(3) Whether a natural
disposition
is requisite for prophecy?
Summa Theologica
Now
the prophetic light is not in the prophet's intellect by way of an
abiding form, else a prophet would always be able to prophesy, which is
clearly false. For Gregory says (Hom. i super Ezech. ): "Sometimes the
spirit of prophecy is lacking to the prophet, nor is it always within
the call of his mind, yet so that in its absence he knows that its
presence is due to a gift. " Hence Eliseus said of the Sunamite woman (4
Kings 4:27): "Her soul is in anguish, and the Lord hath hid it from me,
and hath not told me. " The reason for this is that the intellectual
light that is in a subject by way of an abiding and complete form,
perfects the intellect chiefly to the effect of knowing the principle
of the things manifested by that light; thus by the light of the active
intellect the intellect knows chiefly the first principles of all
things known naturally. Now the principle of things pertaining to
supernatural knowledge, which are manifested by prophecy, is God
Himself, Whom the prophets do not see in His essence, although He is
seen by the blessed in heaven, in whom this light is by way of an
abiding and complete form, according to Ps. 35:10, "In Thy light we
shall see light. "
It follows therefore that the prophetic light is in the prophet's soul
by way of a passion or transitory impression. This is indicated Ex.
33:22: "When my glory shall pass, I will set thee in a hole of the
rock," etc. , and 3 Kings 19:11: "Go forth and stand upon the mount
before the Lord; and behold the Lord passeth," etc. Hence it is that
even as the air is ever in need of a fresh enlightening, so too the
prophet's mind is always in need of a fresh revelation; thus a disciple
who has not yet acquired the principles of an art needs to have every
detail explained to him. Wherefore it is written (Is. 1:4): "In the
morning He wakeneth my ear, so that I may hear Him as a master. " This
is also indicated by the very manner in which prophecies are uttered:
thus it is stated that "the Lord spake to such and such a prophet," or
that "the word of the Lord," or "the hand of the Lord was made upon
him. "
But a habit is an abiding form. Wherefore it is evident that, properly
speaking, prophecy is not a habit.
Reply to Objection 1: This division of the Philosopher's does not
comprise absolutely all that is in the soul, but only such as can be
principles of moral actions, which are done sometimes from passion,
sometimes from habit, sometimes from mere power, as in the case of
those who perform an action from the judgment of their reason before
having the habit of that action.
However, prophecy may be reduced to a passion, provided we understand
passion to denote any kind of receiving, in which sense the Philosopher
says (De Anima iii, 4) that "to understand is, in a way, to be
passive. " For just as, in natural knowledge, the possible intellect is
passive to the light of the active intellect, so too in prophetic
knowledge the human intellect is passive to the enlightening of the
Divine light.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as in corporeal things, when a passion
ceases, there remains a certain aptitude to a repetition of the
passion---thus wood once ignited is more easily ignited again, so too
in the prophet's intellect, after the actual enlightenment has ceased,
there remains an aptitude to be enlightened anew---thus when the mind
has once been aroused to devotion, it is more easily recalled to its
former devotion. Hence Augustine says (De orando Deum. Ep. cxxx, 9)
that our prayers need to be frequent, "lest devotion be extinguished as
soon as it is kindled. "
We might, however, reply that a person is called a prophet, even while
his prophetic enlightenment ceases to be actual, on account of his
being deputed by God, according to Jer. 1:5, "And I made thee a prophet
unto the nations. "
Reply to Objection 3: Every gift of grace raises man to something above
human nature, and this may happen in two ways. First, as to the
substance of the act---for instance, the working of miracles, and the
knowledge of the uncertain and hidden things of Divine wisdom---and for
such acts man is not granted a habitual gift of grace. Secondly, a
thing is above human nature as to the mode but not the substance of the
act---for instance to love God and to know Him in the mirror of His
creatures---and for this a habitual gift of grace is bestowed.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether prophecy is only about future contingencies?
Objection 1: It would seem that prophecy is only about future
contingencies. For Cassiodorus says [*Prol. super Psalt. i] that
"prophecy is a Divine inspiration or revelation, announcing the issue
of things with unchangeable truth. " Now issues pertain to future
contingencies. Therefore the prophetic revelation is about future
contingencies alone.
Objection 2: Further, according to 1 Cor. 12, the grace of prophecy is
differentiated from wisdom and faith, which are about Divine things;
and from the discernment of spirits, which is about created spirits;
and from knowledge, which is about human things. Now habits and acts
are differentiated by their objects, as stated above ([3661]FS, Q[54],
A[2]). Therefore it seems that the object of prophecy is not connected
with any of the above. Therefore it follows that it is about future
contingencies alone.
Objection 3: Further, difference of object causes difference of
species, as stated above ([3662]FS, Q[54], A[2]). Therefore, if one
prophecy is about future contingencies, and another about other things,
it would seem to follow that these are different species of prophecy.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. i super Ezech. ) that some
prophecies are "about the future, for instance (Is. 7:14), 'Behold a
virgin shall conceive, and bear a son'"; some are "about the past, as
(Gn. 1:1), 'In the beginning God created heaven and earth'"; some are
"about the present," as (1 Cor. 14:24,25), "If all prophesy, and there
come in one that believeth not . . . the secrets of his heart are made
manifest. " Therefore prophecy is not about future contingencies alone.
I answer that, A manifestation made by means of a certain light can
extend to all those things that are subject to that light: thus the
body's sight extends to all colors, and the soul's natural knowledge
extends to whatever is subject to the light of the active intellect.
Now prophetic knowledge comes through a Divine light, whereby it is
possible to know all things both Divine and human, both spiritual and
corporeal; and consequently the prophetic revelation extends to them
all. Thus by the ministry of spirits a prophetic revelation concerning
the perfections of God and the angels was made to Is. 6:1, where it is
written, "I saw the Lord sitting upon a throne high and elevated. "
Moreover his prophecy contains matters referring to natural bodies,
according to the words of Is. 40:12, "Who hath measured the waters in
the hollow of His hand," etc. It also contains matters relating to
human conduct, according to Is. 58:1, "Deal thy bread to the hungry,"
etc. ; and besides this it contains things pertaining to future events,
according to Is. 47:9, "Two things shall come upon thee suddenly in one
day, barrenness and widowhood. "
Since, however, prophecy is about things remote from our knowledge, it
must be observed that the more remote things are from our knowledge the
more pertinent they are to prophecy. Of such things there are three
degrees. One degree comprises things remote from the knowledge, either
sensitive or intellective, of some particular man, but not from the
knowledge of all men; thus a particular man knows by sense things
present to him locally, which another man does not know by human sense,
since they are removed from him. Thus Eliseus knew prophetically what
his disciple Giezi had done in his absence (4 Kings 5:26), and in like
manner the secret thoughts of one man are manifested prophetically to
another, according to 1 Cor. 14:25; and again in this way what one man
knows by demonstration may be revealed to another prophetically.
The second degree comprises those things which surpass the knowledge of
all men without exception, not that they are in themselves unknowable,
but on account of a defect in human knowledge; such as the mystery of
the Trinity, which was revealed by the Seraphim saying: "Holy, Holy,
Holy," etc. (Is. 6:3).
The last degree comprises things remote from the knowledge of all men,
through being in themselves unknowable; such are future contingencies,
the truth of which is indeterminate. And since that which is predicated
universally and by its very nature, takes precedence of that which is
predicated in a limited and relative sense, it follows that revelation
of future events belongs most properly to prophecy, and from this
prophecy apparently takes its name. Hence Gregory says (Hom. i super
Ezech. ): "And since a prophet is so called because he foretells the
future, his name loses its significance when he speaks of the past or
present. "
Reply to Objection 1: Prophecy is there defined according to its proper
signification; and it is in this sense that it is differentiated from
the other gratuitous graces.
Reply to Objection 2: This is evident from what has just been said. We
might also reply that all those things that are the matter of prophecy
have the common aspect of being unknowable to man except by Divine
revelation; whereas those that are the matter of "wisdom," "knowledge,"
and the "interpretation of speeches," can be known by man through
natural reason, but are manifested in a higher way through the
enlightening of the Divine light. As to "faith," although it is about
things invisible to man, it is not concerned with the knowledge of the
things believed, but with a man's certitude of assent to things known
by others.
Reply to Objection 3: The formal element in prophetic knowledge is the
Divine light, which being one, gives unity of species to prophecy,
although the things prophetically manifested by the Divine light are
diverse.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether by the Divine revelation a prophet knows all that can be known
prophetically?
Objection 1: It would seem that by the Divine revelation a prophet
knows all that can be known prophetically. For it is written (Amos
3:7): "The Lord God doth nothing without revealing His secret to His
servants the prophets. " Now whatever is revealed prophetically is
something done by God. Therefore there is not one of them but what is
revealed to the prophet.
Objection 2: Further, "God's works are perfect" (Dt. 32:4). Now
prophecy is a "Divine revelation," as stated above [3663](A[3]).
Therefore it is perfect; and this would not be so unless all possible
matters of prophecy were revealed prophetically, since "the perfect is
that which lacks nothing" (Phys. iii, 6). Therefore all possible
matters of prophecy are revealed to the prophet.
