But, from what I recollect of it, congress have even de-
scended from the authority which the spirit of that act gives
them; while the particular states have no farther attended
to it, than as it suited their pretensions and convenience.
scended from the authority which the spirit of that act gives
them; while the particular states have no farther attended
to it, than as it suited their pretensions and convenience.
Hamilton - 1834 - Life on Hamilton - v1
Hamilton.
In a letter of the twenty-fifth of September, addressed to
Miss Schuyler, he thus adverts to this affecting story:
"Arnold, hearing of the plot being detected, immediately
fled to the enemy. I went in pursuit of him, but was much
too late; and could hardly regret the disappointment, when
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-20 04:05 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uva. x000275470 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? HAMILTON. 275
on my return, I saw an amiable woman, frantic with dis-
tress for the loss of a husband she tenderly loved, -- a trai-
tor to his country and to his fame, -- a disgrace to his con-
nexions ; it was the most affecting scene I ever was witness
to. She, for a considerable time, entirely lost herself. The
General went up to see her, and she upbraided him with
being in a plot to murder her child. One moment she raved,
another she melted into tears. Sometimes she pressed her
infant to her bosom, and lamented its fate, occasioned by
the imprudence of its father, in a manner that would have
pierced insensibility itself. All the sweetness of beauty, all
the loveliness of innocence, all the tenderness of a wife, and
all the fondness of a mother, showed themselves in her ap-
pearance and conduct. We have every reason to believe,
that she was entirely unacquainted with the plan, and that
the first knowledge of it, was when Arnold went to tell her
he must banish himself from his country and from her for-
ever. She instantly fell into a convulsion, and he left her
in that situation.
"This morning she is more composed. I paid her a visit,
and endeavoured to soothe her by every method in my pow-
er; though you may imagine she is not easily to be consoled.
Added to her other distresses, she is very apprehensive the
resentments of her country will fall upon her, (who is only
unfortunate,) for the guilt of her husband.
"I have tried to persuade her that her fears are ill found-
ed; but she will not be convinced. She received us in bed,
with every circumstance that would interest our sympathy,
and her sufferings were so eloquent, that I wished myself
her brother, to have a right to become her defender; -- as
it is, I have entreated her to enable me to give her proofs
of my friendship. Could I forgive Arnold for sacrificing his
honour, reputation, and duty, I could not forgive him for
acting a part that must have forfeited the esteem of so fine
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-20 04:05 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uva. x000275470 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 276 THE LIFE OF
a woman. At present, she almost forgets his crime in his
misfortunes; and her horror at the guilt of the traitor, is lost
in her love of the man. But a virtuous mind cannot long
esteem a base one, and time will make her despise, if it can-
not make her hate. "
One circumstance in this melancholy scene dwelt deep-
ly on the mind of Hamilton. It is that to which, in the
beautiful tribute of an eloquent female,* to the memory
of Andre, she most feelingly alludes, -- the manner of
his death. On the day of his execution, Hamilton thus
writes. f
"Poor Andre suffers to-day;--every thing that is amiable
in virtue, in fortitude, in delicate sentiment, and accom-
plished manners, pleads for him; but hard-hearted policy
calls for a sacrifice. He must die . I send you my
account of Arnold's affair, and to justify myself to your
sentiments, I must inform you, that I urged a compliance
with Andre's request to be shot, and I do not think it
would have had an ill effect, but some people are only
sensible to motives of policy, and sometimes, from a nar-
row disposition, mistake it.
"When Andre's tale comes to be told, and present resent-
ment is over, -- the refusing him the privilege of choosing
the manner of his death will be branded with too much
obstinacy.
"It was proposed to me to suggest to him the idea of
an exchange for Arnold; but I knew I should have for-
feited his esteem by doing it, and therefore declined it.
As a man of honour, he could not but reject it; and I
would not for the world have proposed to him a thing
which must have placed me in the unamiable light of sup-
posing him capable of a meanness, or of not feeling my-
self the impropriety of the measure. I confess to you, I
* Miss Seward. f Tappan, Oct. 2, 1780.
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-20 04:05 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uva. x000275470 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? HAMILTON. 277
had the weakness to value the esteem of a dying man, be-
cause I reverenced his merit. "*
The eloquent an! feeling narrative contained in these
letters, which does so much honour to the sentiments of their
author, is a just tribute to the character of the captive, and
to the temper of the army.
