No More Learning

Secondly, it is again evident if we consider the specific nature of
Happiness. For it has been shown above ([1038]Q[3], A[8]) that man's
perfect Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence. Now it
is impossible for anyone seeing the Divine Essence, to wish not to see
It. Because every good that one possesses and yet wishes to be without,
is either insufficient, something more sufficing being desired in its
stead; or else has some inconvenience attached to it, by reason of
which it becomes wearisome. But the vision of the Divine Essence fills
the soul with all good things, since it unites it to the source of all
goodness; hence it is written (Ps. 16:15): "I shall be satisfied when
Thy glory shall appear"; and (Wis. 7:11): "All good things came to me
together with her," i. e. with the contemplation of wisdom. In like
manner neither has it any inconvenience attached to it; because it is
written of the contemplation of wisdom (Wis. 8:16): "Her conversation
hath no bitterness, nor her company any tediousness. " It is thus
evident that the happy man cannot forsake Happiness of his own accord.
Moreover, neither can he lose Happiness, through God taking it away
from him. Because, since the withdrawal of Happiness is a punishment,
it cannot be enforced by God, the just Judge, except for some fault;
and he that sees God cannot fall into a fault, since rectitude of the
will, of necessity, results from that vision as was shown above
([1039]Q[4], A[4]). Nor again can it be withdrawn by any other agent.
Because the mind that is united to God is raised above all other
things: and consequently no other agent can sever the mind from that
union. Therefore it seems unreasonable that as time goes on, man should
pass from happiness to misery, and vice versa; because such like
vicissitudes of time can only be for such things as are subject to time
and movement.

Reply to Objection 1: Happiness is consummate perfection, which
excludes every defect from the happy. And therefore whoever has
happiness has it altogether unchangeably: this is done by the Divine
power, which raises man to the participation of eternity which
transcends all change.

Reply to Objection 2: The will can be directed to opposites, in things
which are ordained to the end; but it is ordained, of natural
necessity, to the last end. This is evident from the fact that man is
unable not to wish to be happy.

Reply to Objection 3: Happiness has a beginning owing to the condition
of the participator: but it has no end by reason of the condition of
the good, the participation of which makes man happy. Hence the
beginning of happiness is from one cause, its endlessness is from
another.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether man can attain happiness by his natural powers?

Objection 1: It would seem that man can attain Happiness by his natural
powers. For nature does not fail in necessary things. But nothing is so
necessary to man as that by which he attains the last end. Therefore
this is not lacking to human nature. Therefore man can attain Happiness
by his natural powers.

Objection 2: Further, since man is more noble than irrational
creatures, it seems that he must be better equipped than they. But
irrational creatures can attain their end by their natural powers. Much
more therefore can man attain Happiness by his natural powers.

Objection 3: Further, Happiness is a "perfect operation," according to
the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 13). Now the beginning of a thing belongs
to the same principle as the perfecting thereof. Since, therefore, the
imperfect operation, which is as the beginning in human operations, is
subject to man's natural power, whereby he is master of his own
actions; it seems that he can attain to perfect operation, i. e.
Happiness, by his natural powers.

On the contrary, Man is naturally the principle of his action, by his
intellect and will. But final Happiness prepared for the saints,
surpasses the intellect and will of man; for the Apostle says (1 Cor.
2:9) "Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into
the heart of man, what things God hath prepared for them that love
Him. " Therefore man cannot attain Happiness by his natural powers.

I answer that, Imperfect happiness that can be had in this life, can be
acquired by man by his natural powers, in the same way as virtue, in
whose operation it consists: on this point we shall speak further on
(Q[63]). But man's perfect Happiness, as stated above (Q[3], A[8]),
consists in the vision of the Divine Essence. Now the vision of God's
Essence surpasses the nature not only of man, but also of every
creature, as was shown in the [1040]FP, Q[12], A[4]. For the natural
knowledge of every creature is in keeping with the mode of his
substance: thus it is said of the intelligence (De Causis; Prop. viii)
that "it knows things that are above it, and things that are below it,
according to the mode of its substance. " But every knowledge that is
according to the mode of created substance, falls short of the vision
of the Divine Essence, which infinitely surpasses all created
substance. Consequently neither man, nor any creature, can attain final
Happiness by his natural powers.

Reply to Objection 1: Just as nature does not fail man in necessaries,
although it has not provided him with weapons and clothing, as it
provided other animals, because it gave him reason and hands, with
which he is able to get these things for himself; so neither did it
fail man in things necessary, although it gave him not the wherewithal
to attain Happiness: since this it could not do. But it did give him
free-will, with which he can turn to God, that He may make him happy.
"For what we do by means of our friends, is done, in a sense, by
ourselves" (Ethic. iii, 3).

