No More Learning

Objection 2: Further, it is proper to a theological virtue to have God
for its object. But fear has God for its object, in so far as God is
feared. Therefore fear is not a gift, but a theological virtue.

Objection 3: Further, fear arises from love. But love is reckoned a
theological virtue. Therefore fear also is a theological virtue, being
connected with the same matter, as it were.

Objection 4: Further, Gregory says (Moral. ii, 49) that "fear is
bestowed as a remedy against pride. " But the virtue of humility is
opposed to pride. Therefore again, fear is a kind of virtue.

Objection 5: Further, the gifts are more perfect than the virtues,
since they are bestowed in support of the virtues as Gregory says
(Moral. ii, 49). Now hope is more perfect than fear, since hope regards
good, while fear regards evil. Since, then, hope is a virtue, it should
not be said that fear is a gift.

On the contrary, The fear of the Lord is numbered among the seven gifts
of the Holy Ghost (Is. 11:3).

I answer that, Fear is of several kinds, as stated above [2469](A[2]).
Now it is not "human fear," according to Augustine (De Gratia et Lib.
Arb. xviii), "that is a gift of God"---for it was by this fear that
Peter denied Christ---but that fear of which it was said (Mat. 10:28):
"Fear Him that can destroy both soul and body into hell. "

Again servile fear is not to be reckoned among the seven gifts of the
Holy Ghost, though it is from Him, because according to Augustine (De
Nat. et Grat. lvii) it is compatible with the will to sin: whereas the
gifts of the Holy Ghost are incompatible with the will to sin, as they
are inseparable from charity, as stated above ([2470]FS, Q[68], A[5]).

It follows, therefore, that the fear of God, which is numbered among
the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost, is filial or chaste fear. For it was
stated above ([2471]FS, Q[68], AA[1],3) that the gifts of the Holy
Ghost are certain habitual perfections of the soul's powers, whereby
these are rendered amenable to the motion of the Holy Ghost, just as,
by the moral virtues, the appetitive powers are rendered amenable to
the motion of reason. Now for a thing to be amenable to the motion of a
certain mover, the first condition required is that it be a
non-resistant subject of that mover, because resistance of the movable
subject to the mover hinders the movement. This is what filial or
chaste fear does, since thereby we revere God and avoid separating
ourselves from Him. Hence, according to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in
Monte i, 4) filial fear holds the first place, as it were, among the
gifts of the Holy Ghost, in the ascending order, and the last place, in
the descending order.

Reply to Objection 1: Filial fear is not opposed to the virtue of hope:
since thereby we fear, not that we may fail of what we hope to obtain
by God's help, but lest we withdraw ourselves from this help. Wherefore
filial fear and hope cling together, and perfect one another.

Reply to Objection 2: The proper and principal object of fear is the
evil shunned, and in this way, as stated above [2472](A[1]), God cannot
be an object of fear. Yet He is, in this way, the object of hope and
the other theological virtues, since, by the virtue of hope, we trust
in God's help, not only to obtain any other goods, but, chiefly, to
obtain God Himself, as the principal good. The same evidently applies
to the other theological virtues.

Reply to Objection 3: From the fact that love is the origin of fear, it
does not follow that the fear of God is not a distinct habit from
charity which is the love of God, since love is the origin of all the
emotions, and yet we are perfected by different habits in respect of
different emotions. Yet love is more of a virtue than fear is, because
love regards good, to which virtue is principally directed by reason of
its own nature, as was shown above ([2473]FS, Q[55], AA[3],4); for
which reason hope is also reckoned as a virtue; whereas fear
principally regards evil, the avoidance of which it denotes, wherefore
it is something less than a theological virtue.

Reply to Objection 4: According to Ecclus. 10:14, "the beginning of the
pride of man is to fall off from God," that is to refuse submission to
God, and this is opposed to filial fear, which reveres God. Thus fear
cuts off the source of pride for which reason it is bestowed as a
remedy against pride. Yet it does not follow that it is the same as the
virtue of humility, but that it is its origin. For the gifts of the
Holy Ghost are the origin of the intellectual and moral virtues, as
stated above ([2474]FS, Q[68], A[4]), while the theological virtues are
the origin of the gifts, as stated above ([2475]FS, Q[69], A[4], ad 3).

This suffices for the Reply to the Fifth Objection.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether fear decreases when charity increases?

Objection 1: It seems that fear decreases when charity increases. For
Augustine says (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract. ix): "The more charity
increases, the more fear decreases. "

Objection 2: Further, fear decreases when hope increases. But charity
increases when hope increases, as stated above ([2476]Q[17], A[8]).
Therefore fear decreases when charity increases.

