The report of the board of war had shown that there
were in captivity, at the commencement of the year, nearly
seventeen hundred men.
were in captivity, at the commencement of the year, nearly
seventeen hundred men.
Hamilton - 1834 - Life on Hamilton - v1
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? HAMILTON. 177
tensive prerogatives in his department, than it will be for
the good of the service to grant. I should be sorry to ex-
cite any prejudice against him on this account; perhaps I
may be mistaken in my conjecture. The caution I give
will do no harm, if I am; if I am not, it may be useful. In
either case, the Baron deserves to be considered as a valu-
able man, and treated with all the deference which good
policy will warrant.
On the first institution of this office, the General allowed
him to exercise more ample powers than would be proper
for a continuance. They were necessary in the commence-
ment; to put things in a train, with a degree of despatch
which the exigency of our affairs required; but it has been
necessary to restrain them, even earlier than was intended.
The novelty of the office excited questions about its boun-
daries; the extent of its operations alarmed the officers of
every rank for their own rights. Their jealousies and dis-
contents were rising fast to a height that threatened to
overturn the whole plan. It became necessary to apply a
remedy. The General has delineated the functions of the
inspectorship in general orders, a copy of which will be
sent to congress. The plan is good, and satisfactory to the
army in general.
It may be improved, but it will be unsafe to deviate es-
sentially from it. It is, of course, the General's intention
that whatever regulations are adopted by him, should un-
dergo the revision, and receive the sanction of congress;
but it is indispensable, in the present state of our army, that
he should have the power, from time to time, to introduce
and authorize the reformations necessary in our system.
It is a work which must be done by occasional and gradual
steps, and ought to be entrusted to a person on the spot,
who is thoroughly acquainted with all our defects, and has
judgment sufficient to adopt the progressive remedies they
require. The plan established by congress, on a report of
vol. i. 23
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? 178 THE LIFE OF
the Board of war, when Conway was appointed, appears to
me exceptionable in many respects. It makes the inspector
independent of the commander-in-chief; confers powers
which would produce universal opposition in the army, and,
by making the previous concurrence of the Board of war
requisite to the introduction of every regulation which should
be found necessary, opens such a continual source of delay
as would defeat the usefulness of the institution. Let the
commander-in-chief introduce, and the legislature after-
wards ratify or reject, as they shall think proper. Perhaps
you will not differ much from me, when I suppose, that so
far as relates to the Board of war, the former scheme was
a brat of faction, and therefore ought to be renounced.
There is one thing which the Baron has much at heart,
which, in good policy, he can by no means be indulged in:
-- it is the power of enforcing that part of discipline, which
we understand by subordination, or an obedience to orders.
This power can only be properly lodged with the com-
mander-in-chief, and would inflame the whole army if put
into other hands. Each captain is vested with it in his
company, -- each colonel in his regiment, -- each general
in his particular command, -- and the commander-in-chief
in the whole.
When I began this letter, I did not intend to meddle with
any other subject than the Inspectorship; but one just
comes into my head, which appears to me of no small im-
portance. The goodness or force of an army depends as
, much, perhaps more, on the composition of the corps which
form it, as on its collective number. The composition is
good or bad, not only according to the quality of the men,
but in proportion to the completeness or incompleteness of
a corps in respect to numbers. A regiment, for instance,
with a full complement of officers, and fifty or sixty men,
is not half so good as a company with the same number of
men. A colonel will look upon such a command as un-
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? HAMILTON. 179
worthy his ambition, and will neglect and despise it; -- a
captain would pride himself in it, and take all the pains in
his power to bring it to perfection. In one case, we shall
see a total relaxation of discipline, and negligence of every
thing that constitutes military excellence; on the other,
there will be attention, energy, and every thing that can be
wished. Opinion, whether well or ill founded, is the go-
verning principle of human affairs. A corps much below
its establishment, comparing what it is, with what it ought
to be, loses all confidence in itself, and the whole army
loses that confidence and emulation which are essential to
success. These, and a thousand other things that will oc-
cur to you, make it evident, that the most important advan-
tages, attend the having complete corps, and proportional
disadvantages, the reverse. Ten thousand men, distributed
into twenty imperfect regiments, will not have the efficiency
of the same number, in half the number of regiments. The
fact is, with respect to the American army, that the want
of discipline, and other defects we labour under, are as
much owing to the skeleton state of our regiments, as to
any other cause. -- What then?
Have we any prospect of filling our regiments? My
opinion is, that we have nearly arrived to our ne plus ultra.
If so, we ought to reduce the number of corps, and give
them that substance and consistency which they want, by
incorporating them together, so as to bring them near their
establishment. By this measure, the army would be infi-
nitely improved, and the state would be saved the expense
of maintaining a number of superfluous officers.
In the present condition of our regiments, they are incapa-
ble even of performing their common exercises without join-
ing two or more together, -- an expedient reluctantly sub-
mitted to by those officers who see themselves made second
in command of a battalion, instead of first, as their com-
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? 180 THE LIFE OP
mission imports, which happens to every younger colonel
whose regiment is united with that of an elder.
What would be the inconveniences, while the officers
who remain in command, and who might be selected from
the others on account of superior merit, would applaud
themselves in the preference given them, and rejoice at a
change which confers such additional consequence on them-
selves?
Those who should be excluded by the measure, would
return home discontented, artd make a noise, which would
soon subside and be forgotten among matters of greater
moment. To quiet them still more effectually, if it should
be thought necessary, they might be put upon half-pay for
a certain time.
If on considering this matter, you should agree with me
in sentiment, it were to be wished the scheme could be im-
mediately adopted, while the arrangement now in hand is
still unexecuted. If it is made, it will be rather inconve-
nient immediately after to unhinge and throw the whole
system again afloat.
When you determined on your last arrangement, you did
not know what success the different states might have had
in drafting and recruiting. It would then have been impro-
per to reduce the number of corps, as proposed. We have
now seen their success; we have no prospect of seeing the
regiments filled; -- we should reduce them.
Believe me to be, with great esteem and regard,
Dear sir, your obedient servant,
A. Hamilton.
The measures here suggested were frequently brought
before the consideration of congress, and various steps were
taken to remedy the evil; but the reduction of the army,
always difficult and embarrassing, especially in popular go-
vernments, required great deliberation in a war where too
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? HAMILTON. 181
often the caprices of individuals were unavoidably more con-
sulted, than the public interest.
The proposed limitation of the office of Inspector-general
was made, and among his papers a draft of a plan for that
department of the army, exists in Hamilton's hand-writing.
It was proposed to congress by General Washington, in
lieu of the system which had been framed in 1777, and was
adopted in part on the fifth of May, 1778.
This plan proposed the establishment of one inspector-
general, six deputy inspector-generals, and one inspector
to each brigade; defined the duties of the office, rendering
it subordinate to congress, to the board of war, and to the
commander-in-chief, at the head of which it was proposed
to place Baron Steuben, and also to introduce into it Gene-
ral Cadwallader and Colonel Fleming. Of the former of
whom, it is remarked in a letter from Washington, "that he
is a military genius, of a decisive and independent spirit,
properly impressed with the necessity of order and disci-
pline, and of sufficient vigour to enforce it. He would soon
perfect himself in the practical part, and be fit to suc-
ceed to the first place in the department. " Of Colonel Fle-
ming, who has been previously mentioned as the early in-
structer of Hamilton, it is observed, "he is an excellent dis-
ciplinarian, and from long practice in the British army, has
acquired the necessary knowledge. " The military arrange-
ments were soon after improved, by the better organization
of the armoury department, and measures taken connected
with the corps of cavalry, at the head of which it was sub-
sequently* proposed to place General Cadwallader.