Reply to Objection 2: The nature that can attain perfect good, although
it needs help from without in order to attain it, is of more noble
condition than a nature which cannot attain perfect good, but attains
some imperfect good, although it need no help from without in order to
attain it, as the Philosopher says (De Coel. ii, 12). Thus he is better
disposed to health who can attain perfect health, albeit by means of
medicine, than he who can attain but imperfect health, without the help
of medicine. And therefore the rational creature, which can attain the
perfect good of happiness, but needs the Divine assistance for the
purpose, is more perfect than the irrational creature, which is not
capable of attaining this good, but attains some imperfect good by its
natural powers.

Reply to Objection 3: When imperfect and perfect are of the same
species, they can be caused by the same power. But this does not follow
of necessity, if they be of different species: for not everything, that
can cause the disposition of matter, can produce the final perfection.
Now the imperfect operation, which is subject to man's natural power,
is not of the same species as that perfect operation which is man's
happiness: since operation takes its species from its object.
Consequently the argument does not prove.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether man attains happiness through the action of some higher creature?

Objection 1: It would seem that man can be made happy through the
action of some higher creature, viz. an angel. For since we observe a
twofold order in things---one, of the parts of the universe to one
another, the other, of the whole universe to a good which is outside
the universe; the former order is ordained to the second as to its end
(Metaph. xii, 10). Thus the mutual order of the parts of an army is
dependent on the order of the parts of an army is dependent on the
order of the whole army to the general. But the mutual order of the
parts of the universe consists in the higher creatures acting on the
lower, as stated in the [1041]FP, Q[109], A[2]: while happiness
consists in the order of man to a good which is outside the universe,
i. e. God. Therefore man is made happy, through a higher creature, viz.
an angel, acting on him.

Objection 2: Further, that which is such in potentiality, can be
reduced to act, by that which is such actually: thus what is
potentially hot, is made actually hot, by something that is actually
hot. But man is potentially happy. Therefore he can be made actually
happy by an angel who is actually happy.

Objection 3: Further, Happiness consists in an operation of the
intellect as stated above (Q[3], A[4]). But an angel can enlighten
man's intellect as shown in the [1042]FP, Q[111], A[1]. Therefore an
angel can make a man happy.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 83:12): "The Lord will give grace
and glory. "

I answer that, Since every creature is subject to the laws of nature,
from the very fact that its power and action are limited: that which
surpasses created nature, cannot be done by the power of any creature.
Consequently if anything need to be done that is above nature, it is
done by God immediately; such as raising the dead to life, restoring
sight to the blind, and such like. Now it has been shown above
[1043](A[5]) that Happiness is a good surpassing created nature.
Therefore it is impossible that it be bestowed through the action of
any creature: but by God alone is man made happy, if we speak of
perfect Happiness. If, however, we speak of imperfect happiness, the
same is to be said of it as of the virtue, in whose act it consists.

Reply to Objection 1: It often happens in the case of active powers
ordained to one another, that it belongs to the highest power to reach
the last end, while the lower powers contribute to the attainment of
that last end, by causing a disposition thereto: thus to the art of
sailing, which commands the art of shipbuilding, it belongs to use a
ship for the end for which it was made. Thus, too, in the order of the
universe, man is indeed helped by the angels in the attainment of his
last end, in respect of certain preliminary dispositions thereto:
whereas he attains the last end itself through the First Agent, which
is God.

Reply to Objection 2: When a form exists perfectly and naturally in
something, it can be the principle of action on something else: for
instance a hot thing heats through heat. But if a form exist in
something imperfectly, and not naturally, it cannot be the principle
whereby it is communicated to something else: thus the "intention" of
color which is in the pupil, cannot make a thing white; nor indeed can
everything enlightened or heated give heat or light to something else;
for if they could, enlightening and heating would go on to infinity.
But the light of glory, whereby God is seen, is in God perfectly and
naturally; whereas in any creature, it is imperfectly and by likeness
or participation. Consequently no creature can communicate its
Happiness to another.

Reply to Objection 3: A happy angel enlightens the intellect of a man
or of a lower angel, as to certain notions of the Divine works: but not
as to the vision of the Divine Essence, as was stated in the [1044]FP,
Q[106], A[1]: since in order to see this, all are immediately
enlightened by God.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether any good works are necessary that man may receive happiness from
God?

Objection 1: It would seem that no works of man are necessary that he
may obtain Happiness from God. For since God is an agent of infinite
power, He requires before acting, neither matter, nor disposition of
matter, but can forthwith produce the whole effect. But man's works,
since they are not required for Happiness, as the efficient cause
thereof, as stated above [1045](A[6]), can be required only as
dispositions thereto. Therefore God who does not require dispositions
before acting, bestows Happiness without any previous works.