Objection 3: Further, the Divine light which causes prophecy is more
powerful than the right of natural reason which is the cause of human
science. Now a man who has acquired a science knows whatever pertains
to that science; thus a grammarian knows all matters of grammar.
Therefore it would seem that a prophet knows all matters of prophecy.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. i super Ezech. ) that "sometimes the
spirit of prophecy indicates the present to the prophet's mind and
nowise the future; and sometimes it points not to the present but to
the future. " Therefore the prophet does not know all matters of
prophecy.
I answer that, Things which differ from one another need not exist
simultaneously, save by reason of some one thing in which they are
connected and on which they depend: thus it has been stated above
([3664]FS, Q[65], AA[1],2) that all the virtues must needs exist
simultaneously on account of prudence and charity. Now all the things
that are known through some principle are connected in that principle
and depend thereon. Hence he who knows a principle perfectly, as
regards all to which its virtue extends, knows at the same time all
that can be known through that principle; whereas if the common
principle is unknown, or known only in a general way, it does not
follow that one knows all those things at the same time, but each of
them has to be manifested by itself, so that consequently some of them
may be known, and some not.
Now the principle of those things that are prophetically manifested by
the Divine light is the first truth, which the prophets do not see in
itself. Wherefore there is no need for their knowing all possible
matters of prophecy; but each one knows some of them according to the
special revelation of this or that matter.
Reply to Objection 1: The Lord reveals to the prophets all things that
are necessary for the instruction of the faithful; yet not all to every
one, but some to one, and some to another.
Reply to Objection 2: Prophecy is by way of being something imperfect
in the genus of Divine revelation: hence it is written (1 Cor. 13:8)
that "prophecies shall be made void," and that "we prophesy in part,"
i. e. imperfectly. The Divine revelation will be brought to its
perfection in heaven; wherefore the same text continues (1 Cor.
113:10): "When that which is perfect is come, that which is in part
shall be done away. " Consequently it does not follow that nothing is
lacking to prophetic revelation, but that it lacks none of those things
to which prophecy is directed.
Reply to Objection 3: He who has a science knows the principles of that
science, whence whatever is pertinent to that science depends;
wherefore to have the habit of a science perfectly, is to know whatever
is pertinent to that science. But God Who is the principle of prophetic
knowledge is not known in Himself through prophecy; wherefore the
comparison fails.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the prophet always distinguishes what he says by his own spirit from
what he says by the prophetic spirit?
Objection 1: It would seem that the prophet always distinguishes what
he says by his own spirit from what he says by the prophetic spirit.
For Augustine states (Confess. vi, 13) that his mother said "she could,
through a certain feeling, which in words she could not express,
discern betwixt Divine revelations, and the dreams of her own soul. "
Now prophecy is a Divine revelation, as stated above [3665](A[3]).
Therefore the prophet always distinguishes what he says by the spirit
of prophecy, from what he says by his own spirit.
Objection 2: Further, God commands nothing impossible, as Jerome
[*Pelagius. Ep. xvi, among the supposititious works of St. Jerome]
says. Now the prophets were commanded (Jer. 23:28): "The prophet that
hath a dream, let him tell a dream; and he that hath My word, let him
speak My word with truth. " Therefore the prophet can distinguish what
he has through the spirit of prophecy from what he sees otherwise.
Objection 3: Further, the certitude resulting from a Divine light is
greater than that which results from the light of natural reason. Now
he that has science, by the light of natural reason knows for certain
that he has it. Therefore he that has prophecy by a Divine light is
much more certain that he has it.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. i super Ezech. ): "It must be
observed that sometimes the holy prophets, when consulted, utter
certain things by their own spirit, through being much accustomed to
prophesying, and think they are speaking by the prophetic spirit. "
I answer that, The prophet's mind is instructed by God in two ways: in
one way by an express revelation, in another way by a most mysterious
instinct to "which the human mind is subjected without knowing it," as
Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 17). Accordingly the prophet has the
greatest certitude about those things which he knows by an express
revelation, and he has it for certain that they are revealed to him by
God; wherefore it is written (Jer. 26:15): "In truth the Lord sent me
to you, to speak all these words in your hearing. " Else, were he not
certain about this, the faith which relies on the utterances of the
prophet would not be certain. A sign of the prophet's certitude may be
gathered from the fact that Abraham being admonished in a prophetic
vision, prepared to sacrifice his only-begotten son, which he nowise
would have done had he not been most certain of the Divine revelation.
On the other hand, his position with regard to the things he knows by
instinct is sometimes such that he is unable to distinguish fully
whether his thoughts are conceived of Divine instinct or of his own
spirit. And those things which we know by Divine instinct are not all
manifested with prophetic certitude, for this instinct is something
imperfect in the genus of prophecy. It is thus that we are to
understand the saying of Gregory. Lest, however, this should lead to
error, "they are very soon set aright by the Holy Ghost [*For instance,
cf. 2 Kings 7:3 seqq. ], and from Him they hear the truth, so that they
reproach themselves for having said what was untrue," as Gregory adds
(Hom. i super Ezech. ).
The arguments set down in the first place consider the revelation that
is made by the prophetic spirit; wherefore the answer to all the
objections is clear.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether things known or declared prophetically can be false?
Objection 1: It would seem that things known or declared prophetically
can be false. For prophecy is about future contingencies, as stated
above (A[3] ). Now future contingencies may possibly not happen; else
they would happen of necessity. Therefore the matter of prophecy can be
false.
Objection 2: Further, Isaias prophesied to Ezechias saying (Is. 38:1):
"Take order with thy house, for thou shalt surely die, and shalt not
live," and yet fifteen years were added to his life (4 Kings 20:6).
Again the Lord said (Jer. 18:7,8): "I will suddenly speak against a
nation and against a kingdom, to root out and to pull down and to
destroy it. If that nation against which I have spoken shall repent of
their evil, I also will repent of the evil that I have thought to do
them. " This is instanced in the example of the Ninevites, according to
Jn. 3:10: "The Lord [Vulg. : 'God'] had mercy with regard to the evil
which He had said that He would do to them, and He did it not. "
Therefore the matter of prophecy can be false.
Objection 3: Further, in a conditional proposition, whenever the
antecedent is absolutely necessary, the consequent is absolutely
necessary, because the consequent of a conditional proposition stands
in the same relation to the antecedent, as the conclusion to the
premises in a syllogism, and a syllogism whose premises are necessary
always leads to a necessary conclusion, as we find proved in I Poster.
6. But if the matter of a prophecy cannot be false, the following
conditional proposition must needs be true: "If a thing has been
prophesied, it will be. " Now the antecedent of this conditional
proposition is absolutely necessary, since it is about the past.
Therefore the consequent is also necessary absolutely; yet this is
unfitting, for then prophecy would not be about contingencies.
Therefore it is untrue that the matter of prophecy cannot be false.
On the contrary, Cassiodorus says [*Prol. in Psalt. i] that "prophecy
is a Divine inspiration or revelation, announcing the issue of things
with invariable truth. " Now the truth of prophecy would not be
invariable, if its matter could be false. Therefore nothing false can
come under prophecy.
I answer that, As may be gathered from what has been said
([3666]AA[1],3,5), prophecy is a kind of knowledge impressed under the
form of teaching on the prophet's intellect, by Divine revelation. Now
the truth of knowledge is the same in disciple and teacher since the
knowledge of the disciple is a likeness of the knowledge of the
teacher, even as in natural things the form of the thing generated is a
likeness of the form of the generator. Jerome speaks in this sense when
he says [*Comment. in Daniel ii, 10] that "prophecy is the seal of the
Divine foreknowledge. " Consequently the same truth must needs be in
prophetic knowledge and utterances, as in the Divine knowledge, under
which nothing false can possibly come, as stated in the [3667]FP,
Q[16], A[8]. Therefore nothing false can come under prophecy.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated in the [3668]FP, Q[14], A[13] the
certitude of the Divine foreknowledge does not exclude the contingency
of future singular events, because that knowledge regards the future as
present and already determinate to one thing. Wherefore prophecy also,
which is an "impressed likeness" or "seal of the Divine foreknowledge,"
does not by its unchangeable truth exclude the contingency of future
things.
Reply to Objection 2: The Divine foreknowledge regards future things in
two ways. First, as they are in themselves, in so far, to wit, as it
sees them in their presentiality: secondly, as in their causes,
inasmuch as it sees the order of causes in relation to their effects.
And though future contingencies, considered as in themselves, are
determinate to one thing, yet, considered as in their causes, they are
not so determined but that they can happen otherwise. Again, though
this twofold knowledge is always united in the Divine intellect, it is
not always united in the prophetic revelation, because an imprint made
by an active cause is not always on a par with the virtue of that
cause. Hence sometimes the prophetic revelation is an imprinted
likeness of the Divine foreknowledge, in so far as the latter regards
future contingencies in themselves: and such things happen in the same
way as foretold, for example this saying of Is. 7:14: "Behold a virgin
shall conceive. " Sometimes, however, the prophetic revelation is an
imprinted likeness of the Divine foreknowledge as knowing the order of
causes to effects; and then at times the event is otherwise than
foretold. Yet the prophecy does not cover a falsehood, for the meaning
of the prophecy is that inferior causes, whether they be natural causes
or human acts, are so disposed as to lead to such a result. In this way
we are to understand the saying of Is. 38:1: "Thou shalt die, and not
live"; in other words, "The disposition of thy body has a tendency to
death": and the saying of Jonah 3:4, "Yet forty days, and Nineveh shall
be destroyed," that is to say, "Its merits demand that it should be
destroyed. " God is said "to repent," metaphorically, inasmuch as He
bears Himself after the manner of one who repents, by "changing His
sentence, although He changes not His counsel" [*Cf. [3669]FP, Q[19],
A[7], ad 2].