Objection 3: Further, love implies union, whereas fear implies
separation. Now separation decreases when union increases. Therefore
fear decreases when the love of charity increases.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 36) that "the fear of
God not only begins but also perfects wisdom, whereby we love God above
all things, and our neighbor as ourselves. "

I answer that, Fear is twofold, as stated above ([2477]AA[2],4); one is
filial fear, whereby a son fears to offend his father or to be
separated from him; the other is servile fear, whereby one fears
punishment.

Now filial fear must needs increase when charity increases, even as an
effect increases with the increase of its cause. For the more one loves
a man, the more one fears to offend him and to be separated from him.

On the other hand servile fear, as regards its servility, is entirely
cast out when charity comes, although the fear of punishment remains as
to its substance, as stated above [2478](A[6]). This fear decreases as
charity increases, chiefly as regards its act, since the more a man
loves God, the less he fears punishment; first, because he thinks less
of his own good, to which punishment is opposed; secondly, because, the
faster he clings, the more confident he is of the reward, and,
consequently the less fearful of punishment.

Reply to Objection 1: Augustine speaks there of the fear of punishment.

Reply to Objection 2: It is fear of punishment that decreases when hope
increases; but with the increase of the latter filial fear increases,
because the more certainly a man expects to obtain a good by another's
help, the more he fears to offend him or to be separated from him.

Reply to Objection 3: Filial fear does not imply separation from God,
but submission to Him, and shuns separation from that submission. Yet,
in a way, it implies separation, in the point of not presuming to equal
oneself to Him, and of submitting to Him, which separation is to be
observed even in charity, in so far as a man loves God more than
himself and more than aught else. Hence the increase of the love of
charity implies not a decrease but an increase in the reverence of
fear.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether fear remains in heaven?

Objection 1: It would seem that fear does not remain in heaven. For it
is written (Prov. 1:33): "He . . . shall enjoy abundance, without fear
of evils," which is to be understood as referring to those who already
enjoy wisdom in everlasting happiness. Now every fear is about some
evil, since evil is the object of fear, as stated above ([2479]AA[2],5;
[2480]FS, Q[42], A[1]). Therefore there will be no fear in heaven.

Objection 2: Further, in heaven men will be conformed to God, according
to 1 Jn. 3:2, "When He shall appear, we shall be like to Him. " But God
fears nothing. Therefore, in heaven, men will have no fear.

Objection 3: Further, hope is more perfect than fear, since hope
regards good, and fear, evil. Now hope will not be in heaven. Therefore
neither will there be fear in heaven.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 18:10): "The fear of the Lord is
holy, enduring for ever and ever. "

I answer that, Servile fear, or fear of punishment, will by no means be
in heaven, since such a fear is excluded by the security which is
essential to everlasting happiness, as stated above ([2481]FS, Q[5],
A[4]).

But regard to filial fear, as it increases with the increase of
charity, so is it perfected when charity is made perfect; hence, in
heaven, it will not have quite the same act as it has now.

In order to make this clear, we must observe that the proper object of
fear is a possible evil, just as the proper object of hope is a
possible good: and since the movement of fear is like one of avoidance,
fear implies avoidance of a possible arduous evil, for little evils
inspire no fear. Now as a thing's good consists in its staying in its
own order, so a thing's evil consists in forsaking its order. Again,
the order of a rational creature is that it should be under God and
above other creatures. Hence, just as it is an evil for a rational
creature to submit, by love, to a lower creature, so too is it an evil
for it, if it submit not to God, by presumptuously revolt against Him
or contemn Him. Now this evil is possible to a rational creature
considered as to its nature on account of the natural flexibility of
the free-will; whereas in the blessed, it becomes impossible, by reason
of the perfection of glory. Therefore the avoidance of this evil that
consists in non-subjection to God, and is possible to nature, but
impossible in the state of bliss, will be in heaven; while in this life
there is avoidance of this evil as of something altogether possible.
Hence Gregory, expounding the words of Job (26:11), "The pillars of
heaven tremble, and dread at His beck," says (Moral. xvii, 29): "The
heavenly powers that gaze on Him without ceasing, tremble while
contemplating: but their awe, lest it should be of a penal nature, is
one not of fear but of wonder," because, to wit, they wonder at God's
supereminence and incomprehensibility. Augustine also (De Civ. Dei xiv,
9) in this sense, admits fear in heaven, although he leaves the
question doubtful. "If," he says, "this chaste fear that endureth for
ever and ever is to be in the future life, it will not be a fear that
is afraid of an evil which might possibly occur, but a fear that holds
fast to a good which we cannot lose. For when we love the good which we
have acquired, with an unchangeable love, without doubt, if it is
allowable to say so, our fear is sure of avoiding evil. Because chaste
fear denotes a will that cannot consent to sin, and whereby we avoid
sin without trembling lest, in our weakness, we fall, and possess
ourselves in the tranquillity born of charity. Else, if no kind of fear
is possible there, perhaps fear is said to endure for ever and ever,
because that which fear will lead us to, will be everlasting. "

Reply to Objection 1: The passage quoted excludes from the blessed, the
fear that denotes solicitude, and anxiety about evil, but not the fear
which is accompanied by security.