Objection 2: Further, just as God is the immediate cause of Happiness,
so is He the immediate cause of nature. But when God first established
nature, He produced creatures without any previous disposition or
action on the part of the creature, but made each one perfect forthwith
in its species. Therefore it seems that He bestows Happiness on man
without any previous works.

Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 4:6) that Happiness is of
the man "to whom God reputeth justice without works. " Therefore no
works of man are necessary for attaining Happiness.

On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 13:17): "If you know these things,
you shall be blessed if you do them. " Therefore Happiness is obtained
through works.

I answer that, Rectitude of the will, as stated above (Q[4], A[4]), is
necessary for Happiness; since it is nothing else than the right order
of the will to the last end; and it is therefore necessary for
obtaining the end, just as the right disposition of matter, in order to
receive the form. But this does not prove that any work of man need
precede his Happiness: for God could make a will having a right
tendency to the end, and at the same time attaining the end; just as
sometimes He disposes matter and at the same time introduces the form.
But the order of Divine wisdom demands that it should not be thus; for
as is stated in De Coel. ii, 12, "of those things that have a natural
capacity for the perfect good, one has it without movement, some by one
movement, some by several. " Now to possess the perfect good without
movement, belongs to that which has it naturally: and to have Happiness
naturally belongs to God alone. Therefore it belongs to God alone not
to be moved towards Happiness by any previous operation. Now since
Happiness surpasses every created nature, no pure creature can
becomingly gain Happiness, without the movement of operation, whereby
it tends thereto. But the angel, who is above man in the natural order,
obtained it, according to the order of Divine wisdom, by one movement
of a meritorious work, as was explained in the [1046]FP, Q[62], A[5];
whereas man obtains it by many movements of works which are called
merits. Wherefore also according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 9),
happiness is the reward of works of virtue.

Reply to Objection 1: Works are necessary to man in order to gain
Happiness; not on account of the insufficiency of the Divine power
which bestows Happiness, but that the order in things be observed.

Reply to Objection 2: God produced the first creatures so that they are
perfect forthwith, without any previous disposition or operation of the
creature; because He instituted the first individuals of the various
species, that through them nature might be propagated to their progeny.
In like manner, because Happiness was to be bestowed on others through
Christ, who is God and Man, "Who," according to Heb. 2:10, "had brought
many children into glory"; therefore, from the very beginning of His
conception, His soul was happy, without any previous meritorious
operation. But this is peculiar to Him: for Christ's merit avails
baptized children for the gaining of Happiness, though they have no
merits of their own; because by Baptism they are made members of
Christ.

Reply to Objection 3: The Apostle is speaking of the Happiness of Hope,
which is bestowed on us by sanctifying grace, which is not given on
account of previous works. For grace is not a term of movement, as
Happiness is; rather is it the principle of the movement that tends
towards Happiness.
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Whether every man desires happiness?

Objection 1: It would seem that not all desire Happiness. For no man
can desire what he knows not; since the apprehended good is the object
of the appetite (De Anima iii, 10). But many know not what Happiness
is. This is evident from the fact that, as Augustine says (De Trin.
xiii, 4), "some thought that Happiness consists in pleasures of the
body; some, in a virtue of the soul; some in other things. " Therefore
not all desire Happiness.

Objection 2: Further, the essence of Happiness is the vision of the
Divine Essence, as stated above ([1047]Q[3], A[8]). But some consider
it impossible for man to see the Divine Essence; wherefore they desire
it not. Therefore all men do not desire Happiness.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 5) that "happy is
he who has all he desires, and desires nothing amiss. " But all do not
desire this; for some desire certain things amiss, and yet they wish to
desire such things. Therefore all do not desire Happiness.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 3): "If that actor had
said: 'You all wish to be happy; you do not wish to be unhappy,' he
would have said that which none would have failed to acknowledge in his
will. " Therefore everyone desires to be happy.

I answer that, Happiness can be considered in two ways. First according
to the general notion of happiness: and thus, of necessity, every man
desires happiness. For the general notion of happiness consists in the
perfect good, as stated above ([1048]AA[3],4). But since good is the
object of the will, the perfect good of a man is that which entirely
satisfies his will. Consequently to desire happiness is nothing else
than to desire that one's will be satisfied. And this everyone desires.
Secondly we may speak of Happiness according to its specific notion, as
to that in which it consists. And thus all do not know Happiness;
because they know not in what thing the general notion of happiness is
found. And consequently, in this respect, not all desire it. Wherefore
the reply to the first Objection is clear.