Reply to Objection 3: Since the same truth of prophecy is the same as
the truth of Divine foreknowledge, as stated above, the conditional
proposition: "If this was prophesied, it will be," is true in the same
way as the proposition: "If this was foreknown, it will be": for in
both cases it is impossible for the antecedent not to be. Hence the
consequent is necessary, considered, not as something future in our
regard, but as being present to the Divine foreknowledge, as stated in
the [3670]FP, Q[14], A[13], ad 2.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE CAUSE OF PROPHECY (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider the cause of prophecy. Under this head there are
six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether prophecy is natural?
(2) Whether it is from God by means of the angels?
(3) Whether a natural disposition is requisite for prophecy?
(4) Whether a good life is requisite?
(5) Whether any prophecy is from the demons?
(6) Whether prophets of the demons ever tell what is true?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether prophecy can be natural?
Objection 1: It would seem that prophecy can be natural. For Gregory
says (Dial. iv, 26) that "sometimes the mere strength of the soul is
sufficiently cunning to foresee certain things": and Augustine says
(Gen. ad lit. xii, 13) that the human soul, according as it is
withdrawn from the sense of the body, is able to foresee the future
[*Cf. [3671]FP, Q[86], A[4], ad 2]. Now this pertains to prophecy.
Therefore the soul can acquire prophecy naturally.
Objection 2: Further, the human soul's knowledge is more alert while
one wakes than while one sleeps. Now some, during sleep, naturally
foresee the future, as the Philosopher asserts (De Somn. et Vigil. [*De
Divinat. per Somn. ii, which is annexed to the work quoted]). Much more
therefore can a man naturally foreknow the future.
Objection 3: Further, man, by his nature, is more perfect than dumb
animals. Yet some dumb animals have foreknowledge of future things that
concern them. Thus ants foreknow the coming rains, which is evident
from their gathering grain into their nest before the rain commences;
and in like manner fish foreknow a coming storm, as may be gathered
from their movements in avoiding places exposed to storm. Much more
therefore can men foreknow the future that concerns themselves, and of
such things is prophecy. Therefore prophecy comes from nature.
Objection 4: Further, it is written (Prov. 29:18): "When prophecy shall
fail, the people shall be scattered abroad"; wherefore it is evident
that prophecy is necessary for the stability of the human race. Now
"nature does not fail in necessaries" [*Aristotle, de Anima iii, 9].
Therefore it seems that prophecy is from nature.
On the contrary, It is written (2 Pet. 1:21): "For prophecy came not by
the will of man at any time, but the holy men of God spoke, inspired by
the Holy Ghost. " Therefore prophecy comes not from nature, but through
the gift of the Holy Ghost.
I answer that, As stated above (Q[171], A[6], ad 2) prophetic
foreknowledge may regard future things in two ways: in one way, as they
are in themselves; in another way, as they are in their causes. Now, to
foreknow future things, as they are in themselves, is proper to the
Divine intellect, to Whose eternity all things are present, as stated
in the [3672]FP, Q[14], A[13]. Wherefore such like foreknowledge of the
future cannot come from nature, but from Divine revelation alone. On
the other hand, future things can be foreknown in their causes with a
natural knowledge even by man: thus a physician foreknows future health
or death in certain causes, through previous experimental knowledge of
the order of those causes to such effects. Such like knowledge of the
future may be understood to be in a man by nature in two ways. In one
way that the soul, from that which it holds, is able to foreknow the
future, and thus Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 13): "Some have
deemed the human soul to contain a certain power of divination. " This
seems to be in accord with the opinion of Plato [*Phaed. xxvii; Civit.
vi], who held that our souls have knowledge of all things by
participating in the ideas; but that this knowledge is obscured in them
by union with the body; yet in some more, in others less, according to
a difference in bodily purity. According to this it might be said that
men, whose souls are not much obscured through union with the body, are
able to foreknow such like future things by their own knowledge.
Against this opinion Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 13): "How is it
that the soul cannot always have this power of divination, since it
always wishes to have it? "
Since, however, it seems truer, according to the opinion of Aristotle,
that the soul acquires knowledge from sensibles, as stated in the
[3673]FP, Q[84], A[6], it is better to have recourse to another
explanation, and to hold that men have no such foreknowledge of the
future, but that they can acquire it by means of experience, wherein
they are helped by their natural disposition, which depends on the
perfection of a man's imaginative power, and the clarity of his
understanding.
Nevertheless this latter foreknowledge of the future differs in two
ways from the former, which comes through Divine revelation. First,
because the former can be about any events whatever, and this
infallibly; whereas the latter foreknowledge, which can be had
naturally, is about certain effects, to which human experience may
extend. Secondly, because the former prophecy is "according to the
unchangeable truth" [*[3674]Q[171], A[3], OBJ[1]], while the latter is
not, and can cover a falsehood. Now the former foreknowledge, and not
the latter, properly belongs to prophecy, because, as stated above
([3675]Q[171], A[3]), prophetic knowledge is of things which naturally
surpass human knowledge. Consequently we must say that prophecy
strictly so called cannot be from nature, but only from Divine
revelation.
Reply to Objection 1: When the soul is withdrawn from corporeal things,
it becomes more adapted to receive the influence of spiritual
substances [*Cf. FP, Q[88], A[4], ad 2], and also is more inclined to
receive the subtle motions which take place in the human imagination
through the impression of natural causes, whereas it is hindered from
receiving them while occupied with sensible things. Hence Gregory says
(Dial. iv, 26) that "the soul, at the approach of death, foresees
certain future things, by reason of the subtlety of its nature,"
inasmuch as it is receptive even of slight impressions. Or again, it
knows future things by a revelation of the angels; but not by its own
power, because according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 13), "if this
were so, it would be able to foreknow the future whenever it willed,"
which is clearly false.
Objection 2: Knowledge of the future by means of dreams, comes either
from the revelation of spiritual substances, or from a corporeal cause,
as stated above ([3676]Q[95], A[6]), when we were treating of
divination. Now both these causes are more applicable to a person while
asleep than while awake, because, while awake, the soul is occupied
with external sensibles, so that it is less receptive of the subtle
impressions either of spiritual substances, or even of natural causes;
although as regards the perfection of judgment, the reason is more
alert in waking than in sleeping.
Reply to Objection 3: Even dumb animals have no foreknowledge of future
events, except as these are foreknown in their causes, whereby their
imagination is moved more than man's, because man's imagination,
especially in waking, is more disposed according to reason than
according to the impression of natural causes. Yet reason effects much
more amply in man, that which the impression of natural causes effects
in dumb animals; and Divine grace by inspiring the prophecy assists man
still more.
Reply to Objection 4: The prophetic light extends even to the direction
of human acts; and in this way prophecy is requisite for the government
of a people, especially in relation to Divine worship; since for this
nature is not sufficient, and grace is necessary.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether prophetic revelation comes through the angels?
Objection 1: It would seem that prophetic revelation does not come
through the angels. For it is written (Wis. 7:27) that Divine wisdom
"conveyeth herself into holy souls," and "maketh the friends of God,
and the prophets. " Now wisdom makes the friends of God immediately.
Therefore it also makes the prophets immediately, and not through the
medium of the angels.
Objection 2: Further, prophecy is reckoned among the gratuitous graces.
But the gratuitous graces are from the Holy Ghost, according to 1 Cor.
12:4, "There are diversities of graces, but the same Spirit. " Therefore
the prophetic revelation is not made by means of an angel.
Objection 3: Further, Cassiodorus [*Prol. in Psalt. i] says that
prophecy is a "Divine revelation": whereas if it were conveyed by the
angels, it would be called an angelic revelation. Therefore prophecy is
not bestowed by means of the angels.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv): "Our glorious fathers
received Divine visions by means of the heavenly powers"; and he is
speaking there of prophetic visions. Therefore prophetic revelation is
conveyed by means of the angels.
I answer that, As the Apostle says (Rom. 13:1), "Things that are of God
are well ordered [*Vulg. : 'Those that are, are ordained of God. ']. " Now
the Divine ordering, according to Dionysius [*Coel. Hier. iv; Eccl.
Hier. v], is such that the lowest things are directed by middle things.
Now the angels hold a middle position between God and men, in that they
have a greater share in the perfection of the Divine goodness than men
have. Wherefore the Divine enlightenments and revelations are conveyed
from God to men by the angels. Now prophetic knowledge is bestowed by
Divine enlightenment and revelation. Therefore it is evident that it is
conveyed by the angels.