In effecting the contemplated change in the inspector-
general's department, "the fondness for importance," of
which Hamilton speaks, in his letter to Mr. Duer, as a trait
of Steuben, was the source of many a disquietude, for the
* September 7th, 1778.
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? 182 THE LIFE OF
Baron was too valuable to be offended, and too sensitive to
be easily satisfied.
This petted veteran has been much misunderstood. He
has been regarded as the type of a race now gone by. It
has been supposed that his mind was ever in the drill, that
he considered mankind as born for arms, and believed that
the business of society was war. But his character rose
far above that of a mere soldier. While in Paris, he was
invited by the Count St. Germains to visit America, as the
General most competent to organize an army. He arrived
in seventy-seven; and of the extent and value of his servi-
ces, the conduct of the troops at Monmouth is the best com-
mentary. His exertions were so successful, that at the close
of the war few countries could boast a better disciplined or
more serviceable corps than the American army. That he
stood high in the favour of the great Frederick, is a proof that
he was more than an ordinary man. His information was
various, his intellect active and comprehensive, his temper
energetic and decisive, his knowledge of men great, and in
ihe intercourse of life he showed himself an accomplished
gentleman. His disposition being generous and jovial, and
his conversation various and playful, he was fond of socie-
ty, of which he was a favourite, where a little proneness to
parade placed him sometimes too much in advance. But
his character had in it nothing repulsive or selfish; and amidst
all his imprudences, there shone forth many a gleam of the
warmest benevolence. Of Hamilton he became exceed-
ingly fond, who repaid this preference by every office of
friendship. Aware of his profusion, he became the volun-
teer trustee of his funds, and often would the old General,
smiling, declare -- "the Secretary of the Treasury is my
banker -- my Hamilton takes care of me, when he cannot
take care of himself. "
Another subject was at this time taken into serious con-
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? HAMILTON. 183
aideration, -- the policy to be adopted towards the numer-
ous Indians who threatened the frontier of the republic.
The reluctance of the United States to employ them as
auxiliaries, is among the most gratifying incidents in the
early history of the Revolution. But this disposition was
at last changed by the different policy of the enemy; and in
a report framed by Mr. Gouverneur Morris,* stating "that
unless they were employed with them, they would be em-
ployed against them," suggesting "that there is great reason
to believe that the novelty of their appearance in the field,
the circumstances of horror and affright which attend their
attack, will have a great effect upon the minds of men wholly
unacquainted with such an enemy," it is proposed that the
Southern Indians should be embodied under General Gist,
and the Oneidas employed as light troops -- among whom
Louis, a chief of considerable talent, was soon after commis-
sioned as colonel, and served with singular fidelity through-
out the war.
The pacific conduct of a large portion of the Mohawks,
had been chiefly attributable to General Schuyler. In the
reign of Queen Anne, his ancestor had been employed as su-
perintendent over this savage people, and he became so po-
pular, that his portrait was preserved among them with the
greatest care, and brought out at every important council
they held. This influence descended in the family; and du-
ring the fiercest moments of the contest, instances and mes-
sages of mutual kindness occurred. The wild imaginative
sensibility of this race clothed the person of Schuyler with
an almost supernatural sacredness; and it is a remarkable
fact, that on the very day on which Miss McCrea was mur-
dered, his wife and second daughter passed these hordes un-
molested. Even until the close of Schuyler's life, parties
are remembered to have been seen encamping near his
* February 20th, 1778.
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? 184 THE LIFE OF
residence at Albany, preferring confident claims upon his
bounty, indulging in mimic representations of their savage
sports, and reminding him that he was descended from their
"Great Father Queedir. "
The rejection by congress of the conciliatory bills which
had been proposed by the British government, in conse-
quence of the state of our negotiations at Paris, was fol-
lowed by the arrival of Mr. Deane, with copies of the trea-
ties which had been concluded with France the preceding
winter.
The acknowledgement of our independence by the rival
of England, and the assurances of aid which were given,
was an event which, after the many delays that had been
interposed, elevated the hopes of the nation to the highest
point. Copies of the treaties were circulated by order of
congress -- a general thanksgiving was appointed -- and to
add to the effect, the army of Washington celebrated with
military pomp the alliance of the nations.
The spirit of exultation which followed the capture of
Burgoyne, though checked by the subsequent reverses of
the year, and by the distresses of the army through the
winter, again revived; and for a moment the country indul-
ged in the fond hope that their sufferings were now to end.
The provident mind of Washington took immediate alarm,
which a letter drawn up by Colonel Hamilton, in reply to
General Greene, strongly depicts.
WASHINGTON TO GREENE.
In answer to your favour of the third, I give it clearly
as my opinion, that no change has happened in our affairs,
which will justify the least relaxation in any of our military
preparations, and consequently, that the provisions you have
been, and are making in your department, ought to be con-
tinued in their fullest vigour and extent.
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? HAMILTON. 185
The intelligence from abroad is extremely favourable,
and affords us an earnest of success, with proper manage-
ment, but there is nothing in it that can make it prudent to
depart in the smallest degree from the exertion we should
otherwise have made. There may still be business enough
to call out our most strenuous efforts. Britain is a country
full of resources. Her interest and connexions in Europe
are great; an union within, under a popular administra-
tion, which a principle of common danger may produce,
would render her capable of great internal exertions.
The storm which now seems to be rising in Europe may
subside, and a compromise ensue between the contending
powers, from which a change in the system may result, very
advantageous to the views of our enemies. All these are
events which may happen; and which, if there were no
other considerations, would make it unwise to suffer our-
selves to be lulled into security, or to remit any endeavours
that may serve to put our military affairs upon the most
respectable footing possible.
But it is also to be remembered, that the British army in
America is still very considerable; and if collected, would
be formidable to all the force we should be able to oppose to
it. In all probability, it will either be withdrawn or assem-
bled at one point, for some vigorous and enterprising push,
if it were only to make the way for a negotiation. The for-
mer is more to be wished than expected. British pride
would never submit to it, but in the last extremity; and per-
haps we should flatter ourselves too much, to suppose that
extremity exists. If the latter should be the case, remissness
in our present preparations might be fatal; or at any rate,
could not fail to have a very injurious influence. The ene-
my might obtain successes which would have a most un-
happy operation upon the current of our sentiments at home,
and upon the progress of our negotiations and growing
friendships abroad.
vol. I. 24
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? 186 THE LIFE OF
If we had nothing to fear from any offensive operations of
the enemy, policy may require very extensive and important
offensive operations on our part, which will make it neces-
sary we should be prepared in the amplest manner at all
points.
In a word, in what manner so ever the remainder of the
contest is to be prosecuted, whether it is to depend upon
fighting or negotiation, a powerful army, well furnished
with every apparatus of war, will put it in our power to
meet all contingencies, with confidence and advantage, and
to pursue the true interests of these States, through any com-
bination of circumstances that shall present itself, with firm-
ness and decision.
Whether any or what change may happen in the local
situation of the army, in the approaching campaign, or what
disposition in your department may be requisite in conse-
quence, are matters which, for particular reasons, I cannot
yet determine. A council will soon be held, in which will
be decided a general plan of operations for the army. When
this is done, you will receive your instructions accordingly:
in the mean time, you will proceed in the plan already on
foot. With great esteem, I am, sir,
Your most obedient servant,
G. W.
These sentiments were repeatedly urged upon congress
by the commander-in-chief, and the utmost efforts were
made to check the growth of that supineness which, che-
rished by the false expectations of the country, threatened
the most alarming consequences.
