No More Learning

Thus, only the Person who utters
the Word is "speaker" in God, although each Person understands and is
understood, and consequently is spoken by the Word.

Reply to Objection 4: The term "word" is there taken figuratively, as
the thing signified or effected by word is called word. For thus
creatures are said to do the word of God, as executing any effect,
whereto they are ordained from the word conceived of the divine wisdom;
as anyone is said to do the word of the king when he does the work to
which he is appointed by the king's word.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether "Word" is the Son's proper name?

Objection 1: It would seem that "Word" is not the proper name of the
Son. For the Son is a subsisting person in God. But word does not
signify a subsisting thing, as appears in ourselves. Therefore word
cannot be the proper name of the person of the Son.

Objection 2: Further, the word proceeds from the speaker by being
uttered. Therefore if the Son is properly the word, He proceeds from
the Father, by way only of utterance; which is the heresy of Valentine;
as appears from Augustine (De Haeres. xi).

Objection 3: Further, every proper name of a person signifies some
property of that person. Therefore, if the Word is the Son's proper
name, it signifies some property of His; and thus there will be several
more properties in God than those above mentioned.

Objection 4: Further, whoever understands conceives a word in the act
of understanding. But the Son understands. Therefore some word belongs
to the Son; and consequently to be Word is not proper to the Son.

Objection 5: Further, it is said of the Son (Heb. 1:3): "Bearing all
things by the word of His power;" whence Basil infers (Cont. Eunom. v,
11) that the Holy Ghost is the Son's Word. Therefore to be Word is not
proper to the Son.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 11): "By Word we
understand the Son alone. "

I answer that, "Word," said of God in its proper sense, is used
personally, and is the proper name of the person of the Son. For it
signifies an emanation of the intellect: and the person Who proceeds in
God, by way of emanation of the intellect, is called the Son; and this
procession is called generation, as we have shown above ([291]Q[27],
A[2]). Hence it follows that the Son alone is properly called Word in
God.

Reply to Objection 1: "To be" and "to understand" are not the same in
us. Hence that which in us has intellectual being, does not belong to
our nature. But in God "to be" and "to understand" are one and the
same: hence the Word of God is not an accident in Him, or an effect of
His; but belongs to His very nature. And therefore it must needs be
something subsistent; for whatever is in the nature of God subsists;
and so Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 18) that "the Word of God is
substantial and has a hypostatic being; but other words [as our own]
are activities if the soul. "

Reply to Objection 2: The error of Valentine was condemned, not as the
Arians pretended, because he asserted that the Son was born by being
uttered, as Hilary relates (De Trin. vi); but on account of the
different mode of utterance proposed by its author, as appears from
Augustine (De Haeres. xi).

Reply to Objection 3: In the term "Word" the same property is comprised
as in the name Son. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 11): "Word and
Son express the same. " For the Son's nativity, which is His personal
property, is signified by different names, which are attributed to the
Son to express His perfection in various ways. To show that He is of
the same nature as the Father, He is called the Son; to show that He is
co-eternal, He is called the Splendor; to show that He is altogether
like, He is called the Image; to show that He is begotten immaterially,
He is called the Word. All these truths cannot be expressed by only one
name.

Reply to Objection 4: To be intelligent belongs to the Son, in the same
way as it belongs to Him to be God, since to understand is said of God
essentially, as stated above ([292]Q[14], AA[2],4). Now the Son is God
begotten, and not God begetting; and hence He is intelligent, not as
producing a Word, but as the Word proceeding; forasmuch as in God the
Word proceeding does not differ really from the divine intellect, but
is distinguished from the principle of the Word only by relation.

Reply to Objection 5: When it is said of the Son, "Bearing all things
by the word of His power"; "word" is taken figuratively for the effect
of the Word. Hence a gloss says that "word" is here taken to mean
command; inasmuch as by the effect of the power of the Word, things are
kept in being, as also by the effect of the power of the Word things
are brought into being. Basil speaks widely and figuratively in
applying Word to the Holy Ghost; in the sense perhaps that everything
that makes a person known may be called his word, and so in that way
the Holy Ghost may be called the Son's Word, because He manifests the
Son.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the name "Word" imports relation to creatures?

Objection 1: It would seem that the name 'Word' does not import
relation to creatures. For every name that connotes some effect in
creatures, is said of God essentially. But Word is not said
essentially, but personally. Therefore Word does not import relation to
creatures.

Objection 2: Further, whatever imports relation to creatures is said of
God in time; as "Lord" and "Creator. " But Word is said of God from
eternity. Therefore it does not import relation to the creature.

Objection 3: Further, Word imports relation to the source whence it
proceeds. Therefore, if it imports relation to the creature, it follows
that the Word proceeds from the creature.

Objection 4: Further, ideas (in God) are many according to their
various relations to creatures. Therefore if Word imports relation to
creatures, it follows that in God there is not one Word only, but many.

Objection 5: Further, if Word imports relation to the creature, this
can only be because creatures are known by God. But God does not know
beings only; He knows also non-beings. Therefore in the Word are
implied relations to non-beings; which appears to be false.