Reply to Objection 2: Since the will follows the apprehension of the
intellect or reason; just as it happens that where there is no real
distinction, there may be a distinction according to the consideration
of reason; so does it happen that one and the same thing is desired in
one way, and not desired in another. So that happiness may be
considered as the final and perfect good, which is the general notion
of happiness: and thus the will naturally and of necessity tends
thereto, as stated above. Again it can be considered under other
special aspects, either on the part of the operation itself, or on the
part of the operating power, or on the part of the object; and thus the
will does not tend thereto of necessity.

Reply to Objection 3: This definition of Happiness given by
some---"Happy is the man that has all he desires," or, "whose every
wish is fulfilled" is a good and adequate definition; but an inadequate
definition if understood in another. For if we understand it simply of
all that man desires by his natural appetite, thus it is true that he
who has all that he desires, is happy: since nothing satisfies man's
natural desire, except the perfect good which is Happiness. But if we
understand it of those things that man desires according to the
apprehension of the reason, thus it does not belong to Happiness, to
have certain things that man desires; rather does it belong to
unhappiness, in so far as the possession of such things hinders man
from having all that he desires naturally; thus it is that reason
sometimes accepts as true things that are a hindrance to the knowledge
of truth. And it was through taking this into consideration that
Augustine added so as to include perfect Happiness---that he "desires
nothing amiss": although the first part suffices if rightly understood,
to wit, that "happy is he who has all he desires. "
__________________________________________________________________

TREATISE ON HUMAN ACTS: ACTS PECULIAR TO MAN (QQ[6]-21)
__________________________________________________________________

OF THE VOLUNTARY AND THE INVOLUNTARY (EIGHT ARTICLES)

Since therefore Happiness is to be gained by means of certain acts, we
must in due sequence consider human acts, in order to know by what acts
we may obtain Happiness, and by what acts we are prevented from
obtaining it. But because operations and acts are concerned with things
singular, consequently all practical knowledge is incomplete unless it
take account of things in detail. The study of Morals, therefore, since
it treats of human acts, should consider first the general principles;
and secondly matters of detail.

In treating of the general principles, the points that offer themselves
for our consideration are (1) human acts themselves; (2) their
principles. Now of human acts some are proper to man; others are common
to man and animals. And since Happiness is man's proper good, those
acts which are proper to man have a closer connection with Happiness
than have those which are common to man and the other animals. First,
then, we must consider those acts which are proper to man; secondly,
those acts which are common to man and the other animals, and are
called Passions. The first of these points offers a twofold
consideration: (1) What makes a human act? (2) What distinguishes human
acts?

And since those acts are properly called human which are voluntary,
because the will is the rational appetite, which is proper to man; we
must consider acts in so far as they are voluntary.

First, then, we must consider the voluntary and involuntary in general;
secondly, those acts which are voluntary, as being elicited by the
will, and as issuing from the will immediately; thirdly, those acts
which are voluntary, as being commanded by the will, which issue from
the will through the medium of the other powers.

And because voluntary acts have certain circumstances, according to
which we form our judgment concerning them, we must first consider the
voluntary and the involuntary, and afterwards, the circumstances of
those acts which are found to be voluntary or involuntary. Under the
first head there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether there is anything voluntary in human acts?

(2) Whether in irrational animals?

(3) Whether there can be voluntariness without any action?

(4) Whether violence can be done to the will?

(5) Whether violence causes involuntariness?

(6) Whether fear causes involuntariness?

(7) Whether concupiscence causes involuntariness?

(8) Whether ignorance causes involuntariness?
__________________________________________________________________

Whether there is anything voluntary in human acts?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is nothing voluntary in human
acts. For that is voluntary "which has its principle within itself. " as
Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Natura Hom. xxxii. ], Damascene (De Fide
Orth. ii, 24), and Aristotle (Ethic. iii, 1) declare. But the principle
of human acts is not in man himself, but outside him: since man's
appetite is moved to act, by the appetible object which is outside him,
and is as a "mover unmoved" (De Anima iii, 10). Therefore there is
nothing voluntary in human acts.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher (Phys. viii, 2) proves that in
animals no new movement arises that is not preceded by a motion from
without. But all human acts are new, since none is eternal.
Consequently, the principle of all human acts is from without: and
therefore there is nothing voluntary in them.

Objection 3: Further, he that acts voluntarily, can act of himself. But
this is not true of man; for it is written (Jn. 15:5): "Without Me you
can do nothing. " Therefore there is nothing voluntary in human acts.

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that "the voluntary
is an act consisting in a rational operation. " Now such are human acts.
Therefore there is something voluntary in human acts.

