repre-
sentation, increased from fifty-six to sixty-five members.
At this important moment, when a large concession had
been made to the advocates of an equal power in the
states, and a basis had been formed upon which a compound
* Madison states a proposition, proceeding from himself, as a proper ground
of compromise; that in the first branch the states should be represented ac-
cording to the number of free inhabitants, and in the second, which had for
one of its primary objects the guardianship of property, according to the whole
number, including slaves--in effect, a southern predominance.
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-20 03:43 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uva. x000275492 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? HAMILTON.
527
government, in part national, and in part federal, was to
be established, Yates and Lansing retired finally from
the convention. * On the last day on which they appeared,
Washington replied to Hamilton.
WASHINGTON TO HAMILTON.
Philadelphia, 10th July, 1787.
DEAR SIR,
I thank you for your communication of the third. When
I refer you to the state of the counsels which prevailed at
the period you left this city, and add that they are now,
if possible, in a worse train than ever, you will find but
little ground on which the hope of a good establishment
can be formed. In a word, I almost despair of seeing a
favourable issue to the proceedings of the convention, and
do therefore repent having had any agency in the busi-
ness.
The men who oppose a strong and energetic govern-
ment, are, in my opinion, narrow-minded politicians, or
are under the influence of local views.
The apprehension expressed by them, that the people
will not accede to the form proposed, is the ostensible, not
the real cause of opposition; but admitting that the pre-
sent sentiment is as they prognosticate, the question ought
nevertheless to be, is it oris it not the best form? If the for-
mer, recommend it, and it will assuredly obtain maugre
opposition.
/ am sorry you went away--/ wish you were back. The
crisis is equally important and alarming, and no opposition,
under such circumstances, should discourage exertions, till
the structure is fixed. I will not, at this time, trouble you
with more than my best wishes and sincere regards.
? July 10.
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-20 03:43 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uva. x000275492 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 528
THE LIFE OF
A stronger contrast cannot be drawn, than is seen in
the tone of this correspondence, and in the conduct of the
governing party in New-York.
On the one side, the utmost solicitude to seize this "crit-
ical opportunity for establishing the prosperity of this
country on a solid foundation;" on the other, a cold and
selfish desertion of it at the moment of its utmost peril.
It was not possible to have taken a course more calcula-
ted to arrest the proceedings of the convention; and when
the juncture at which the delegates from New-York re-
tired is considered, no doubt can be entertained that such
was the object.
That they acted in accordance with Clinton, was proved
by his deportment at this time. Unreserved declarations
were made by him, that no good was to be expected from
the appointment or deliberations of this body. That the
most probable result was, that the country would be thrown
into confusion by the measure. That it was by no means
a necessary one, as the confederation had not undergone
a sufficient trial, and probably, on a more full experiment,
would be found to answer all the purposes of the union.
"Clinton,"" Hamilton remarked, " was not a man govern-
ed in ordinary cases by sudden impulse; though of an
irritable temper, when not under the immediate influence
of irritation, he was circumspect and guarded, and seldom
acted or spoke without premeditation or design. "
Such declarations from such a source, could only have
been intended to excite prejudices against whatever plan
should be proposed by the convention. Feeling that Clin-
ton's conduct might, and fearing that it would, induce the
mischief he so confidently and openly predicted, Hamilton
resolved to exhibit it before the public in all its deformity.
He immediately published a pointed animadversion, charg-
ing these declarations upon him, and avowing a readiness
to substantiate them.
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-20 03:43 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uva. x000275492 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? H A MI I. TON.
520
Having thus interposed his personal influence to counter-
act this insidious policy by an appeal to the people, he
hastened to Philadelphia, and there, without a vote, stand-
ing alone, and unsupported by his state, he renewed his
exertions to compose the heats and heal the differences
which had arisen, and, as far as was in his power, to aid in
directing the course of the convention.
The discussion of the compromise was protracted until
late in July, when the first of the propositions having been
modified, both were adopted, though by a voti. indicating
a wide difference of opinion. Five states were in favour
of them, but they were those of secondary importance.
Pennsylvania, Virginia, South Carolina, and Georgia, voted
against them; and the important commonwealth of Mas-
sachusetts was divided. During this debate the number
of representatives was apportioned to each state, in the first
congress. It was declared that the representation ought
to be proportioned to direct taxation, and to ascertain the
necessary alterations in it, that a periodical census should
be taken. South Carolina and Georgia, seeking to increase
their relative weight, would have embraced in this census
all their slaves; but the three-fifths compromise, although
at first rejected,* was finally adopted. An effort was also
made to establish the principle, that the representation of
the new states to be admitted into the union, should never
exceed that of the original thirteen; but this unequal pro-
position was defeated. f
In determining the period when a census should be taken,
a similar contest for power was also seen. The vote was
at first unanimous for a re-apportionment at the expiration
of fifteen years. Then two years were proposed'; then six;
then twenty; a decennial census was ultimately established.