Within a short time after the date of this letter, a nego-
tiation was again opened for the exchange of prisoners.
The report of the board of war had shown that there
were in captivity, at the commencement of the year, nearly
seventeen hundred men.
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? HAMILTON. 187
The treatment they received excited the utmost indig-
nation. During the summer the privates had been crowd-
ed into sugar houses, deprived of their clothing, kept on
short allowances, and debarred the privileges of being visit-
ed by an American commissary. During the winter, both
officers and men were confined in the provost guard, or in
prison-ships, enduring unparalleled rigour, and rapidly sink-
ing under privations and disease.
These circumstances operated strongly on the feelings
of the army. The negotiations which had failed were re-
newed, and, with the sanction of congress, it was deter-
mined to proceed to an exchange, without reference to
certain controverted points. With this view, on the fourth
of June Washington addressed the following letter to Co-
lonel Hamilton, paying him the gratifying compliment of
discretionary powers.
"SIR,
"Mr. Loring having been sent by Sir Henry Clinton to
meet Mr. Boudinot, or any other person appointed by me
for the purpose of effecting an exchange of prisoners, I
have therefore to desire you (Mr. Boudinot being absent)
to hear any proposals Mr. Loring may have to offer on this
subject, and to do definitively whatever may be necessary
towards the execution of a general exchange of prisoners;
and I do hereby assure you, that your proceedings in this
instance will be ratified by me.
G. Washington.
li. Col. Hamilton.
The mission was in part successful, and an exchange of
the prisoners in Philadelphia followed.
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? CHAPTER IX.
[1778. ]
While the United States, strengthened by an alliance
with France, were indulging the most sanguine anticipa-
tions of success, the British councils were full of embar-
rassment and uncertainty. Stimulated by hatred of their
great rival, they found their generous people again rushing
forward to lavish their treasures, and expend their blood
in a cause which the national sentiment had at first con-
demned; but how to achieve their object, or what new
system of warfare to adopt, which could promise a more
favourable result, was the great, the perplexing question.
It had been found that New-England was fully able to
cope with any aggression that might be made upon her.
The efforts in New-York, though more successful, had
secured a station for one army, but had resulted in the
capture of another. The campaign of the Jersies had
been little more than a mere marauding inroad, and the
possession of Philadelphia, after vast losses, without weak-
ening the confidence of the Americans in their eventual
success, had placed their enemy in a position to extricate
themselves from which, seemed to be the great object of
solicitude. Results, the obvious consequences of this mad
attempt to subjugate a people, who must be divided and
debased before they can be conquered, were attributed to
the incapacity of Sir William Howe; and, in the idle hope
that a new leader of her armies might better reward the
efforts of the nation, the command was confided to Sir
Henry Clinton.
The intelligence that a French armament was destined to
America, confirmed the purpose which had long been enter-
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? 190 THI LIFE OF
tained of surrendering the prize of the last campaign, and
concentrating the whole strength at New-York, there to
await such a plan of operations as future events should
develope.
The increased and augmenting force of the Americans,
rendered their position in a city without works, and incapa-
ble of being fortified, extremely perilous. Subsistence for
the army becoming daily more difficult of attainment,
which a blockade of the Delaware, by a French fleet, would
entirely intercept, and the effective strength which on its
embarkation in the preceding year had reached nearly
eighteen thousand men, notwithstanding the reinforcements
in the autumn, was reduced by losses and desertions to little
more than eleven thousand.
What would be the future operations of the enemy, be-
came now the interesting problem with the Americans.
By many it was supposed that the threatened danger of
their West India possessions would be seized, as a pretext
to withdraw from the United States, which was counte-
nanced by the evacuation of the Fort's Lee* and Washing-
ton, and by the reduced number of the troops in New-
York, now amounting only to six thousand three hundred
men. By others, an attempt on the Highlands was expect-
ed; but this belief, the inadequacy of the force in Canada,
necessary to co-operate, did not justify: Washington mean-
while had ascertained! their purposes, and hoped to crush
them by a decisive blow.
* May 21st, 1778.
t The most active surveillance was kept up at this time as to the movements
of the British army. This duty was especially confided to Captain Allan
McLane, who rendered invaluable services by his zeal, intelligence, and
activity. The following is a letter addressed to him by Colonel Laurens.
Head-duarters, May 26th, 1778.
sir:
I have received your letter and communicated its contents to his excellency.
Intelligence becomes every moment more interesting. The grand fact of the
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? HAMILTON. 191
The British army broke up from their encampment on
the eighteenth of June, and proceeding down the Delaware,
landed in New-Jersey, at Gloucester, and on the same day
marched to Haddonsfield. As soon as this information
reached head-quarters, the commander-in-chief having de-
tached General Dickinson to collect the Jersey militia,
who had received orders from Governor Livingston, al-
ways zealous and on the alert, to hold themselves in imme-
diate readiness, and having commanded General Maxwell
to follow the route of the enemy, convened a council of
war to decide upon the plan of operations. At this council
it was determined by a majority of its members to avoid
either a general or partial engagement in opposition to
the sentiments of Greene, Wayne and Cadwallader, who
urged the opinion, that their true policy was to harass the
enemy on their retreat, and without an unnecessary ex-
posure of the army to seize the first opportunity of bringing
on an engagement.
The opinion of General Lee, who was particularly stre-
nuous in opposing an attack, and whose reputation for mili-
tary experience gave it a preponderating weight, caused
enemy's design to evacuate the city being ascertained, no pains should be
spared to discover, if possible, the precise moment when the event is to take
place, and the route which their army will pursue ; whether they mean to
cross the Delaware and march through Jersey, or cross the Schuylkill and
march down to Chester, to embark there, on account of the tedious navigation
through the chevaux-de-frize, and because they may cover their real march by
a pretended attempt on this army. Endeavour to discover the number of
transports, their situation on the river; as well as that of the ships-of-war.
whether the horses that have been embarked were really dragoon horses, or
only those that are superfluous, as their heavy artillery and baggage is em-
barked, and they would march as light as possible through Jersies, provided
they go that way. What are the bridge-boats that you speak of? do you
mean those that may be put together for facilitating the embarkation on board
the transports? His excellency desires if you have sufficient ground for
suspecting , that you will immediately secure them and send them to
camp. "
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? 192 THE LIFE OF
great offence to the personal friends of Washington. He
not only urged the impolicy of active operations, but endeav-
oured to sustain it on grounds extremely mortifying to the
pride of the American army.
Colonel Hamilton, whose ardour for battle was fully sup-
ported by a sense of duty, in an eulogium which he pronoun-
ced upon General Greene, thus expressed himself in refer-
ence to this determination.
"I forbear to lift the veil from off those impotent councils,
which by a formal vote had decreed an undisturbed passage
to an enemy retiring from the fairest fruits of his victories,
to seek an asylum from impending danger, disheartened by
retreat, dispirited by desertion, broken by fatigue ;-- re-
treating through woods, denies, and morasses, in which his
discipline was useless, in the face of an army superior in
numbers, elated by pursuit, and ardent to signalize their
courage. 'Tis enough for the honour of Greene to say, that
he left nothing unessayed to avert and to frustrate so degra-
ding a resolution; and it was happy for America, that the
man whose reputation could not be wounded without
wounding the cause of his country, had the noble fortitude
to rescue himself and the army he commanded from the
disgrace with which they were both menaced, by the cha-
racteristic imbecility of a council of war. "
The first movements of Sir Henry Clinton, rendering it
doubtful which course he proposed to take, Washington, em-
barrassed by the decision of the council, and yet unwilling
to assume the responsibility of precipitating an engagement,
took a circuitous route, by which he reached Hopewell, a
place about five miles from Princeton, about noon of the
twenty-third of June, where he halted until the morning of the
twenty-fifth, having detached a small force under Arnold to
take possession of Philadelphia. Meanwhile the enemy,
with Dickinson and Maxwell harassing their left, and Gene-
ral Cadwallader and Colonel Morgan annoying their rear
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? HAMILTON. 193
and right flank, gained the vicinity of Allentown. A letter
written by Hamilton, by the orders of General Washington,
to Cadwallader, from this point, explains the delay of the
army, which has been the subject of animadversion.
