No More Learning

Objection 2: Further, Augustine thus argues (Contra Maximin. iii, 8):
"If God could, but would not, beget a Son His equal, He would have been
envious. " For the same reason, if God could have made better things
than He has done, but was not willing so to do, He would have been
envious. But envy is far removed from God. Therefore God makes
everything of the best. He cannot therefore make anything better than
He does.

Objection 3: Further, what is very good and the best of all cannot be
bettered; because nothing is better than the best. But as Augustine
says (Enchiridion 10), "each thing that God has made is good, and,
taken all together they are very good; because in them all consists the
wondrous beauty of the universe. " Therefore the good in the universe
could not be made better by God.

Objection 4: Further, Christ as man is full of grace and truth, and has
the Spirit without measure; and so He cannot be better. Again created
happiness is described as the highest good, and thus cannot be better.
And the Blessed Virgin Mary is raised above all the choirs of angels,
and so cannot be better than she is. God cannot therefore make all
things better than He has made them.

On the contrary, It is said (Eph. 3:20): "God is able to do all things
more abundantly than we desire or understand. "

I answer that, The goodness of anything is twofold; one, which is of
the essence of it---thus, for instance, to be rational pertains to the
essence of man. As regards this good, God cannot make a thing better
than it is itself; although He can make another thing better than it;
even as He cannot make the number four greater than it is; because if
it were greater it would no longer be four, but another number. For the
addition of a substantial difference in definitions is after the manner
of the addition of unity of numbers (Metaph. viii, 10). Another kind of
goodness is that which is over and above the essence; thus, the good of
a man is to be virtuous or wise. As regards this kind of goodness, God
can make better the things He has made. Absolutely speaking, however,
God can make something else better than each thing made by Him.

Reply to Objection 1: When it is said that God can make a thing better
than He makes it, if "better" is taken substantively, this proposition
is true. For He can always make something else better than each
individual thing: and He can make the same thing in one way better than
it is, and in another way not; as was explained above. If, however,
"better" is taken as an adverb, implying the manner of the making; thus
God cannot make anything better than He makes it, because He cannot
make it from greater wisdom and goodness. But if it implies the manner
of the thing done, He can make something better; because He can give to
things made by Him a better manner of existence as regards the
accidents, although not as regards the substance.

Reply to Objection 2: It is of the nature of a son that he should be
equal to his father, when he comes to maturity. But it is not of the
nature of anything created, that it should be better than it was made
by God. Hence the comparison fails.

Reply to Objection 3: The universe, the present creation being
supposed, cannot be better, on account of the most beautiful order
given to things by God; in which the good of the universe consists. For
if any one thing were bettered, the proportion of order would be
destroyed; as if one string were stretched more than it ought to be,
the melody of the harp would be destroyed. Yet God could make other
things, or add something to the present creation; and then there would
be another and a better universe.

Reply to Objection 4: The humanity of Christ, from the fact that it is
united to the Godhead; and created happiness from the fact that it is
the fruition of God; and the Blessed Virgin from the fact that she is
the mother of God; have all a certain infinite dignity from the
infinite good, which is God. And on this account there cannot be
anything better than these; just as there cannot be anything better
than God.
__________________________________________________________________

OF THE DIVINE BEATITUDE (FOUR ARTICLES)

After considering all that pertains to the unity of the divine essence,
we come to treat of the divine beatitude. Concerning this, there are
four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether beatitude belongs to God?

(2) In regard to what is God called blessed; does this regard His act
of intellect?

(3) Whether He is essentially the beatitude of each of the blessed?

(4) Whether all other beatitude is included in the divine beatitude?
__________________________________________________________________

Whether beatitude belongs to God?

Objection 1: It seems that beatitude does not belong to God. For
beatitude according to Boethius (De Consol. iv) "is a state made
perfect by the aggregation of all good things. " But the aggregation of
goods has no place in God; nor has composition. Therefore beatitude
does not belong to God.

Objection 2: Further, beatitude or happiness is the reward of virtue,
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 9). But reward does not apply
to God; as neither does merit. Therefore neither does beatitude.

On the contrary, The Apostle says: "Which in His times He shall show,
who is the Blessed and only Almighty, the King of Kings and Lord of
Lords. " (1 Tim. 6:15).

I answer that, Beatitude belongs to God in a very special manner. For
nothing else is understood to be meant by the term beatitude than the
perfect good of an intellectual nature; which is capable of knowing
that it has a sufficiency of the good which it possesses, to which it
is competent that good or ill may befall, and which can control its own
actions. All of these things belong in a most excellent manner to God,
namely, to be perfect, and to possess intelligence. Whence beatitude
belongs to God in the highest degree.

Reply to Objection 1: Aggregation of good is in God, after the manner
not of composition, but of simplicity; for those things which in
creatures is manifold, pre-exist in God, as was said above ([218]Q[4],
A[2]; [219]Q[13], A[4]), in simplicity and unity.