* Connecticut, Virginia, North Carolina, and Georgia, voting for it.
t Affirmative, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Delaware, and Maryland
07
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-20 03:43 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uva. x000275492 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 530
THE LIFE OF
The principles of the constitution of the first branch be-
ing settled, those of the second were considered. A pro-
posal was made to fix the number of senators at thirty-six,
and to apportion them among the states. Massachusetts
and Virginia urged this change warmly, but it was resolv-
ed that each state should have an equal vote. The com-
promise on this point being effected, a new contest for
power was seen in the several modifications suggested in
the structure of the other departments of the government,
and in the extent and distribution of its powers.
The legislative powers of the government were now
considered, and a general declaratory clause was passed,
having in view subsequent alterations. It was not to be
expected that the proposed negative of Madison on the
state laws, would be retained; it was only supported by
the votes of three states, and in lieu of it, the legislative
acts of the United States, and treaties made under its au-
thority, were declared to be the supreme law of the land.
The institution of the executive department was the
next subject of deliberation. This marked instance was
now seen of the influences whicli were operating: Randolph
had insisted earnestly on a plural executive; he suggest-
ed, as giving a reasonable security to the smaller states, the
appointment of one executive, to be elected by an equality of
state votes. The delegates from Virginia, who had hesitated,
yielding, it was unanimously dec! ared that the national exec-
utive was to consist of one person. The effort was renewed
to render him eligible by the electors of the people. It was
then proposed that he should be chosen by electors ap-
pointed by the legislatures of the states; but the choice was
given to the national legislature, in conformity with the
original proposition of Virginia. He was declared to be
re-eligible. The trusts of carrying into execution the na-
tional laws, and of appointing the national officers, subject
to the negative of two-thirds of the legislature, were con-
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-20 03:43 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uva. x000275492 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? HAMILTON.
? 31
fided to him: and a motion was made to substitute for a
term of seven years, the provision that he should hold his
office during good behaviour. This important substitute
was supported by the votes of four states, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Virginia; but the term of
seven years was retained.
A judiciary during good behaviour was next established;
and, after an effort to confids the appointment of the
judges to the executive department solely, and then, as
Hamilton had proposed in his plan, to require the consent
of the senate, the appointment was given to the senate;
another concession to state influence. Its jurisdiction was
declared to extend to cases arising under laws passed by
the general legislature, and to such other questions as in-
volve the national peace and harmony.
The discussion was continued until the twenty-sixth of
July, much time being devoted to the institution of the
executive, and to the consideration of a proposal to require
certain qualifications of landed property and citizenship
in the members of each department of the government.
The modified resolutions were then referred to a commit-
tee of detail to prepare and report the outline of a constitu-
tion on the sixth of August, to which time the convention
adjourned. A draft of a constitution was on that day
reported, founded upon the principles which had been pre-
viously adopted, with many supplementary provisions.
The compromise, thus far, had only extended to the
structure of the government; its influence was now chiefly
seen in the limitations of its powers--limitations which
may be, with much probability, ascribed to Randolph and
Ellsworth, who, with Rutledge, Gorham, and Wilson, com-
posed the committee of detail.
This supposition is founded on a fact, which, it is be- ?
lieved, has not heretofore attracted attention.
On the twenty-second of August, seventeen hundred
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-20 03:43 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uva. x000275492 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 532
THE LIFE OF
and eighty-one, Randolph, Ellsworth, and Varnum, who
had been appointed a committee to prepare an exposition
of the confederation, made a report. They stated that they
ought to be discharged, because "the omission to enume-
rate any of the powers of congress would become an ar-
gument against their existence, and that it will be early
enough to insist on them when they shall be exercised
and disputed. "
Having specified in what particulars "the confedera-
tion requires execution," they proceeded to enumerate the
cases in which they deemed the extension of the powers
of congress necessary.
This exposition of the existing powers of the confede-
ration, and this enumeration of the proposed supplemental
powers, may be regarded as the source from which the detail
of the legislative powers enumerated in this plan of a con-
stitution is derived. One marked difference is observed.
By the report, the concurrence of two-thirds of congress
was required in the exercise of the great powers of war,
treaty, and revenue, while in this draft of the constitution
such concurrence is only made necessary to the passage
of a navigation act--a vicious check upon legislation, cer-
tain to result in evasive refinements. The convention
having refused to go into committee, this plan of a consti-
tution was discussed in the house. In its general outline
may be seen the extent to which Hamilton's system was
followed, and in the similarity of some of the modifications
which were proposed, the part he took as the discussion
progressed.
He continued in the convention until after the thirteenth
of August, when it is seen by the journal, that instead of
the provision requiring as a qualification for a seat in the
house of representatives that the candidate should have been
a citizen seven years, he urged that citizenship and inhabi-
tancy were sufficient prc-rcquisites, leaving to the discre-
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-20 03:43 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uva.