No More Learning

The spirit of de-solidarization, whether private, local, national, multinational, or imperial, reaches so deep that every unity wants to be certain that it will be spared, even if the others are swallowed up by the maelstrom. The next years will show how dangerous this multi-egoistic situation is. If it belongs to the lessons of the twentieth century that universalism from above fails, the stigma of the twenty-first century could become the failure to cultivate a sense for common situations from below.
These changes ruin the moral, rhetorical, and doctrinal basis of the tra- ditional left. Previously successful language games have become implausible as what could be commonly taken for granted has changed. The prudish gynecological images with which Marxism got intoxicated have totally lost their footing in reality. Who could seriously repeat the phrase that the means for the realization of the classless "society" would grow "from the bottom" of the bourgeois "society"—in order to one day break free, and why not with the help of a bloody C-section by the name of "revolution"? It would now be just as ridiculous to continue using the outdated metaphor of a "primal ground," as if truth and the future could hide down there, ready for the big leap to the top. The conception of a hidden "society" beneath "society," of a secret world of cellars and tunnels where the subversion of the bourgeois edifices was planned for the future, is a totally empty con- ception. Only abstruse "sleepers" wait under the cover of normality for the day of being activated. The deep bunkers built today—for example, for the secret nuclear-weapons programs of expansive middle-tier powers—could be all kinds of things, but not incubation cells for happy futures.
Today the decline of a mythology of cellars and the underground extends so far that even steadfast partisans of the communist idea such as Antonio Negri have had to give up the old totem of the left: the groundhog. In a universe made up of surfaces, Negri claims, this being, which digs in hidden
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places, has lost its political significance. It is to be replaced by the snake, a creature with a rich gnostic past life that adapts perfectly well in the hori-
5
left to understand of what had already been hidden for alert observers of the Soviet experiment after 1918 and Lenin's decrees concerning the red terror, for the sympathizers with the left opposition after 1921, for those stuck with Utopian defiance after 1956, and for the special-needs students of history after 1968.
The art of reading for "deconstruction," the representative of radical cri- tique, could only remain on the stage by clearly distinguishing itself from the myths of the underground. It is not concerned with digging down into the impossible depth of texts and institutions in order to attach dynamite to the "foundations. " It carefully points to the instability and ambiguities of seemingly solid constructions; it reveals the indeterminacy of allegedly clear binary oppositions; it makes manifest the hidden self-contradictions of coherent discourses. As a new version of the dream analysis of texts of any kind, in particular those of the old European metaphysics, it is, although its defenders often claim the opposite, an upgraded version of hermeneutics, which dedicates itself with a critical apparatus and heightened pathos to
6
the task of provisionally letting everything be what it is. Starting with this
result, it is also possible to understand the complicity between deconstruc- tion and American mass culture: the latter is also committed to the mission of not touching "what exists. " Its means is the incessant evocation of the dream of a worse world next to which the existing world looks like a real- ized Utopia, worthy of being defended by all means.
It would be possible to gather many observations following a similar tendency in order to always repeat the same fact: after the resignation of the Eastern opponents from the world civil war in between 1917 and 1945, and since the end of the Cold War between the two primary nuclear pow- ers, the ideological pendulum, which used to swing to the extremes, has almost reached a standstill. Where everything is pulled to the center, grav- ity wins. Graffiti artists from Berlin understood: Being puts consciousness out of tune (Das Sein verstimmt das Bewufitsein). "Being" now refers to the gravitational forces of the unified center. Only what possesses the power to draw down is real. What could be more obvious in this situation than that the new unhappy consciousness diverts itself from Being just like in the old days? Precisely this is the signature of an age that wants to be everything but
zontal dimension to the flat, transparent shape and color changing world. Let us return to the irony of the situation: after 1991 there was nothing
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critical. The intelligentsia has, for the most part, turned away from criti- cism to opt once again for the primacy of religion. Desecularization gains ground every day. The need for the life-serving illusion has wrestled down "truth"—what this transition means for the process of civilization in the long run cannot be predicted today. Criticism was, it is important to real- ize, the consequence of the ontological assumption that fictions can fail because of facts. Now it is the facts that fail because of fictions—because in the future, facts themselves are supposed to be only successful fictions.
Future historians will confirm that the last third of the twentieth cen- tury was dominated by the motif of a return to the center—a center that could never fully decide on its motivations and philosophical implications. These historians will identify the unwillingness of the intellectual to identify positive values in the center or middle positions as one of the symptoms of the crises of that epoch—the ongoing romanticism of radicals blocked the learning processes that could have prepared for the problems of the twenty-first century. They will have to reconstruct how the decay of West- ern democracies came about after they more and more committed them- selves to a neo-authoritarian, partially even neo-belligerent turn after 1990, and even more strongly after 2001.
Returning to today's perspectives, the horizon seems still relatively open, although nobody would believe that it provides for positive medium-term outlooks. What characterizes the situation is not the real decrease of avail- able quantities of rage among the excluded, ambitious, unsuccessful, and vengeful. Their quantity necessarily has to be higher under free circum- stances than in the past authoritarian systems of the East in which a climate of discouragement characterized the atmosphere. The mark of the situation is rather the loss of the function of symbolic institutions responsible for the political accumulation and transformation of dissident energies during two centuries of conflict. This raises the question of how our time will interpret the formula ira quaerens intellectum—indeed, whether is it at all possible today to revitalize the liaison between indignation and adaptability that constituted (or at least co-constituted) politics for two hundred years?
THE EROTICIZATION OF ALBANIA;
OR, THE ADVENTURES OF THE POSTCOMMUNIST SOUL
IT SEEMS AS IF IT IS NOT ONLY RAGE, DISSATISFACTION, AND GENERAL being-against-it that cannot be addressed anymore. Psychic economies
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have for some time found themselves altogether condemned to privatize
7
their illusions. The age of the serial reproduction of self-deception has also
begun. Consequently, it could have been predicted that those liberated from communism during a critical period show a significantly higher susceptibil- ity for designer illusions.
Seen from a functional perspective, the postcommunist situation implies,
as I have already stated, a return of the command economy to the property
economy, that is, the replacement of the medium of language with that of
8
money. In psychopolitical terms the conversion corresponds to the tran-
sition from a dynamic system of rage and pride to a dynamic system of greed—or, in terms of this psychopolitical analysis: a turn away from the primacy of thymotics for an eroticization without limitations.