Reply to Objection 2: It belongs as an accident to beatitude or
happiness to be the reward of virtue, so far as anyone attains to
beatitude; even as to be the term of generation belongs accidentally to
a being, so far as it passes from potentiality to act. As, then, God
has being, though not begotten; so He has beatitude, although not
acquired by merit.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether God is called blessed in respect of His intellect?

Objection 1: It seems that God is not called blessed in respect to His
intellect. For beatitude is the highest good. But good is said to be in
God in regard to His essence, because good has reference to being which
is according to essence, according to Boethius (De Hebdom. ). Therefore
beatitude also is said to be in God in regard to His essence, and not
to His intellect.

Objection 2: Further, Beatitude implies the notion of end. Now the end
is the object of the will, as also is the good. Therefore beatitude is
said to be in God with reference to His will, and not with reference to
His intellect.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxii, 7): "He is in glory, Who
whilst He rejoices in Himself, needs not further praise. " To be in
glory, however, is the same as to be blessed. Therefore, since we enjoy
God in respect to our intellect, because "vision is the whole of the
reward," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii), it would seem that
beatitude is said to be in God in respect of His intellect.

I answer that, Beatitude, as stated above [220](A[1]), is the perfect
good of an intellectual nature. Thus it is that, as everything desires
the perfection of its nature, intellectual nature desires naturally to
be happy. Now that which is most perfect in any intellectual nature is
the intellectual operation, by which in some sense it grasps
everything. Whence the beatitude of every intellectual nature consists
in understanding. Now in God, to be and to understand are one and the
same thing; differing only in the manner of our understanding them.
Beatitude must therefore be assigned to God in respect of His
intellect; as also to the blessed, who are called blesses [beati] by
reason of the assimilation to His beatitude.

Reply to Objection 1: This argument proves that beatitude belongs to
God; not that beatitude pertains essentially to Him under the aspect of
His essence; but rather under the aspect of His intellect.

Reply to Objection 2: Since beatitude is a good, it is the object of
the will; now the object is understood as prior to the act of a power.
Whence in our manner of understanding, divine beatitude precedes the
act of the will at rest in it. This cannot be other than the act of the
intellect; and thus beatitude is to be found in an act of the
intellect.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether God is the beatitude of each of the blessed?

Objection 1: It seems that God is the beatitude of each of the blessed.
For God is the supreme good, as was said above ([221]Q[6], AA[2],4).
But it is quite impossible that there should be many supreme goods, as
also is clear from what has been said above ([222]Q[11], A[3]).
Therefore, since it is of the essence of beatitude that it should be
the supreme good, it seems that beatitude is nothing else but God
Himself.

Objection 2: Further, beatitude is the last end of the rational nature.
But to be the last end of the rational nature belongs only to God.
Therefore the beatitude of every blessed is God alone.

On the contrary, The beatitude of one is greater than that of another,
according to 1 Cor. 15:41: "Star differeth from star in glory. " But
nothing is greater than God. Therefore beatitude is something different
from God.

I answer that, The beatitude of an intellectual nature consists in an
act of the intellect. In this we may consider two things, namely, the
object of the act, which is the thing understood; and the act itself
which is to understand. If, then, beatitude be considered on the side
of the object, God is the only beatitude; for everyone is blessed from
this sole fact, that he understands God, in accordance with the saying
of Augustine (Confess. v, 4): "Blessed is he who knoweth Thee, though
he know nought else. " But as regards the act of understanding,
beatitude is a created thing in beatified creatures; but in God, even
in this way, it is an uncreated thing.

Reply to Objection 1: Beatitude, as regards its object, is the supreme
good absolutely, but as regards its act, in beatified creatures it is
their supreme good, not absolutely, but in that kind of goods which a
creature can participate.

Reply to Objection 2: End is twofold, namely, "objective" and
"subjective," as the Philosopher says (Greater Ethics i, 3), namely,
the "thing itself" and "its use. " Thus to a miser the end is money, and
its acquisition. Accordingly God is indeed the last end of a rational
creature, as the thing itself; but created beatitude is the end, as the
use, or rather fruition, of the thing.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether all other beatitude is included in the beatitude of God?

Objection 1: It seems that the divine beatitude does not embrace all
other beatitudes. For there are some false beatitudes. But nothing
false can be in God. Therefore the divine beatitude does not embrace
all other beatitudes.

Objection 2: Further, a certain beatitude, according to some, consists
in things corporeal; as in pleasure, riches, and such like. Now none of
these have to do with God, since He is incorporeal. Therefore His
beatitude does not embrace all other beatitudes.

On the contrary, Beatitude is a certain perfection. But the divine
perfection embraces all other perfection, as was shown above
([223]Q[4], A[2] ). Therefore the divine beatitude embraces all other
beatitudes.