"DEAR SIR,
"I have just receivedyours this day from the Draw Bridge.
The army marched this morning to this place. It was my
intention to have taken post near Princeton; but finding the
enemy are dilatory in advancing, I am doubtful of the pro-
priety of proceeding any farther, till their intention is as-
certained. I wish you to inform me more particularly of
the obstructions which have been thrown in their way, that
I may be better able to judge whether their delay is owing
to necessity or choice. Any circumstance that may serve
to throw light upon this question, I shall be obliged to you
for, as it is of very great importance. If their delay is vo-
luntary, it argues a design to draw us into a general action,
and proves that they consider this to be a desirable event.
They may, perhaps, wish to draw us off from (he Delaware,
far to the left, and then by a rapid movement gain ovr right
flank and rear.
"I should be glad of your sentiments ful'y as to their pro-
bable designs, and the conduct which it will be most proper
for us to observe in consequence. You will be pleased to
continue to advise me punctually of every movement and
appearance of the enemy.
"Let me remind you of mentioning always (he hour at
which you write, which is of the greatest moment. "
"While the army was at this post, and Sir Henry Clinton
was balancing between the route to Staten Island, which
would expose him to the danger of crossing the Raritan with
an army in his rear, and that which, leading to Amboy by
way of Monmouth, gave him the advantage, if necessary,of
vol. i. 25
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? 194 THK LIFE Or
entrenching himself on the high grounds of Middletown,
Washington called a second council of general officers, in
which, supported by Greene, Wayne, and La Fayette, he
urged the policy of pursuing the enemy, and bringing on an
engagement before they could reach the eminences in their
front.
The former opinion, by the overruling influence of Lee,
still prevailed; and Washington was thus again placed in
the dilemma, either of assuming the responsibility of an at-
tack, or of subjecting himself to the imputation of pusillani-
mously sacrificing the opportunity, which the advantage of
the ground, and his superior force seemed to promise of a
decisive victory. As soon as the council had broken up,
Colonel Hamilton, anxious for the fame of his chief, and fear-
ing that he might yield to the perplexity of his situation,
called upon General Greene, and urged him to unite with
him in pressing Washington to force an engagement. As
they approached the General, sitting in his tent, he arose,
and said, " Gentlemen, I anticipate the object of your visit;
-- you wish me to fight. " Greene and Hamilton then reca-
pitulated the reasons which had been advanced in the
council; avowing it as their opinion, that if the British were
suffered to retreat unmolested, they were disgraced. --
Washington concurred, and an attack was decided upon.
Unable to induce the council to recede from their decision,
he succeeded in obtaining their assent to the detachment
of fifteen hundred men, under General Scott, to join the
corps on the left flank of the enemy. Even the strength of
this detachment was a subject of controversy; but the lion-
hearted Wayne, firmly resisting the idea of inactivity, refu-
sed to sign the resolutions of the council, and the point was
ultimately carried.
General Washington determined to take decisive mea-
sures. In pursuance of this purpose, Wayne was sent for-
ward with a thousand men to join the advanced corps,
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? HAMILTON. 195
now exceeding four thousand troops. The strength of this
body rendering it a command proper for a Major General,
and Lee yielding his priority, La Fayette was assigned to
it by Washington, with instructions to Colonel Hamilton
to accompany him, and aid in the execution of their design.
The orders pointed strongly to the junction of this de-
tachment, with the troops under Scott, to harass the ene-
my, impede their march, and if possible bring on an en-
gagement.
"As the detachment," observes the Marquis, "began to
march, Lee, hearing that his concession of the command
was viewed with surprise, came up to La Fayette, and
stating his feelings, said that to him he confided his ho-
nour. " The Marquis, too generous to resist this appeal,
assured him, that if no action occurred that day, and Gene-
ral Lee should come out with the next detachment, that he
would yield him the command.
Meanwhile the advanced detachment pushed forward to
Cranberry, from whence Hamilton writes on the twenty-
fifth, confirming the information that the enemy had filed
off from Allentown, to the heights of Monmouth, the posi-
tion it had been apprehended they would attain, and says,
"I recommend to you to move towards this place as soon as
the convenience of your men will permit. I am told that Co-
lonel Morgan is on the enemy's right flank:--we had a slight
skirmish with their rear this forenoon, on the Monmouth
road, leading from Allentown. " On the twenty-sixth, he
writes to General Washington, who had moved forward on
the evening of the twenty-fifth, and arrived at Cranberry
next morning.
HAMILTON TO WASHINGTON.
Robins' Tavern, 8 miles from Allentown, 12 o'clock.
"SIR,
"We have halted the troops at this place, eight miles from
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? 196 THE LIFE OF
Allentown. The enemy, by our last reports, were four
miles from this, and had passed the road which turns off
towards South Amboy, which determines their route to-
wards Shrewsbury. Our reason for halting is, the extreme
distress of the troops for want of provisions. General
Wayne's detachment is almost starving, and seem both un-
willing and unable to march till they are supplied. If we
do not receive an immediate supply, the whole purpose of
our detachment must be frustrated.
"On my arrival at Cranberry last evening, I proceeded, by
desire of General the Marquis, immediately to Hyde's
Town and Allentown, to take measures for co-operating
with the different parts of the detachments, and to find what
was doing to procure intelligence. I found every precau-
tion neglected ; -- no horse was near the enemy, or could
be heard of till late in the morning; so that before we could
send out parties, and get the necessary information, they
were in full march, and as they have marched pretty expe-
ditiously, we should not be able to come up with them
during the day, even if we did not suffer the impediment we
do on the score of provisions.
"We are entirely at a loss where the army is, which is
no inconsiderable check to our enterprise. If the army is
wholly out of supporting distance, we risk the total loss of
the detachment in making an attack. If the army will
countenance us, we may do something clever. We feel
our personal honour, as well as the honour of the army and
the good of the service, interested, and are heartily desirous
to attempt whatever the disposition of our men will second,
and prudence authorize. It is evident, the enemy wish to
avoid, not to engage us. An officer is just come in, who
informs he left the enemy's force near five miles off, still in
march. To ascertain more fully their route, I have order-
ed a fresh party on their left, and towards the head of their
column. They have three brigades in rear of their bag-
gage"
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? HAMILTON. 197
In the after part of the same day he again writes to Ge-
neral Washington, who, at the head of the main body, was
detained at Cranberry by a heavy storm.
HAMILTON TO "WASHINGTON.
"SIR,
"The result of what I have seen and heard respecting the
enemy is, that they have encamped with their van a little
beyond Monmouth Court-House, and their rear at Mana-
lapans river, about seven miles from this place. Their
march to-day has been very judiciously conducted; their
baggage in front, and their flying army in the rear, with a
rear guard of one thousand men about four hundred paces
from the main body.
To attack them in this situation, without being supported
by the whole army, would be folly in the extreme. If it
should be thought advisable to give the necessary support,
the army can move to some position near the enemy's left
flank, which would put them in a very awkward situation,
with so respectable a body in their rear, and would put it
out of their power to turn either flank, should they be so
disposed.