Reply to Objection 1: Charity which makes man a friend of God, is a
perfection of the will, in which God alone can form an impression;
whereas prophecy is a perfection of the intellect, in which an angel
also can form an impression, as stated in the [3677]FP, Q[111], A[1],
wherefore the comparison fails between the two.
Reply to Objection 2: The gratuitous graces are ascribed to the Holy
Ghost as their first principle: yet He works grace of this kind in men
by means of the angels.
Reply to Objection 3: The work of the instrument is ascribed to the
principal agent by whose power the instrument acts. And since a
minister is like an instrument, prophetic revelation, which is conveyed
by the ministry of the angels, is said to be Divine.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a natural disposition is requisite for prophecy?
Objection 1: It would seem that a natural disposition is requisite for
prophecy. For prophecy is received by the prophet according to the
disposition of the recipient, since a gloss of Jerome on Amos 1:2, "The
Lord will roar from Sion," says: "Anyone who wishes to make a
comparison naturally turns to those things of which he has experience,
and among which his life is spent. For example, sailors compare their
enemies to the winds, and their losses to a shipwreck. In like manner
Amos, who was a shepherd, likens the fear of God to that which is
inspired by the lion's roar. " Now that which is received by a thing
according to the mode of the recipient requires a natural disposition.
Therefore prophecy requires a natural disposition.
Objection 2: Further, the considerations of prophecy are more lofty
than those of acquired science. Now natural indisposition hinders the
considerations of acquired science, since many are prevented by natural
indisposition from succeeding to grasp the speculations of science.
Much more therefore is a natural disposition requisite for the
contemplation of prophecy.
Objection 3: Further, natural indisposition is a much greater obstacle
than an accidental impediment. Now the considerations of prophecy are
hindered by an accidental occurrence. For Jerome says in his commentary
on Matthew [*The quotation is from Origen, Hom. vi in Num. ] that "at
the time of the marriage act, the presence of the Holy Ghost will not
be vouchsafed, even though it be a prophet that fulfils the duty of
procreation. " Much more therefore does a natural indisposition hinder
prophecy; and thus it would seem that a good natural disposition is
requisite for prophecy.
On the contrary, Gregory says in a homily for Pentecost (xxx in Ev. ):
"He," namely the Holy Ghost, "fills the boy harpist and makes him a
Psalmist; He fills the herdsman plucking wild figs, and makes him a
prophet. " Therefore prophecy requires no previous disposition, but
depends on the will alone of the Holy Ghost, of Whom it is written (1
Cor. 12:2): "All these things, one and the same Spirit worketh,
dividing to every one according as He will. "
I answer that, As stated above [3678](A[1]), prophecy in its true and
exact sense comes from Divine inspiration; while that which comes from
a natural cause is not called prophecy except in a relative sense. Now
we must observe that as God Who is the universal efficient cause
requires neither previous matter nor previous disposition of matter in
His corporeal effects, for He is able at the same instant to bring into
being matter and disposition and form, so neither does He require a
previous disposition in His spiritual effects, but is able to produce
both the spiritual effect and at the same time the fitting disposition
as requisite according to the order of nature. More than this, He is
able at the same time, by creation, to produce the subject, so as to
dispose a soul for prophecy and give it the prophetic grace, at the
very instant of its creation.
Reply to Objection 1: It matters not to prophecy by what comparisons
the thing prophesied is expressed; and so the Divine operation makes no
change in a prophet in this respect. Yet if there be anything in him
incompatible with prophecy, it is removed by the Divine power.
Reply to Objection 2: The considerations of science proceed from a
natural cause, and nature cannot work without a previous disposition in
matter. This cannot be said of God Who is the cause of prophecy.
Reply to Objection 3: A natural indisposition, if not removed, might be
an obstacle to prophetic revelation, for instance if a man were
altogether deprived of the natural senses. In the same way a man might
be hindered from the act of prophesying by some very strong passion,
whether of anger, or of concupiscence as in coition, or by any other
passion. But such a natural indisposition as this is removed by the
Divine power, which is the cause of prophecy.
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Whether a good life is requisite for prophecy?
Objection 1: It would seem that a good life is requisite for prophecy.
For it is written (Wis. 7:27) that the wisdom of God "through nations
conveyeth herself into holy souls," and "maketh the friends of God, and
prophets. " Now there can be no holiness without a good life and
sanctifying grace. Therefore prophecy cannot be without a good life and
sanctifying grace.
Objection 2: Further, secrets are not revealed save to a friend,
according to Jn. 15:15, "But I have called you friends, because all
things whatsoever I have heard of My Father, I have made known to you. "
Now God reveals His secrets to the prophets (Amos 3:7). Therefore it
would seem that the prophets are the friends of God; which is
impossible without charity. Therefore seemingly prophecy cannot be
without charity; and charity is impossible without sanctifying grace.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Mat. 7:15): "Beware of false
prophets, who come to you in the clothing of sheep, but inwardly they
are ravening wolves. " Now all who are without grace are likened
inwardly to a ravening wolf, and consequently all such are false
prophets. Therefore no man is a true prophet except he be good by
grace.
Objection 4: Further, the Philosopher says (De Somn. et Vigil. [*Cf. De
Divinat. per Somn. i, which is annexed to the work quoted]) that "if
interpretation of dreams is from God, it is unfitting for it to be
bestowed on any but the best. " Now it is evident that the gift of
prophecy is from God. Therefore the gift of prophecy is vouchsafed only
to the best men.
On the contrary, To those who had said, "Lord, have we not prophesied
in Thy name? " this reply is made: "I never knew you" (Mat. 7:22,23).
Now "the Lord knoweth who are His" (2 Tim. 2:19). Therefore prophecy
can be in those who are not God's by grace.
I answer that, A good life may be considered from two points of view.
First, with regard to its inward root, which is sanctifying grace.
Secondly, with regard to the inward passions of the soul and the
outward actions. Now sanctifying grace is given chiefly in order that
man's soul may be united to God by charity. Wherefore Augustine says
(De Trin. xv, 18): "A man is not transferred from the left side to the
right, unless he receive the Holy Ghost, by Whom he is made a lover of
God and of his neighbor. " Hence whatever can be without charity can be
without sanctifying grace, and consequently without goodness of life.
Now prophecy can be without charity; and this is clear on two counts.
First, on account of their respective acts: for prophecy pertains to
the intellect, whose act precedes the act of the will, which power is
perfected by charity. For this reason the Apostle (1 Cor. 13) reckons
prophecy with other things pertinent to the intellect, that can be had
without charity. Secondly, on account of their respective ends. For
prophecy like other gratuitous graces is given for the good of the
Church, according to 1 Cor. 12:7, "The manifestation of the Spirit is
given to every man unto profit"; and is not directly intended to unite
man's affections to God, which is the purpose of charity. Therefore
prophecy can be without a good life, as regards the first root of this
goodness.
If, however, we consider a good life, with regard to the passions of
the soul, and external actions, from this point of view an evil life is
an obstacle to prophecy. For prophecy requires the mind to be raised
very high in order to contemplate spiritual things, and this is
hindered by strong passions, and the inordinate pursuit of external
things. Hence we read of the sons of the prophets (4 Kings 4:38) that
they "dwelt together with [Vulg. : 'before']" Eliseus, leading a
solitary life, as it were, lest worldly employment should be a
hindrance to the gift of prophecy.
Reply to Objection 1: Sometimes the gift of prophecy is given to a man
both for the good of others, and in order to enlighten his own mind;
and such are those whom Divine wisdom, "conveying itself" by
sanctifying grace to their minds, "maketh the friends of God, and
prophets. " Others, however, receive the gift of prophecy merely for the
good of others. Hence Jerome commenting on Mat. 7:22, says: "Sometimes
prophesying, the working of miracles, and the casting out of demons are
accorded not to the merit of those who do these things, but either to
the invoking the name of Christ, or to the condemnation of those who
invoke, and for the good of those who see and hear. "
Reply to Objection 2: Gregory [*Hom. xxvii in Ev. ] expounding this
passage [*Jn. 15:15] says: "Since we love the lofty things of heaven as
soon as we hear them, we know them as soon as we love them, for to love
is to know. Accordingly He had made all things known to them, because
having renounced earthly desires they were kindled by the torches of
perfect love. " In this way the Divine secrets are not always revealed
to prophets.
Reply to Objection 3: Not all wicked men are ravening wolves, but only
those whose purpose is to injure others. For Chrysostom says [*Opus
Imperf. in Matth. , Hom. xix, among the works of St. John Chrysostom,
and falsely ascribed to him] that "Catholic teachers, though they be
sinners, are called slaves of the flesh, but never ravening wolves,
because they do not purpose the destruction of Christians. " And since
prophecy is directed to the good of others, it is manifest that such
are false prophets, because they are not sent for this purpose by God.
Reply to Objection 4: God's gifts are not always bestowed on those who
are simply the best, but sometimes are vouchsafed to those who are best
as regards the receiving of this or that gift. Accordingly God grants
the gift of prophecy to those whom He judges best to give it to.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether any prophecy comes from the demons?