I answer that, Whatever is desirable in whatsoever beatitude, whether
true or false, pre-exists wholly and in a more eminent degree in the
divine beatitude. As to contemplative happiness, God possesses a
continual and most certain contemplation of Himself and of all things
else; and as to that which is active, He has the governance of the
whole universe. As to earthly happiness, which consists in delight,
riches, power, dignity, and fame, according to Boethius (De Consol.
iii, 10), He possesses joy in Himself and all things else for His
delight; instead of riches He has that complete self-sufficiency, which
is promised by riches; in place of power, He has omnipotence; for
dignities, the government of all things; and in place of fame, He
possesses the admiration of all creatures.

Reply to Objection 1: A particular kind of beatitude is false according
as it falls short of the idea of true beatitude; and thus it is not in
God. But whatever semblance it has, howsoever slight, of beatitude, the
whole of it pre-exists in the divine beatitude.

Reply to Objection 2: The good that exists in things corporeal in a
corporeal manner, is also in God, but in a spiritual manner.

We have now spoken enough concerning what pertains to the unity of the
divine essence.
__________________________________________________________________

TREATISE ON THE MOST HOLY TRINITY (QQ[27]-43)
__________________________________________________________________

THE PROCESSION OF THE DIVINE PERSONS (FIVE ARTICLES)

Having considered what belongs to the unity of the divine essence, it
remains to treat of what belongs to the Trinity of the persons in God.
And because the divine Persons are distinguished from each other
according to the relations of origin, the order of the doctrine leads
us to consider firstly, the question of origin or procession; secondly,
the relations of origin; thirdly, the persons.

Concerning procession there are five points of inquiry:

(1) Whether there is procession in God?

(2) Whether any procession in God can be called generation?

(3) Whether there can be any other procession in God besides
generation.

(4) Whether that other procession can be called generation?

(5) Whether there are more than two processions in God?
__________________________________________________________________

Whether there is procession in God?

Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be any procession in God.
For procession signifies outward movement. But in God there is nothing
mobile, nor anything extraneous. Therefore neither is there procession
in God.

Objection 2: Further, everything which proceeds differs from that
whence it proceeds. But in God there is no diversity; but supreme
simplicity. Therefore in God there is no procession.

Objection 3: Further, to proceed from another seems to be against the
nature of the first principle. But God is the first principle, as shown
above ([224]Q[2], A[3]). Therefore in God there is no procession.

On the contrary, Our Lord says, "From God I proceeded" (Jn. 8:42).

I answer that, Divine Scripture uses, in relation to God, names which
signify procession. This procession has been differently understood.
Some have understood it in the sense of an effect, proceeding from its
cause; so Arius took it, saying that the Son proceeds from the Father
as His primary creature, and that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the
Father and the Son as the creature of both. In this sense neither the
Son nor the Holy Ghost would be true God: and this is contrary to what
is said of the Son, "That . . . we may be in His true Son. This is true
God" (1 Jn. 5:20). Of the Holy Ghost it is also said, "Know you not
that your members are the temple of the Holy Ghost? " (1 Cor. 6:19).
Now, to have a temple is God's prerogative. Others take this procession
to mean the cause proceeding to the effect, as moving it, or impressing
its own likeness on it; in which sense it was understood by Sabellius,
who said that God the Father is called Son in assuming flesh from the
Virgin, and that the Father also is called Holy Ghost in sanctifying
the rational creature, and moving it to life. The words of the Lord
contradict such a meaning, when He speaks of Himself, "The Son cannot
of Himself do anything" (Jn. 5:19); while many other passages show the
same, whereby we know that the Father is not the Son. Careful
examination shows that both of these opinions take procession as
meaning an outward act; hence neither of them affirms procession as
existing in God Himself; whereas, since procession always supposes
action, and as there is an outward procession corresponding to the act
tending to external matter, so there must be an inward procession
corresponding to the act remaining within the agent. This applies most
conspicuously to the intellect, the action of which remains in the
intelligent agent. For whenever we understand, by the very fact of
understanding there proceeds something within us, which is a conception
of the object understood, a conception issuing from our intellectual
power and proceeding from our knowledge of that object. This conception
is signified by the spoken word; and it is called the word of the heart
signified by the word of the voice.

As God is above all things, we should understand what is said of God,
not according to the mode of the lowest creatures, namely bodies, but
from the similitude of the highest creatures, the intellectual
substances; while even the similitudes derived from these fall short in
the representation of divine objects. Procession, therefore, is not to
be understood from what it is in bodies, either according to local
movement or by way of a cause proceeding forth to its exterior effect,
as, for instance, like heat from the agent to the thing made hot.
Rather it is to be understood by way of an intelligible emanation, for
example, of the intelligible word which proceeds from the speaker, yet
remains in him. In that sense the Catholic Faith understands procession
as existing in God.

Reply to Objection 1: This objection comes from the idea of procession
in the sense of local motion, or of an action tending to external
matter, or to an exterior effect; which kind of procession does not
exist in God, as we have explained.