Andre, educated amidst a circle of devoted relatives,
and habitually indulging every ardent impulse of his gene-
rous nature, had torn himself from their reluctant arms to
win honour in the field. Commended to the notice of Sir
Henry Clinton, he rose fast in his esteem, and was often
selected for those delicate duties which serve to mitigate
the miseries of war.
In the performance of these, his deportment often formed
a strong contrast with that of his less polished brethren;
and such was the impression on the minds of those Ameri-
cans who had been prisoners, that when the news of this
event arrived, great as was the rejoicing at the detection
of the plot and the capture of the spy, every bosom swelled
with regret to learn that that spy was Andre.
Shocked as Hamilton was with the danger of this con-
spiracy, and his indignation heightened by the belief that
it was intended to reach the person of Washington, his ge-
* The following note was addressed by Andre to General Washington, on
the day previous to his execution.
Tappan, October 1, 1780.
"Buoyed above the terror of death, by the consciousness of a life devoted
to honourable pursuits, and stained with no action that can give me remorse,
I trust that the request I make to your excellency, at this serious period, and
which is to soften my last moments, will not be rejected.
"Sympathy towards a soldier, will surely induce your excellency, and a
military tribunal, to adapt the mode of my death to the feelings of a man of
honour.
"Let me hope, sir, if aught in my character impresses you with esteem to-
wards me, if aught in my misfortunes marks me as the victim of policy, and
not of resentment, I shall experience the operation of these feelings in your
breast, by being informed that I am not to die on a gibbet. "
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-20 04:05 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uva. x000275470 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 278 THE LIFE OF
nerous feelings, nevertheless, seemed wholly to take posses-
sion of him, and during all the period of Andre's confine-
ment and trial, he exhausted every Aeans to alleviate his
sufferings, and to withdraw him from the bitterness of his
reflections.
As soon as he was brought in, addressing to a much loved
friend the unnecessary request, he said, "Major Jackson,
I have learned that Andre was very kind to you when you
were a prisoner, will you not visit him? " Thus awakening
the sympathies of the army, he turned their resentment
upon the traitor, to whose criminal arts the British officer
had unhappily lent himself. The conduct of Andre's cap-
tors was the theme of honest pride, and every soldier in the
camp participated in their triumph; but when the day of
his execution came, he was followed only by the brigade on
duty, and with the exception of those officers who sur-
rounded the scaffold to soothe its victim, not an officer or
soldier was to be seen as a spectator. All retired to their
tents, exhibiting that delicacy and sensibility which became
the soldiers of such a cause.
It is, indeed, impossible to trace the annals of the revo-
lution without remarking the kind temper of the Americans
towards their enemies, and the happy commingling of the
heroic with the milder virtues, both in the army and in the
people.
Habituated to all the comforts, indeed luxuries, which
render the condition of the American commonalty an ob-
ject of envy among those of less happy regions, and free as
the wilderness which surrounded them, the aggravated pri-
vations that followed the march of war, -- aggravated by
the insolent bearing of an enemy, who threatened to visit
on them the calamities which their own nation had expe-
rienced in a former age, and avowed the dispossession of
the inhabitants, and the disherison of their progeny, as the
reward promised to the subjugation of rebels, -- amid ra-
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-20 04:05 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uva. x000275470 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? HAMILTON. 279
pine and devastation, when even congress felt it necessary
to advise the people to erect places of refuge in the forest,
far from their dwellings, for their aged parents, their chil-
dren, and their wives, yet whenever the instruments of
these evils fell into their hands, they are seen nursing their
wounds, fostering them amid their sufferings, and winning
them by their kindnesses to a detestation of the cause in
whieh they had embarked. In vain are sought instances of
cruelty to the enemy. It would have been too great a vio-
lation of public sentiment, and would have doomed its per-
petrators to infamy.
This virtue of a humane people, was followed by its re-
ward. The enemy lost more by desertion than by the
sword, especially among the mercenaries of the continent;
and thus the seeds of those kind feelings were planted in the
midst of war, which have drawn within the bosom of our
country, and linked to her institutions, the oppressed of
every other.
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-20 04:05 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uva. x000275470 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? ? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-20 04:05 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uva. x000275470 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? CHAPTER XII.
[1780. ]
During the series of events which have been related in
the preceding chapter, the mind of Hamilton, roused to the
great political questions which engaged so strongly the
public attention, though oppressed with the various labours
of his situation, to which the letters of his friends frequently
advert, turned with eager aptitude to an examination of
the defects of the existing government, and the remedies
which might be applied.