? HAMILTON. 177
tensive prerogatives in his department, than it will be for
the good of the service to grant. I should be sorry to ex-
cite any prejudice against him on this account; perhaps I
may be mistaken in my conjecture. The caution I give
will do no harm, if I am; if I am not, it may be useful. In
either case, the Baron deserves to be considered as a valu-
able man, and treated with all the deference which good
policy will warrant.
On the first institution of this office, the General allowed
him to exercise more ample powers than would be proper
for a continuance. They were necessary in the commence-
ment; to put things in a train, with a degree of despatch
which the exigency of our affairs required; but it has been
necessary to restrain them, even earlier than was intended.
The novelty of the office excited questions about its boun-
daries; the extent of its operations alarmed the officers of
every rank for their own rights. Their jealousies and dis-
contents were rising fast to a height that threatened to
overturn the whole plan. It became necessary to apply a
remedy. The General has delineated the functions of the
inspectorship in general orders, a copy of which will be
sent to congress. The plan is good, and satisfactory to the
army in general.
It may be improved, but it will be unsafe to deviate es-
sentially from it. It is, of course, the General's intention
that whatever regulations are adopted by him, should un-
dergo the revision, and receive the sanction of congress;
but it is indispensable, in the present state of our army, that
he should have the power, from time to time, to introduce
and authorize the reformations necessary in our system.
It is a work which must be done by occasional and gradual
steps, and ought to be entrusted to a person on the spot,
who is thoroughly acquainted with all our defects, and has
judgment sufficient to adopt the progressive remedies they
require. The plan established by congress, on a report of
vol. i. 23
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? 178 THE LIFE OF
the Board of war, when Conway was appointed, appears to
me exceptionable in many respects. It makes the inspector
independent of the commander-in-chief; confers powers
which would produce universal opposition in the army, and,
by making the previous concurrence of the Board of war
requisite to the introduction of every regulation which should
be found necessary, opens such a continual source of delay
as would defeat the usefulness of the institution. Let the
commander-in-chief introduce, and the legislature after-
wards ratify or reject, as they shall think proper. Perhaps
you will not differ much from me, when I suppose, that so
far as relates to the Board of war, the former scheme was
a brat of faction, and therefore ought to be renounced.
There is one thing which the Baron has much at heart,
which, in good policy, he can by no means be indulged in:
-- it is the power of enforcing that part of discipline, which
we understand by subordination, or an obedience to orders.
This power can only be properly lodged with the com-
mander-in-chief, and would inflame the whole army if put
into other hands. Each captain is vested with it in his
company, -- each colonel in his regiment, -- each general
in his particular command, -- and the commander-in-chief
in the whole.
When I began this letter, I did not intend to meddle with
any other subject than the Inspectorship; but one just
comes into my head, which appears to me of no small im-
portance. The goodness or force of an army depends as
, much, perhaps more, on the composition of the corps which
form it, as on its collective number. The composition is
good or bad, not only according to the quality of the men,
but in proportion to the completeness or incompleteness of
a corps in respect to numbers. A regiment, for instance,
with a full complement of officers, and fifty or sixty men,
is not half so good as a company with the same number of
men. A colonel will look upon such a command as un-
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? HAMILTON. 179
worthy his ambition, and will neglect and despise it; -- a
captain would pride himself in it, and take all the pains in
his power to bring it to perfection. In one case, we shall
see a total relaxation of discipline, and negligence of every
thing that constitutes military excellence; on the other,
there will be attention, energy, and every thing that can be
wished. Opinion, whether well or ill founded, is the go-
verning principle of human affairs. A corps much below
its establishment, comparing what it is, with what it ought
to be, loses all confidence in itself, and the whole army
loses that confidence and emulation which are essential to
success. These, and a thousand other things that will oc-
cur to you, make it evident, that the most important advan-
tages, attend the having complete corps, and proportional
disadvantages, the reverse. Ten thousand men, distributed
into twenty imperfect regiments, will not have the efficiency
of the same number, in half the number of regiments. The
fact is, with respect to the American army, that the want
of discipline, and other defects we labour under, are as
much owing to the skeleton state of our regiments, as to
any other cause. -- What then?
Have we any prospect of filling our regiments? My
opinion is, that we have nearly arrived to our ne plus ultra.
If so, we ought to reduce the number of corps, and give
them that substance and consistency which they want, by
incorporating them together, so as to bring them near their
establishment. By this measure, the army would be infi-
nitely improved, and the state would be saved the expense
of maintaining a number of superfluous officers.
In the present condition of our regiments, they are incapa-
ble even of performing their common exercises without join-
ing two or more together, -- an expedient reluctantly sub-
mitted to by those officers who see themselves made second
in command of a battalion, instead of first, as their com-
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? 180 THE LIFE OP
mission imports, which happens to every younger colonel
whose regiment is united with that of an elder.
What would be the inconveniences, while the officers
who remain in command, and who might be selected from
the others on account of superior merit, would applaud
themselves in the preference given them, and rejoice at a
change which confers such additional consequence on them-
selves?
Those who should be excluded by the measure, would
return home discontented, artd make a noise, which would
soon subside and be forgotten among matters of greater
moment. To quiet them still more effectually, if it should
be thought necessary, they might be put upon half-pay for
a certain time.
If on considering this matter, you should agree with me
in sentiment, it were to be wished the scheme could be im-
mediately adopted, while the arrangement now in hand is
still unexecuted. If it is made, it will be rather inconve-
nient immediately after to unhinge and throw the whole
system again afloat.
When you determined on your last arrangement, you did
not know what success the different states might have had
in drafting and recruiting. It would then have been impro-
per to reduce the number of corps, as proposed. We have
now seen their success; we have no prospect of seeing the
regiments filled; -- we should reduce them.
Believe me to be, with great esteem and regard,
Dear sir, your obedient servant,
A. Hamilton.
The measures here suggested were frequently brought
before the consideration of congress, and various steps were
taken to remedy the evil; but the reduction of the army,
always difficult and embarrassing, especially in popular go-
vernments, required great deliberation in a war where too
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? HAMILTON. 181
often the caprices of individuals were unavoidably more con-
sulted, than the public interest.
The proposed limitation of the office of Inspector-general
was made, and among his papers a draft of a plan for that
department of the army, exists in Hamilton's hand-writing.
It was proposed to congress by General Washington, in
lieu of the system which had been framed in 1777, and was
adopted in part on the fifth of May, 1778.
This plan proposed the establishment of one inspector-
general, six deputy inspector-generals, and one inspector
to each brigade; defined the duties of the office, rendering
it subordinate to congress, to the board of war, and to the
commander-in-chief, at the head of which it was proposed
to place Baron Steuben, and also to introduce into it Gene-
ral Cadwallader and Colonel Fleming. Of the former of
whom, it is remarked in a letter from Washington, "that he
is a military genius, of a decisive and independent spirit,
properly impressed with the necessity of order and disci-
pline, and of sufficient vigour to enforce it. He would soon
perfect himself in the practical part, and be fit to suc-
ceed to the first place in the department. " Of Colonel Fle-
ming, who has been previously mentioned as the early in-
structer of Hamilton, it is observed, "he is an excellent dis-
ciplinarian, and from long practice in the British army, has
acquired the necessary knowledge. " The military arrange-
ments were soon after improved, by the better organization
of the armoury department, and measures taken connected
with the corps of cavalry, at the head of which it was sub-
sequently* proposed to place General Cadwallader.