Reply to Objection 2: Whatever proceeds by way of outward procession is
necessarily distinct from the source whence it proceeds, whereas,
whatever proceeds within by an intelligible procession is not
necessarily distinct; indeed, the more perfectly it proceeds, the more
closely it is one with the source whence it proceeds. For it is clear
that the more a thing is understood, the more closely is the
intellectual conception joined and united to the intelligent agent;
since the intellect by the very act of understanding is made one with
the object understood. Thus, as the divine intelligence is the very
supreme perfection of God ([225]Q[14], A[2]), the divine Word is of
necessity perfectly one with the source whence He proceeds, without any
kind of diversity.

Reply to Objection 3: To proceed from a principle, so as to be
something outside and distinct from that principle, is irreconcilable
with the idea of a first principle; whereas an intimate and uniform
procession by way of an intelligible act is included in the idea of a
first principle. For when we call the builder the principle of the
house, in the idea of such a principle is included that of his art; and
it would be included in the idea of the first principle were the
builder the first principle of the house. God, Who is the first
principle of all things, may be compared to things created as the
architect is to things designed.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether any procession in God can be called generation?

Objection 1: It would seem that no procession in God can be called
generation. For generation is change from non-existence to existence,
and is opposed to corruption; while matter is the subject of both.
Nothing of all this belongs to God. Therefore generation cannot exist
in God.

Objection 2: Further, procession exists in God, according to an
intelligible mode, as above explained [226](A[1]). But such a process
is not called generation in us; therefore neither is it to be so called
in God.

Objection 3: Further, anything that is generated derives existence from
its generator. Therefore such existence is a derived existence. But no
derived existence can be a self-subsistence. Therefore, since the
divine existence is self-subsisting ([227]Q[3], A[4]), it follows that
no generated existence can be the divine existence. Therefore there is
no generation in God.

On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 2:7): "This day have I begotten Thee. "

I answer that, The procession of the Word in God is called generation.
In proof whereof we must observe that generation has a twofold meaning:
one common to everything subject to generation and corruption; in which
sense generation is nothing but change from non-existence to existence.
In another sense it is proper and belongs to living things; in which
sense it signifies the origin of a living being from a conjoined living
principle; and this is properly called birth. Not everything of that
kind, however, is called begotten; but, strictly speaking, only what
proceeds by way of similitude. Hence a hair has not the aspect of
generation and sonship, but only that has which proceeds by way of a
similitude. Nor will any likeness suffice; for a worm which is
generated from animals has not the aspect of generation and sonship,
although it has a generic similitude; for this kind of generation
requires that there should be a procession by way of similitude in the
same specific nature; as a man proceeds from a man, and a horse from a
horse. So in living things, which proceed from potential to actual
life, such as men and animals, generation includes both these kinds of
generation. But if there is a being whose life does not proceed from
potentiality to act, procession (if found in such a being) excludes
entirely the first kind of generation; whereas it may have that kind of
generation which belongs to living things. So in this manner the
procession of the Word in God is generation; for He proceeds by way of
intelligible action, which is a vital operation:---from a conjoined
principle (as above described):---by way of similitude, inasmuch as the
concept of the intellect is a likeness of the object conceived:---and
exists in the same nature, because in God the act of understanding and
His existence are the same, as shown above ([228]Q[14], A[4]). Hence
the procession of the Word in God is called generation; and the Word
Himself proceeding is called the Son.

Reply to Objection 1: This objection is based on the idea of generation
in the first sense, importing the issuing forth from potentiality to
act; in which sense it is not found in God.

Reply to Objection 2: The act of human understanding in ourselves is
not the substance itself of the intellect; hence the word which
proceeds within us by intelligible operation is not of the same nature
as the source whence it proceeds; so the idea of generation cannot be
properly and fully applied to it.
But the divine act of intelligence is
the very substance itself of the one who understands ([229]Q[14],
A[4]). The Word proceeding therefore proceeds as subsisting in the same
nature; and so is properly called begotten, and Son. Hence Scripture
employs terms which denote generation of living things in order to
signify the procession of the divine Wisdom, namely, conception and
birth; as is declared in the person of the divine Wisdom, "The depths
were not as yet, and I was already conceived; before the hills, I was
brought forth. " (Prov. 8:24). In our way of understanding we use the
word "conception" in order to signify that in the word of our intellect
is found the likeness of the thing understood, although there be no
identity of nature.

Reply to Objection 3: Not everything derived from another has existence
in another subject; otherwise we could not say that the whole substance
of created being comes from God, since there is no subject that could
receive the whole substance. So, then, what is generated in God
receives its existence from the generator, not as though that existence
were received into matter or into a subject (which would conflict with
the divine self-subsistence); but when we speak of His existence as
received, we mean that He Who proceeds receives divine existence from
another; not, however, as if He were other from the divine nature. For
in the perfection itself of the divine existence are contained both the
Word intelligibly proceeding and the principle of the Word, with
whatever belongs to His perfection ([230]Q[4], A[2]).
__________________________________________________________________

Whether any other procession exists in God besides that of the Word?