Objection 1: It would seem that no prophecy comes from the demons. For
prophecy is "a Divine revelation," according to Cassiodorus [*Prol. in
Psalt.
the prophetic light is not in the prophet's intellect by way of an
abiding form, else a prophet would always be able to prophesy, which is
clearly false. For Gregory says (Hom. i super Ezech. ): "Sometimes the
spirit of prophecy is lacking to the prophet, nor is it always within
the call of his mind, yet so that in its absence he knows that its
presence is due to a gift. " Hence Eliseus said of the Sunamite woman (4
Kings 4:27): "Her soul is in anguish, and the Lord hath hid it from me,
and hath not told me. " The reason for this is that the intellectual
light that is in a subject by way of an abiding and complete form,
perfects the intellect chiefly to the effect of knowing the principle
of the things manifested by that light; thus by the light of the active
intellect the intellect knows chiefly the first principles of all
things known naturally. Now the principle of things pertaining to
supernatural knowledge, which are manifested by prophecy, is God
Himself, Whom the prophets do not see in His essence, although He is
seen by the blessed in heaven, in whom this light is by way of an
abiding and complete form, according to Ps. 35:10, "In Thy light we
shall see light. "
It follows therefore that the prophetic light is in the prophet's soul
by way of a passion or transitory impression. This is indicated Ex.
33:22: "When my glory shall pass, I will set thee in a hole of the
rock," etc. , and 3 Kings 19:11: "Go forth and stand upon the mount
before the Lord; and behold the Lord passeth," etc. Hence it is that
even as the air is ever in need of a fresh enlightening, so too the
prophet's mind is always in need of a fresh revelation; thus a disciple
who has not yet acquired the principles of an art needs to have every
detail explained to him. Wherefore it is written (Is. 1:4): "In the
morning He wakeneth my ear, so that I may hear Him as a master. " This
is also indicated by the very manner in which prophecies are uttered:
thus it is stated that "the Lord spake to such and such a prophet," or
that "the word of the Lord," or "the hand of the Lord was made upon
him. "
But a habit is an abiding form. Wherefore it is evident that, properly
speaking, prophecy is not a habit.
Reply to Objection 1: This division of the Philosopher's does not
comprise absolutely all that is in the soul, but only such as can be
principles of moral actions, which are done sometimes from passion,
sometimes from habit, sometimes from mere power, as in the case of
those who perform an action from the judgment of their reason before
having the habit of that action.
However, prophecy may be reduced to a passion, provided we understand
passion to denote any kind of receiving, in which sense the Philosopher
says (De Anima iii, 4) that "to understand is, in a way, to be
passive. " For just as, in natural knowledge, the possible intellect is
passive to the light of the active intellect, so too in prophetic
knowledge the human intellect is passive to the enlightening of the
Divine light.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as in corporeal things, when a passion
ceases, there remains a certain aptitude to a repetition of the
passion---thus wood once ignited is more easily ignited again, so too
in the prophet's intellect, after the actual enlightenment has ceased,
there remains an aptitude to be enlightened anew---thus when the mind
has once been aroused to devotion, it is more easily recalled to its
former devotion. Hence Augustine says (De orando Deum. Ep. cxxx, 9)
that our prayers need to be frequent, "lest devotion be extinguished as
soon as it is kindled. "
We might, however, reply that a person is called a prophet, even while
his prophetic enlightenment ceases to be actual, on account of his
being deputed by God, according to Jer. 1:5, "And I made thee a prophet
unto the nations. "
Reply to Objection 3: Every gift of grace raises man to something above
human nature, and this may happen in two ways. First, as to the
substance of the act---for instance, the working of miracles, and the
knowledge of the uncertain and hidden things of Divine wisdom---and for
such acts man is not granted a habitual gift of grace. Secondly, a
thing is above human nature as to the mode but not the substance of the
act---for instance to love God and to know Him in the mirror of His
creatures---and for this a habitual gift of grace is bestowed.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether prophecy is only about future contingencies?
Objection 1: It would seem that prophecy is only about future
contingencies. For Cassiodorus says [*Prol. super Psalt. i] that
"prophecy is a Divine inspiration or revelation, announcing the issue
of things with unchangeable truth. " Now issues pertain to future
contingencies. Therefore the prophetic revelation is about future
contingencies alone.
Objection 2: Further, according to 1 Cor. 12, the grace of prophecy is
differentiated from wisdom and faith, which are about Divine things;
and from the discernment of spirits, which is about created spirits;
and from knowledge, which is about human things. Now habits and acts
are differentiated by their objects, as stated above ([3661]FS, Q[54],
A[2]). Therefore it seems that the object of prophecy is not connected
with any of the above. Therefore it follows that it is about future
contingencies alone.
Objection 3: Further, difference of object causes difference of
species, as stated above ([3662]FS, Q[54], A[2]). Therefore, if one
prophecy is about future contingencies, and another about other things,
it would seem to follow that these are different species of prophecy.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. i super Ezech. ) that some
prophecies are "about the future, for instance (Is. 7:14), 'Behold a
virgin shall conceive, and bear a son'"; some are "about the past, as
(Gn. 1:1), 'In the beginning God created heaven and earth'"; some are
"about the present," as (1 Cor. 14:24,25), "If all prophesy, and there
come in one that believeth not . . . the secrets of his heart are made
manifest. " Therefore prophecy is not about future contingencies alone.
I answer that, A manifestation made by means of a certain light can
extend to all those things that are subject to that light: thus the
body's sight extends to all colors, and the soul's natural knowledge
extends to whatever is subject to the light of the active intellect.
Now prophetic knowledge comes through a Divine light, whereby it is
possible to know all things both Divine and human, both spiritual and
corporeal; and consequently the prophetic revelation extends to them
all. Thus by the ministry of spirits a prophetic revelation concerning
the perfections of God and the angels was made to Is. 6:1, where it is
written, "I saw the Lord sitting upon a throne high and elevated. "
Moreover his prophecy contains matters referring to natural bodies,
according to the words of Is. 40:12, "Who hath measured the waters in
the hollow of His hand," etc. It also contains matters relating to
human conduct, according to Is. 58:1, "Deal thy bread to the hungry,"
etc. ; and besides this it contains things pertaining to future events,
according to Is. 47:9, "Two things shall come upon thee suddenly in one
day, barrenness and widowhood. "
Since, however, prophecy is about things remote from our knowledge, it
must be observed that the more remote things are from our knowledge the
more pertinent they are to prophecy. Of such things there are three
degrees. One degree comprises things remote from the knowledge, either
sensitive or intellective, of some particular man, but not from the
knowledge of all men; thus a particular man knows by sense things
present to him locally, which another man does not know by human sense,
since they are removed from him. Thus Eliseus knew prophetically what
his disciple Giezi had done in his absence (4 Kings 5:26), and in like
manner the secret thoughts of one man are manifested prophetically to
another, according to 1 Cor. 14:25; and again in this way what one man
knows by demonstration may be revealed to another prophetically.
The second degree comprises those things which surpass the knowledge of
all men without exception, not that they are in themselves unknowable,
but on account of a defect in human knowledge; such as the mystery of
the Trinity, which was revealed by the Seraphim saying: "Holy, Holy,
Holy," etc. (Is. 6:3).
The last degree comprises things remote from the knowledge of all men,
through being in themselves unknowable; such are future contingencies,
the truth of which is indeterminate. And since that which is predicated
universally and by its very nature, takes precedence of that which is
predicated in a limited and relative sense, it follows that revelation
of future events belongs most properly to prophecy, and from this
prophecy apparently takes its name. Hence Gregory says (Hom. i super
Ezech. ): "And since a prophet is so called because he foretells the
future, his name loses its significance when he speaks of the past or
present. "
Reply to Objection 1: Prophecy is there defined according to its proper
signification; and it is in this sense that it is differentiated from
the other gratuitous graces.
Reply to Objection 2: This is evident from what has just been said. We
might also reply that all those things that are the matter of prophecy
have the common aspect of being unknowable to man except by Divine
revelation; whereas those that are the matter of "wisdom," "knowledge,"
and the "interpretation of speeches," can be known by man through
natural reason, but are manifested in a higher way through the
enlightening of the Divine light. As to "faith," although it is about
things invisible to man, it is not concerned with the knowledge of the
things believed, but with a man's certitude of assent to things known
by others.
Reply to Objection 3: The formal element in prophetic knowledge is the
Divine light, which being one, gives unity of species to prophecy,
although the things prophetically manifested by the Divine light are
diverse.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether by the Divine revelation a prophet knows all that can be known
prophetically?
Objection 1: It would seem that by the Divine revelation a prophet
knows all that can be known prophetically. For it is written (Amos
3:7): "The Lord God doth nothing without revealing His secret to His
servants the prophets. " Now whatever is revealed prophetically is
something done by God. Therefore there is not one of them but what is
revealed to the prophet.
Objection 2: Further, "God's works are perfect" (Dt. 32:4). Now
prophecy is a "Divine revelation," as stated above [3663](A[3]).
Therefore it is perfect; and this would not be so unless all possible
matters of prophecy were revealed prophetically, since "the perfect is
that which lacks nothing" (Phys. iii, 6). Therefore all possible
matters of prophecy are revealed to the prophet.