Reply to Objection 2: As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix) "the same things
are both like and unlike God. They are like by reason of a variable
imitation of the Inimitable"---that is, because, so far as they can,
they imitate God Who cannot be imitated perfectly---"they are unlike
because they are the effects of a Cause of Whom they fall short
infinitely and immeasurably. " Hence, if there be no fear in God (since
there is none above Him to whom He may be subject) it does not follow
that there is none in the blessed, whose happiness consists in perfect
subjection to God.

Reply to Objection 3: Hope implies a certain defect, namely the
futurity of happiness, which ceases when happiness is present: whereas
fear implies a natural defect in a creature, in so far as it is
infinitely distant from God, and this defect will remain even in
heaven. Hence fear will not be cast out altogether.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether poverty of spirit is the beatitude corresponding to the gift of
fear?

Objection 1: It would seem that poverty of spirit is not the beatitude
corresponding to the gift of fear. For fear is the beginning of the
spiritual life, as explained above [2482](A[7]): whereas poverty
belongs to the perfection of the spiritual life, according to Mat.
19:21, "If thou wilt be perfect, go sell what thou hast, and give to
the poor. " Therefore poverty of spirit does not correspond to the gift
of fear.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (Ps. 118:120): "Pierce Thou my
flesh with Thy fear," whence it seems to follow that it belongs to fear
to restrain the flesh. But the curbing of the flesh seems to belong
rather to the beatitude of mourning. Therefore the beatitude of
mourning corresponds to the gift of fear, rather than the beatitude of
poverty.

Objection 3: Further, the gift of fear corresponds to the virtue of
hope, as stated above (A[9], ad 1). Now the last beatitude which is,
"Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of
God," seems above all to correspond to hope, because according to Rom.
5:2, "we . . . glory in the hope of the glory of the sons of God. "
Therefore that beatitude corresponds to the gift of fear, rather than
poverty of spirit.

Objection 4: Further, it was stated above ([2483]FS, Q[70], A[2]) that
the fruits correspond to the beatitudes. Now none of the fruits
correspond to the gift of fear. Neither, therefore, does any of the
beatitudes.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4): "The
fear of the Lord is befitting the humble of whom it is said: Blessed
are the poor in spirit. "

I answer that, Poverty of spirit properly corresponds to fear. Because,
since it belongs to filial fear to show reverence and submission to
God, whatever results from this submission belongs to the gift of fear.
Now from the very fact that a man submits to God, it follows that he
ceases to seek greatness either in himself or in another but seeks it
only in God. For that would be inconsistent with perfect subjection to
God, wherefore it is written (Ps. 19:8): "Some trust in chariots and
some in horses; but we will call upon the name of . . . our God. " It
follows that if a man fear God perfectly, he does not, by pride, seek
greatness either in himself or in external goods, viz. honors and
riches. In either case, this proceeds from poverty of spirit, in so far
as the latter denotes either the voiding of a puffed up and proud
spirit, according to Augustine's interpretation (De Serm. Dom. in Monte
i, 4), or the renunciation of worldly goods which is done in spirit,
i. e. by one's own will, through the instigation of the Holy Spirit,
according to the expounding of Ambrose on Lk. 6:20 and Jerome on Mat.
5:3.

Reply to Objection 1: Since a beatitude is an act of perfect virtue,
all the beatitudes belong to the perfection of spiritual life. And this
perfection seems to require that whoever would strive to obtain a
perfect share of spiritual goods, needs to begin by despising earthly
goods, wherefore fear holds the first place among the gifts.
Perfection, however, does not consist in the renunciation itself of
temporal goods; since this is the way to perfection: whereas filial
fear, to which the beatitude of poverty corresponds, is consistent with
the perfection of wisdom, as stated above ([2484]AA[7],10).

Reply to Objection 2: The undue exaltation of man either in himself or
in another is more directly opposed to that submission to God which is
the result of filial fear, than is external pleasure. Yet this is, in
consequence, opposed to fear, since whoever fears God and is subject to
Him, takes no delight in things other than God. Nevertheless, pleasure
is not concerned, as exaltation is, with the arduous character of a
thing which fear regards: and so the beatitude of poverty corresponds
to fear directly, and the beatitude of mourning, consequently.