Objection 1: It would seem that no other procession exists in God
besides the generation of the Word. Because, for whatever reason we
admit another procession, we should be led to admit yet another, and so
on to infinitude; which cannot be. Therefore we must stop at the first,
and hold that there exists only one procession in God.

Objection 2: Further, every nature possesses but one mode of
self-communication; because operations derive unity and diversity from
their terms. But procession in God is only by way of communication of
the divine nature. Therefore, as there is only one divine nature
([231]Q[11], A[4] ), it follows that only one procession exists in God.

Objection 3: Further, if any other procession but the intelligible
procession of the Word existed in God, it could only be the procession
of love, which is by the operation of the will. But such a procession
is identified with the intelligible procession of the intellect,
inasmuch as the will in God is the same as His intellect ([232]Q[19],
A[1]). Therefore in God there is no other procession but the procession
of the Word.

On the contrary, The Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father (Jn. 15:26);
and He is distinct from the Son, according to the words, "I will ask My
Father, and He will give you another Paraclete" (Jn. 14:16). Therefore
in God another procession exists besides the procession of the Word.

I answer that, There are two processions in God; the procession of the
Word, and another.

In evidence whereof we must observe that procession exists in God, only
according to an action which does not tend to anything external, but
remains in the agent itself. Such an action in an intellectual nature
is that of the intellect, and of the will. The procession of the Word
is by way of an intelligible operation. The operation of the will
within ourselves involves also another procession, that of love,
whereby the object loved is in the lover; as, by the conception of the
word, the object spoken of or understood is in the intelligent agent.
Hence, besides the procession of the Word in God, there exists in Him
another procession called the procession of love.

Reply to Objection 1: There is no need to go on to infinitude in the
divine processions; for the procession which is accomplished within the
agent in an intellectual nature terminates in the procession of the
will.

Reply to Objection 2: All that exists in God, is God ([233]Q[3],
AA[3],4); whereas the same does not apply to others. Therefore the
divine nature is communicated by every procession which is not outward,
and this does not apply to other natures.

Reply to Objection 3: Though will and intellect are not diverse in God,
nevertheless the nature of will and intellect requires the processions
belonging to each of them to exist in a certain order. For the
procession of love occurs in due order as regards the procession of the
Word; since nothing can be loved by the will unless it is conceived in
the intellect. So as there exists a certain order of the Word to the
principle whence He proceeds, although in God the substance of the
intellect and its concept are the same; so, although in God the will
and the intellect are the same, still, inasmuch as love requires by its
very nature that it proceed only from the concept of the intellect,
there is a distinction of order between the procession of love and the
procession of the Word in God.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the procession of love in God is generation?

Objection 1: It would seem that the procession of love in God is
generation. For what proceeds by way of likeness of nature among living
things is said to be generated and born. But what proceeds in God by
way of love proceeds in the likeness of nature; otherwise it would be
extraneous to the divine nature, and would be an external procession.
Therefore what proceeds in God by way of love, proceeds as generated
and born.

Objection 2: Further, as similitude is of the nature of the word, so
does it belong to love. Hence it is said, that "every beast loves its
like" (Ecclus. 13:19). Therefore if the Word is begotten and born by
way of likeness, it seems becoming that love should proceed by way of
generation.

Objection 3: Further, what is not in any species is not in the genus.
So if there is a procession of love in God, there ought to be some
special name besides this common name of procession. But no other name
is applicable but generation. Therefore the procession of love in God
is generation.

On the contrary, Were this true, it would follow that the Holy Ghost
Who proceeds as love, would proceed as begotten; which is against the
statement of Athanasius: "The Holy Ghost is from the Father and the
Son, not made, nor begotten, but proceeding. "

I answer that, The procession of love in God ought not to be called
generation. In evidence whereof we must consider that the intellect and
the will differ in this respect, that the intellect is made actual by
the object understood residing according to its own likeness in the
intellect; whereas the will is made actual, not by any similitude of
the object willed within it, but by its having a certain inclination to
the thing willed. Thus the procession of the intellect is by way of
similitude, and is called generation, because every generator begets
its own like; whereas the procession of the will is not by way of
similitude, but rather by way of impulse and movement towards an
object.

So what proceeds in God by way of love, does not proceed as begotten,
or as son, but proceeds rather as spirit; which name expresses a
certain vital movement and impulse, accordingly as anyone is described
as moved or impelled by love to perform an action.

Reply to Objection 1: All that exists in God is one with the divine
nature. Hence the proper notion of this or that procession, by which
one procession is distinguished from another, cannot be on the part of
this unity: but the proper notion of this or that procession must be
taken from the order of one procession to another; which order is
derived from the nature of the will and intellect. Hence, each
procession in God takes its name from the proper notion of will and
intellect; the name being imposed to signify what its nature really is;
and so it is that the Person proceeding as love receives the divine
nature, but is not said to be born.

Reply to Objection 2: Likeness belongs in a different way to the word
and to love. It belongs to the word as being the likeness of the object
understood, as the thing generated is the likeness of the generator;
but it belongs to love, not as though love itself were a likeness, but
because likeness is the principle of loving. Thus it does not follow
that love is begotten, but that the one begotten is the principle of
love.