Objection 3: Further, the Divine light which causes prophecy is more
powerful than the right of natural reason which is the cause of human
science. Now a man who has acquired a science knows whatever pertains
to that science; thus a grammarian knows all matters of grammar.
Therefore it would seem that a prophet knows all matters of prophecy.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. i super Ezech. ) that "sometimes the
spirit of prophecy indicates the present to the prophet's mind and
nowise the future; and sometimes it points not to the present but to
the future. " Therefore the prophet does not know all matters of
prophecy.
I answer that, Things which differ from one another need not exist
simultaneously, save by reason of some one thing in which they are
connected and on which they depend: thus it has been stated above
([3664]FS, Q[65], AA[1],2) that all the virtues must needs exist
simultaneously on account of prudence and charity. Now all the things
that are known through some principle are connected in that principle
and depend thereon. Hence he who knows a principle perfectly, as
regards all to which its virtue extends, knows at the same time all
that can be known through that principle; whereas if the common
principle is unknown, or known only in a general way, it does not
follow that one knows all those things at the same time, but each of
them has to be manifested by itself, so that consequently some of them
may be known, and some not.
Now the principle of those things that are prophetically manifested by
the Divine light is the first truth, which the prophets do not see in
itself. Wherefore there is no need for their knowing all possible
matters of prophecy; but each one knows some of them according to the
special revelation of this or that matter.
Reply to Objection 1: The Lord reveals to the prophets all things that
are necessary for the instruction of the faithful; yet not all to every
one, but some to one, and some to another.
Reply to Objection 2: Prophecy is by way of being something imperfect
in the genus of Divine revelation: hence it is written (1 Cor. 13:8)
that "prophecies shall be made void," and that "we prophesy in part,"
i. e. imperfectly. The Divine revelation will be brought to its
perfection in heaven; wherefore the same text continues (1 Cor.
113:10): "When that which is perfect is come, that which is in part
shall be done away. " Consequently it does not follow that nothing is
lacking to prophetic revelation, but that it lacks none of those things
to which prophecy is directed.
Reply to Objection 3: He who has a science knows the principles of that
science, whence whatever is pertinent to that science depends;
wherefore to have the habit of a science perfectly, is to know whatever
is pertinent to that science. But God Who is the principle of prophetic
knowledge is not known in Himself through prophecy; wherefore the
comparison fails.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the prophet always distinguishes what he says by his own spirit from
what he says by the prophetic spirit?
Objection 1: It would seem that the prophet always distinguishes what
he says by his own spirit from what he says by the prophetic spirit.
For Augustine states (Confess. vi, 13) that his mother said "she could,
through a certain feeling, which in words she could not express,
discern betwixt Divine revelations, and the dreams of her own soul. "
Now prophecy is a Divine revelation, as stated above [3665](A[3]).
Therefore the prophet always distinguishes what he says by the spirit
of prophecy, from what he says by his own spirit.
Objection 2: Further, God commands nothing impossible, as Jerome
[*Pelagius. Ep. xvi, among the supposititious works of St. Jerome]
says. Now the prophets were commanded (Jer. 23:28): "The prophet that
hath a dream, let him tell a dream; and he that hath My word, let him
speak My word with truth. " Therefore the prophet can distinguish what
he has through the spirit of prophecy from what he sees otherwise.
Objection 3: Further, the certitude resulting from a Divine light is
greater than that which results from the light of natural reason. Now
he that has science, by the light of natural reason knows for certain
that he has it. Therefore he that has prophecy by a Divine light is
much more certain that he has it.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. i super Ezech. ): "It must be
observed that sometimes the holy prophets, when consulted, utter
certain things by their own spirit, through being much accustomed to
prophesying, and think they are speaking by the prophetic spirit. "
I answer that, The prophet's mind is instructed by God in two ways: in
one way by an express revelation, in another way by a most mysterious
instinct to "which the human mind is subjected without knowing it," as
Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 17). Accordingly the prophet has the
greatest certitude about those things which he knows by an express
revelation, and he has it for certain that they are revealed to him by
God; wherefore it is written (Jer. 26:15): "In truth the Lord sent me
to you, to speak all these words in your hearing. " Else, were he not
certain about this, the faith which relies on the utterances of the
prophet would not be certain. A sign of the prophet's certitude may be
gathered from the fact that Abraham being admonished in a prophetic
vision, prepared to sacrifice his only-begotten son, which he nowise
would have done had he not been most certain of the Divine revelation.
On the other hand, his position with regard to the things he knows by
instinct is sometimes such that he is unable to distinguish fully
whether his thoughts are conceived of Divine instinct or of his own
spirit. And those things which we know by Divine instinct are not all
manifested with prophetic certitude, for this instinct is something
imperfect in the genus of prophecy. It is thus that we are to
understand the saying of Gregory. Lest, however, this should lead to
error, "they are very soon set aright by the Holy Ghost [*For instance,
cf. 2 Kings 7:3 seqq. ], and from Him they hear the truth, so that they
reproach themselves for having said what was untrue," as Gregory adds
(Hom. i super Ezech. ).
The arguments set down in the first place consider the revelation that
is made by the prophetic spirit; wherefore the answer to all the
objections is clear.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether things known or declared prophetically can be false?
Objection 1: It would seem that things known or declared prophetically
can be false. For prophecy is about future contingencies, as stated
above (A[3] ). Now future contingencies may possibly not happen; else
they would happen of necessity. Therefore the matter of prophecy can be
false.
Objection 2: Further, Isaias prophesied to Ezechias saying (Is. 38:1):
"Take order with thy house, for thou shalt surely die, and shalt not
live," and yet fifteen years were added to his life (4 Kings 20:6).
Again the Lord said (Jer. 18:7,8): "I will suddenly speak against a
nation and against a kingdom, to root out and to pull down and to
destroy it. If that nation against which I have spoken shall repent of
their evil, I also will repent of the evil that I have thought to do
them. " This is instanced in the example of the Ninevites, according to
Jn. 3:10: "The Lord [Vulg. : 'God'] had mercy with regard to the evil
which He had said that He would do to them, and He did it not. "
Therefore the matter of prophecy can be false.
Objection 3: Further, in a conditional proposition, whenever the
antecedent is absolutely necessary, the consequent is absolutely
necessary, because the consequent of a conditional proposition stands
in the same relation to the antecedent, as the conclusion to the
premises in a syllogism, and a syllogism whose premises are necessary
always leads to a necessary conclusion, as we find proved in I Poster.
6. But if the matter of a prophecy cannot be false, the following
conditional proposition must needs be true: "If a thing has been
prophesied, it will be. " Now the antecedent of this conditional
proposition is absolutely necessary, since it is about the past.
Therefore the consequent is also necessary absolutely; yet this is
unfitting, for then prophecy would not be about contingencies.
Therefore it is untrue that the matter of prophecy cannot be false.
On the contrary, Cassiodorus says [*Prol. in Psalt. i] that "prophecy
is a Divine inspiration or revelation, announcing the issue of things
with invariable truth. " Now the truth of prophecy would not be
invariable, if its matter could be false. Therefore nothing false can
come under prophecy.
I answer that, As may be gathered from what has been said
([3666]AA[1],3,5), prophecy is a kind of knowledge impressed under the
form of teaching on the prophet's intellect, by Divine revelation. Now
the truth of knowledge is the same in disciple and teacher since the
knowledge of the disciple is a likeness of the knowledge of the
teacher, even as in natural things the form of the thing generated is a
likeness of the form of the generator. Jerome speaks in this sense when
he says [*Comment. in Daniel ii, 10] that "prophecy is the seal of the
Divine foreknowledge. " Consequently the same truth must needs be in
prophetic knowledge and utterances, as in the Divine knowledge, under
which nothing false can possibly come, as stated in the [3667]FP,
Q[16], A[8]. Therefore nothing false can come under prophecy.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated in the [3668]FP, Q[14], A[13] the
certitude of the Divine foreknowledge does not exclude the contingency
of future singular events, because that knowledge regards the future as
present and already determinate to one thing. Wherefore prophecy also,
which is an "impressed likeness" or "seal of the Divine foreknowledge,"
does not by its unchangeable truth exclude the contingency of future
things.
Reply to Objection 2: The Divine foreknowledge regards future things in
two ways. First, as they are in themselves, in so far, to wit, as it
sees them in their presentiality: secondly, as in their causes,
inasmuch as it sees the order of causes in relation to their effects.
And though future contingencies, considered as in themselves, are
determinate to one thing, yet, considered as in their causes, they are
not so determined but that they can happen otherwise. Again, though
this twofold knowledge is always united in the Divine intellect, it is
not always united in the prophetic revelation, because an imprint made
by an active cause is not always on a par with the virtue of that
cause. Hence sometimes the prophetic revelation is an imprinted
likeness of the Divine foreknowledge, in so far as the latter regards
future contingencies in themselves: and such things happen in the same
way as foretold, for example this saying of Is. 7:14: "Behold a virgin
shall conceive. " Sometimes, however, the prophetic revelation is an
imprinted likeness of the Divine foreknowledge as knowing the order of
causes to effects; and then at times the event is otherwise than
foretold. Yet the prophecy does not cover a falsehood, for the meaning
of the prophecy is that inferior causes, whether they be natural causes
or human acts, are so disposed as to lead to such a result. In this way
we are to understand the saying of Is. 38:1: "Thou shalt die, and not
live"; in other words, "The disposition of thy body has a tendency to
death": and the saying of Jonah 3:4, "Yet forty days, and Nineveh shall
be destroyed," that is to say, "Its merits demand that it should be
destroyed. " God is said "to repent," metaphorically, inasmuch as He
bears Himself after the manner of one who repents, by "changing His
sentence, although He changes not His counsel" [*Cf. [3669]FP, Q[19],
A[7], ad 2].