The essence of eroticism cannot be understood from the perspective of the special case of the sexual libido and its aesthetic triggers, as recent social psychology assumes. Rather, eroticism is based on the stimulation of the idea of lack and all types of feelings of insufficiency. It articulates itself in corresponding actions of wanting to have and wanting to achieve: no phenomenon of recent psychohistory serves better as an illustration than the reception of the ur-capitalist idea of money that creates money in the countries of the former "Eastern bloc. " Marx, who often quotes Hegel inap- propriately, could have claimed that all comedies of history happen twice: the first time they are bloody, and the second time ridiculous. It would be interesting to read how the author of The Eighteenth Brumaire would have commented on the great investment of fraud with which the proletarian populations and peasants of Eastern Europe were deceived for seventy years about their assembled rage and their aspirations for respect and pride. One would like to know just as much how Marx would have glossed over the waves of corporate criminality which went over the former "Eastern bloc" countries after the breakdown of the communist regimes.
The wave began shortly after the memorable day of December 25, 1991, when the red flag over the Kremlin flew for the last time. The earli- est manifestations appeared in postcommunist Romania, which after the execution of the dictator Ceausescu in 1989—also on December 25—took its first steps on the unfamiliar stage of democracy and market economy. Starting in 1992, a hitherto unknown gold fever infected the country, caused by an invasion of allegedly new investment systems, the most successful of which was called Caritas, a name that inspires confidence. The agents of these systems—in Romania alone there are said to have been roughly 600
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such conspiracies against probability—promised to finally communicate to their customers a sense of the pleasures of capitalism. The investment games fascinated large parts of the population by promising fantastic profit margins—during the initial phase of the wave it was a common occurrence that the "invested" money increased its value by factor of eight within a few weeks and months. Within a year, Ion Stoica, a fifty-year-old business- man and the initiator of Caritas, became the hero of the nation. Factory worker, unemployed, or employee—those who could invest the remainder of their money could enjoy the benefits of enormous premiums. Many put a mortgage on or sold their houses to acquire the necessary liquidity. For two years, Stoica deluded exhilarated investors about the true nature of the enterprise by providing high yields on a regular basis. The "earnings" were, of course, not returns from regular corporations but rather, as is typical for pyramid schemes, came form shifting the assets of later investors to the accounts of those who had entered the scheme at an earlier point. Up to 20 percent of the Romanian population are said to have bought into this popu- lar and widespread investment game. In the spring of 1994, the yields slowed down and, shortly afterward, the system collapsed. Countless people faced immense debt. It took a concerted effort on the part of the government to prevent a national uprising. For those who were deceived, it could have only been a cold comfort that Stoica was sentenced to six years in prison.
In spite of this deterring episode, the spirit of the blessed Charles A. Ponzi (1882-1949) was soon to go around countless other postcommunist countries. In 1919, in Boston, Ponzi, an Italian adventurer who came to the United States in 1903, launched the first investment scheme. He went on to become a multimillionaire in less than a year, though afterward he spent most of his time in various prisons and died in Rio de Janeiro after a long, poverty-stricken odyssey. During his better days he was celebrated by his enthusiastic supporters as the first get-rich-quick financier of the twenti- eth century. His system, which was based on the trade of postal reply cou- pons (which pretended to use differences in value between American and Italian stamps), was seen by its sympathizers as the most elegant money- creation machine of all time. Since then, there have been countless attempts all over the world to make a quick fortune with the help of the so-called Ponzi scheme. In the footsteps of Ponzi, the Russian Sergey Mavrodi became the sixth-richest man in Russia with his pyramid scheme MMM, which collapsed in 1994 after at least 5 million of his compatriots invested enormous sums of money in it. Being the sixth-richest person in Russia
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THE DISPERSION OF RAGE IN THE ERA OF THE CENTER
meant something in the empire of new billionaires. In order to evade legal prosecution, Mavrodi let himself be voted into the Duma by his followers, who worshiped him like a savior. After his immunity as a congressman was abolished, he disappeared somewhere abroad, without a doubt because he was convinced that the days of such a talented man would be too valuable to be spent in the prisons of the new Russia.
During the same year, the spark went over to Poland, the Czech Repub- lic, Bulgaria, and Serbia. From Poland it is said to have passed to Albania. It is part of the instructive moments of de-Sovietization that it was precisely the poorest country of Europe that became the most extensive laboratory for postmodern rip-off capitalism. A young businessman from Hamburg with a questionable reputation was partially responsible for the destruc- tion of the illusion in Eastern Europe. His system, which was propagated with sectarian psycho-techniques, went by the name of Jump before being renamed Titan because of an acute danger of being exposed. This Ponzi scheme was once again refurbished and, thanks to the Polish manager of Titan, brought to Albania. However, it is said that it was practiced there as only one among at least a dozen Ponzi schemes. There the managers of the intensely propagated game trend were successful in plunging most of the country into greed psychosis from 1994 to 1996. The idea that money would multiply itself if merely lent to an "investment society" permeated the entire population, which had for decades lived under the dictator Enver Hoxha in severe poverty and confinement from information. One of the indirect consequences was the ignorance of the public with regard to the Romanian affair, which had been carried out only recently. Until the end of 1996 more than half of the 3. 3 million Albanians had made "investments" in the pyramid schemes, which were carried out all over the country—many of them pledged their houses and farms to real banks. Here as well profits of up to 100 percent were promised and, for some time at least, also paid. During the final nervous phase of the game, 40 to 50 percent per month was paid out—enough of an incentive to downplay the signs of a reasonable hesitation. The Albanian pyramids also became so attractive because they were advertised on national TV—a fact that was misinterpreted by count- less investors as a proof of seriousness.
When the schemes collapsed in January 1997, a frustrated panic broke out. Upset investors accused the state and the government of failing to undertake the necessary measures to protect the investors—which was cor- rect, because those with positions of responsibility had ignored warnings
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from the World Bank. Groups of those negatively affected spontaneously set police stations on fire, while gangs of angry workers and employees stormed the weapons caches of the police and the army and took approximately 600,000 small arms. In subsequent years, the rate of murder and homicide skyrocketed in Albania, five times as high as before—the majority of the weapons could not be recuperated. It seemed as if state structures deterio- rated overnight: several provincial cities fell into the hands of insurgents, who were recruited primarily from members of the oppositional socialist party. The capital, Tirana, became an arena of civil-war scenes. For a couple of weeks there was no regulatory authority in sight, probably because a large portion of the civil servants had joined the protests. Many policemen who had deserted could only be convinced to return by being promised a tri- pling of their salaries. The Albanian president, Sali Berisha, whose Demo- cratic Party was obviously affiliated with the managers of the pyramids, felt impelled to resign from office.
At the height of the upheaval, the masses, who were driven by a mix- ture of defiance and vengeance, stormed schools and universities as well as countless factories and public offices. They took everything they could and destroyed the remainder in blind anger. Western observers who visited Albania shortly afterward reported that they had never seen such a degree of destruction, even in countries devastated by war. Public buildings were looted to the last doorknobs; families sat in cold apartments beneath a rug and stared for the whole day at images from Italian TV commercials. Many Albanians attempted to leave the country out of fear in overloaded ships and scruffy fishing cutters and even on rafts. Within a few days the har- bors of Brindisi and other Italian Adriatic cities were flooded with refugees. European foreign ministers were, as usual, incapable of coming up with a realistic agreement on the quotas for the admission of this "invasion of the despairing" to the countries of the European Union. The fact that, within a relatively short amount of time, the situation normalized was mainly attrib- utable to the newly formed government's admission that the government had been partially responsible for the debacle. Moreover, the Albanian central bank could rescue significant sums for the investors by freezing the pyramid accounts; another portion of the losses was supposed to be made up by the national budget.