Mere military movements had become of secondary in-
terest; temporary expedients for the financial embarrass-
ments were sought in vain; and while the public press
was engaged in the discussion of transient questions, he
was looking with intense anxiety to the adoption of some
great and effectual mean by which the distresses of the
country might be reached at their sources.
From his first entrance into the public service, he felt
the necessity of a more energetic system; and it was ob-
jected to him then, as it has been since, that he looked
with too fearful an apprehension upon a government merely
federative and advisory.
An attempt, the most flagitious, was made on this ground,
to produce a breach between him and the commander-in-
chief, which was detected, exposed, and defied with a lofty
tone of conscious purity. *
The same sense of the public dangers, influenced in com-
mon the minds of Washington and Hamilton; and while
* The instrument was Doctor Gordon, author of the History of the Ame-
rican War.
vol. I. 36
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-20 04:05 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uva. x000275470 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 282 THE LIFE OF
the former in his addresses to congress was enforcing his
apprehensions with all the solemnity which the dignity of
his station authorized, the other, by letters to his friends,
and by personal solicitation, sought, within a more limited
sphere, to urge attention to this great object of his just and
honest solicitude. In a letter to Isaac Sears, with whom
his intimacy had been formed in the early struggles of New-
York, he thus expresses himself:
"I was much obliged to you, my dear sir, for the letter
which you did me the favour to write me since your return
to Boston. I am sorry to find that the same spirit of indif-
ference to public affairs prevails. It is necessary we should
rouse, and begin to do our business in earnest, or we shall
play a losing game. It is impossible the contest can be
much longer supported on the present footing. We must
have a government with more power. We must have a
tax in kind. We must have a foreign loan. We must
have a bank, on the true principles of a bank. We must
have an administration distinct from congress, and in the
hands of single men under their orders. We must, above
all things, have an army for the war, and an establishment
that will interest the officers in the service.
"Congress are deliberating on our military affairs; but I
apprehend their resolutions will be tinctured with the old
spirit. We seem to be proof against experience. They
will, however, recommend an army for the war, at least as
a primary object. All those who love their country, ought to
exert their influence in the states where they reside to de-
termine them to take up this object with energy. The states
must sink under the burden of temporary enlistments, and
the enemy will conquer us by degrees during the intervals
of our weakness.
"Clinlon is now said to be making a considerable detach-
ment to the southward. My fears are high, my hopes low.
We are told here, fbere is to be a congress of the neutral
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-20 04:05 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uva. x000275470 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? HAMILTON. 283
powers at the Hague, for mediating of peace. God send
it may be true. We want it; but if the idea goes abroad,
ten to one if we do not fancy the thing done, and fall into a
profound sleep, till the cannon of the enemy awaken us
next campaign. -- This is our national character. -- I am,
with great regard, dear sir, your most obedient servant,
A. Hamilton. "
On these measures he seemed, at this time, perpetually to
descant. Many of his letters have been lost, others cannot
be obtained; but in all that are known, his mind appeared
intent on the accomplishment of what he early foresaw could
alone save the country, -- a re-organization of the govern-
ment.
A letter written at this period, to his friend Duane, con-
tains a comprehensive view of the subjects which engrossed
his thoughts, and will give a clear insight into the character
of his mind.
In this will be seen, how early and how deeply he looked
into the wants of the country; and with what enlarged ideas
he projected a form of government, by which congress
should have complete sovereignty in all that relates to war,
peace, trade, and finance, and to the management of foreign
affairs; reserving merely to the states, that part of internal
police which relates to the rights of property and life among
individuals, and to raising money by internal taxes, -- the
distribution of the powers of the government into separate
departments, -- recruiting the army on a permanent esta-
blishment,--and an extensive and comprehensive system for
drawing out the resources of the country, and rendering
them most effectually applicable to its necessities.
The admirable perspicuity of his style, the extraordinary
faculty which he showed in what he terms " a hastily writ-
ten production," and when, as he says, "he is merely skim-
ming the surface," of comprehending in a summary of his
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-20 04:05 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uva. x000275470 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 284 THE LIFE OF
thoughts every particular essential to the developement of
them; but what will be especially observed, the ripeness of
his views, and that keen insight into the nature and opera-
tion of political institutions, which have given to his opinions
such an authoritative influence, are here strongly manifested.