Reply to Objection 3: Since the same truth of prophecy is the same as
the truth of Divine foreknowledge, as stated above, the conditional
proposition: "If this was prophesied, it will be," is true in the same
way as the proposition: "If this was foreknown, it will be": for in
both cases it is impossible for the antecedent not to be. Hence the
consequent is necessary, considered, not as something future in our
regard, but as being present to the Divine foreknowledge, as stated in
the [3670]FP, Q[14], A[13], ad 2.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE CAUSE OF PROPHECY (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider the cause of prophecy. Under this head there are
six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether prophecy is natural?
(2) Whether it is from God by means of the angels?
(3) Whether a natural disposition is requisite for prophecy?
(4) Whether a good life is requisite?
(5) Whether any prophecy is from the demons?
(6) Whether prophets of the demons ever tell what is true?
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Whether prophecy can be natural?
Objection 1: It would seem that prophecy can be natural. For Gregory
says (Dial. iv, 26) that "sometimes the mere strength of the soul is
sufficiently cunning to foresee certain things": and Augustine says
(Gen. ad lit. xii, 13) that the human soul, according as it is
withdrawn from the sense of the body, is able to foresee the future
[*Cf. [3671]FP, Q[86], A[4], ad 2]. Now this pertains to prophecy.
Therefore the soul can acquire prophecy naturally.
Objection 2: Further, the human soul's knowledge is more alert while
one wakes than while one sleeps. Now some, during sleep, naturally
foresee the future, as the Philosopher asserts (De Somn. et Vigil. [*De
Divinat. per Somn. ii, which is annexed to the work quoted]). Much more
therefore can a man naturally foreknow the future.
Objection 3: Further, man, by his nature, is more perfect than dumb
animals. Yet some dumb animals have foreknowledge of future things that
concern them. Thus ants foreknow the coming rains, which is evident
from their gathering grain into their nest before the rain commences;
and in like manner fish foreknow a coming storm, as may be gathered
from their movements in avoiding places exposed to storm. Much more
therefore can men foreknow the future that concerns themselves, and of
such things is prophecy. Therefore prophecy comes from nature.
Objection 4: Further, it is written (Prov. 29:18): "When prophecy shall
fail, the people shall be scattered abroad"; wherefore it is evident
that prophecy is necessary for the stability of the human race. Now
"nature does not fail in necessaries" [*Aristotle, de Anima iii, 9].
Therefore it seems that prophecy is from nature.
On the contrary, It is written (2 Pet. 1:21): "For prophecy came not by
the will of man at any time, but the holy men of God spoke, inspired by
the Holy Ghost. " Therefore prophecy comes not from nature, but through
the gift of the Holy Ghost.
I answer that, As stated above (Q[171], A[6], ad 2) prophetic
foreknowledge may regard future things in two ways: in one way, as they
are in themselves; in another way, as they are in their causes. Now, to
foreknow future things, as they are in themselves, is proper to the
Divine intellect, to Whose eternity all things are present, as stated
in the [3672]FP, Q[14], A[13]. Wherefore such like foreknowledge of the
future cannot come from nature, but from Divine revelation alone. On
the other hand, future things can be foreknown in their causes with a
natural knowledge even by man: thus a physician foreknows future health
or death in certain causes, through previous experimental knowledge of
the order of those causes to such effects. Such like knowledge of the
future may be understood to be in a man by nature in two ways. In one
way that the soul, from that which it holds, is able to foreknow the
future, and thus Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 13): "Some have
deemed the human soul to contain a certain power of divination. " This
seems to be in accord with the opinion of Plato [*Phaed. xxvii; Civit.
vi], who held that our souls have knowledge of all things by
participating in the ideas; but that this knowledge is obscured in them
by union with the body; yet in some more, in others less, according to
a difference in bodily purity. According to this it might be said that
men, whose souls are not much obscured through union with the body, are
able to foreknow such like future things by their own knowledge.
Against this opinion Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 13): "How is it
that the soul cannot always have this power of divination, since it
always wishes to have it? "
Since, however, it seems truer, according to the opinion of Aristotle,
that the soul acquires knowledge from sensibles, as stated in the
[3673]FP, Q[84], A[6], it is better to have recourse to another
explanation, and to hold that men have no such foreknowledge of the
future, but that they can acquire it by means of experience, wherein
they are helped by their natural disposition, which depends on the
perfection of a man's imaginative power, and the clarity of his
understanding.
Nevertheless this latter foreknowledge of the future differs in two
ways from the former, which comes through Divine revelation. First,
because the former can be about any events whatever, and this
infallibly; whereas the latter foreknowledge, which can be had
naturally, is about certain effects, to which human experience may
extend. Secondly, because the former prophecy is "according to the
unchangeable truth" [*[3674]Q[171], A[3], OBJ[1]], while the latter is
not, and can cover a falsehood. Now the former foreknowledge, and not
the latter, properly belongs to prophecy, because, as stated above
([3675]Q[171], A[3]), prophetic knowledge is of things which naturally
surpass human knowledge. Consequently we must say that prophecy
strictly so called cannot be from nature, but only from Divine
revelation.
Reply to Objection 1: When the soul is withdrawn from corporeal things,
it becomes more adapted to receive the influence of spiritual
substances [*Cf. FP, Q[88], A[4], ad 2], and also is more inclined to
receive the subtle motions which take place in the human imagination
through the impression of natural causes, whereas it is hindered from
receiving them while occupied with sensible things. Hence Gregory says
(Dial. iv, 26) that "the soul, at the approach of death, foresees
certain future things, by reason of the subtlety of its nature,"
inasmuch as it is receptive even of slight impressions. Or again, it
knows future things by a revelation of the angels; but not by its own
power, because according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 13), "if this
were so, it would be able to foreknow the future whenever it willed,"
which is clearly false.
Objection 2: Knowledge of the future by means of dreams, comes either
from the revelation of spiritual substances, or from a corporeal cause,
as stated above ([3676]Q[95], A[6]), when we were treating of
divination. Now both these causes are more applicable to a person while
asleep than while awake, because, while awake, the soul is occupied
with external sensibles, so that it is less receptive of the subtle
impressions either of spiritual substances, or even of natural causes;
although as regards the perfection of judgment, the reason is more
alert in waking than in sleeping.
Reply to Objection 3: Even dumb animals have no foreknowledge of future
events, except as these are foreknown in their causes, whereby their
imagination is moved more than man's, because man's imagination,
especially in waking, is more disposed according to reason than
according to the impression of natural causes. Yet reason effects much
more amply in man, that which the impression of natural causes effects
in dumb animals; and Divine grace by inspiring the prophecy assists man
still more.
Reply to Objection 4: The prophetic light extends even to the direction
of human acts; and in this way prophecy is requisite for the government
of a people, especially in relation to Divine worship; since for this
nature is not sufficient, and grace is necessary.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether prophetic revelation comes through the angels?
Objection 1: It would seem that prophetic revelation does not come
through the angels. For it is written (Wis. 7:27) that Divine wisdom
"conveyeth herself into holy souls," and "maketh the friends of God,
and the prophets. " Now wisdom makes the friends of God immediately.
Therefore it also makes the prophets immediately, and not through the
medium of the angels.
Objection 2: Further, prophecy is reckoned among the gratuitous graces.
But the gratuitous graces are from the Holy Ghost, according to 1 Cor.
12:4, "There are diversities of graces, but the same Spirit. " Therefore
the prophetic revelation is not made by means of an angel.
Objection 3: Further, Cassiodorus [*Prol. in Psalt. i] says that
prophecy is a "Divine revelation": whereas if it were conveyed by the
angels, it would be called an angelic revelation. Therefore prophecy is
not bestowed by means of the angels.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv): "Our glorious fathers
received Divine visions by means of the heavenly powers"; and he is
speaking there of prophetic visions. Therefore prophetic revelation is
conveyed by means of the angels.
I answer that, As the Apostle says (Rom. 13:1), "Things that are of God
are well ordered [*Vulg. : 'Those that are, are ordained of God. ']. " Now
the Divine ordering, according to Dionysius [*Coel. Hier. iv; Eccl.
Hier. v], is such that the lowest things are directed by middle things.
Now the angels hold a middle position between God and men, in that they
have a greater share in the perfection of the Divine goodness than men
have. Wherefore the Divine enlightenments and revelations are conveyed
from God to men by the angels. Now prophetic knowledge is bestowed by
Divine enlightenment and revelation. Therefore it is evident that it is
conveyed by the angels.