On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 63), that "the name
Word signifies not only relation to the Father, but also relation to
those beings which are made through the Word, by His operative power. "

I answer that, Word implies relation to creatures. For God by knowing
Himself, knows every creature. Now the word conceived in the mind is
representative of everything that is actually understood. Hence there
are in ourselves different words for the different things which we
understand. But because God by one act understands Himself and all
things, His one only Word is expressive not only of the Father, but of
all creatures.

And as the knowledge of God is only cognitive as regards God, whereas
as regards creatures, it is both cognitive and operative, so the Word
of God is only expressive of what is in God the Father, but is both
expressive and operative of creatures; and therefore it is said (Ps.
32:9): "He spake, and they were made;" because in the Word is implied
the operative idea of what God makes.

Reply to Objection 1: The nature is also included indirectly in the
name of the person; for person is an individual substance of a rational
nature. Therefore the name of a divine person, as regards the personal
relation, does not imply relation to the creature, but it is implied in
what belongs to the nature. Yet there is nothing to prevent its
implying relation to creatures, so far as the essence is included in
its meaning: for as it properly belongs to the Son to be the Son, so it
properly belongs to Him to be God begotten, or the Creator begotten;
and in this way the name Word imports relation to creatures.

Reply to Objection 2: Since the relations result from actions, some
names import the relation of God to creatures, which relation follows
on the action of God which passes into some exterior effect, as to
create and to govern; and the like are applied to God in time. But
others import a relation which follows from an action which does not
pass into an exterior effect, but abides in the agent---as to know and
to will: such are not applied to God in time; and this kind of relation
to creatures is implied in the name of the Word. Nor is it true that
all names which import the relation of God to creatures are applied to
Him in time; but only those names are applied in time which import
relation following on the action of God passing into exterior effect.

Reply to Objection 3: Creatures are known to God not by a knowledge
derived from the creatures themselves, but by His own essence. Hence it
is not necessary that the Word should proceed from creatures, although
the Word is expressive of creatures.

Reply to Objection 4: The name of Idea is imposed chiefly to signify
relation to creatures; and therefore it is applied in a plural sense to
God; and it is not said personally. But the name of Word is imposed
chiefly to signify the speaker, and consequently, relation to
creatures, inasmuch as God, by understanding Himself, understands every
creature; and so there is only one Word in God, and that is a personal
one.

Reply to Objection 5: God's knowledge of non-beings and God's Word
about non-beings are the same; because the Word of God contains no less
than does the knowledge of God, as Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 14).
Nevertheless the Word is expressive and operative of beings, but is
expressive and manifestive of non-beings.
__________________________________________________________________

OF THE IMAGE (TWO ARTICLES)

We next inquire concerning the image: about which there are two points
of inquiry:

(1) Whether Image in God is said personally?

(2) Whether this name belongs to the Son alone?
__________________________________________________________________

Whether image in God is said personally?

Objection 1: It would seem that image is not said personally of God.
For Augustine (Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum i) says, "The Godhead of
the Holy Trinity and the Image whereunto man is made are one. "
Therefore Image is said of God essentially, and not personally.

Objection 2: Further, Hilary says (De Synod. ): "An image is a like
species of that which it represents. " But species or form is said of
God essentially. Therefore so also is Image.

Objection 3: Further, Image is derived from imitation, which implies
"before" and "after. " But in the divine persons there is no "before"
and "after. " Therefore Image cannot be a personal name in God.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 1): "What is more absurd
than to say that an image is referred to itself? " Therefore the Image
in God is a relation, and is thus a personal name.

I answer that, Image includes the idea of similitude. Still, not any
kind of similitude suffices for the notion of image, but only
similitude of species, or at least of some specific sign. In corporeal
things the specific sign consists chiefly in the figure. For we see
that the species of different animals are of different figures; but not
of different colors. Hence if the color of anything is depicted on a
wall, this is not called an image unless the figure is likewise
depicted. Further, neither the similitude of species or of figure is
enough for an image, which requires also the idea of origin; because,
as Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 74): "One egg is not the image of
another, because it is not derived from it. " Therefore for a true image
it is required that one proceeds from another like to it in species, or
at least in specific sign. Now whatever imports procession or origin in
God, belongs to the persons. Hence the name "Image" is a personal name.

Reply to Objection 1: Image, properly speaking, means whatever proceeds
forth in likeness to another. That to the likeness of which anything
proceeds, is properly speaking called the exemplar, and is improperly
called the image. Nevertheless Augustine (Fulgentius) uses the name of
Image in this sense when he says that the divine nature of the Holy
Trinity is the Image to whom man was made.

Reply to Objection 2: "Species," as mentioned by Hilary in the
definition of image, means the form derived from one thing to another.
In this sense image is said to be the species of anything, as that
which is assimilated to anything is called its form, inasmuch as it has
a like form.

Reply to Objection 3: Imitation in God does not signify posteriority,
but only assimilation.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the name of Image is proper to the Son?

Objection 1: It would seem that the name of Image is not proper to the
Son; because, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 18), "The Holy Ghost
is the Image of the Son. " Therefore Image does not belong to the Son
alone.

Objection 2: Further, similitude in expression belongs to the nature of
an image, as Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 74). But this belongs to
the Holy Ghost, Who proceeds from another by way of similitude.
Therefore the Holy Ghost is an Image; and so to be Image does not
belong to the Son alone.