Reply to Objection 3: We can name God only from creatures ([234]Q[13],
A[1]). As in creatures generation is the only principle of
communication of nature, procession in God has no proper or special
name, except that of generation. Hence the procession which is not
generation has remained without a special name; but it can be called
spiration, as it is the procession of the Spirit.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether there are more than two processions in God?

Objection 1: It would seem that there are more than two processions in
God. As knowledge and will are attributed to God, so is power.
Therefore, if two processions exist in God, of intellect and will, it
seems that there must also be a third procession of power.

Objection 2: Further, goodness seems to be the greatest principle of
procession, since goodness is diffusive of itself. Therefore there must
be a procession of goodness in God.

Objection 3: Further, in God there is greater power of fecundity than
in us. But in us there is not only one procession of the word, but
there are many: for in us from one word proceeds another; and also from
one love proceeds another. Therefore in God there are more than two
processions.

On the contrary, In God there are not more than two who proceed---the
Son and the Holy Ghost. Therefore there are in Him but two processions.

I answer that, The divine processions can be derived only from the
actions which remain within the agent. In a nature which is
intellectual, and in the divine nature these actions are two, the acts
of intelligence and of will. The act of sensation, which also appears
to be an operation within the agent, takes place outside the
intellectual nature, nor can it be reckoned as wholly removed from the
sphere of external actions; for the act of sensation is perfected by
the action of the sensible object upon sense. It follows that no other
procession is possible in God but the procession of the Word, and of
Love.

Reply to Objection 1: Power is the principle whereby one thing acts on
another. Hence it is that external action points to power. Thus the
divine power does not imply the procession of a divine person; but is
indicated by the procession therefrom of creatures.

Reply to Objection 2: As Boethius says (De Hebdom. ), goodness belongs
to the essence and not to the operation, unless considered as the
object of the will.

Thus, as the divine processions must be denominated from certain
actions; no other processions can be understood in God according to
goodness and the like attributes except those of the Word and of love,
according as God understands and loves His own essence, truth and
goodness.

Reply to Objection 3: As above explained ([235]Q[14], A[5]; [236]Q[19],
A[5]), God understands all things by one simple act; and by one act
also He wills all things. Hence there cannot exist in Him a procession
of Word from Word, nor of Love from Love: for there is in Him only one
perfect Word, and one perfect Love; thereby being manifested His
perfect fecundity.
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THE DIVINE RELATIONS (FOUR ARTICLES)

The divine relations are next to be considered, in four points of
inquiry:

(1) Whether there are real relations in God?

(2) Whether those relations are the divine essence itself, or are
extrinsic to it?

(3) Whether in God there can be several relations distinct from each
other?

(4) The number of these relations.
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Whether there are real relations in God?

Objection 1: It would seem that there are no real relations in God. For
Boethius says (De Trin. iv), "All possible predicaments used as regards
the Godhead refer to the substance; for nothing can be predicated
relatively. " But whatever really exists in God can be predicated of
Him. Therefore no real relation exists in God.

Objection 2: Further, Boethius says (De Trin. iv) that, "Relation in
the Trinity of the Father to the Son, and of both to the Holy Ghost, is
the relation of the same to the same. " But a relation of this kind is
only a logical one; for every real relation requires and implies in
reality two terms. Therefore the divine relations are not real
relations, but are formed only by the mind.

Objection 3: Further, the relation of paternity is the relation of a
principle. But to say that God is the principle of creatures does not
import any real relation, but only a logical one. Therefore paternity
in God is not a real relation; while the same applies for the same
reason to the other relations in God.

Objection 4: Further, the divine generation proceeds by way of an
intelligible word. But the relations following upon the operation of
the intellect are logical relations. Therefore paternity and filiation
in God, consequent upon generation, are only logical relations.

On the contrary, The Father is denominated only from paternity; and the
Son only from filiation. Therefore, if no real paternity or filiation
existed in God, it would follow that God is not really Father or Son,
but only in our manner of understanding; and this is the Sabellian
heresy.

I answer that, relations exist in God really; in proof whereof we may
consider that in relations alone is found something which is only in
the apprehension and not in reality. This is not found in any other
genus; forasmuch as other genera, as quantity and quality, in their
strict and proper meaning, signify something inherent in a subject. But
relation in its own proper meaning signifies only what refers to
another. Such regard to another exists sometimes in the nature of
things, as in those things which by their own very nature are ordered
to each other, and have a mutual inclination; and such relations are
necessarily real relations; as in a heavy body is found an inclination
and order to the centre; and hence there exists in the heavy body a
certain respect in regard to the centre and the same applies to other
things. Sometimes, however, this regard to another, signified by
relation, is to be found only in the apprehension of reason comparing
one thing to another, and this is a logical relation only; as, for
instance, when reason compares man to animal as the species to the
genus. But when something proceeds from a principle of the same nature,
then both the one proceeding and the source of procession, agree in the
same order; and then they have real relations to each other. Therefore
as the divine processions are in the identity of the same nature, as
above explained ([237]Q[27], AA[2],4), these relations, according to
the divine processions, are necessarily real relations.