Reply to Objection 3: Hope denotes a movement by way of a relation of
tendency to a term, whereas fear implies movement by way of a relation
of withdrawal from a term: wherefore the last beatitude which is the
term of spiritual perfection, fittingly corresponds to hope, by way of
ultimate object; while the first beatitude, which implies withdrawal
from external things which hinder submission to God, fittingly
corresponds to fear.

Reply to Objection 4: As regards the fruits, it seems that those things
correspond to the gift of fear, which pertain to the moderate use of
temporal things or to abstinence therefrom; such are modesty,
continency and chastity.
__________________________________________________________________

OF DESPAIR (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the contrary vices; (1) despair; (2) presumption.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether despair is a sin?

(2) Whether it can be without unbelief?

(3) Whether it is the greatest of sins?

(4) Whether it arises from sloth?
__________________________________________________________________

Whether despair is a sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that despair is not a sin. For every sin
includes conversion to a mutable good, together with aversion from the
immutable good, as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19). But despair
includes no conversion to a mutable good. Therefore it is not a sin.

Objection 2: Further, that which grows from a good root, seems to be no
sin, because "a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit" (Mat. 7:18).
Now despair seems to grow from a good root, viz. fear of God, or from
horror at the greatness of one's own sins. Therefore despair is not a
sin.

Objection 3: Further, if despair were a sin, it would be a sin also for
the damned to despair. But this is not imputed to them as their fault
but as part of their damnation. Therefore neither is it imputed to
wayfarers as their fault, so that it is not a sin.

On the contrary, That which leads men to sin, seems not only to be a
sin itself, but a source of sins. Now such is despair, for the Apostle
says of certain men (Eph. 4:19): "Who, despairing, have given
themselves up to lasciviousness, unto the working of all uncleanness
and [Vulg. : 'unto'] covetousness. " Therefore despair is not only a sin
but also the origin of other sins.

I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 2) affirmation
and negation in the intellect correspond to search and avoidance in the
appetite; while truth and falsehood in the intellect correspond to good
and evil in the appetite. Consequently every appetitive movement which
is conformed to a true intellect, is good in itself, while every
appetitive movement which is conformed to a false intellect is evil in
itself and sinful. Now the true opinion of the intellect about God is
that from Him comes salvation to mankind, and pardon to sinners,
according to Ezech. 18:23, "I desire not the death of the sinner, but
that he should be converted, and live" [*Vulg. : 'Is it My will that a
sinner should die . . . and not that he should be converted and live? '
Cf. Ezech. 33:11]: while it is a false opinion that He refuses pardon
to the repentant sinner, or that He does not turn sinners to Himself by
sanctifying grace. Therefore, just as the movement of hope, which is in
conformity with the true opinion, is praiseworthy and virtuous, so the
contrary movement of despair, which is in conformity with the false
opinion about God, is vicious and sinful.

Reply to Objection 1: In every mortal sin there is, in some way,
aversion from the immutable good, and conversion to a mutable good, but
not always in the same way. Because, since the theological virtues have
God for their object, the sins which are contrary to them, such as
hatred of God, despair and unbelief, consist principally in aversion
from the immutable good; but, consequently, they imply conversion to a
mutable good, in so far as the soul that is a deserter from God, must
necessarily turn to other things. Other sins, however, consist
principally in conversion to a mutable good, and, consequently, in
aversion from the immutable good: because the fornicator intends, not
to depart from God, but to enjoy carnal pleasure, the result of which
is that he departs from God.
Reply to Objection 2: A thing may grow from a virtuous root in two
ways: first, directly and on the part of the virtue itself; even as an
act proceeds from a habit: and in this way no sin can grow from a
virtuous root, for in this sense Augustine declared (De Lib. Arb. ii,
18,19) that "no man makes evil use of virtue. " Secondly, a thing
proceeds from a virtue indirectly, or is occasioned by a virtue, and in
this way nothing hinders a sin proceeding from a virtue: thus sometimes
men pride themselves of their virtues, according to Augustine (Ep.
ccxi): "Pride lies in wait for good works that they may die. " In this
way fear of God or horror of one's own sins may lead to despair, in so
far as man makes evil use of those good things, by allowing them to be
an occasion of despair.

Reply to Objection 3: The damned are outside the pale of hope on
account of the impossibility of returning to happiness: hence it is not
imputed to them that they hope not, but it is a part of their
damnation. Even so, it would be no sin for a wayfarer to despair of
obtaining that which he had no natural capacity for obtaining, or which
was not due to be obtained by him; for instance, if a physician were to
despair of healing some sick man, or if anyone were to despair of ever
becoming rich.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether there can be despair without unbelief?

Objection 1: It would seem that there can be no despair without
unbelief. For the certainty of hope is derived from faith; and so long
as the cause remains the effect is not done away. Therefore a man
cannot lose the certainty of hope, by despairing, unless his faith be
removed.