Objection 3: Further, man is also called the image of God, according to
1 Cor. 11:7, "The man ought not to cover his head, for he is the image
and the glory of God. " Therefore Image is not proper to the Son.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 2): "The Son alone is the
Image of the Father. "

I answer that, The Greek Doctors commonly say that the Holy Ghost is
the Image of both the Father and of the Son; but the Latin Doctors
attribute the name Image to the Son alone. For it is not found in the
canonical Scripture except as applied to the Son; as in the words, "Who
is the Image of the invisible God, the firstborn of creatures" (Col.
1:15) and again: "Who being the brightness of His glory, and the figure
of His substance. " (Heb. 1:3).

Some explain this by the fact that the Son agrees with the Father, not
in nature only, but also in the notion of principle: whereas the Holy
Ghost agrees neither with the Son, nor with the Father in any notion.
This, however, does not seem to suffice. Because as it is not by reason
of the relations that we consider either equality or inequality in God,
as Augustine says (De Trin. v, 6), so neither (by reason thereof do we
consider) that similitude which is essential to image. Hence others say
that the Holy Ghost cannot be called the Image of the Son, because
there cannot be an image of an image; nor of the Father, because again
the image must be immediately related to that which it is the image;
and the Holy Ghost is related to the Father through the Son; nor again
is He the Image of the Father and the Son, because then there would be
one image of two; which is impossible. Hence it follows that the Holy
Ghost is in no way an Image. But this is no proof: for the Father and
the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost, as we shall explain
further on ([293]Q[36], A[4] ). Hence there is nothing to prevent there
being one Image of the Father and of the Son, inasmuch as they are one;
since even man is one image of the whole Trinity.

Therefore we must explain the matter otherwise by saying that, as the
Holy Ghost, although by His procession He receives the nature of the
Father, as the Son also receives it, nevertheless is not said to be
"born"; so, although He receives the likeness of the Father, He is not
called the Image; because the Son proceeds as word, and it is essential
to word to be like species with that whence it proceeds; whereas this
does not essentially belong to love, although it may belong to that
love which is the Holy Ghost, inasmuch as He is the divine love.

Reply to Objection 1: Damascene and the other Greek Doctors commonly
employ the term image as meaning a perfect similitude.

Reply to Objection 2: Although the Holy Ghost is like to the Father and
the Son, still it does not follow that He is the Image, as above
explained.

Reply to Objection 3: The image of a thing may be found in something in
two ways. In one way it is found in something of the same specific
nature; as the image of the king is found in his son. In another way it
is found in something of a different nature, as the king's image on the
coin. In the first sense the Son is the Image of the Father; in the
second sense man is called the image of God; and therefore in order to
express the imperfect character of the divine image in man, man is not
simply called the image, but "to the image," whereby is expressed a
certain movement of tendency to perfection. But it cannot be said that
the Son of God is "to the image," because He is the perfect Image of
the Father.
__________________________________________________________________

OF THE PERSON OF THE HOLY GHOST (FOUR ARTICLES)

We proceed to treat of what belongs to the person of the Holy Ghost,
Who is called not only the Holy Ghost, but also the Love and Gift of
God. Concerning the name "Holy Ghost" there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether this name, "Holy Ghost," is the proper name of one divine
Person?

(2) Whether that divine person Who is called the Holy Ghost, proceeds
from the Father and the Son?

(3) Whether He proceeds from the Father through the Son?

(4) Whether the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost?
__________________________________________________________________

Whether this name "Holy Ghost" is the proper name of one divine person?

Objection 1: It would seem that this name, "Holy Ghost," is not the
proper name of one divine person. For no name which is common to the
three persons is the proper name of any one person. But this name of
'Holy Ghost' [*It should be borne in mind that the word "ghost" is the
old English equivalent for the Latin "spiritus," whether in the sense
of "breath" or "blast," or in the sense of "spirit," as an immaterial
substance. Thus, we read in the former sense (Hampole, Psalter x, 7),
"The Gost of Storms" [spiritus procellarum], and in the latter "Trubled
gost is sacrifice of God" (Prose Psalter, A. D. 1325), and "Oure
wrestlynge is . . . against the spiritual wicked gostes of the ayre"
(More, "Comfort against Tribulation"); and in our modern expression of
"giving up the ghost. " As applied to God, and not specially to the
third Holy Person, we have an example from Maunder, "Jhesu Criste was
the worde and the goste of Good. " (See Oxford Dictionary). ] is common
to the three persons; for Hilary (De Trin. viii) shows that the "Spirit
of God" sometimes means the Father, as in the words of Is. 61:1: "The
Spirit of the Lord is upon me;" and sometimes the Son, as when the Son
says: "In the Spirit of God I cast out devils" (Mat. 12:28), showing
that He cast out devils by His own natural power; and that sometimes it
means the Holy Ghost, as in the words of Joel 2:28: "I will pour out of
My Spirit over all flesh. " Therefore this name 'Holy Ghost' is not the
proper name of a divine person.

Objection 2: Further, the names of the divine persons are relative
terms, as Boethius says (De Trin. ). But this name "Holy Ghost" is not a
relative term. Therefore this name is not the proper name of a divine
Person.