The processes of these schemes and their effects are symptomatically important because a message about capitalism as such is concealed in the infectious energy with which the wave spread through poor countries such
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as Romania and Albania—at least a message about the exterior view of the system as it presents itself in the daydreams of people excluded from free markets and the private-property economy. Apart from revealing aspects of human nature, the Romanian and Albanian tragicomedies presented the mythic essence ofthe capitalist conception ofwealth: the idea that the money used as capital possesses the property of a self-multiplying fiuidum—or that money as capital is a powerful amulet that promises the constant arrival of happiness assets to its wearers.
This phantasm does not lack support, even though the serious interpret- ers of the market economy, or rather the private-property economy, have for a long time warned about short circuits resulting from a purely specula- tive usage of money and referred to detached casino capitalism as a danger for the global economy in general. Indeed, the party that creates real value within the capitalist complex does not tire of emphasizing that the process of creating prosperity rests initially and, for the most part, exclusively on the artfully directed synergy of private property, cash generation, labor, organi- zation, and innovation, while all other transactions, in particular the purely monetized economy, will never be more'than smoke rings in virtual space. The party of easy gains, on the other hand, continues to hold onto the belief that enrichment is nothing other than the natural reward for engaging in speculative risk. For them, it is not labor and effort that result in wealth, although the necessity of labor and effort is not completely denied. Accord- ing to them, the true significance of wealth consists in demonstrating the sovereignty of Fortuna, who chooses those she favors and leaves the others with nothing. In a less mythological way of speaking, this means that who wins is right and who loses should not complain.
The mistake of the Albanians was thus not a complete misunderstand- ing of the facts of speculative capitalism. Rather, the Albanians succumbed to a late-socialist dream image that suggested to them that under the capi- talist system there could be a first prize for everyone. In their willingness to distance themselves from the phantom of socialist pride and, like the other members of the free world, prioritize desire, they committed them- selves to the new circumstances without ulterior motives. Because of their inability and unwillingness to come up with a realistic conception of where the desired gains were supposed to come from, they remained prisoners of their own past. It is beyond doubt that the feeling of being cut off from wealth and its distribution for too long played a role in the storm after the Ponzi schemes. After half a century in a dictatorship that spoon-fed them
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grandiose phrases, the people finally wanted to take part in the satisfying injustices of the affluent world—even if someone else would have to pay the bill for the fantastic increase of their input. Just like everyone who followed the call of the popular Eros, the awakened Albanians were convinced that this time it was their turn to bring home the beautiful bride.
REAL CAPITALISM:
COLLAPSE DEFERRAL IN DYNAMIC SYSTEMS OF GREED
NOTHING COULD HAVE BEEN MORE MISPLACED IN LIGHT OF THE Albanian mishap than the sarcasm of some Western observers toward "Shqiptar capitalism. " In reality, only a few party supporters of regular cap- italism are likely to be able to define the difference between the economic system they favor and a simple pyramid scheme. It cannot be denied that the phenomenon of a gain that one did not earn—or, more generally, of income without effort—is highly valued by long-time players of the capi- talist system. For the imaginary of modern national economies, the magic and irrational aspects of an uneven distribution of wealth have a signifi- cance that would have to be called archetypical, if the term did not have misleading depth-psychological connotations. The modern property econ- omy attracted a shining aura of happiness fantasies from the beginning, so that the term "Fortuna capitalism" would have been more appropriate. Non-European users grasped this imaginary dimension of the new eco- nomic processes within a short time. If the modern property and monetary economy—which is often called, with a slip of the tongue, capitalism— exerts, beyond cultural boundaries, a fascination that even overshadows its practical advantages, then the imaginary dimension derives without ques- tion from this source. Furthermore, the belief in the returning Fortuna, who promotes her beneficiaries via banks and stock exchanges, needs to be understood as a post-Christian reinterpretation of Protestant fantasies of being chosen—with the danger of thus disclosing the merciless essence of Calvinism, whose true face is expressed in the mystic obscenity of the feel- ing of closeness to God when time has come to an end.
The preconditions for the objective commensurability of regular capital- ism with a Ponzi scheme can be located in the undeniable fact that both models are credit-based systems of growth that are, for good or evil, depen- dent on extended reproduction. Both share a tendency to collapse, the regu- lation of which becomes constitutive for the system dynamics as a whole.
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In the case of a pure Ponzi scheme, the collapse needs to occur relatively suddenly (or it needs to be brought about consciously) because the num- ber of momentarily recruitable payers necessarily becomes zero after only a few rounds—which is why, even with good camouflage, it is hardly possible to extend a game longer than a few years. Ponzi himself could extend his games for about nine months, his Eastern European successors for two years at most. Regular capitalism, which is based on industry and banks, distin- guishes itself, on the other hand, in that its players respond to fluctuations of interest rates with economic growth, which is primarily caused by the synergy of market expansion, product innovation, and technical rational- ization. Its modus of "fleeing ahead" is thus elastic, long-term, and familiar with crises. Its mode of operation includes creative and civilized behaviors. At times, it does not even shy away from revolutionary culture advances. To the amazement of its agents, the capital process has so far showed that it is capable of controlling tendencies that signal collapse even over larger volatility and stagnation phases. Today it can look back on a more or less coherent developmental process of approximately ten human generations, if one follows Immanuel Wallerstein in assuming that the global capitalist system had already emerged around 1500.
With regard to the achievement of the essentially ahistorical or purely futuristic capitalist system, it needs to be stated that it did bring about a his- torically of a special kind. Its general tendency was made mystical with the singular concept of "progress. " This does not really change the ironic rela- tionship between capitalism and the past. The entrepreneurially run world
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talism confronts today's players and critics with a high standard of seri- ousness. This can be summarized by the thesis that capitalism provides a growth model for, in principle, an inexhaustible future power. In its name, it is expected that its actors participate in a life of permanent technical change, penetrated in all its domains by commodification and money trans- fer. The truth is that the future of the game does not look as promising as its boosters relentlessly claim. It suffices to read the popular term "sustain- ability" as a neurotic symptom of the self-doubt of the status quo. As the word demonstrates, the more thoughtful among today's economic experts already have a clear idea of what is incompatible within the system.
In fact, even non-Ponzi schemes (i. e. , the regular national economy in particular and the global economy in general) are unbalanced systems that
needs the past basically only to leave it behind.