I answer that, There must needs be something voluntary in human acts.
In order to make this clear, we must take note that the principle of
some acts or movements is within the agent, or that which is moved;
whereas the principle of some movements or acts is outside. For when a
stone is moved upwards, the principle of this movement is outside the
stone: whereas when it is moved downwards, the principle of this
movement is in the stone. Now of those things that are moved by an
intrinsic principle, some move themselves, some not. For since every
agent or thing moved, acts or is moved for an end, as stated above
([1049]Q[1], A[2]); those are perfectly moved by an intrinsic
principle, whose intrinsic principle is one not only of movement but of
movement for an end. Now in order for a thing to be done for an end,
some knowledge of the end is necessary. Therefore, whatever so acts or
is moved by an intrinsic principle, that it has some knowledge of the
end, has within itself the principle of its act, so that it not only
acts, but acts for an end. On the other hand, if a thing has no
knowledge of the end, even though it have an intrinsic principle of
action or movement, nevertheless the principle of acting or being moved
for an end is not in that thing, but in something else, by which the
principle of its action towards an end is not in that thing, but in
something else, by which the principle of its action towards an end is
imprinted on it. Wherefore such like things are not said to move
themselves, but to be moved by others. But those things which have a
knowledge of the end are said to move themselves because there is in
them a principle by which they not only act but also act for an end.
And consequently, since both are from an intrinsic principle, to wit,
that they act and that they act for an end, the movements of such
things are said to be voluntary: for the word "voluntary" implies that
their movements and acts are from their own inclination. Hence it is
that, according to the definitions of Aristotle, Gregory of Nyssa, and
Damascene [*See Objection 1], the voluntary is defined not only as
having "a principle within" the agent, but also as implying
"knowledge. " Therefore, since man especially knows the end of his work,
and moves himself, in his acts especially is the voluntary to be found.

Reply to Objection 1: Not every principle is a first principle.
Therefore, although it is essential to the voluntary act that its
principle be within the agent, nevertheless it is not contrary to the
nature of the voluntary act that this intrinsic principle be caused or
moved by an extrinsic principle: because it is not essential to the
voluntary act that its intrinsic principle be a first principle. Yet
again it must be observed that a principle of movement may happen to be
first in a genus, but not first simply: thus in the genus of things
subject to alteration, the first principle of alteration is a heavenly
body, which is nevertheless, is not the first mover simply, but is
moved locally by a higher mover. And so the intrinsic principle of the
voluntary act, i. e. the cognitive and appetitive power, is the first
principle in the genus of appetitive movement, although it is moved by
an extrinsic principle according to other species of movement.

Reply to Objection 2: New movements in animals are indeed preceded by a
motion from without; and this in two respects. First, in so far as by
means of an extrinsic motion an animal's senses are confronted with
something sensible, which, on being apprehended, moves the appetite.
Thus a lion, on seeing a stag in movement and coming towards him,
begins to be moved towards the stag. Secondly, in so far as some
extrinsic motion produces a physical change in an animal's body, as in
the case of cold or heat; and through the body being affected by the
motion of an outward body, the sensitive appetite which is the power of
a bodily organ, is also moved indirectly; thus it happens that through
some alteration in the body the appetite is roused to the desire of
something. But this is not contrary to the nature of voluntariness, as
stated above (ad 1), for such movements caused by an extrinsic
principle are of another genus of movement.

Reply to Objection 3: God moves man to act, not only by proposing the
appetible to the senses, or by effecting a change in his body, but also
by moving the will itself; because every movement either of the will or
of nature, proceeds from God as the First Mover. And just as it is not
incompatible with nature that the natural movement be from God as the
First Mover, inasmuch as nature is an instrument of God moving it: so
it is not contrary to the essence of a voluntary act, that it proceed
from God, inasmuch as the will is moved by God. Nevertheless both
natural and voluntary movements have this in common, that it is
essential that they should proceed from a principle within the agent.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether there is anything voluntary in irrational animals?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is nothing voluntary in
irrational animals. For a thing is called "voluntary" from "voluntas"
[will]. Now since the will is in the reason (De Anima iii, 9), it
cannot be in irrational animals. Therefore neither is there anything
voluntary in them.

Objection 2: Further, according as human acts are voluntary, man is
said to be master of his actions. But irrational animals are not
masters of their actions; for "they act not; rather are they acted
upon," as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 27). Therefore there is no
such thing as a voluntary act in irrational animals.

Objection 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. 24) that "voluntary
acts lead to praise and blame. " But neither praise nor blame is due to
the acts of irrational minds. Therefore such acts are not voluntary.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) that "both
children and irrational animals participate in the voluntary. " The same
is said by Damascene (De Fide Orth. 24) and Gregory of Nyssa
[*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxii. ].