Objection 3: Further, because the Son is the name of a divine Person He
cannot be called the Son of this or of that. But the spirit is spoken
of as of this or that man, as appears in the words, "The Lord said to
Moses, I will take of thy spirit and will give to them" (Num. 11:17)
and also "The Spirit of Elias rested upon Eliseus" (4 Kings 2:15).
Therefore "Holy Ghost" does not seem to be the proper name of a divine
Person.

On the contrary, It is said (1 Jn. 5:7): "There are three who bear
witness in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost. " As
Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 4): "When we ask, Three what? we say,
Three persons. " Therefore the Holy Ghost is the name of a divine
person.

I answer that, While there are two processions in God, one of these,
the procession of love, has no proper name of its own, as stated above
([294]Q[27] , A[4], ad 3). Hence the relations also which follow from
this procession are without a name ([295]Q[28], A[4]): for which reason
the Person proceeding in that manner has not a proper name. But as some
names are accommodated by the usual mode of speaking to signify the
aforesaid relations, as when we use the names of procession and
spiration, which in the strict sense more fittingly signify the
notional acts than the relations; so to signify the divine Person, Who
proceeds by way of love, this name "Holy Ghost" is by the use of
scriptural speech accommodated to Him. The appropriateness of this name
may be shown in two ways. Firstly, from the fact that the person who is
called "Holy Ghost" has something in common with the other Persons.
For, as Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 17; v, 11), "Because the Holy
Ghost is common to both, He Himself is called that properly which both
are called in common. For the Father also is a spirit, and the Son is a
spirit; and the Father is holy, and the Son is holy. " Secondly, from
the proper signification of the name. For the name spirit in things
corporeal seems to signify impulse and motion; for we call the breath
and the wind by the term spirit. Now it is a property of love to move
and impel the will of the lover towards the object loved. Further,
holiness is attributed to whatever is ordered to God. Therefore because
the divine person proceeds by way of the love whereby God is loved,
that person is most properly named "The Holy Ghost.
"

Reply to Objection 1: The expression Holy Spirit, if taken as two
words, is applicable to the whole Trinity: because by 'spirit' the
immateriality of the divine substance is signified; for corporeal
spirit is invisible, and has but little matter; hence we apply this
term to all immaterial and invisible substances. And by adding the word
"holy" we signify the purity of divine goodness. But if Holy Spirit be
taken as one word, it is thus that the expression, in the usage of the
Church, is accommodated to signify one of the three persons, the one
who proceeds by way of love, for the reason above explained.

Reply to Objection 2: Although this name "Holy Ghost" does not indicate
a relation, still it takes the place of a relative term, inasmuch as it
is accommodated to signify a Person distinct from the others by
relation only. Yet this name may be understood as including a relation,
if we understand the Holy Spirit as being breathed [spiratus].

Reply to Objection 3: In the name Son we understand that relation only
which is of something from a principle, in regard to that principle:
but in the name "Father" we understand the relation of principle; and
likewise in the name of Spirit inasmuch as it implies a moving power.
But to no creature does it belong to be a principle as regards a divine
person; but rather the reverse. Therefore we can say "our Father," and
"our Spirit"; but we cannot say "our Son. "
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Holy Ghost does not proceed from
the Son. For as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): "We must not dare to say
anything concerning the substantial Divinity except what has been
divinely expressed to us by the sacred oracles. " But in the Sacred
Scripture we are not told that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son;
but only that He proceeds from the Father, as appears from Jn. 15:26:
"The Spirit of truth, Who proceeds from the Father. " Therefore the Holy
Ghost does not proceed from the Son.

Objection 2: Further, In the creed of the council of Constantinople
(Can. vii) we read: "We believe in the Holy Ghost, the Lord and
Life-giver, who proceeds from the Father; with the Father and the Son
to be adored and glorified. " Therefore it should not be added in our
Creed that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son; and those who added
such a thing appear to be worthy of anathema.

Objection 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i): "We say that
the Holy Ghost is from the Father, and we name Him the spirit of the
Father; but we do not say that the Holy Ghost is from the Son, yet we
name Him the Spirit of the Son. " Therefore the Holy Ghost does not
proceed from the Son.

Objection 4: Further, Nothing proceeds from that wherein it rests. But
the Holy Ghost rests in the Son; for it is said in the legend of St.
Andrew: "Peace be to you and to all who believe in the one God the
Father, and in His only Son our Lord Jesus Christ, and in the one Holy
Ghost proceeding from the Father, and abiding in the Son. " Therefore
the Holy Ghost does not proceed from the Son.

Objection 5: Further, the Son proceeds as the Word. But our breath
[spiritus] does not seem to proceed in ourselves from our word.
Therefore the Holy Ghost does not proceed from the Son.

Objection 6: Further, the Holy Ghost proceeds perfectly from the
Father. Therefore it is superfluous to say that He proceeds from the
Son.

Objection 7: Further "the actual and the possible do not differ in
things perpetual" (Phys. iii, text 32), and much less so in God. But it
is possible for the Holy Ghost to be distinguished from the Son, even
if He did not proceed from Him. For Anselm says (De Process. Spir.
Sancti, ii): "The Son and the Holy Ghost have their Being from the
Father; but each in a different way; one by Birth, the other by
Procession, so that they are thus distinct from one another. " And
further on he says: "For even if for no other reason were the Son and
the Holy Ghost distinct, this alone would suffice. " Therefore the Holy
Spirit is distinct from the Son, without proceeding from Him.