Reply to Objection 1: Charity which makes man a friend of God, is a
perfection of the will, in which God alone can form an impression;
whereas prophecy is a perfection of the intellect, in which an angel
also can form an impression, as stated in the [3677]FP, Q[111], A[1],
wherefore the comparison fails between the two.
Reply to Objection 2: The gratuitous graces are ascribed to the Holy
Ghost as their first principle: yet He works grace of this kind in men
by means of the angels.
Reply to Objection 3: The work of the instrument is ascribed to the
principal agent by whose power the instrument acts. And since a
minister is like an instrument, prophetic revelation, which is conveyed
by the ministry of the angels, is said to be Divine.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a natural disposition is requisite for prophecy?
Objection 1: It would seem that a natural disposition is requisite for
prophecy. For prophecy is received by the prophet according to the
disposition of the recipient, since a gloss of Jerome on Amos 1:2, "The
Lord will roar from Sion," says: "Anyone who wishes to make a
comparison naturally turns to those things of which he has experience,
and among which his life is spent. For example, sailors compare their
enemies to the winds, and their losses to a shipwreck. In like manner
Amos, who was a shepherd, likens the fear of God to that which is
inspired by the lion's roar. " Now that which is received by a thing
according to the mode of the recipient requires a natural disposition.
Therefore prophecy requires a natural disposition.
Objection 2: Further, the considerations of prophecy are more lofty
than those of acquired science. Now natural indisposition hinders the
considerations of acquired science, since many are prevented by natural
indisposition from succeeding to grasp the speculations of science.
Much more therefore is a natural disposition requisite for the
contemplation of prophecy.
Objection 3: Further, natural indisposition is a much greater obstacle
than an accidental impediment. Now the considerations of prophecy are
hindered by an accidental occurrence. For Jerome says in his commentary
on Matthew [*The quotation is from Origen, Hom. vi in Num. ] that "at
the time of the marriage act, the presence of the Holy Ghost will not
be vouchsafed, even though it be a prophet that fulfils the duty of
procreation. " Much more therefore does a natural indisposition hinder
prophecy; and thus it would seem that a good natural disposition is
requisite for prophecy.
On the contrary, Gregory says in a homily for Pentecost (xxx in Ev. ):
"He," namely the Holy Ghost, "fills the boy harpist and makes him a
Psalmist; He fills the herdsman plucking wild figs, and makes him a
prophet. " Therefore prophecy requires no previous disposition, but
depends on the will alone of the Holy Ghost, of Whom it is written (1
Cor. 12:2): "All these things, one and the same Spirit worketh,
dividing to every one according as He will. "
I answer that, As stated above [3678](A[1]), prophecy in its true and
exact sense comes from Divine inspiration; while that which comes from
a natural cause is not called prophecy except in a relative sense. Now
we must observe that as God Who is the universal efficient cause
requires neither previous matter nor previous disposition of matter in
His corporeal effects, for He is able at the same instant to bring into
being matter and disposition and form, so neither does He require a
previous disposition in His spiritual effects, but is able to produce
both the spiritual effect and at the same time the fitting disposition
as requisite according to the order of nature. More than this, He is
able at the same time, by creation, to produce the subject, so as to
dispose a soul for prophecy and give it the prophetic grace, at the
very instant of its creation.
Reply to Objection 1: It matters not to prophecy by what comparisons
the thing prophesied is expressed; and so the Divine operation makes no
change in a prophet in this respect. Yet if there be anything in him
incompatible with prophecy, it is removed by the Divine power.
Reply to Objection 2: The considerations of science proceed from a
natural cause, and nature cannot work without a previous disposition in
matter. This cannot be said of God Who is the cause of prophecy.
Reply to Objection 3: A natural indisposition, if not removed, might be
an obstacle to prophetic revelation, for instance if a man were
altogether deprived of the natural senses. In the same way a man might
be hindered from the act of prophesying by some very strong passion,
whether of anger, or of concupiscence as in coition, or by any other
passion. But such a natural indisposition as this is removed by the
Divine power, which is the cause of prophecy.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a good life is requisite for prophecy?
Objection 1: It would seem that a good life is requisite for prophecy.
For it is written (Wis. 7:27) that the wisdom of God "through nations
conveyeth herself into holy souls," and "maketh the friends of God, and
prophets. " Now there can be no holiness without a good life and
sanctifying grace. Therefore prophecy cannot be without a good life and
sanctifying grace.
Objection 2: Further, secrets are not revealed save to a friend,
according to Jn. 15:15, "But I have called you friends, because all
things whatsoever I have heard of My Father, I have made known to you. "
Now God reveals His secrets to the prophets (Amos 3:7). Therefore it
would seem that the prophets are the friends of God; which is
impossible without charity. Therefore seemingly prophecy cannot be
without charity; and charity is impossible without sanctifying grace.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Mat. 7:15): "Beware of false
prophets, who come to you in the clothing of sheep, but inwardly they
are ravening wolves. " Now all who are without grace are likened
inwardly to a ravening wolf, and consequently all such are false
prophets. Therefore no man is a true prophet except he be good by
grace.
Objection 4: Further, the Philosopher says (De Somn. et Vigil. [*Cf. De
Divinat. per Somn. i, which is annexed to the work quoted]) that "if
interpretation of dreams is from God, it is unfitting for it to be
bestowed on any but the best. " Now it is evident that the gift of
prophecy is from God. Therefore the gift of prophecy is vouchsafed only
to the best men.
On the contrary, To those who had said, "Lord, have we not prophesied
in Thy name? " this reply is made: "I never knew you" (Mat. 7:22,23).
Now "the Lord knoweth who are His" (2 Tim. 2:19). Therefore prophecy
can be in those who are not God's by grace.
I answer that, A good life may be considered from two points of view.
First, with regard to its inward root, which is sanctifying grace.
Secondly, with regard to the inward passions of the soul and the
outward actions. Now sanctifying grace is given chiefly in order that
man's soul may be united to God by charity. Wherefore Augustine says
(De Trin. xv, 18): "A man is not transferred from the left side to the
right, unless he receive the Holy Ghost, by Whom he is made a lover of
God and of his neighbor. " Hence whatever can be without charity can be
without sanctifying grace, and consequently without goodness of life.
Now prophecy can be without charity; and this is clear on two counts.
First, on account of their respective acts: for prophecy pertains to
the intellect, whose act precedes the act of the will, which power is
perfected by charity. For this reason the Apostle (1 Cor. 13) reckons
prophecy with other things pertinent to the intellect, that can be had
without charity. Secondly, on account of their respective ends. For
prophecy like other gratuitous graces is given for the good of the
Church, according to 1 Cor. 12:7, "The manifestation of the Spirit is
given to every man unto profit"; and is not directly intended to unite
man's affections to God, which is the purpose of charity. Therefore
prophecy can be without a good life, as regards the first root of this
goodness.
If, however, we consider a good life, with regard to the passions of
the soul, and external actions, from this point of view an evil life is
an obstacle to prophecy. For prophecy requires the mind to be raised
very high in order to contemplate spiritual things, and this is
hindered by strong passions, and the inordinate pursuit of external
things. Hence we read of the sons of the prophets (4 Kings 4:38) that
they "dwelt together with [Vulg. : 'before']" Eliseus, leading a
solitary life, as it were, lest worldly employment should be a
hindrance to the gift of prophecy.
Reply to Objection 1: Sometimes the gift of prophecy is given to a man
both for the good of others, and in order to enlighten his own mind;
and such are those whom Divine wisdom, "conveying itself" by
sanctifying grace to their minds, "maketh the friends of God, and
prophets. " Others, however, receive the gift of prophecy merely for the
good of others. Hence Jerome commenting on Mat. 7:22, says: "Sometimes
prophesying, the working of miracles, and the casting out of demons are
accorded not to the merit of those who do these things, but either to
the invoking the name of Christ, or to the condemnation of those who
invoke, and for the good of those who see and hear. "
Reply to Objection 2: Gregory [*Hom. xxvii in Ev. ] expounding this
passage [*Jn. 15:15] says: "Since we love the lofty things of heaven as
soon as we hear them, we know them as soon as we love them, for to love
is to know. Accordingly He had made all things known to them, because
having renounced earthly desires they were kindled by the torches of
perfect love. " In this way the Divine secrets are not always revealed
to prophets.
Reply to Objection 3: Not all wicked men are ravening wolves, but only
those whose purpose is to injure others. For Chrysostom says [*Opus
Imperf. in Matth. , Hom. xix, among the works of St. John Chrysostom,
and falsely ascribed to him] that "Catholic teachers, though they be
sinners, are called slaves of the flesh, but never ravening wolves,
because they do not purpose the destruction of Christians. " And since
prophecy is directed to the good of others, it is manifest that such
are false prophets, because they are not sent for this purpose by God.
Reply to Objection 4: God's gifts are not always bestowed on those who
are simply the best, but sometimes are vouchsafed to those who are best
as regards the receiving of this or that gift. Accordingly God grants
the gift of prophecy to those whom He judges best to give it to.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether any prophecy comes from the demons?
Objection 1: It would seem that no prophecy comes from the demons. For
prophecy is "a Divine revelation," according to Cassiodorus [*Prol. in
Psalt.