Reply to Objection 1: Relationship is not predicated of God according
to its proper and formal meaning, that is to say, in so far as its
proper meaning denotes comparison to that in which relation is
inherent, but only as denoting regard to another. Nevertheless Boethius
did not wish to exclude relation in God; but he wished to show that it
was not to be predicated of Him as regards the mode of inherence in
Himself in the strict meaning of relation; but rather by way of
relation to another.

Reply to Objection 2: The relation signified by the term "the same" is
a logical relation only, if in regard to absolutely the same thing;
because such a relation can exist only in a certain order observed by
reason as regards the order of anything to itself, according to some
two aspects thereof. The case is otherwise, however, when things are
called the same, not numerically, but generically or specifically. Thus
Boethius likens the divine relations to a relation of identity, not in
every respect, but only as regards the fact that the substance is not
diversified by these relations, as neither is it by relation of
identity.

Reply to Objection 3: As the creature proceeds from God in diversity of
nature, God is outside the order of the whole creation, nor does any
relation to the creature arise from His nature; for He does not produce
the creature by necessity of His nature, but by His intellect and will,
as is above explained ([238]Q[14], AA[3],4; [239]Q[19], A[8]).
Therefore there is no real relation in God to the creature; whereas in
creatures there is a real relation to God; because creatures are
contained under the divine order, and their very nature entails
dependence on God. On the other hand, the divine processions are in one
and the same nature. Hence no parallel exists.

Reply to Objection 4: Relations which result from the mental operation
alone in the objects understood are logical relations only, inasmuch as
reason observes them as existing between two objects perceived by the
mind. Those relations, however, which follow the operation of the
intellect, and which exist between the word intellectually proceeding
and the source whence it proceeds, are not logical relations only, but
are real relations; inasmuch as the intellect and the reason are real
things, and are really related to that which proceeds from them
intelligibly; as a corporeal thing is related to that which proceeds
from it corporeally. Thus paternity and filiation are real relations in
God.
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Whether relation in God is the same as His essence?

Objection 1: It would seem that the divine relation is not the same as
the divine essence. For Augustine says (De Trin. v) that "not all that
is said of God is said of His substance, for we say some things
relatively, as Father in respect of the Son: but such things do not
refer to the substance. " Therefore the relation is not the divine
essence.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. vii) that, "every
relative expression is something besides the relation expressed, as
master is a man, and slave is a man. " Therefore, if relations exist in
God, there must be something else besides relation in God. This can
only be His essence. Therefore essence differs from relation.

Objection 3: Further, the essence of relation is the being referred to
another, as the Philosopher says (Praedic. v). So if relation is the
divine essence, it follows that the divine essence is essentially
itself a relation to something else; whereas this is repugnant to the
perfection of the divine essence, which is supremely absolute and
self-subsisting ([240]Q[3], A[4]). Therefore relation is not the divine
essence.

On the contrary, Everything which is not the divine essence is a
creature. But relation really belongs to God; and if it is not the
divine essence, it is a creature; and it cannot claim the adoration of
latria; contrary to what is sung in the Preface: "Let us adore the
distinction of the Persons, and the equality of their Majesty. "

I answer that, It is reported that Gilbert de la Porree erred on this
point, but revoked his error later at the council of Rheims. For he
said that the divine relations are assistant, or externally affixed.

To perceive the error here expressed, we must consider that in each of
the nine genera of accidents there are two points for remark. One is
the nature belonging to each one of them considered as an accident;
which commonly applies to each of them as inherent in a subject, for
the essence of an accident is to inhere. The other point of remark is
the proper nature of each one of these genera. In the genera, apart
from that of "relation," as in quantity and quality, even the true idea
of the genus itself is derived from a respect to the subject; for
quantity is called the measure of substance, and quality is the
disposition of substance. But the true idea of relation is not taken
from its respect to that in which it is, but from its respect to
something outside. So if we consider even in creatures, relations
formally as such, in that aspect they are said to be "assistant," and
not intrinsically affixed, for, in this way, they signify a respect
which affects a thing related and tends from that thing to something
else; whereas, if relation is considered as an accident, it inheres in
a subject, and has an accidental existence in it. Gilbert de la Porree
considered relation in the former mode only.

Now whatever has an accidental existence in creatures, when considered
as transferred to God, has a substantial existence; for there is no
accident in God; since all in Him is His essence. So, in so far as
relation has an accidental existence in creatures, relation really
existing in God has the existence of the divine essence in no way
distinct therefrom. But in so far as relation implies respect to
something else, no respect to the essence is signified, but rather to
its opposite term.