On the contrary, Athanasius says: "The Holy Ghost is from the Father
and the Son; not made, nor created, nor begotten, but proceeding. "

I answer that, It must be said that the Holy Ghost is from the Son. For
if He were not from Him, He could in no wise be personally
distinguished from Him; as appears from what has been said above
([296]Q[28], A[3]; [297]Q[30], A[2]). For it cannot be said that the
divine Persons are distinguished from each other in any absolute sense;
for it would follow that there would not be one essence of the three
persons: since everything that is spoken of God in an absolute sense,
belongs to the unity of essence. Therefore it must be said that the
divine persons are distinguished from each other only by the relations.
Now the relations cannot distinguish the persons except forasmuch as
they are opposite relations; which appears from the fact that the
Father has two relations, by one of which He is related to the Son, and
by the other to the Holy Ghost; but these are not opposite relations,
and therefore they do not make two persons, but belong only to the one
person of the Father. If therefore in the Son and the Holy Ghost there
were two relations only, whereby each of them were related to the
Father, these relations would not be opposite to each other, as neither
would be the two relations whereby the Father is related to them.
Hence, as the person of the Father is one, it would follow that the
person of the Son and of the Holy Ghost would be one, having two
relations opposed to the two relations of the Father. But this is
heretical since it destroys the Faith in the Trinity. Therefore the Son
and the Holy Ghost must be related to each other by opposite relations.
Now there cannot be in God any relations opposed to each other, except
relations of origin, as proved above (Q[28], A[44]). And opposite
relations of origin are to be understood as of a "principle," and of
what is "from the principle. " Therefore we must conclude that it is
necessary to say that either the Son is from the Holy Ghost; which no
one says; or that the Holy Ghost is from the Son, as we confess.

Furthermore, the order of the procession of each one agrees with this
conclusion. For it was said above ([298]Q[27], AA[2],4; [299]Q[28],
A[4]), that the Son proceeds by the way of the intellect as Word, and
the Holy Ghost by way of the will as Love. Now love must proceed from a
word. For we do not love anything unless we apprehend it by a mental
conception. Hence also in this way it is manifest that the Holy Ghost
proceeds from the Son.

We derive a knowledge of the same truth from the very order of nature
itself. For we nowhere find that several things proceed from one
without order except in those which differ only by their matter; as for
instance one smith produces many knives distinct from each other
materially, with no order to each other; whereas in things in which
there is not only a material distinction we always find that some order
exists in the multitude produced. Hence also in the order of creatures
produced, the beauty of the divine wisdom is displayed. So if from the
one Person of the Father, two persons proceed, the Son and the Holy
Ghost, there must be some order between them. Nor can any other be
assigned except the order of their nature, whereby one is from the
other. Therefore it cannot be said that the Son and the Holy Ghost
proceed from the Father in such a way as that neither of them proceeds
from the other, unless we admit in them a material distinction; which
is impossible.

Hence also the Greeks themselves recognize that the procession of the
Holy Ghost has some order to the Son. For they grant that the Holy
Ghost is the Spirit "of the Son"; and that He is from the Father
"through the Son. " Some of them are said also to concede that "He is
from the Son"; or that "He flows from the Son," but not that He
proceeds; which seems to come from ignorance or obstinacy. For a just
consideration of the truth will convince anyone that the word
procession is the one most commonly applied to all that denotes origin
of any kind. For we use the term to describe any kind of origin; as
when we say that a line proceeds from a point, a ray from the sun, a
stream from a source, and likewise in everything else. Hence, granted
that the Holy Ghost originates in any way from the Son, we can conclude
that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son.

Reply to Objection 1: We ought not to say about God anything which is
not found in Holy Scripture either explicitly or implicitly. But
although we do not find it verbally expressed in Holy Scripture that
the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son, still we do find it in the sense
of Scripture, especially where the Son says, speaking of the Holy
Ghost, "He will glorify Me, because He shall receive of Mine" (Jn.
16:14). It is also a rule of Holy Scripture that whatever is said of
the Father, applies to the Son, although there be added an exclusive
term; except only as regards what belongs to the opposite relations,
whereby the Father and the Son are distinguished from each other. For
when the Lord says, "No one knoweth the Son, but the Father," the idea
of the Son knowing Himself is not excluded. So therefore when we say
that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father, even though it be added
that He proceeds from the Father alone, the Son would not thereby be at
all excluded; because as regards being the principle of the Holy Ghost,
the Father and the Son are not opposed to each other, but only as
regards the fact that one is the Father, and the other is the Son.

Reply to Objection 2: In every council of the Church a symbol of faith
has been drawn up to meet some prevalent error condemned in the council
at that time. Hence subsequent councils are not to be described as
making a new symbol of faith; but what was implicitly contained in the
first symbol was explained by some addition directed against rising
heresies. Hence in the decision of the council of Chalcedon it is
declared that those who were congregated together in the council of
Constantinople, handed down the doctrine about the Holy Ghost, not
implying that there was anything wanting in the doctrine of their
predecessors who had gathered together at Nicaea, but explaining what
those fathers had understood of the matter. Therefore, because at the
time of the ancient councils the error of those who said that the Holy
Ghost did not proceed from the Son had not arisen, it was not necessary
to make any explicit declaration on that point; whereas, later on, when
certain errors rose up, another council [*Council of Rome, under Pope
Damasus] assembled in the west, the matter was explicitly defined by
the authority of the Roman Pontiff, by whose authority also the ancient
councils were summoned and confirmed. Nevertheless the truth was
contained implicitly in the belief that the Holy Ghost proceeds from
the Father.