I answer that, As stated above [1050](A[1]), it is essential to the
voluntary act that its principle be within the agent, together with
some knowledge of the end. Now knowledge of the end is twofold; perfect
and imperfect. Perfect knowledge of the end consists in not only
apprehending the thing which is the end, but also in knowing it under
the aspect of end, and the relationship of the means to that end. And
such knowledge belongs to none but the rational nature. But imperfect
knowledge of the end consists in mere apprehension of the end, without
knowing it under the aspect of end, or the relationship of an act to
the end. Such knowledge of the end is exercised by irrational animals,
through their senses and their natural estimative power.

Consequently perfect knowledge of the end leads to the perfect
voluntary; inasmuch as, having apprehended the end, a man can, from
deliberating about the end and the means thereto, be moved, or not, to
gain that end. But imperfect knowledge of the end leads to the
imperfect voluntary; inasmuch as the agent apprehends the end, but does
not deliberate, and is moved to the end at once. Wherefore the
voluntary in its perfection belongs to none but the rational nature:
whereas the imperfect voluntary is within the competency of even
irrational animals.

Reply to Objection 1: The will is the name of the rational appetite;
and consequently it cannot be in things devoid of reason. But the word
"voluntary" is derived from "voluntas" [will], and can be extended to
those things in which there is some participation of will, by way of
likeness thereto. It is thus that voluntary action is attributed to
irrational animals, in so far as they are moved to an end, through some
kind of knowledge.

Reply to Objection 2: The fact that man is master of his actions, is
due to his being able to deliberate about them: for since the
deliberating reason is indifferently disposed to opposite things, the
will can be inclined to either. But it is not thus that voluntariness
is in irrational animals, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 3: Praise and blame are the result of the voluntary
act, wherein is the perfect voluntary; such as is not to be found in
irrational animals.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether there can be voluntariness without any act?

Objection 1: It would seem that voluntariness cannot be without any
act. For that is voluntary which proceeds from the will. But nothing
can proceed from the will, except through some act, at least an act of
the will. Therefore there cannot be voluntariness without act.

Objection 2: Further, just as one is said to wish by an act of the
will, so when the act of the will ceases, one is said not to wish. But
not to wish implies involuntariness, which is contrary to
voluntariness. Therefore there can be nothing voluntary when the act of
the will ceases.

Objection 3: Further, knowledge is essential to the voluntary, as
stated above ([1051]AA[1],2). But knowledge involves an act. Therefore
voluntariness cannot be without some act.

On the contrary, The word "voluntary" is applied to that of which we
are masters. Now we are masters in respect of to act and not to act, to
will and not to will. Therefore just as to act and to will are
voluntary, so also are not to act and not to will.

I answer that, Voluntary is what proceeds from the will. Now one thing
proceeds from another in two ways. First, directly; in which sense
something proceeds from another inasmuch as this other acts; for
instance, heating from heat. Secondly, indirectly; in which sense
something proceeds from another through this other not acting; thus the
sinking of a ship is set down to the helmsman, from his having ceased
to steer. But we must take note that the cause of what follows from
want of action is not always the agent as not acting; but only then
when the agent can and ought to act. For if the helmsman were unable to
steer the ship or if the ship's helm be not entrusted to him, the
sinking of the ship would not be set down to him, although it might be
due to his absence from the helm.

Since, then, the will by willing and acting, is able, and sometimes
ought, to hinder not-willing and not-acting; this not-willing and
not-acting is imputed to, as though proceeding from, the will. And thus
it is that we can have the voluntary without an act; sometimes without
outward act, but with an interior act; for instance, when one wills not
to act; and sometimes without even an interior act, as when one does
not will to act.

Reply to Objection 1: We apply the word "voluntary" not only to that
which proceeds from the will directly, as from its action; but also to
that which proceeds from it indirectly as from its inaction.

Reply to Objection 2: "Not to wish" is said in two senses. First, as
though it were one word, and the infinitive of "I-do-not-wish. "
Consequently just as when I say "I do not wish to read," the sense is,
"I wish not to read"; so "not to wish to read" is the same as "to wish
not to read," and in this sense "not to wish" implies involuntariness.
Secondly it is taken as a sentence: and then no act of the will is
affirmed. And in this sense "not to wish" does not imply
involuntariness.

Reply to Objection 3: Voluntariness requires an act of knowledge in the
same way as it requires an act of will; namely, in order that it be in
one's power to consider, to wish and to act. And then, just as not to
wish, and not to act, when it is time to wish and to act, is voluntary,
so is it voluntary not to consider.
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Whether violence can be done to the will?

Objection 1: It would seem that violence can be done to the will. For
everything can be compelled by that which is more powerful. But there
is something, namely, God, that is more powerful than the human will.
Therefore it can be compelled, at least by Him.