In effecting the contemplated change in the inspector-
general's department, "the fondness for importance," of
which Hamilton speaks, in his letter to Mr. Duer, as a trait
of Steuben, was the source of many a disquietude, for the
* September 7th, 1778.
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? 182 THE LIFE OF
Baron was too valuable to be offended, and too sensitive to
be easily satisfied.
This petted veteran has been much misunderstood. He
has been regarded as the type of a race now gone by. It
has been supposed that his mind was ever in the drill, that
he considered mankind as born for arms, and believed that
the business of society was war. But his character rose
far above that of a mere soldier. While in Paris, he was
invited by the Count St. Germains to visit America, as the
General most competent to organize an army. He arrived
in seventy-seven; and of the extent and value of his servi-
ces, the conduct of the troops at Monmouth is the best com-
mentary. His exertions were so successful, that at the close
of the war few countries could boast a better disciplined or
more serviceable corps than the American army. That he
stood high in the favour of the great Frederick, is a proof that
he was more than an ordinary man. His information was
various, his intellect active and comprehensive, his temper
energetic and decisive, his knowledge of men great, and in
ihe intercourse of life he showed himself an accomplished
gentleman. His disposition being generous and jovial, and
his conversation various and playful, he was fond of socie-
ty, of which he was a favourite, where a little proneness to
parade placed him sometimes too much in advance. But
his character had in it nothing repulsive or selfish; and amidst
all his imprudences, there shone forth many a gleam of the
warmest benevolence. Of Hamilton he became exceed-
ingly fond, who repaid this preference by every office of
friendship. Aware of his profusion, he became the volun-
teer trustee of his funds, and often would the old General,
smiling, declare -- "the Secretary of the Treasury is my
banker -- my Hamilton takes care of me, when he cannot
take care of himself. "
Another subject was at this time taken into serious con-
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? HAMILTON. 183
aideration, -- the policy to be adopted towards the numer-
ous Indians who threatened the frontier of the republic.
The reluctance of the United States to employ them as
auxiliaries, is among the most gratifying incidents in the
early history of the Revolution. But this disposition was
at last changed by the different policy of the enemy; and in
a report framed by Mr. Gouverneur Morris,* stating "that
unless they were employed with them, they would be em-
ployed against them," suggesting "that there is great reason
to believe that the novelty of their appearance in the field,
the circumstances of horror and affright which attend their
attack, will have a great effect upon the minds of men wholly
unacquainted with such an enemy," it is proposed that the
Southern Indians should be embodied under General Gist,
and the Oneidas employed as light troops -- among whom
Louis, a chief of considerable talent, was soon after commis-
sioned as colonel, and served with singular fidelity through-
out the war.
The pacific conduct of a large portion of the Mohawks,
had been chiefly attributable to General Schuyler. In the
reign of Queen Anne, his ancestor had been employed as su-
perintendent over this savage people, and he became so po-
pular, that his portrait was preserved among them with the
greatest care, and brought out at every important council
they held. This influence descended in the family; and du-
ring the fiercest moments of the contest, instances and mes-
sages of mutual kindness occurred. The wild imaginative
sensibility of this race clothed the person of Schuyler with
an almost supernatural sacredness; and it is a remarkable
fact, that on the very day on which Miss McCrea was mur-
dered, his wife and second daughter passed these hordes un-
molested. Even until the close of Schuyler's life, parties
are remembered to have been seen encamping near his
* February 20th, 1778.
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? 184 THE LIFE OF
residence at Albany, preferring confident claims upon his
bounty, indulging in mimic representations of their savage
sports, and reminding him that he was descended from their
"Great Father Queedir. "
The rejection by congress of the conciliatory bills which
had been proposed by the British government, in conse-
quence of the state of our negotiations at Paris, was fol-
lowed by the arrival of Mr. Deane, with copies of the trea-
ties which had been concluded with France the preceding
winter.
The acknowledgement of our independence by the rival
of England, and the assurances of aid which were given,
was an event which, after the many delays that had been
interposed, elevated the hopes of the nation to the highest
point. Copies of the treaties were circulated by order of
congress -- a general thanksgiving was appointed -- and to
add to the effect, the army of Washington celebrated with
military pomp the alliance of the nations.
The spirit of exultation which followed the capture of
Burgoyne, though checked by the subsequent reverses of
the year, and by the distresses of the army through the
winter, again revived; and for a moment the country indul-
ged in the fond hope that their sufferings were now to end.
The provident mind of Washington took immediate alarm,
which a letter drawn up by Colonel Hamilton, in reply to
General Greene, strongly depicts.
WASHINGTON TO GREENE.
In answer to your favour of the third, I give it clearly
as my opinion, that no change has happened in our affairs,
which will justify the least relaxation in any of our military
preparations, and consequently, that the provisions you have
been, and are making in your department, ought to be con-
tinued in their fullest vigour and extent.
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? HAMILTON. 185
The intelligence from abroad is extremely favourable,
and affords us an earnest of success, with proper manage-
ment, but there is nothing in it that can make it prudent to
depart in the smallest degree from the exertion we should
otherwise have made. There may still be business enough
to call out our most strenuous efforts. Britain is a country
full of resources. Her interest and connexions in Europe
are great; an union within, under a popular administra-
tion, which a principle of common danger may produce,
would render her capable of great internal exertions.
The storm which now seems to be rising in Europe may
subside, and a compromise ensue between the contending
powers, from which a change in the system may result, very
advantageous to the views of our enemies. All these are
events which may happen; and which, if there were no
other considerations, would make it unwise to suffer our-
selves to be lulled into security, or to remit any endeavours
that may serve to put our military affairs upon the most
respectable footing possible.
But it is also to be remembered, that the British army in
America is still very considerable; and if collected, would
be formidable to all the force we should be able to oppose to
it. In all probability, it will either be withdrawn or assem-
bled at one point, for some vigorous and enterprising push,
if it were only to make the way for a negotiation. The for-
mer is more to be wished than expected. British pride
would never submit to it, but in the last extremity; and per-
haps we should flatter ourselves too much, to suppose that
extremity exists. If the latter should be the case, remissness
in our present preparations might be fatal; or at any rate,
could not fail to have a very injurious influence. The ene-
my might obtain successes which would have a most un-
happy operation upon the current of our sentiments at home,
and upon the progress of our negotiations and growing
friendships abroad.
vol. I. 24
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? 186 THE LIFE OF
If we had nothing to fear from any offensive operations of
the enemy, policy may require very extensive and important
offensive operations on our part, which will make it neces-
sary we should be prepared in the amplest manner at all
points.
In a word, in what manner so ever the remainder of the
contest is to be prosecuted, whether it is to depend upon
fighting or negotiation, a powerful army, well furnished
with every apparatus of war, will put it in our power to
meet all contingencies, with confidence and advantage, and
to pursue the true interests of these States, through any com-
bination of circumstances that shall present itself, with firm-
ness and decision.
Whether any or what change may happen in the local
situation of the army, in the approaching campaign, or what
disposition in your department may be requisite in conse-
quence, are matters which, for particular reasons, I cannot
yet determine. A council will soon be held, in which will
be decided a general plan of operations for the army. When
this is done, you will receive your instructions accordingly:
in the mean time, you will proceed in the plan already on
foot. With great esteem, I am, sir,
Your most obedient servant,
G. W.
These sentiments were repeatedly urged upon congress
by the commander-in-chief, and the utmost efforts were
made to check the growth of that supineness which, che-
rished by the false expectations of the country, threatened
the most alarming consequences.
Within a short time after the date of this letter, a nego-
tiation was again opened for the exchange of prisoners.