Especially after the vanishing of the so-called socialist alternative, capi-
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continuously have to cope with a significant degree of internal threat. Con- solidated capitalism can only compensate for its inherent tendency toward collapse (the first manifestation of which was the overproduction crisis that Marx describes) by taking the bull by the horns. What for today's customer is a proof of genuine business principles is rooted in the refinement of steer- ing instruments whose key mechanism needs to be identified as an "art of central banking. "10 This amounts to a process of making the unserious serious—expressed differently, a technology of decelerating breakdown. By raising and lowering the primary interest rates, a central bank pursues the task of minimizing the endemic risks of a crash by adjusting to an acceptable level the stress incurred by the interest rate. By making regulatory decisions, it orients itself according to the actual and expected results of economic achievements, that is, according to the sum total of the effects of market expansion, product innovation, and increased productivity. In this context, the notorious phrase "jumpstart the economy" means nothing other than decreasing the risk of insolvency for the units that are in debt. In the case of professional steering mechanisms, the pressure to settle debt on all levels of economic activity does not need to spell doom for the entire system, even though many businesses and private households might crash. In the big pic- ture, liability stress advances the economic process to new rejuvenations and increases.
The compulsion to expand and innovate, which is characteristic of the capitalist method of production, thus traces itself back to the artfully con-
11
fined but never fully eliminated Ponzi factor.
complex constitutes a global network of operations to relocate mountains of debt. But even the best-compensated Ponzi scheme cannot achieve more in the long run than postponing the moment of its demystification—at the very least until the moment in which the path of expansion is blocked because all new players who can be recruited have already entered the game. This might still be a distant possibility for our contemporary world, so that a final rush is for the moment not justified. The indeterminacy of the moment of disappointment can still be interpreted by the participants of the game, with a certain degree of justification, as the essential openness of the future. Nevertheless, those buying into the game should know the opinion of a minority of experts who claim that the openness effect—the unlimited ability to perpetuate the game under its present conditions—can hardly be sustained for more than a few decades. Other interpreters believe that the game will continue for a longer period of time, especially those who
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are optimistic enough to predict the exhaustion of fossil energies only for the twenty-second century.
During the almost one hundred years since Charles A. Ponzi's Boston coup of 1919, his psychological assumptions have not in any way been falsi- fied. It can be assumed that in general they characterize the psychomotor skills of the capitalist mode of production with a high degree of accuracy. In fact, a certain level of decision making based on the greed dynamic remains indispensible for the morally inconspicuous and economically solid mani- festations of the system. These basic decisions are motivated by strong ten- dencies of expansion that occur in the psycho-semantic economies of the players in increasingly more intensive ways—usually via a detour through cultural media, such as novels, theater, films, and TV. Mass media syner- gistically create a climate of increasing liberalization, and this wins over the long course against conservative reactions.
Because the quantitative expansion of monetary processes cannot be distinguished from qualitative changes in forms of life, ensembles of capi- talist players have to adapt to a permanently revisionist climate. What has been referred to as the Zeitgeist since 1800 cannot be imagined without the money spirit. However much one attempts to point out the polarity of money and spirit in the conservative milieu, in the big picture those poles are converging. The expectation of adaptation is manifested in the demand for "mobility" and "lifelong learning" with the aim of making professional biographies flexible and, at the same time, allowing for the highest possible degree of consumerism during old age—this is the point of the most recent introduction of propaganda for a California-style retirement capitalism in Germany. As much as serious values seem to be required in this constant movement, the global tendency of the game requires a continually increas- ing level of frivolity in player populations. Even under the most favorable of circumstances—when the welfare-state satisfaction of a population has been largely successful and the containment and stimulation of a capital econ- omy has been running smoothly in a country for a long enough period of time—the system requires the integration of a growing portion of the pop- ulation into more risky greed activities and offensive acts of carelessness— a circumstance only remotely captured by the expression "consumer soci- ety. " "Consumption" here refers to the willingness of clients to participate in credit-based pleasure-acceleration games—with the danger of spending a large portion of one's lifetime stuck with repayment. The secret of the consumerist lifestyle is concealed in the evocation in its participants of a
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neo-aristocratic feeling of the complete appropriateness of luxury and extravagance. Under capitalism, an aristocrat is someone who does not need to reflect in order to know that he or she deserves only the best.
Greed is the affect that refers to the ontological assumption that it is pos- sible to sustain a permanent asymmetry between giving and taking. If taking gets the upper hand in a capitalist player for a long enough period of time, one usually calls it success. The common understanding of success sees it as a phenomenon of overcompensation—often accompanied by a tendency to repeat the unlikely. Stabilized overcompensation creates claims to elite sta- tus. Those who have been chronically overcompensated develop the talent of taking their premiums to be an appropriate toll for their effort—or, in the case of a lack of effort, for their mere eminent existence, or even for their physical appearance. Part of a fully developed greed system is typically also the elevation of being good-looking into a good reason for expecting over- compensation. It is characteristic of the unfolded greed culture that its agents assume that they will be compensated most for what they are responsible for least. It is not accidental that the "lookism," this religion of ingratitude, is on the rise globally. Youth culture has been announcing the good news for a long time that in order to be successful, it is enough to look like someone who is known through the mass media that sustain that very culture.
The capitalist form of eroticism unfolds bit by bit the paradox of an "over- compensation for everyone. " Through it the human right of greed without limits is proclaimed. Consequently, the market of appearance becomes the market of all markets—in it potential objects of desire are transformed into greed subjects by the drug of overcompensation.
It is easily understandable why the last "class antagonism" under capitalism will be between those who are overcompensated and those who make a normal amount of money or very little. The reason this divide is nearly synonymous with the antagonism between the beautiful people and those who cannot earn with their appear- ance is somewhat more sophisticated. A definition of the word "people" in advanced capitalism would involve the mass of those excluded from overcompensation. These masses are certain not to get anything for their mere appearance.
THROUGH THEIR BEHAVIOR, THE ELITES OF GREED ADMIT THE potential for permanent lotteries—or at least for sufficiently long phases of success to provide the lucky ones with surpluses for the rest of their lives.
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Generally, acute greed is accompanied by the feeling that one deserves more luck than one has so far received—one of the reasons it is not possible to determine internal limits for activities that are driven by greed. Few aspirants of Fortuna were willing during the capitalist centuries to state with Andrew Carnegie, "I have had far beyond my just share of life's blessings. "12
With regard to the unlucky Albanians and their initiation into the spirit of speculative capitalism, it needs to be noted that overall they could be lucky that things did not turn out worse. Apart from the approximately 2,000 bankruptcies of smaller companies, their nationwide losses turned out to be far less dramatic after the crisis than one would have feared. Those who escaped learned that the restructuring toward private property of a command economy could not be achieved through mere speculation. They learned what is a known fact for veterans of capitalism: everyday creation of value possesses a special kind of inertia that one cannot rush unpunished. If one wants to create wealth, one usually has to work for a while and abstain. However much the dream of making a fast buck is indispensable for the moving dynamic of capitalism, it presupposes a regular entrepreneurial cul- ture and a disciplined work world, which combine to take on a road that is only a little bit steep.