Objection 2: Further, every passive subject is compelled by its active
principle, when it is changed by it. But the will is a passive force:
for it is a "mover moved" (De Anima iii, 10). Therefore, since it is
sometimes moved by its active principle, it seems that sometimes it is
compelled.

Objection 3: Further, violent movement is that which is contrary to
nature. But the movement of the will is sometimes contrary to nature;
as is clear of the will's movement to sin, which is contrary to nature,
as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 20). Therefore the movement of the
will can be compelled.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 10) that what is done
by the will is not done of necessity. Now, whatever is done under
compulsion is done of necessity: consequently what is done by the will,
cannot be compelled. Therefore the will cannot be compelled to act.

I answer that, The act of the will is twofold: one is its immediate
act, as it were, elicited by it, namely, "to wish"; the other is an act
of the will commanded by it, and put into execution by means of some
other power, such as "to walk" and "to speak," which are commanded by
the will to be executed by means of the motive power.

As regards the commanded acts of the will, then, the will can suffer
violence, in so far as violence can prevent the exterior members from
executing the will's command. But as to the will's own proper act,
violence cannot be done to the will.

The reason of this is that the act of the will is nothing else than an
inclination proceeding from the interior principle of knowledge: just
as the natural appetite is an inclination proceeding from an interior
principle without knowledge. Now what is compelled or violent is from
an exterior principle. Consequently it is contrary to the nature of the
will's own act, that it should be subject to compulsion and violence:
just as it is also contrary to the nature of a natural inclination or
movement. For a stone may have an upward movement from violence, but
that this violent movement be from its natural inclination is
impossible. In like manner a man may be dragged by force: but it is
contrary to the very notion of violence, that he be dragged of his own
will.

Reply to Objection 1: God Who is more powerful than the human will, can
move the will of man, according to Prov. 21:1: "The heart of the king
is in the hand of the Lord; whithersoever He will He shall turn it. "
But if this were by compulsion, it would no longer be by an act of the
will, nor would the will itself be moved, but something else against
the will.

Reply to Objection 2: It is not always a violent movement, when a
passive subject is moved by its active principle; but only when this is
done against the interior inclination of the passive subject. Otherwise
every alteration and generation of simply bodies would be unnatural and
violent: whereas they are natural by reason of the natural interior
aptitude of the matter or subject to such a disposition. In like manner
when the will is moved, according to its own inclination, by the
appetible object, this movement is not violent but voluntary.

Reply to Objection 3: That to which the will tends by sinning, although
in reality it is evil and contrary to the rational nature, nevertheless
is apprehended as something good and suitable to nature, in so far as
it is suitable to man by reason of some pleasurable sensation or some
vicious habit.
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Whether violence causes involuntariness?

Objection 1: It would seem that violence does not cause
involuntariness. For we speak of voluntariness and involuntariness in
respect of the will. But violence cannot be done to the will, as shown
above [1052](A[4]). Therefore violence cannot cause involuntariness.

Objection 2: Further, that which is done involuntarily is done with
grief, as Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 24) and the Philosopher (Ethic.
iii, 5) say. But sometimes a man suffers compulsion without being
grieved thereby. Therefore violence does not cause involuntariness.

Objection 3: Further, what is from the will cannot be involuntary. But
some violent actions proceed from the will: for instance, when a man
with a heavy body goes upwards; or when a man contorts his limbs in a
way contrary to their natural flexibility. Therefore violence does not
cause involuntariness.

On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1) and Damascene (De Fide
Orth. ii, 24) say that "things done under compulsion are involuntary. "

I answer that, Violence is directly opposed to the voluntary, as
likewise to the natural. For the voluntary and the natural have this in
common, that both are from an intrinsic principle; whereas violence is
from an extrinsic principle. And for this reason, just as in things
devoid of knowledge, violence effects something against nature: so in
things endowed with knowledge, it effects something against the will.
Now that which is against nature is said to be "unnatural"; and in like
manner that which is against the will is said to be "involuntary. "
Therefore violence causes involuntariness.

Reply to Objection 1: The involuntary is opposed to the voluntary. Now
it has been said [1053](A[4]) that not only the act, which proceeds
immediately from the will, is called voluntary, but also the act
commanded by the will. Consequently, as to the act which proceeds
immediately from the will, violence cannot be done to the will, as
stated above [1054](A[4]): wherefore violence cannot make that act
involuntary. But as to the commanded act, the will can suffer violence:
and consequently in this respect violence causes involuntariness.