Reply to Objection 3: The Nestorians were the first to introduce the
error that the Holy Ghost did not proceed from the Son, as appears in a
Nestorian creed condemned in the council of Ephesus. This error was
embraced by Theodoric the Nestorian, and several others after him,
among whom was also Damascene. Hence, in that point his opinion is not
to be held. Although, too, it has been asserted by some that while
Damascene did not confess that the Holy Ghost was from the Son, neither
do those words of his express a denial thereof.

Reply to Objection 4: When the Holy Ghost is said to rest or abide in
the Son, it does not mean that He does not proceed from Him; for the
Son also is said to abide in the Father, although He proceeds from the
Father. Also the Holy Ghost is said to rest in the Son as the love of
the lover abides in the beloved; or in reference to the human nature of
Christ, by reason of what is written: "On whom thou shalt see the
Spirit descending and remaining upon Him, He it is who baptizes" (Jn.
1:33).

Reply to Objection 5: The Word in God is not taken after the similitude
of the vocal word, whence the breath [spiritus] does not proceed; for
it would then be only metaphorical; but after the similitude of the
mental word, whence proceeds love.

Reply to Objection 6: For the reason that the Holy Ghost proceeds from
the Father perfectly, not only is it not superfluous to say He proceeds
from the Son, but rather it is absolutely necessary. Forasmuch as one
power belongs to the Father and the Son; and because whatever is from
the Father, must be from the Son unless it be opposed to the property
of filiation; for the Son is not from Himself, although He is from the
Father.

Reply to Objection 7: The Holy Ghost is distinguished from the Son,
inasmuch as the origin of one is distinguished from the origin of the
other; but the difference itself of origin comes from the fact that the
Son is only from the Father, whereas the Holy Ghost is from the Father
and the Son; for otherwise the processions would not be distinguished
from each other, as explained above, and in [300]Q[27].
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Whether the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father through the Son?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Holy Ghost does not proceed from
the Father through the Son. For whatever proceeds from one through
another, does not proceed immediately. Therefore, if the Holy Ghost
proceeds from the Father through the Son, He does not proceed
immediately; which seems to be unfitting.

Objection 2: Further, if the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father
through the Son, He does not proceed from the Son, except on account of
the Father. But "whatever causes a thing to be such is yet more so. "
Therefore He proceeds more from the Father than from the Son.

Objection 3: Further, the Son has His being by generation. Therefore if
the Holy Ghost is from the Father through the Son, it follows that the
Son is first generated and afterwards the Holy Ghost proceeds; and thus
the procession of the Holy Ghost is not eternal, which is heretical.

Objection 4: Further, when anyone acts through another, the same may be
said conversely. For as we say that the king acts through the bailiff,
so it can be said conversely that the bailiff acts through the king.
But we can never say that the Son spirates the Holy Ghost through the
Father. Therefore it can never be said that the Father spirates the
Holy Ghost through the Son.

On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. xii): "Keep me, I pray, in this
expression of my faith, that I may ever possess the Father---namely
Thyself: that I may adore Thy Son together with Thee: and that I may
deserve Thy Holy Spirit, who is through Thy Only Begotten. "

I answer that, Whenever one is said to act through another, this
preposition "through" points out, in what is covered by it, some cause
or principle of that act. But since action is a mean between the agent
and the thing done, sometimes that which is covered by the preposition
"through" is the cause of the action, as proceeding from the agent; and
in that case it is the cause of why the agent acts, whether it be a
final cause or a formal cause, whether it be effective or motive. It is
a final cause when we say, for instance, that the artisan works through
love of gain. It is a formal cause when we say that he works through
his art. It is a motive cause when we say that he works through the
command of another. Sometimes, however, that which is covered by this
preposition "through" is the cause of the action regarded as terminated
in the thing done; as, for instance, when we say, the artisan acts
through the mallet, for this does not mean that the mallet is the cause
why the artisan acts, but that it is the cause why the thing made
proceeds from the artisan, and that it has even this effect from the
artisan. This is why it is sometimes said that this preposition
"through" sometimes denotes direct authority, as when we say, the king
works through the bailiff; and sometimes indirect authority, as when we
say, the bailiff works through the king.

Therefore, because the Son receives from the Father that the Holy Ghost
proceeds from Him, it can be said that the Father spirates the Holy
Ghost through the Son, or that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father
through the Son, which has the same meaning.

Reply to Objection 1: In every action two things are to be considered,
the "suppositum" acting, and the power whereby it acts; as, for
instance, fire heats through heat. So if we consider in the Father and
the Son the power whereby they spirate the Holy Ghost, there is no
mean, for this is one and the same power. But if we consider the
persons themselves spirating, then, as the Holy Ghost proceeds both
from the Father and from the Son, the Holy Ghost proceeds from the
Father immediately, as from Him, and mediately, as from the Son; and
thus He is said to proceed from the Father through the Son. So also did
Abel proceed immediately from Adam, inasmuch as Adam was his father;
and mediately, as Eve was his mother, who proceeded from Adam;
although, indeed, this example of a material procession is inept to
signify the immaterial procession of the divine persons.