As already stated, regular capitalism, which knows how to content itself with profit rates earned in the real economy, is marked by the tension between the burden of interest and an increase in productivity—including all the psychopolitical factors without which the transformation of a given population into consumers capable of increasing demand does not work. While the pyramid crises in Eastern and Southern Europe could be traced back to an acute greed psychosis—and therefore to a sudden and rough eroticization of affective economies—it was necessary to instill deeper, more discreet, and chronically effective forms of eroticizing "society" dur- ing the subsequent consolidation phase.
By now we are in a position to understand why the psychodynamic mod- ernization of "societies" moved by money bears the face of eroticism: noth- ing less is on the agenda of economic modernity than using contemporary psychopolitics of desire imitation and calculating greed to replace the (only seemingly archaic) thymotic control of affect with (only seemingly irratio- nal) aspects that are incompatible with the market. This transformation cannot be achieved without a far-reaching depolarization of populations— and also without the progressive loss of the meaning of language in favor of the image and the number. In particular, classic leftist parties, insofar
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as they are active as rage and dissidence banks, have to appear in this new climate as dysfunctional relics. They are condemned to struggle with ugly speeches against images of beautiful people and tables of solid numbers— an impossible task. Modernized parties of social democrats a la New Labor, on the other hand, move within the element of capitalist eroticism as sound as a bell—they ceased being pride and rage parties and acknowledged the primacy of appetites. Through the introduction of a Western culture of the standardized image, a depository of illusions is provided to the postcom- munist nations that addresses simultaneously erotic longing and the neces- sity of waiting.
In the course of the transformation there is, from the standpoint of moral history, a singular stimulation of wish rivalries between the partici- pants of the generalized games of desire. In Western populations the struc- tural transformation of desire took many centuries to come about—with a significant acceleration during the nineteenth century. This time has been characterized as the century of the operetta because the eroticization of the bourgeoisie and petit bourgeoisie, which the Zeitgeist called for, created
13
its most effective medium in this genre.
social orders caused currents of rivalry and severe contests between the participants in court intrigues and leaders of trading concerns. Both were systems of action that were already characterized by emotional "modern- ization," notably by the consolidation of commerce and an intensifica- tion of the liaisons dangereuses, that is, strategic interactions. There was no historical formation, however, in which such a high degree of greed- and envy-driven competition was required as the unfolded "society" of mass consumption, which—after a more than hundred-year prelude—expanded triumphantly according to Euro-American models during the second half of the twentieth century around the globe.
These processes reveal that all modernizations culminate in a more or less dramatic revision of the form of morality authoritative since antiq- uity. Because today's systems no longer presuppose combative collectives but eroticized populations, they refrain from demanding the cancelation of the Old Testament's fifth commandment—one of the most characteristic traits of left fascism, which, as we have seen, returned in National Social- ism. These two formations of thymotic affect modeling called for resolute fighters and child-bearing mothers, not ambitious lovers and luxury con- sumers—in fact, British followers of the Communist International sang this song in the 1930s: "Let's liquidate love / Till the revolution / Until then love
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The courtly and early-bourgeois
THE DISPERSION OF RAGE IN THE ERA OF THE CENTER
is / An un-bolshevik thing. "14 The primacy of combative values was self- evident for the activists, while Eros figured under the disdainful heading of "bourgeois luxury. " As long as killing enjoyed a priority over loving, the
15
spirit of revision was primarily directed against the fifth commandment.
In the advanced sphere of consumption, on the other hand, loving, wish- ing, and enjoying become the most important civic duties. Nowadays, the abstinence provisions and the prohibitions against envy in the Ten Com- mandments are what have to be bracketed and replaced by their reversals. While the tenth commandment states, "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's house, thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's wife, nor his manservant, nor his maidservant" (Exodus 20:17), the first commandment of the new authorita-
tive law states: "Thou shall desire and enjoy whatever others present to you as a desirable goodr The second commandment reinforces the first: it is an imperative to exhibit oneself, which, in diametrical opposition to the rules of discretion of the tradition, elevates the open display of personal enjoy-
16
Thou shall not make a secret ofyour desires! It
ment to the status of a norm.
would be short-sighted to think that the effects of the exhibition principle are limited to the world of advertising and night clubs—the reality con- struction of subjective capitalism is in fact fully built on competitions for visibility. Visibility designates the possibilities of stimulating envy impulses in the worlds of commodities, money, knowledge, sports, and art. In order to compensate for the dangerous effects of the two disinhibition command- ments, the third and final commandment needs to claim: Thou shalt not make responsible anyone else but thyselffor potential disappointments during the contestfor access to the objects of desire and privileges of enjoyment!
DISPERSED DISSIDENCE:
THE MISANTHROPIC INTERNATIONAL
THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS PRESENT A VARIETY OF CONDITIONS attesting to the impossibility of collecting and organizing contemporary rage and dissidence quanta in the neocapitalist heartland. The most important factor preventing this has already been referred to in passing: in the present, no movements and parties are visible that could once again take on the func- tions of a world bank for the utopian-prophetic use of thymotic impulses. In the absence of a successful collection point of rage with a perspective on what needs to be done, we are thus at the same time missing the theoretical standpoint from which consultations concerning truly global matters could
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be carried out. Even though for years there has been a flood of moralizing remarks about the so-called globalization of the public sphere of the West and the newly industrialized countries, the sum total of the discourses does not suggest in the least the emergence of a new "organon"—unless one is willing to accept the global sociological divisions of the Pentagon and its staff members, concerned with the so-called war on terror as such. The same cir- cumstance is expressed by the thesis that, at this moment, there are no forms of positive apocalypse whose popularization would be capable of translating the potential collapse of currently successful social and economic systems into attractive visions for the time to come. Neither in Davos nor in Porto Allegre during recent years was there a convincing conversation concern- ing postcapitalist models. Put differently, this only proves that capitalism wants to be the entire culture. Thus it erects itself as the intransient horizon of the present. What comes after it has to be, according to its self-conception, only always again its own restless metamorphoses and euphoric exaggera- tions. Only the discourses of the solar movement and related antisystemic approaches contain projections that reveal a level of temporal depth, projec- tions that confront the dominant system with its inevitable end because of its dependence on fossil energies. Some of these projections only identify the reasons for the transition to a non-fossil-energy regime, while others advance
17
affect economy of capitalist democracies has already been, at least indirectly, touched upon: contemporary conditions, at least according to their general direction, defeat most variations of fundamentalist thinking—including the young Hegelian figures who present themselves as the practical real- izations of a thinking that "gets to the roots. " All forms of bearded theory have been excluded from the canon of the present. Typical bearded theories commented on the worldviews of their enemies from the standpoint of ide- ology critique (and operated on a second-order level of observation) but continued to use naive semantics to support their own cause—which puts them near the crudest systems of faith. They create the connection between thymotics and extremism, on the one hand, and extremism and monologic
18
A third reason for the diffusion of rage and protest potentials can be located in the change of its collection media and its organizing myths. While
to a horizon beyond capital economy.