Objection 2: Further, to prefer one's own guilt to God's mercy and
goodness, is to deny the infinity of God's goodness and mercy, and so
savors of unbelief. But whoever despairs, prefers his own guilt to the
Divine mercy and goodness, according to Gn. 4:13: "My iniquity is
greater than that I may deserve pardon. " Therefore whoever despairs, is
an unbeliever.

Objection 3: Further, whoever falls into a condemned heresy, is an
unbeliever. But he that despairs seems to fall into a condemned heresy,
viz. that of the Novatians, who say that there is no pardon for sins
after Baptism. Therefore it seems that whoever despairs, is an
unbeliever.

On the contrary, If we remove that which follows, that which precedes
remains. But hope follows faith, as stated above ([2485]Q[17], A[7]).
Therefore when hope is removed, faith can remain; so that, not everyone
who despairs, is an unbeliever.

I answer that, Unbelief pertains to the intellect, but despair, to the
appetite: and the intellect is about universals, while the appetite is
moved in connection with particulars, since the appetitive movement is
from the soul towards things, which, in themselves, are particular. Now
it may happen that a man, while having a right opinion in the
universal, is not rightly disposed as to his appetitive movement, his
estimate being corrupted in a particular matter, because, in order to
pass from the universal opinion to the appetite for a particular thing,
it is necessary to have a particular estimate (De Anima iii, 2), just
as it is impossible to infer a particular conclusion from an universal
proposition, except through the holding of a particular proposition.
Hence it is that a man, while having right faith, in the universal,
fails in an appetitive movement, in regard to some particular, his
particular estimate being corrupted by a habit or a passion, just as
the fornicator, by choosing fornication as a good for himself at this
particular moment, has a corrupt estimate in a particular matter,
although he retains the true universal estimate according to faith,
viz. that fornication is a mortal sin. In the same way, a man while
retaining in the universal, the true estimate of faith, viz. that there
is in the Church the power of forgiving sins, may suffer a movement of
despair, to wit, that for him, being in such a state, there is no hope
of pardon, his estimate being corrupted in a particular matter. In this
way there can be despair, just as there can be other mortal sins,
without belief.

Reply to Objection 1: The effect is done away, not only when the first
cause is removed, but also when the secondary cause is removed. Hence
the movement of hope can be done away, not only by the removal of the
universal estimate of faith, which is, so to say, the first cause of
the certainty of hope, but also by the removal of the particular
estimate, which is the secondary cause, as it were.

Reply to Objection 2: If anyone were to judge, in universal, that God's
mercy is not infinite, he would be an unbeliever. But he who despairs
judges not thus, but that, for him in that state, on account of some
particular disposition, there is no hope of the Divine mercy.

The same answer applies to the Third Objection, since the Novatians
denied, in universal, that there is remission of sins in the Church.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether despair is the greatest of sins?

Objection 1: It would seem that despair is not the greatest of sins.
For there can be despair without unbelief, as stated above
[2486](A[2]). But unbelief is the greatest of sins because it
overthrows the foundation of the spiritual edifice. Therefore despair
is not the greatest of sins.

Objection 2: Further, a greater evil is opposed to a greater good, as
the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 10). But charity is greater than
hope, according to 1 Cor. 13:13. Therefore hatred of God is a greater
sin than despair.

Objection 3: Further, in the sin of despair there is nothing but
inordinate aversion from God: whereas in other sins there is not only
inordinate aversion from God, but also an inordinate conversion.
Therefore the sin of despair is not more but less grave than other
sins.

On the contrary, An incurable sin seems to be most grievous, according
to Jer. 30:12: "Thy bruise is incurable, thy wound is very grievous. "
Now the sin of despair is incurable, according to Jer. 15:18: "My wound
is desperate so as to refuse to be healed. " [*Vulg. : 'Why is my wound,'
etc. ] Therefore despair is a most grievous sin.

I answer that, Those sins which are contrary to the theological virtues
are in themselves more grievous than others: because, since the
theological virtues have God for their object, the sins which are
opposed to them imply aversion from God directly and principally. Now
every mortal sin takes its principal malice and gravity from the fact
of its turning away from God, for if it were possible to turn to a
mutable good, even inordinately, without turning away from God, it
would not be a mortal sin. Consequently a sin which, first and of its
very nature, includes aversion from God, is most grievous among mortal
sins.

Now unbelief, despair and hatred of God are opposed to the theological
virtues: and among them, if we compare hatred of God and unbelief to
despair, we shall find that, in themselves, that is, in respect of
their proper species, they are more grievous. For unbelief is due to a
man not believing God's own truth; while the hatred of God arises from
man's will being opposed to God's goodness itself; whereas despair
consists in a man ceasing to hope for a share of God's goodness. Hence
it is clear that unbelief and hatred of God are against God as He is in
Himself, while despair is against Him, according as His good is
partaken of by us. Wherefore strictly speaking it is more grievous sin
to disbelieve God's truth, or to hate God, than not to hope to receive
glory from Him.