The report of the board of war had shown that there
were in captivity, at the commencement of the year, nearly
seventeen hundred men.
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? HAMILTON. 187
The treatment they received excited the utmost indig-
nation. During the summer the privates had been crowd-
ed into sugar houses, deprived of their clothing, kept on
short allowances, and debarred the privileges of being visit-
ed by an American commissary. During the winter, both
officers and men were confined in the provost guard, or in
prison-ships, enduring unparalleled rigour, and rapidly sink-
ing under privations and disease.
These circumstances operated strongly on the feelings
of the army. The negotiations which had failed were re-
newed, and, with the sanction of congress, it was deter-
mined to proceed to an exchange, without reference to
certain controverted points. With this view, on the fourth
of June Washington addressed the following letter to Co-
lonel Hamilton, paying him the gratifying compliment of
discretionary powers.
"SIR,
"Mr. Loring having been sent by Sir Henry Clinton to
meet Mr. Boudinot, or any other person appointed by me
for the purpose of effecting an exchange of prisoners, I
have therefore to desire you (Mr. Boudinot being absent)
to hear any proposals Mr. Loring may have to offer on this
subject, and to do definitively whatever may be necessary
towards the execution of a general exchange of prisoners;
and I do hereby assure you, that your proceedings in this
instance will be ratified by me.
G. Washington.
li. Col. Hamilton.
The mission was in part successful, and an exchange of
the prisoners in Philadelphia followed.
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? CHAPTER IX.
[1778. ]
While the United States, strengthened by an alliance
with France, were indulging the most sanguine anticipa-
tions of success, the British councils were full of embar-
rassment and uncertainty. Stimulated by hatred of their
great rival, they found their generous people again rushing
forward to lavish their treasures, and expend their blood
in a cause which the national sentiment had at first con-
demned; but how to achieve their object, or what new
system of warfare to adopt, which could promise a more
favourable result, was the great, the perplexing question.
It had been found that New-England was fully able to
cope with any aggression that might be made upon her.
The efforts in New-York, though more successful, had
secured a station for one army, but had resulted in the
capture of another. The campaign of the Jersies had
been little more than a mere marauding inroad, and the
possession of Philadelphia, after vast losses, without weak-
ening the confidence of the Americans in their eventual
success, had placed their enemy in a position to extricate
themselves from which, seemed to be the great object of
solicitude. Results, the obvious consequences of this mad
attempt to subjugate a people, who must be divided and
debased before they can be conquered, were attributed to
the incapacity of Sir William Howe; and, in the idle hope
that a new leader of her armies might better reward the
efforts of the nation, the command was confided to Sir
Henry Clinton.
The intelligence that a French armament was destined to
America, confirmed the purpose which had long been enter-
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? 190 THI LIFE OF
tained of surrendering the prize of the last campaign, and
concentrating the whole strength at New-York, there to
await such a plan of operations as future events should
develope.
The increased and augmenting force of the Americans,
rendered their position in a city without works, and incapa-
ble of being fortified, extremely perilous. Subsistence for
the army becoming daily more difficult of attainment,
which a blockade of the Delaware, by a French fleet, would
entirely intercept, and the effective strength which on its
embarkation in the preceding year had reached nearly
eighteen thousand men, notwithstanding the reinforcements
in the autumn, was reduced by losses and desertions to little
more than eleven thousand.
What would be the future operations of the enemy, be-
came now the interesting problem with the Americans.
By many it was supposed that the threatened danger of
their West India possessions would be seized, as a pretext
to withdraw from the United States, which was counte-
nanced by the evacuation of the Fort's Lee* and Washing-
ton, and by the reduced number of the troops in New-
York, now amounting only to six thousand three hundred
men. By others, an attempt on the Highlands was expect-
ed; but this belief, the inadequacy of the force in Canada,
necessary to co-operate, did not justify: Washington mean-
while had ascertained! their purposes, and hoped to crush
them by a decisive blow.
* May 21st, 1778.
t The most active surveillance was kept up at this time as to the movements
of the British army. This duty was especially confided to Captain Allan
McLane, who rendered invaluable services by his zeal, intelligence, and
activity. The following is a letter addressed to him by Colonel Laurens.
Head-duarters, May 26th, 1778.
sir:
I have received your letter and communicated its contents to his excellency.
Intelligence becomes every moment more interesting. The grand fact of the
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? HAMILTON. 191
The British army broke up from their encampment on
the eighteenth of June, and proceeding down the Delaware,
landed in New-Jersey, at Gloucester, and on the same day
marched to Haddonsfield. As soon as this information
reached head-quarters, the commander-in-chief having de-
tached General Dickinson to collect the Jersey militia,
who had received orders from Governor Livingston, al-
ways zealous and on the alert, to hold themselves in imme-
diate readiness, and having commanded General Maxwell
to follow the route of the enemy, convened a council of
war to decide upon the plan of operations. At this council
it was determined by a majority of its members to avoid
either a general or partial engagement in opposition to
the sentiments of Greene, Wayne and Cadwallader, who
urged the opinion, that their true policy was to harass the
enemy on their retreat, and without an unnecessary ex-
posure of the army to seize the first opportunity of bringing
on an engagement.
The opinion of General Lee, who was particularly stre-
nuous in opposing an attack, and whose reputation for mili-
tary experience gave it a preponderating weight, caused
enemy's design to evacuate the city being ascertained, no pains should be
spared to discover, if possible, the precise moment when the event is to take
place, and the route which their army will pursue ; whether they mean to
cross the Delaware and march through Jersey, or cross the Schuylkill and
march down to Chester, to embark there, on account of the tedious navigation
through the chevaux-de-frize, and because they may cover their real march by
a pretended attempt on this army. Endeavour to discover the number of
transports, their situation on the river; as well as that of the ships-of-war.
whether the horses that have been embarked were really dragoon horses, or
only those that are superfluous, as their heavy artillery and baggage is em-
barked, and they would march as light as possible through Jersies, provided
they go that way. What are the bridge-boats that you speak of? do you
mean those that may be put together for facilitating the embarkation on board
the transports? His excellency desires if you have sufficient ground for
suspecting , that you will immediately secure them and send them to
camp. "
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? 192 THE LIFE OF
great offence to the personal friends of Washington. He
not only urged the impolicy of active operations, but endeav-
oured to sustain it on grounds extremely mortifying to the
pride of the American army.
Colonel Hamilton, whose ardour for battle was fully sup-
ported by a sense of duty, in an eulogium which he pronoun-
ced upon General Greene, thus expressed himself in refer-
ence to this determination.
"I forbear to lift the veil from off those impotent councils,
which by a formal vote had decreed an undisturbed passage
to an enemy retiring from the fairest fruits of his victories,
to seek an asylum from impending danger, disheartened by
retreat, dispirited by desertion, broken by fatigue ;-- re-
treating through woods, denies, and morasses, in which his
discipline was useless, in the face of an army superior in
numbers, elated by pursuit, and ardent to signalize their
courage. 'Tis enough for the honour of Greene to say, that
he left nothing unessayed to avert and to frustrate so degra-
ding a resolution; and it was happy for America, that the
man whose reputation could not be wounded without
wounding the cause of his country, had the noble fortitude
to rescue himself and the army he commanded from the
disgrace with which they were both menaced, by the cha-
racteristic imbecility of a council of war. "
The first movements of Sir Henry Clinton, rendering it
doubtful which course he proposed to take, Washington, em-
barrassed by the decision of the council, and yet unwilling
to assume the responsibility of precipitating an engagement,
took a circuitous route, by which he reached Hopewell, a
place about five miles from Princeton, about noon of the
twenty-third of June, where he halted until the morning of the
twenty-fifth, having detached a small force under Arnold to
take possession of Philadelphia. Meanwhile the enemy,
with Dickinson and Maxwell harassing their left, and Gene-
ral Cadwallader and Colonel Morgan annoying their rear
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? HAMILTON. 193
and right flank, gained the vicinity of Allentown. A letter
written by Hamilton, by the orders of General Washington,
to Cadwallader, from this point, explains the delay of the
army, which has been the subject of animadversion.