Reply to Objection 2: As that is said to be natural, which is according
to the inclination of nature; so that is said to be voluntary, which is
according to the inclination of the will. Now a thing is said to be
natural in two ways. First, because it is from nature as from an active
principle: thus it is natural for fire to produce heat. Secondly,
according to a passive principle; because, to wit, there is in nature
an inclination to receive an action from an extrinsic principle: thus
the movement of the heavens is said to be natural, by reason of the
natural aptitude in a heavenly body to receive such movement; although
the cause of that movement is a voluntary agent. In like manner an act
is said to be voluntary in two ways. First, in regard to action, for
instance, when one wishes to be passive to another. Hence when action
is brought to bear on something, by an extrinsic agent, as long as the
will to suffer that action remains in the passive subject, there is not
violence simply: for although the patient does nothing by way of
action, he does something by being willing to suffer. Consequently this
cannot be called involuntary.

Reply to Objection 3: As the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, 4) the
movement of an animal, whereby at times an animal is moved against the
natural inclination of the body, although it is not natural to the
body, is nevertheless somewhat natural to the animal, to which it is
natural to be moved according to its appetite. Accordingly this is
violent, not simply but in a certain respect. The same remark applies
in the case of one who contorts his limbs in a way that is contrary to
their natural disposition. For this is violent in a certain respect,
i. e. as to that particular limb; but not simply, i. e. as to the man
himself.
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Whether fear causes involuntariness simply?

Objection 1: It would seem that fear causes involuntariness simply. For
just as violence regards that which is contrary to the will at the
time, so fear regards a future evil which is repugnant to the will. But
violence causes involuntariness simply. Therefore fear too causes
involuntariness simply.

Objection 2: Further, that which is such of itself, remains such,
whatever be added to it: thus what is hot of itself, as long as it
remains, is still hot, whatever be added to it. But that which is done
through fear, is involuntary in itself. Therefore, even with the
addition of fear, it is involuntary.

Objection 3: Further, that which is such, subject to a condition, is
such in a certain respect; whereas what is such, without any condition,
is such simply: thus what is necessary, subject to a condition, is
necessary in some respect: but what is necessary absolutely, is
necessary simply. But that which is done through fear, is absolutely
involuntary; and is not voluntary, save under a condition, namely, in
order that the evil feared may be avoided. Therefore that which is done
through fear, is involuntary simply.

On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxx. ] and
the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1) say that such things as are done
through fear are "voluntary rather than involuntary. "

I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii) and likewise
Gregory of Nyssa in his book on Man (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxx), such
things are done through fear "are of a mixed character," being partly
voluntary and partly involuntary. For that which is done through fear,
considered in itself, is not voluntary; but it becomes voluntary in
this particular case, in order, namely, to avoid the evil feared.

But if the matter be considered aright, such things are voluntary
rather than involuntary; for they are voluntary simply, but involuntary
in a certain respect. For a thing is said to be simply, according as it
is in act; but according as it is only in apprehension, it is not
simply, but in a certain respect. Now that which is done through fear,
is in act in so far as it is done. For, since acts are concerned with
singulars; and the singular, as such, is here and now; that which is
done is in act, in so far as it is here and now and under other
individuating circumstances. And that which is done through fear is
voluntary, inasmuch as it is here and now, that is to say, in so far
as, under the circumstances, it hinders a greater evil which was
feared; thus the throwing of the cargo into the sea becomes voluntary
during the storm, through fear of the danger: wherefore it is clear
that it is voluntary simply. And hence it is that what is done out of
fear is essentially voluntary, because its principle is within. But if
we consider what is done through fear, as outside this particular case,
and inasmuch as it is repugnant to the will, this is merely a
consideration of the mind. And consequently what is done through fear
is involuntary, considered in that respect, that is to say, outside the
actual circumstances of the case.

Reply to Objection 1: Things done through fear and compulsion differ
not only according to present and future time, but also in this, that
the will does not consent, but is moved entirely counter to that which
is done through compulsion: whereas what is done through fear, becomes
voluntary, because the will is moved towards it, albeit not for its own
sake, but on account of something else, that is, in order to avoid an
evil which is feared. For the conditions of a voluntary act are
satisfied, if it be done on account of something else voluntary: since
the voluntary is not only what we wish, for its own sake, as an end,
but also what we wish for the sake of something else, as an end. It is
clear therefore that in what is done from compulsion, the will does
nothing inwardly; whereas in what is done through fear, the will does
something. Accordingly, as Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom.
xxx. ] says, in order to exclude things done through fear, a violent
action is defined as not only one, "the principal whereof is from
without," but with the addition, "in which he that suffers violence
concurs not at all"; because the will of him that is in fear, does
concur somewhat in that which he does through fear.

Reply to Objection 2: Things that are such absolutely, remain such,
whatever be added to them; for instance, a cold thing, or a white
thing: but things that are such relatively, vary according as they are
compared with different things.