Reply to Objection 2: If the Son received from the Father a numerically
distinct power for the spiration of the Holy Ghost, it would follow
that He would be a secondary and instrumental cause; and thus the Holy
Ghost would proceed more from the Father than from the Son; whereas, on
the contrary, the same spirative power belongs to the Father and to the
Son; and therefore the Holy Ghost proceeds equally from both, although
sometimes He is said to proceed principally or properly from the
Father, because the Son has this power from the Father.

Reply to Objection 3: As the begetting of the Son is co-eternal with
the begetter (and hence the Father does not exist before begetting the
Son), so the procession of the Holy Ghost is co-eternal with His
principle. Hence, the Son was not begotten before the Holy Ghost
proceeded; but each of the operations is eternal.

Reply to Objection 4: When anyone is said to work through anything, the
converse proposition is not always true. For we do not say that the
mallet works through the carpenter; whereas we can say that the bailiff
acts through the king, because it is the bailiff's place to act, since
he is master of his own act, but it is not the mallet's place to act,
but only to be made to act, and hence it is used only as an instrument.
The bailiff is, however, said to act through the king, although this
preposition "through" denotes a medium, for the more a "suppositum" is
prior in action, so much the more is its power immediate as regards the
effect, inasmuch as the power of the first cause joins the second cause
to its effect. Hence also first principles are said to be immediate in
the demonstrative sciences. Therefore, so far as the bailiff is a
medium according to the order of the subject's acting, the king is said
to work through the bailiff; but according to the order of powers, the
bailiff is said to act through the king, forasmuch as the power of the
king gives the bailiff's action its effect. Now there is no order of
power between Father and Son, but only order of 'supposita'; and hence
we say that the Father spirates through the Son; and not conversely.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Father and the Son are not one
principle of the Holy Ghost. For the Holy Ghost does not proceed from
the Father and the Son as they are one; not as they are one in nature,
for the Holy Ghost would in that way proceed from Himself, as He is one
in nature with Them; nor again inasmuch as they are united in any one
property, for it is clear that one property cannot belong to two
subjects. Therefore the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son
as distinct from one another. Therefore the Father and the Son are not
one principle of the Holy Ghost.

Objection 2: Further, in this proposition "the Father and the Son are
one principle of the Holy Ghost," we do not designate personal unity,
because in that case the Father and the Son would be one person; nor
again do we designate the unity of property, because if one property
were the reason of the Father and the Son being one principle of the
Holy Ghost, similarly, on account of His two properties, the Father
would be two principles of the Son and of the Holy Ghost, which cannot
be admitted. Therefore the Father and the Son are not one principle of
the Holy Ghost.

Objection 3: Further, the Son is not one with the Father more than is
the Holy Ghost. But the Holy Ghost and the Father are not one principle
as regards any other divine person. Therefore neither are the Father
and the Son.

Objection 4: Further, if the Father and the Son are one principle of
the Holy Ghost, this one is either the Father or it is not the Father.
But we cannot assert either of these positions because if the one is
the Father, it follows that the Son is the Father; and if the one is
not the Father, it follows that the Father is not the Father. Therefore
we cannot say that the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy
Ghost.

Objection 5: Further, if the Father and the Son are one principle of
the Holy Ghost, it seems necessary to say, conversely, that the one
principle of the Holy Ghost is the Father and the Son. But this seems
to be false; for this word "principle" stands either for the person of
the Father, or for the person of the Son; and in either sense it is
false. Therefore this proposition also is false, that the Father and
the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost.

Objection 6: Further, unity in substance makes identity. So if the
Father and the Son are the one principle of the Holy Ghost, it follows
that they are the same principle; which is denied by many. Therefore we
cannot grant that the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy
Ghost.

Objection 7: Further, the Father, Son and Holy Ghost are called one
Creator, because they are the one principle of the creature. But the
Father and the Son are not one, but two Spirators, as many assert; and
this agrees also with what Hilary says (De Trin. ii) that "the Holy
Ghost is to be confessed as proceeding from Father and Son as authors. "
Therefore the Father and the Son are not one principle of the Holy
Ghost.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. v, 14) that the Father and
the Son are not two principles, but one principle of the Holy Ghost.

I answer that, The Father and the Son are in everything one, wherever
there is no distinction between them of opposite relation. Hence since
there is no relative opposition between them as the principle of the
Holy Ghost it follows that the Father and the Son are one principle of
the Holy Ghost.