If, however, despair be compared to the other two sins from our point
of view, then despair is more dangerous, since hope withdraws us from
evils and induces us to seek for good things, so that when hope is
given up, men rush headlong into sin, and are drawn away from good
works. Wherefore a gloss on Prov. 24:10, "If thou lose hope being weary
in the day of distress, thy strength shall be diminished," says:
"Nothing is more hateful than despair, for the man that has it loses
his constancy both in the every day toils of this life, and, what is
worse, in the battle of faith. " And Isidore says (De Sum. Bono ii, 14):
"To commit a crime is to kill the soul, but to despair is to fall into
hell. "
__________________________________________________________________

Whether despair arises from sloth?

Objection 1: It would seem that despair does not arise from sloth.
Because different causes do not give rise to one same effect. Now
despair of the future life arises from lust, according to Gregory
(Moral. xxxi, 45). Therefore it does not arise from sloth.

Objection 2: Further, just as despair is contrary to hope, so is sloth
contrary to spiritual joy. But spiritual joy arises from hope,
according to Rom. 12:12, "rejoicing in hope. " Therefore sloth arises
from despair, and not vice versa.

Objection 3: Further, contrary effects have contrary causes. Now hope,
the contrary of which is despair, seems to proceed from the
consideration of Divine favors, especially the Incarnation, for
Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 10): "Nothing was so necessary to raise
our hope, than that we should be shown how much God loves us. Now what
greater proof could we have of this than that God's Son should deign to
unite Himself to our nature? " Therefore despair arises rather from the
neglect of the above consideration than from sloth.

On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) reckons despair among the
effects of sloth.

I answer that, As stated above (Q[17], A[1]; [2487]FS, Q[40], A[1]),
the object of hope is a good, difficult but possible to obtain by
oneself or by another. Consequently the hope of obtaining happiness may
be lacking in a person in two ways: first, through his not deeming it
an arduous good; secondly, through his deeming it impossible to obtain
either by himself, or by another. Now, the fact that spiritual goods
taste good to us no more, or seem to be goods of no great account, is
chiefly due to our affections being infected with the love of bodily
pleasures, among which, sexual pleasures hold the first place: for the
love of those pleasures leads man to have a distaste for spiritual
things, and not to hope for them as arduous goods. In this way despair
is caused by lust.

On the other hand, the fact that a man deems an arduous good impossible
to obtain, either by himself or by another, is due to his being over
downcast, because when this state of mind dominates his affections, it
seems to him that he will never be able to rise to any good. And since
sloth is a sadness that casts down the spirit, in this way despair is
born of sloth.

Now this is the proper object of hope---that the thing is possible,
because the good and the arduous regard other passions also. Hence
despair is born of sloth in a more special way: though it may arise
from lust, for the reason given above.

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Reply to Objection 2: According to the Philosopher (Rhet. i, 11), just
as hope gives rise to joy, so, when a man is joyful he has greater
hope: and, accordingly, those who are sorrowful fall the more easily
into despair, according to 2 Cor. 2:7: "Lest . . . such an one be
swallowed up by overmuch sorrow. " Yet, since the object of hope is
good, to which the appetite tends naturally, and which it shuns, not
naturally but only on account of some supervening obstacle, it follows
that, more directly, hope gives birth to joy, while on the contrary
despair is born of sorrow.

Reply to Objection 3: This very neglect to consider the Divine favors
arises from sloth. For when a man is influenced by a certain passion he
considers chiefly the things which pertain to that passion: so that a
man who is full of sorrow does not easily think of great and joyful
things, but only of sad things, unless by a great effort he turn his
thoughts away from sadness.
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OF PRESUMPTION (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider presumption, under which head there are four
points of inquiry:

(1) What is the object in which presumption trusts?

(2) Whether presumption is a sin?

(3) To what is it opposed?

(4) From what vice does it arise?
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Whether presumption trusts in God or in our own power?

Objection 1: It would seem that presumption, which is a sin against the
Holy Ghost, trusts, not in God, but in our own power. For the lesser
the power, the more grievously does he sin who trusts in it too much.
But man's power is less than God's. Therefore it is a more grievous sin
to presume on human power than to presume on the power of God. Now the
sin against the Holy Ghost is most grievous. Therefore presumption,
which is reckoned a species of sin against the Holy Ghost, trusts to
human rather than to Divine power.