The second main reason for the devaluation of vengeful impulses in the
thinking, on the other.
tions, it is only surprising for those who have themselves invested in the business of naivete.
If rage cannot lead to insight under such condi-
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class-conscious proletarians of the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen- turies already had the possibility of integrating local suffering and struggle into the epic of the workers' movement, perhaps even into the grand nar- rative about the advent of the revolution, today's rage carriers do not have a convincing narrative that could provide orientation or assign them a vital place in world affairs. In this situation, the return to ethnic or subcultural narratives is not surprising. If the latter are not available, they are replaced by local we-they constructions. Insofar as the dissatisfied of postmodernity cannot abreact their affects in different locations, the only available option is to escape to their own mirror image, which is provided by mass media as soon as scenes of violence attract public interest. The quick mirroring of self-inflicted excesses in the press and TV images may provide a momentary satisfaction for the actors. In some instances it might even symbolize a satis- factory proof of existence. However, it is precisely in such episodes that the medium wins over the content. This shows once again that the instruments of the "bourgeois public sphere" cannot function as collectors or as accu- mulation and cultivation media for thymotic subjects (which means that they are incapable of moderating the transformation of rage into pride and hope). It is beyond doubt that modern mass media possess the potential to initiate affective epidemics—topics that could spread according to the principle of viral infections. At the same time, the media neutralize topics in order to subject all events to the law of standardization. It is their demo- cratic mission to create indifference by eradicating the difference between major and minor matters.
Finally, a fourth motif for the political regression of the left culture of rage results from the conversion of money-directed civilization to the primacy of eroticism. The new commandment to love prescribes the love of goods that your neighbor enjoys as if they could become your own. Apparently this extensive commandment of enjoyment is hardly easier to live by than the Christian commandment of charity. Erotic pressure on the actors in a greed-dynamic "society" necessarily leads to a situation in which ever more irritated and isolated individuals find themselves surrounded by impos- sible offers for relationships. Because of chronic impositions of love, which have to result in failure because of limited means of access, an impulse to hate everything emerges, a hate that belongs to the siege by pseudo-objects. While collective systems of affect convert revolt into participation within the paradigm of postmodern irony, those dissident, angry, socially isolated, and linguistically impoverished impulses are captured by numbness. In this
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situation the vandalistic relationship to impossible objects imposes itself as the most plausible one. Vandalism could be described as the negativity of the ignorant and thus as a form of rage that has given up once and for all any striving to understand.
THERE WAS NO EVENT IN THE MORE RECENT PAST IN WHICH THIS mechanism expressed itself more explicitly than in the Paris banlieue riots, which flamed up in late October 2005 and spread within a few days accord- ing to the rules of the media-rewarded imitation game to numerous cities or metropolitan areas in France. It was fully obvious that the unexpected explosions of violence by a group of exclusively male adolescents with Islamic Arab and Christian African origins were riots for the purpose of abreaction and provocative vandalism fun—that affective cocktail that the political hermeneutics of the hegemonic French center-left culture does not know how to deal with. Consequently, the Paris feuilleton was content with accessing the available language games, which are happy about every occa- sion in which they can quote themselves. ("They set cars on fire—we apply our favorite theories. ")
One thing was certain during all of this: none of the political parties could, nor wanted, to offer itself as gatherer or transformer of the emergent dirty energies. Yes, vague commitments to the obligations of a republican pedagogy could be heard, but nothing that would have pointed to a new strategy of a political use of rage. The only quick-witted interpreter of the psychopolitical situation was the then minister of the interior, Nicolas Sar- kozy, who bluntly referred to the rioters as "rabble" (racaille) who needed to be washed away with a power hose. Not only did he violate the rules of political beau parley, he also made clear that in line with the attitude of the new moral majority in the country, this time there would be no attempts of political integration, only uncompromising practices of elimination. It is possible that through this verbal outbreak a new paradigm of politi- cal semantics was born. The spokespersons of the center-right would thus have understood the postrepublican imperative according to which politics should not mean anything beyond a system of measures for militant con- sumer protection. On the rhetorical plane, the transition from social therapy to disposal of the abject is unmistakable—it expresses a current agreement between the conservative anxiety of a large stratum of the society and the neoliberal principle of being relentless, which the wealthy elite admits to.
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This alliance is confronted by a left that is not capable, in either its postcom- munist or its social-democratic form, of developing appropriate measures
19
of rage collection and its investment in thymotically lucrative projects.
The weakness of the circulating ad hoc explanations for the unexpected eruptions of violence in France is revealed primarily by the fact that most of them attempted to identify the riots as mere momentous symbolic actions, though the interpretations of the symbolized affects varied significantly: depending on the inclination of the interpreter, they ranged from help- less anger through a subsequent need to revenge chronic humiliation up to manifestations of pure "pleasure in evil. " No less misleading is the allegation of some rightwing politicians that the burning of vehicles and buildings as
well as other acts of vandalism were planned, if not also controlled actions. In reality, the escalation of the violence goes back to occasional creations of rage objects, which were rewarded through feedback in the French mass media and with high attention and incentives for imitation. Assuming that this reconstruction of the events on the crucial night are fitting, the trigger- ing event consisted in the sudden dissemination of a rumor that the police had driven two suburban adolescents to their deaths on October 27, 2005. This suggestion (which turned out to be only half-true because there was no direct connection between the deaths of the young men and the persecution by the police) was sufficient to evoke a primitive us-them scenario among the numerous adolescents who were present. It quickly spread to other locations. The national police were naturally on the "they" side, as was, for understandable reasons, the eloquent minister of the interior. A confused complex arose that comprised people, symbols, and institutions in which
the strangeness and hostility of the French environment crystallized.
The formation of a negative object was, in spite of its vagueness, suffi- ciently articulated to evoke, in numerous adolescents and for several weeks, the belief that there was a real battle scene on which one could play. During the course of the riots in the streets of Clichy-sous-Bois, Le Blanc Mesnil, Aulnay-sous-Bois, and so on, one could witness a form of theatrical col- lection with a high power of attraction, even though there was no political management giving orders. An appropriate interpretation of this phenome- non transcends standard sociologies; it rather appears as if only the swarm- logical, medialogical, and mimetological descriptions would be capable of casting light on the rhythm of the events. At any rate, what was decisive for the rapid escalation of the riot was that the typical action on the fight- ing scene, the random burning of parked cars, presented a long-rehearsed
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pattern, not to speak of the initiation qualities of a ritual. Through a strong influx of new players, the pattern of a communion suddenly entered the spotlight through destruction.