Thus it is manifest that relation really existing in God is really the
same as His essence and only differs in its mode of intelligibility; as
in relation is meant that regard to its opposite which is not expressed
in the name of essence. Thus it is clear that in God relation and
essence do not differ from each other, but are one and the same.

Reply to Objection 1: These words of Augustine do not imply that
paternity or any other relation which is in God is not in its very
being the same as the divine essence; but that it is not predicated
under the mode of substance, as existing in Him to Whom it is applied;
but as a relation. So there are said to be two predicaments only in
God, since other predicaments import habitude to that of which they are
spoken, both in their generic and in their specific nature; but nothing
that exists in God can have any relation to that wherein it exists or
of whom it is spoken, except the relation of identity; and this by
reason of God's supreme simplicity.

Reply to Objection 2: As the relation which exists in creatures
involves not only a regard to another, but also something absolute, so
the same applies to God, yet not in the same way. What is contained in
the creature above and beyond what is contained in the meaning of
relation, is something else besides that relation; whereas in God there
is no distinction, but both are one and the same; and this is not
perfectly expressed by the word "relation," as if it were comprehended
in the ordinary meaning of that term. For it was above explained
([241]Q[13], A[2]), in treating of the divine names, that more is
contained in the perfection of the divine essence than can be signified
by any name. Hence it does not follow that there exists in God anything
besides relation in reality; but only in the various names imposed by
us.

Reply to Objection 3: If the divine perfection contained only what is
signified by relative names, it would follow that it is imperfect,
being thus related to something else; as in the same way, if nothing
more were contained in it than what is signified by the word "wisdom,"
it would not in that case be a subsistence. But as the perfection of
the divine essence is greater than can be included in any name, it does
not follow, if a relative term or any other name applied to God signify
something imperfect, that the divine essence is in any way imperfect;
for the divine essence comprehends within itself the perfection of
every genus ([242]Q[4], A[2]).
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Whether the relations in God are really distinguished from each other?

Objection 1: It would seem that the divine relations are not really
distinguished from each other. For things which are identified with the
same, are identified with each other. But every relation in God is
really the same as the divine essence. Therefore the relations are not
really distinguished from each other.

Objection 2: Further, as paternity and filiation are by name
distinguished from the divine essence, so likewise are goodness and
power. But this kind of distinction does not make any real distinction
of the divine goodness and power. Therefore neither does it make any
real distinction of paternity and filiation.

Objection 3: Further, in God there is no real distinction but that of
origin. But one relation does not seem to arise from another. Therefore
the relations are not really distinguished from each other.

On the contrary, Boethius says (De Trin. ) that in God "the substance
contains the unity; and relation multiplies the trinity. " Therefore, if
the relations were not really distinguished from each other, there
would be no real trinity in God, but only an ideal trinity, which is
the error of Sabellius.

I answer that, The attributing of anything to another involves the
attribution likewise of whatever is contained in it. So when "man" is
attributed to anyone, a rational nature is likewise attributed to him.
The idea of relation, however, necessarily means regard of one to
another, according as one is relatively opposed to another. So as in
God there is a real relation [243](A[1]), there must also be a real
opposition. The very nature of relative opposition includes
distinction. Hence, there must be real distinction in God, not, indeed,
according to that which is absolute---namely, essence, wherein there is
supreme unity and simplicity---but according to that which is relative.

Reply to Objection 1: According to the Philosopher (Phys. iii), this
argument holds, that whatever things are identified with the same thing
are identified with each other, if the identity be real and logical;
as, for instance, a tunic and a garment; but not if they differ
logically. Hence in the same place he says that although action is the
same as motion, and likewise passion; still it does not follow that
action and passion are the same; because action implies reference as of
something "from which" there is motion in the thing moved; whereas
passion implies reference as of something "which is from" another.
Likewise, although paternity, just as filiation, is really the same as
the divine essence; nevertheless these two in their own proper idea and
definitions import opposite respects. Hence they are distinguished from
each other.

Reply to Objection 2: Power and goodness do not import any opposition
in their respective natures; and hence there is no parallel argument.

Reply to Objection 3: Although relations, properly speaking, do not
arise or proceed from each other, nevertheless they are considered as
opposed according to the procession of one from another.
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Whether in God there are only four real relations---paternity, filiation,
spiration, and procession?

Objection 1: It would seem that in God there are not only four real
relations---paternity, filiation, spiration and procession. For it must
be observed that in God there exist the relations of the intelligent
agent to the object understood; and of the one willing to the object
willed; which are real relations not comprised under those above
specified. Therefore there are not only four real relations in God.

Objection 2: Further, real relations in God are understood as coming
from the intelligible procession of the Word. But intelligible
relations are infinitely multiplied, as Avicenna says. Therefore in God
there exists an infinite series of real relations.

Objection 3: Further, ideas in God are eternal ([244]Q[15], A[1]); and
are only distinguished from each other by reason of their regard to
things, as above stated. Therefore in God there are many more eternal
relations.

Objection 4: Further, equality, and likeness, and identity are
relations: and they are in God from eternity.