Some, however, assert that this proposition is incorrect: "The Father
and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost," because, they
declare, since the word "principle" in the singular number does not
signify "person," but "property," it must be taken as an adjective; and
forasmuch as an adjective cannot be modified by another adjective, it
cannot properly be said that the Father and the Son are one principle
of the Holy Ghost unless one be taken as an adverb, so that the meaning
should be: They are one principle---that is, in one and the same way.
But then it might be equally right to say that the Father is two
principles of the Son and of the Holy Ghost---namely, in two ways.
Therefore, we must say that, although this word "principle" signifies a
property, it does so after the manner of a substantive, as do the words
"father" and "son" even in things created. Hence it takes its number
from the form it signifies, like other substantives. Therefore, as the
Father and the Son are one God, by reason of the unity of the form that
is signified by this word "God"; so they are one principle of the Holy
Ghost by reason of the unity of the property that is signified in this
word "principle. "

Reply to Objection 1: If we consider the spirative power, the Holy
Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son as they are one in the
spirative power, which in a certain way signifies the nature with the
property, as we shall see later (ad 7). Nor is there any reason against
one property being in two "supposita" that possess one common nature.
But if we consider the "supposita" of the spiration, then we may say
that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son, as distinct;
for He proceeds from them as the unitive love of both.

Reply to Objection 2: In the proposition "the Father and the Son are
one principle of the Holy Ghost," one property is designated which is
the form signified by the term. It does not thence follow that by
reason of the several properties the Father can be called several
principles, for this would imply in Him a plurality of subjects.

Reply to Objection 3: It is not by reason of relative properties that
we speak of similitude or dissimilitude in God, but by reason of the
essence. Hence, as the Father is not more like to Himself than He is to
the Son; so likewise neither is the Son more like to the Father than is
the Holy Ghost.

Reply to Objection 4: These two propositions, "The Father and the Son
are one principle which is the Father," or, "one principle which is not
the Father," are not mutually contradictory; and hence it is not
necessary to assert one or other of them. For when we say the Father
and the Son are one principle, this word "principle" has not
determinate supposition but rather it stands indeterminately for two
persons together. Hence there is a fallacy of "figure of speech" as the
argument concludes from the indeterminate to the determinate.

Reply to Objection 5: This proposition is also true:---The one
principle of the Holy Ghost is the Father and the Son; because the word
"principle" does not stand for one person only, but indistinctly for
the two persons as above explained.

Reply to Objection 6: There is no reason against saying that the Father
and the Son are the same principle, because the word "principle" stands
confusedly and indistinctly for the two Persons together.

Reply to Objection 7: Some say that although the Father and the Son are
one principle of the Holy Ghost, there are two spirators, by reason of
the distinction of "supposita," as also there are two spirating,
because acts refer to subjects. Yet this does not hold good as to the
name "Creator"; because the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the
Son as from two distinct persons, as above explained; whereas the
creature proceeds from the three persons not as distinct persons, but
as united in essence. It seems, however, better to say that because
spirating is an adjective, and spirator a substantive, we can say that
the Father and the Son are two spirating, by reason of the plurality of
the "supposita" but not two spirators by reason of the one spiration.
For adjectival words derive their number from the "supposita" but
substantives from themselves, according to the form signified. As to
what Hilary says, that "the Holy ghost is from the Father and the Son
as His authors," this is to be explained in the sense that the
substantive here stands for the adjective.
__________________________________________________________________

OF THE NAME OF THE HOLY GHOST---LOVE (TWO ARTICLES)

We now inquire concerning the name "Love," on which arise two points of
inquiry:

(1) Whether it is the proper name of the Holy Ghost?

(2) Whether the Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Ghost?
__________________________________________________________________

Whether "Love" is the proper name of the Holy Ghost?

Objection 1: It would seem that "Love" is not the proper name of the
Holy Ghost. For Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 17): "As the Father, Son
and Holy Ghost are called Wisdom, and are not three Wisdoms, but one; I
know not why the Father, Son and Holy Ghost should not be called
Charity, and all together one Charity. " But no name which is predicated
in the singular of each person and of all together, is a proper name of
a person. Therefore this name, "Love," is not the proper name of the
Holy Ghost.

Objection 2: Further, the Holy Ghost is a subsisting person, but love
is not used to signify a subsisting person, but rather an action
passing from the lover to the beloved. Therefore Love is not the proper
name of the Holy Ghost.

Objection 3: Further, Love is the bond between lovers, for as Dionysius
says (Div. Nom. iv): "Love is a unitive force. " But a bond is a medium
between what it joins together, not something proceeding from them.
Therefore, since the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son,
as was shown above ([301]Q[36], A[2]), it seems that He is not the Love
or bond of the Father and the Son.

Objection 4: Further, Love belongs to every lover. But the Holy Ghost
is a lover: therefore He has love. So if the Holy Ghost is Love, He
must be love of love, and spirit from spirit; which is not admissible.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xxx, in Pentecost. ): "The Holy
Ghost Himself is Love. "

I answer that, The name Love in God can be taken essentially and
personally. If taken personally it is the proper name of the Holy
Ghost; as Word is the proper name of the Son.

To see this we must know that since as shown above ([302]Q[27],
AA[2],3,4,5), there are two processions in God, one by way of the
intellect, which is the procession of the Word, and another by way of
the will, which is the procession of Love; forasmuch as the former is
the more known to us, we have been able to apply more suitable names to
express our various considerations as regards that procession, but not
as regards the procession of the will. Hence, we are obliged to employ
circumlocution as regards the person Who proceeds, and the relations
following from this procession which are called "procession" and
"spiration," as stated above ([303]Q[27], A[4], ad 3), and yet express
the origin rather than the relation in the strict sense of the term.