20
In a sharp commentary for the newspaper Liberation,
captured the essence of what was so scandalous about the scandal: it was only through the November riots that the French public became aware that in a series of cities in their country, an average of ninety cars were set on fire every night—during the course of 2005 alone there are said to have been more than 9,000 car burnings, of which approximately 2,800 took place during the banlieue riots and their provincial imitations. The peak of these pyromania games was reached during the night of November 7, when more than 1,400 cars burned across the entire country. Furthermore, the statis- tics for 2005 mention that until November, there were 17,500 arsons in gar- bage containers and almost 6,000 vandalistic acts against public telephone booths and bus stops. Although the sociology of the perpetrators presents a somewhat more complex depiction of the chronic attacks, there is a high measure of similarity between the actors of the acute riot and those of the chronic kindlings. In every case, we are dealing with the same angry young men into whose double misery of unemployment and excess adrenaline the explosive insight into their social superfluity was added. It would be careless not to want to understand that they are the potential recruits for any war, which provides them with a perspective for breaking out of the prison of their involuntary apathy.
Considering the daily arsons, which remained beneath the attention threshold of the media for years, Baudrillard sarcastically speaks of an eter- nal flame that burns in honor of the unknown immigrant, comparable to the flame at the Arc de Triomphe. The wild flames bear witness to the psy- chopolitical disasters of French "society," which cannot manage to com- municate to large portions of its Arabic and African immigrants and their children a consciousness of belonging to the political culture of the country. However, this is a mischaracterization of the situation; what is at stake here is not the French "political culture," whose splendors remain unseen by the angry adolescents. Rather, at stake are attractive social positions, which are impossible to get for the offspring of immigrants. When he asks, "Belonging to what? " Baudrillard already presupposes, with a provincial consciousness of detachment, that the republican ethos has vanished as a political force in French civil "society. " Regis Debray articulated a related diagnosis with a mediological-cultural-theoretical accent by diagnosing, not without a sense
208
Jean Baudrillard
THE DISPERSION OF RAGE IN THE ERA OF THE CENTER
of melancholy, the lack of an effective civil religion in France. If his diag- nosis was correct, it would suggest nothing less than that the country has irrevocably entered a situation that bears not only post-Gaullist but also postrepublican characteristics. Baudrillard, on the other hand, reaches the provocative conclusion that the majority of the French already behave like insecure immigrants in their own country, immigrants who are plagued by resentment. They can only assert themselves as indigenous by discriminat- ing against other immigrants.
The excessive thesis according to which "society" has become a phantom collective to itself points to the psychopolitical consequences of capitalist
21
eroticization.
republican reserves of political culture in France would prove that its regen- erative capacities are in a better state than the witty pessimist commenta- tors would have it. This is confirmed by the protest strikes throughout the country that forced the government of Prime Minister Villepin in March 2006 to withdraw a law that loosened the job market for entering workers (Contrat premier embauche), a law that had already been passed by the national assembly. Then again, the protests prove that the French adoles- cents are at home in an illusory bubble in which they protect privileges as if they were basic rights. The current level of subversive mass eroticization also illustrates, to be sure, how strongly the traditional thymotic ensemble of people, nation, party, and confession has been weakened, partially even destroyed, through the politics of desire in popular capitalism. Through this politics, every individual is turned into a consumption citizen who—unless uplifted by family, cultural, and cooperative counter-forces—is increasingly fixed to poisoned loneliness within a doomed irritation of desire. When the French voted no in the referendum in May 2005 to the European Constitu- tion, they engaged, following Baudrillard, in an act that, according to its political and gestural content, constituted the exact equivalent of the riots of the nonintegrated in the suburbs. In a large majority, they behaved like ballot-arsons. They responded to the praised object, Europe, hardly less scornfully than the banlieue adolescents responded to the attractions of the French Republic.
It is quite likely that a more patient view of the democratic-
These observations, which are the basis of Baudrillard's and Debray's diagnoses, converge in a dark zone. They reveal an amorphous negativism whose phenomenology has been investigated sporadically for a long time while its therapy, as well as its politics, stagnates. In his 1993 essay Ausichten aufden Burgerkrieg (Expectations of civil war), Hans Magnus Enzensberger
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cited a social worker from the banlieue in Paris who vividly described the vandalistic dynamic:
They have already destroyed everything, the mailboxes, the doors, the stair- cases. They have demolished and looted the polyclinic where their smaller brothers and sisters are treated forfree. They do not recognize any rules. They smash medical and dental clinics to bits and pieces arid destroy their schools.
22
ENZENSBERGER INCLUDES THESE OBSERVATIONS IN A PANORAMA OF scenes of shabby violence, which he sums up under the title "molecular civil war. " The typical gesture of this "war" and its "warriors" is the aimless dev- astation of the terrain, which only seemingly resembles "their own. " Such behaviors constitute, according to the author, an answer to the dark insight that speaks from all the images from the crowded camps and dismal sub- urbs: "we are too many. '" This dubbing has to upset its bearers. If these fig- ures, until then often inconspicuous and marginal, finally want to take the "abolishment of the superfluous" into their own hands while lashing out blindly, they do it because "they secretly count themselves among them. "23
The signs of a "molecular civil war" initially increase almost unnoticed: more garbage on the streets, smashed beer bottles on the avenues and side- walks, discarded needles in parks, monotonous graffiti everywhere "whose sole message is autism. " In time, the symptoms of destruction reach a critical threshold: smashed school furniture, cut wires, public telephones that have been made useless with pliers, cars set on fire—now it becomes clear that a basic language of disgust has put up a sign for itself. However, these are not traces of a "civil war. " To speak of a civil war, formed parties of fighters would have to face each other as confrontable realities. Instead, waves of pre-objective negativity enter the picture as vandalistic impro- visations, which attest to the inability of their bearers to act as citizens, even as fighting citizens. As Enzensberger lucidly remarks, in all of these features is an element of "anger about what is in fact," a form of "hatred against everything that functions," a grudge against the circumstance "that forms an insoluble amalgam with self-hatred. "24 At this time he had already attested on television to a complicity among all forms of practiced vandalism, which function "like one single huge graffiti" scribbled on the wall by vengeful semilunatics who know how to get on the evening news
If they are provided with a soccer field, they saw off the goal posts.
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with the help of a few beer bottles filled with gasoline, a lighter, and will- ing cameramen.
What I have referred to as the language of disgust with how things are describes an epidemic of negativity in which the spread of what in former times was called "cultural malaise" advances to a riot in a failed civiliza- tion. This form of negativity has little in common with the forms of mor- ally articulable and politically collectable rage that I have addressed so far. Retrospectively, this spreading disgust makes clear the extent to which the traditional left—especially its Bolshevist wing but also its more liberal forms—can be blamed for anthropological and political negligence since it had always assumed that its members as well as the so-called masses indis- criminately affirmed a natural and ambivalence-free human community in large social associations.