Objection 2: Further, other sins arise from the sin against the Holy
Ghost, for this sin is called malice which is a source from which sins
arise. Now other sins seem to arise from the presumption whereby man
presumes on himself rather than from the presumption whereby he
presumes on God, since self-love is the origin of sin, according to
Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28). Therefore it seems that presumption
which is a sin against the Holy Ghost, relies chiefly on human power.

Objection 3: Further, sin arises from the inordinate conversion to a
mutable good. Now presumption is a sin. Therefore it arises from
turning to human power, which is a mutable good, rather than from
turning to the power of God, which is an immutable good.

On the contrary, Just as, through despair, a man despises the Divine
mercy, on which hope relies, so, through presumption, he despises the
Divine justice, which punishes the sinner. Now justice is in God even
as mercy is. Therefore, just as despair consists in aversion from God,
so presumption consists in inordinate conversion to Him.

I answer that, Presumption seems to imply immoderate hope. Now the
object of hope is an arduous possible good: and a thing is possible to
a man in two ways: first by his own power; secondly, by the power of
God alone. With regard to either hope there may be presumption owing to
lack of moderation. As to the hope whereby a man relies on his own
power, there is presumption if he tends to a good as though it were
possible to him, whereas it surpasses his powers, according to Judith
6:15: "Thou humblest them that presume of themselves. " This presumption
is contrary to the virtue of magnanimity which holds to the mean in
this kind of hope.

But as to the hope whereby a man relies on the power of God, there may
be presumption through immoderation, in the fact that a man tends to
some good as though it were possible by the power and mercy of God,
whereas it is not possible, for instance, if a man hope to obtain
pardon without repenting, or glory without merits. This presumption is,
properly, the sin against the Holy Ghost, because, to wit, by presuming
thus a man removes or despises the assistance of the Holy Spirit,
whereby he is withdrawn from sin.

Reply to Objection 1: As stated above (Q[20], A[3]; [2488]FS, Q[73],
A[3]) a sin which is against God is, in its genus, graver than other
sins. Hence presumption whereby a man relies on God inordinately, is a
more grievous sin than the presumption of trusting in one's own power,
since to rely on the Divine power for obtaining what is unbecoming to
God, is to depreciate the Divine power, and it is evident that it is a
graver sin to detract from the Divine power than to exaggerate one's
own.

Reply to Objection 2: The presumption whereby a man presumes
inordinately on God, includes self-love, whereby he loves his own good
inordinately. For when we desire a thing very much, we think we can
easily procure it through others, even though we cannot.

Reply to Objection 3: Presumption on God's mercy implies both
conversion to a mutable good, in so far as it arises from an inordinate
desire of one's own good, and aversion from the immutable good, in as
much as it ascribes to the Divine power that which is unbecoming to it,
for thus man turns away from God's power.
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Whether presumption is a sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that presumption is not a sin. For no sin is
a reason why man should be heard by God. Yet, through presumption some
are heard by God, for it is written (Judith 9:17): "Hear me a poor
wretch making supplication to Thee, and presuming of Thy mercy. "
Therefore presumption on God's mercy is not a sin.

Objection 2: Further, presumption denotes excessive hope. But there
cannot be excess of that hope which is in God, since His power and
mercy are infinite. Therefore it seems that presumption is not a sin.

Objection 3: Further, that which is a sin does not excuse from sin: for
the Master says (Sent. ii, D, 22) that "Adam sinned less, because he
sinned in the hope of pardon," which seems to indicate presumption.
Therefore presumption is not a sin.

On the contrary, It is reckoned a species of sin against the Holy
Ghost.

I answer that, As stated above ([2489]Q[20], A[1]) with regard to
despair, every appetitive movement that is conformed to a false
intellect, is evil in itself and sinful. Now presumption is an
appetitive movement, since it denotes an inordinate hope. Moreover it
is conformed to a false intellect, just as despair is: for just as it
is false that God does not pardon the repentant, or that He does not
turn sinners to repentance, so is it false that He grants forgiveness
to those who persevere in their sins, and that He gives glory to those
who cease from good works: and it is to this estimate that the movement
of presumption is conformed.

Consequently presumption is a sin, but less grave than despair, since,
on account of His infinite goodness, it is more proper to God to have
mercy and to spare, than to punish: for the former becomes God in
Himself, the latter becomes Him by reason of our sins.

Reply to Objection 1: Presumption sometimes stands for hope, because
even the right hope which we have in God seems to be presumption, if it
be measured according to man's estate: yet it is not, if we look at the
immensity of the goodness of God.

Reply to Objection 2: Presumption does not denote excessive hope, as
though man hoped too much in God; but through man hoping to obtain from
God something unbecoming to Him; which is the same as to hope too
little in Him, since it implies a depreciation of His power; as stated
above (A[1], ad 1).