"DEAR SIR,
"I have just receivedyours this day from the Draw Bridge.
The army marched this morning to this place. It was my
intention to have taken post near Princeton; but finding the
enemy are dilatory in advancing, I am doubtful of the pro-
priety of proceeding any farther, till their intention is as-
certained. I wish you to inform me more particularly of
the obstructions which have been thrown in their way, that
I may be better able to judge whether their delay is owing
to necessity or choice. Any circumstance that may serve
to throw light upon this question, I shall be obliged to you
for, as it is of very great importance. If their delay is vo-
luntary, it argues a design to draw us into a general action,
and proves that they consider this to be a desirable event.
They may, perhaps, wish to draw us off from (he Delaware,
far to the left, and then by a rapid movement gain ovr right
flank and rear.
"I should be glad of your sentiments ful'y as to their pro-
bable designs, and the conduct which it will be most proper
for us to observe in consequence. You will be pleased to
continue to advise me punctually of every movement and
appearance of the enemy.
"Let me remind you of mentioning always (he hour at
which you write, which is of the greatest moment. "
"While the army was at this post, and Sir Henry Clinton
was balancing between the route to Staten Island, which
would expose him to the danger of crossing the Raritan with
an army in his rear, and that which, leading to Amboy by
way of Monmouth, gave him the advantage, if necessary,of
vol. i. 25
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? 194 THK LIFE Or
entrenching himself on the high grounds of Middletown,
Washington called a second council of general officers, in
which, supported by Greene, Wayne, and La Fayette, he
urged the policy of pursuing the enemy, and bringing on an
engagement before they could reach the eminences in their
front.
The former opinion, by the overruling influence of Lee,
still prevailed; and Washington was thus again placed in
the dilemma, either of assuming the responsibility of an at-
tack, or of subjecting himself to the imputation of pusillani-
mously sacrificing the opportunity, which the advantage of
the ground, and his superior force seemed to promise of a
decisive victory. As soon as the council had broken up,
Colonel Hamilton, anxious for the fame of his chief, and fear-
ing that he might yield to the perplexity of his situation,
called upon General Greene, and urged him to unite with
him in pressing Washington to force an engagement. As
they approached the General, sitting in his tent, he arose,
and said, " Gentlemen, I anticipate the object of your visit;
-- you wish me to fight. " Greene and Hamilton then reca-
pitulated the reasons which had been advanced in the
council; avowing it as their opinion, that if the British were
suffered to retreat unmolested, they were disgraced. --
Washington concurred, and an attack was decided upon.
Unable to induce the council to recede from their decision,
he succeeded in obtaining their assent to the detachment
of fifteen hundred men, under General Scott, to join the
corps on the left flank of the enemy. Even the strength of
this detachment was a subject of controversy; but the lion-
hearted Wayne, firmly resisting the idea of inactivity, refu-
sed to sign the resolutions of the council, and the point was
ultimately carried.
General Washington determined to take decisive mea-
sures. In pursuance of this purpose, Wayne was sent for-
ward with a thousand men to join the advanced corps,
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? HAMILTON. 195
now exceeding four thousand troops. The strength of this
body rendering it a command proper for a Major General,
and Lee yielding his priority, La Fayette was assigned to
it by Washington, with instructions to Colonel Hamilton
to accompany him, and aid in the execution of their design.
The orders pointed strongly to the junction of this de-
tachment, with the troops under Scott, to harass the ene-
my, impede their march, and if possible bring on an en-
gagement.
"As the detachment," observes the Marquis, "began to
march, Lee, hearing that his concession of the command
was viewed with surprise, came up to La Fayette, and
stating his feelings, said that to him he confided his ho-
nour. " The Marquis, too generous to resist this appeal,
assured him, that if no action occurred that day, and Gene-
ral Lee should come out with the next detachment, that he
would yield him the command.
Meanwhile the advanced detachment pushed forward to
Cranberry, from whence Hamilton writes on the twenty-
fifth, confirming the information that the enemy had filed
off from Allentown, to the heights of Monmouth, the posi-
tion it had been apprehended they would attain, and says,
"I recommend to you to move towards this place as soon as
the convenience of your men will permit. I am told that Co-
lonel Morgan is on the enemy's right flank:--we had a slight
skirmish with their rear this forenoon, on the Monmouth
road, leading from Allentown. " On the twenty-sixth, he
writes to General Washington, who had moved forward on
the evening of the twenty-fifth, and arrived at Cranberry
next morning.
HAMILTON TO WASHINGTON.
Robins' Tavern, 8 miles from Allentown, 12 o'clock.
"SIR,
"We have halted the troops at this place, eight miles from
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? 196 THE LIFE OF
Allentown. The enemy, by our last reports, were four
miles from this, and had passed the road which turns off
towards South Amboy, which determines their route to-
wards Shrewsbury. Our reason for halting is, the extreme
distress of the troops for want of provisions. General
Wayne's detachment is almost starving, and seem both un-
willing and unable to march till they are supplied. If we
do not receive an immediate supply, the whole purpose of
our detachment must be frustrated.
"On my arrival at Cranberry last evening, I proceeded, by
desire of General the Marquis, immediately to Hyde's
Town and Allentown, to take measures for co-operating
with the different parts of the detachments, and to find what
was doing to procure intelligence. I found every precau-
tion neglected ; -- no horse was near the enemy, or could
be heard of till late in the morning; so that before we could
send out parties, and get the necessary information, they
were in full march, and as they have marched pretty expe-
ditiously, we should not be able to come up with them
during the day, even if we did not suffer the impediment we
do on the score of provisions.
"We are entirely at a loss where the army is, which is
no inconsiderable check to our enterprise. If the army is
wholly out of supporting distance, we risk the total loss of
the detachment in making an attack. If the army will
countenance us, we may do something clever. We feel
our personal honour, as well as the honour of the army and
the good of the service, interested, and are heartily desirous
to attempt whatever the disposition of our men will second,
and prudence authorize. It is evident, the enemy wish to
avoid, not to engage us. An officer is just come in, who
informs he left the enemy's force near five miles off, still in
march. To ascertain more fully their route, I have order-
ed a fresh party on their left, and towards the head of their
column. They have three brigades in rear of their bag-
gage"
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? HAMILTON. 197
In the after part of the same day he again writes to Ge-
neral Washington, who, at the head of the main body, was
detained at Cranberry by a heavy storm.
HAMILTON TO "WASHINGTON.
"SIR,
"The result of what I have seen and heard respecting the
enemy is, that they have encamped with their van a little
beyond Monmouth Court-House, and their rear at Mana-
lapans river, about seven miles from this place. Their
march to-day has been very judiciously conducted; their
baggage in front, and their flying army in the rear, with a
rear guard of one thousand men about four hundred paces
from the main body.
To attack them in this situation, without being supported
by the whole army, would be folly in the extreme. If it
should be thought advisable to give the necessary support,
the army can move to some position near the enemy's left
flank, which would put them in a very awkward situation,
with so respectable a body in their rear, and would put it
out of their power to turn either flank, should they be so
disposed.