The least that would need to be said about these primarily sociophobic assumptions is that they rest on a one-sided perspective. Realistically speak- ing, no social politics would ever possess the slightest prospect for success if it did not understand that the goal of social organization has to be to restrain the molestation of human beings by human beings. The collectivist remains of the twentieth century have violated this precept by inventing an unprecedented sadism of constipation: the most extreme maliciousness of the camp universes, as they have been created by Lenin, Stalin, Hitler, and Mao, does not so much consist in the fact that human beings were reduced to the status of "bare life," as Giorgio Agamben attempted to show in an exaggerated interpretation. Rather, the camp rests on the intuition that hell is always other people as soon as they are mutually forced into unwelcome proximity. In Huis clos, Sartre merely replaces macro-hell with micro-hell. If one shoves one's enemies together into a state of total coexistence, one is responsible for each individual being burned in the small flame of induced hostility against his kin. Only saints survive camp situations without being dehumanized. "Camp" is only a conventional name for the modern forges of misanthropy. Without considering the occult misanthropist substrate— which is only minimally concealed in the conviction that there is no need for human beings to be concerned for other human beings (Celine: "One asshole less")—the exterminist excesses of the more recent past would remain even more obscure, defying all previously attempted historical and psychological explanations. The proposition homo homini lupus loses its plausibility when considering these aspects. He who speaks of the twentieth century as the century of wolves still thinks too innocently.
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The xenophobia of the right is only one of the signs of the misanthropic element, which cannot become visible as long as it persists in concretely identifiable forms, which are, eo ipso, its pseudonyms, its ideological gar- ments. Taking offense only at the political and ideological costumes of social disgust misses the essential misanthropic message. The more obscure aspects of the misanthropic mood are systematically ignored. In reality, the sociophobic-misanthropic tendency is endemic to the left as well as the right. In all opportune idioms it rages against the imposition of coexisting with whomever and whatever. It is only with the epidemically amorphous vandalism that the negative primordial soup surfaces. With it a primary, unblended, and unmitigated misanthropy, the abysmal aversion to the social world and society, and even to the existence of the world in general, becomes identifiable as radical behavior. Hereby it becomes apparent how misanthropy itself is the special form of an amorphous negativity that could be determined with concepts such as misocosmics or misontics: animosities against the world and what exists in the world as a whole. It brings out the aversion to the imposition of existence and coexistence as such.
Rage is encountered in mollusk-like upsurges of this kind at the zero point of articulation. After its relapse to the level of diffuse universal aver- sion, it relinquishes any kind of collectability, transformability, and culti- vatability. It simply no longer remembers anything concerning the close connections among sensitivity for values, legal sensitivity, and a capabil- ity for indignation—the matrix of democratic cultures of irritation. It now seems sunken to a sub-thymotic level from which point there is no initia-
25
tory power to redeem one's own value and claims.
of the darkest form of rage, there lies, diffuse and inarticulable, the desire for an end of humiliation through the real. We are dealing with an extrem- ism of fatigue—a radical apathy that refrains from any attempt at form or cultivation. Its agents would in reality prefer not to lift a finger, as if playing dead could be the means of escaping the prison of failures. When they try to smash whatever happens to get close to them, it happens as if in a foreign tongue of gestures, the meaning of which not even they believe. To these extremists of tedium, their own massive quantity means nothing. They do not want to know that they could perhaps be the strongest of parties—if they could unify and take action for something in their own interests.
This International of human tedium exists in continuous self-dissolu- tion. Every night it decays in millions of isolated anestheticizations; every morning it formlessly erases itself and all its concerns from the day's menu.
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At the "foundation"
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No constitutive assembly would be able to provide form and content to this excessive protest against the actual state of affairs. Wherever fragmentary gatherings occur, one recognizes the theses of the actors in broken glass, wreckage, and burned metal the day after. It is not surprising that the mem- bers of this impossible International do not feel addressed by the thought of an organized gathering at all. Every form of purposive cooperation with them would mean a step toward transcendence, not being weary, not being vanquished. Not taking this step is their most intimate revenge against the status quo.
THE GLOBAL THEATER OF THREATS
TO END, ALLOW ME TO ENGAGE IN A PANORAMIC VIEW IN THE STYLE of a world-historical investigation to look back at the fate of the thymotic during the last two hundred years and situate it against the background of the two monotheistic millennia. What will become clear is that the two most powerful organs of metaphysical and political rage collection in West- ern civilization, the Catholic teachings concerning the wrath of God and the communist organization of antibourgeois and anticapitalist rage masses, have not mastered the challenges of the time and the change in mentality.
Catholicism only survived the advance of modernity for the price of a reluctant accommodation to the present day, an accommodation that lasted for more than two centuries. During this long period it indulged in gestures of denial that in some aspects closely resemble the theocentric antimodern- ism of an Islamist type, which we know from contemporary sources. During its period of defiance it ravaged the hubris of the moderns longing to make religion into a private affair. It rebelled zealously against the tendencies to create a deliberately lay state culture or one that was distanced and neutral with regard to religion. However, the change in the basic attitude of Cathol- icism could not be avoided, even though it was not brought about before the second half of the twentieth century. It brought with it a profound theo- logical conversion: in order to be able to make peace with modernity, Rome needed to distance itself from what before seemed to be nonnegotiable anti- humanist and antiliberal traditions, which were rooted in the absolutism of God's law. The transformation reached a point at which Catholic theology defined itself as an "organon" for a more profound justification of human rights. Naturally this brought with it the surrender or degrading intimi- dation of the believers through apocalyptic threats and dreadful Dies irae
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pronouncements. Subsequently, the time-honored teachings of the wrath of God and images of a revenging Judgment Day at the end of time were withdrawn from within the Church—they have been degraded to the status of curiosities that one inspects as one would a metaphysical horror genre, assuming that one can still find an interest in them.
When it comes to communism's attempt to create a global collection point for thymotic energies with globally convincing human dividends, the disappointed and exasperated elderly witnesses of that spooky epoch are still too close to it to explain why any thought of an "improved" taking-up of similar experiments means for them pure stupidity. In the eyes of those who were born later, the communist adventure already appears like a dark curiosity. It seems to be as gothic as the forgotten Catholic eschatology.
I have addressed the themes, procedures, and promises of the two big rage collectives in the second and third chapters of this book. The effects of its dissolution were addressed in the first chapter, in which the free-floating rage in the early post-Christian situation was sketched out, and this fourth chapter focuses on the political homelessness of rage in the postcommunist situation. I did not pursue the possible and actual relationships between Catholicism and communism—in fact it would have been plausible to por- tray communism as the secularized form of Christian rage theology, even as a materialistic translation of the idea of the kingdom of God.