Reply to Objection 3: To sin with the intention of persevering in sin
and through the hope of being pardoned, is presumptuous, and this does
not diminish, but increases sin. To sin, however, with the hope of
obtaining pardon some time, and with the intention of refraining from
sin and of repenting of it, is not presumptuous, but diminishes sin,
because this seems to indicate a will less hardened in sin.
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Whether presumption is more opposed to fear than to hope?

Objection 1: It would seem that presumption is more opposed to fear
than to hope. Because inordinate fear is opposed to right fear. Now
presumption seems to pertain to inordinate fear, for it is written
(Wis. 17:10): "A troubled conscience always presumes [Douay:
'forecasteth'] grievous things," and (Wis. 17:11) that "fear is a help
to presumption [*Vulg. : 'Fear is nothing else but a yielding up of the
succours from thought. ']. " Therefore presumption is opposed to fear
rather than to hope.

Objection 2: Further, contraries are most distant from one another. Now
presumption is more distant from fear than from hope, because
presumption implies movement to something, just as hope does, whereas
fear denotes movement from a thing. Therefore presumption is contrary
to fear rather than to hope.

Objection 3: Further, presumption excludes fear altogether, whereas it
does not exclude hope altogether, but only the rectitude of hope. Since
therefore contraries destroy one another, it seems that presumption is
contrary to fear rather than to hope.

On the contrary, When two vices are opposed to one another they are
contrary to the same virtue, as timidity and audacity are opposed to
fortitude. Now the sin of presumption is contrary to the sin of
despair, which is directly opposed to hope. Therefore it seems that
presumption also is more directly opposed to hope.

I answer that, As Augustine states (Contra Julian. iv, 3), "every
virtue not only has a contrary vice manifestly distinct from it, as
temerity is opposed to prudence, but also a sort of kindred vice,
alike, not in truth but only in its deceitful appearance, as cunning is
opposed to prudence. " This agrees with the Philosopher who says (Ethic.
ii, 8) that a virtue seems to have more in common with one of the
contrary vices than with the other, as temperance with insensibility,
and fortitude with audacity.

Accordingly presumption appears to be manifestly opposed to fear,
especially servile fear, which looks at the punishment arising from
God's justice, the remission of which presumption hopes for; yet by a
kind of false likeness it is more opposed to hope, since it denotes an
inordinate hope in God. And since things are more directly opposed when
they belong to the same genus, than when they belong to different
genera, it follows that presumption is more directly opposed to hope
than to fear. For they both regard and rely on the same object, hope
inordinately, presumption inordinately.

Reply to Objection 1: Just as hope is misused in speaking of evils, and
properly applied in speaking of good, so is presumption: it is in this
way that inordinate fear is called presumption.

Reply to Objection 2: Contraries are things that are most distant from
one another within the same genus. Now presumption and hope denote a
movement of the same genus, which can be either ordinate or inordinate.
Hence presumption is more directly opposed to hope than to fear, since
it is opposed to hope in respect of its specific difference, as an
inordinate thing to an ordinate one, whereas it is opposed to fear, in
respect of its generic difference, which is the movement of hope.

Reply to Objection 3: Presumption is opposed to fear by a generic
contrariety, and to the virtue of hope by a specific contrariety. Hence
presumption excludes fear altogether even generically, whereas it does
not exclude hope except by reason of its difference, by excluding its
ordinateness.
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Whether presumption arises from vainglory?

Objection 1: It would seem that presumption does not arise from
vainglory. For presumption seems to rely most of all on the Divine
mercy. Now mercy [misericordia] regards unhappiness [miseriam] which is
contrary to glory. Therefore presumption does not arise from vainglory.

Objection 2: Further, presumption is opposed to despair. Now despair
arises from sorrow, as stated above ([2490]Q[20], A[4], ad 2). Since
therefore opposites have opposite causes, presumption would seem to
arise from pleasure, and consequently from sins of the flesh, which
give the most absorbing pleasure.

Objection 3: Further, the vice of presumption consists in tending to
some impossible good, as though it were possible. Now it is owing to
ignorance that one deems an impossible thing to be possible. Therefore
presumption arises from ignorance rather than from vainglory.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that "presumption of
novelties is a daughter of vainglory. "

I answer that, As stated above [2491](A[1]), presumption is twofold;
one whereby a man relies on his own power, when he attempts something
beyond his power, as though it were possible to him. Such like
presumption clearly arises from vainglory; for it is owing to a great
desire for glory, that a man attempts things beyond his power, and
especially novelties which call for greater admiration. Hence Gregory
states explicitly that presumption of novelties is a daughter of
vainglory.

The other presumption is an inordinate trust in the Divine mercy or
power, consisting in the hope of obtaining glory without merits, or
pardon without repentance.