He not only suggests the adoption of many of the leading
measures which were soon after introduced, but points to a
convention of the states, for the creation of a federal
constitution; suggests the mode of enforcing its necessity
on the minds of the people, by "sensible and popular wri-
tings;" thus hinting at the idea which gave birth to the "Fe-
deralist," and unfolding some of those far-reaching views of
national polity, which are there more fully developed.
COLONEL HAMILTON TO THE HON. JAMES DUANE.
Liberty Pole, 1780.
DEAR SIR,
Agreeable to your request, and my promise, I sit down to
give you my ideas of the defects of our present system, and
the changes necessary to save us from ruin. They may,
perhaps, be the reveries of a projector, rather than the sober
views of a politician. You will judge of them, and make
what use you please of them.
The fundamental defect is a want of power in congress.
; It is hardly worth while to show in what this consists, as it
seems to be universally acknowledged; or to point out how
it has happened, as the only question is how to remedy i? )
It may{, however, be said, that it has originated from three
causes, -- an excess of the spirit of liberty, which has made
the particular states show a jealousy of all power not in
their own hands; and this jealousy has led them to exercise
aright of judging, in the last resort, of the measures recom-
mended by congress, and of acting according to their own
opinions of their propriety or necessity; -- a diffidence in
congress of their own powers, by which they have been
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-20 04:05 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uva. x000275470 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? HAMILTON. 285
timid and indecisive in their resolutions ; constantly making
concessions to the states, till they have scarcely left them-
selves the shadow of power; -- a want of sufficient means
at their disposal to answer the public exigencies, and of
vigour to draw forth those means, which have occasioned
them to depend on the states, individually, to fulfil their en-
gagements with the army; the consequence of which has
been to ruin their influence and credit with the army, to
establish its dependence on each state, separately, rather
than on them; that is, than on the whole collectively.
It may be pleaded that congress had never any definitive
powers granted them, and of course could exercise none,--
could do nothing more than recommend. The manner in
which congress was appointed would warrant, and the pub-
lic good required, that they should have considered them-
selves as vested with full power to preserve the republic
from harm.
They have done many of the highest acts of sovereignty,
which were always cheerfully submitted to; the declara-
tion of independence, the declaration of war, the levying
an army, creating a navy, emitting money, making alliances
with foreign powers, appointing a dictator, &c. &c. ; all
these were implications of a complete sovereignty, were
never disputed, and ought to have been a standard for the
whole conduct of administration. Undefined powers are
discretionary powers, limited only by the object for which
they were given; in the present case, the independence
and freedom of America. The confederation made no
difference; for as it has not been generally adopted, it had
no operation.
But, from what I recollect of it, congress have even de-
scended from the authority which the spirit of that act gives
them; while the particular states have no farther attended
to it, than as it suited their pretensions and convenience.
It would take too much time to enter into particular in-
'. :
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-20 04:05 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uva. x000275470 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 286 THE LIFE OF
stances; each of which, separately, might appear inconsi-
derable, but united are of serious import. I only mean to
remark, not to censure.
Butyhe confederation itself is defective, and requires to
be altered; it is neither fit for war, nor peace. The idea
of an uncontrollable sovereignty in each state, over its in-
ternal police, will defeat the other powers given to con-
gress, and make our union feeble and precarious. There
are instances, without number, where acts necessary for
the general good, and which rise out of the powers given
to congress, must interfere with the internal police of the
states; and there are as many instances in which the par-
ticular states, by arrangements of internal police, can ef-
fectually, though indirectly, counteract the arrangements
of congress. You have already had examples of this, for
which I refer you to your own memoryJ
The confederation gives the states, individually, too much
influence in the affairs of the army; they should have no-
thing to do with it.
The entire formation and disposal of our military forces
ought to belong to congress. It is an essential cement of
the union; and it ought to be the policy of congress to de-
stroy all ideas of state attachments in the army, and make
it look up wholly to them. For this purpose, all appoint-
ments, promotions, and provisions whatsoever, ought to be
made by them. It may be apprehended, that this may be
dangerous to liberty. But nothing appears more evident to
me, than that we run much greater risk of having a weak
and disunited federal government, than one which will be
able to usurp upon the rights of the people.
Already some of the lines of the army would obey their
states in opposition to congress, notwithstanding the pains
we have taken to preserve the unity of the army. If any
thing would hinder this, it would be the personal influence
of the General -- a melancholy and mortifying consideration.
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-20 04:05 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uva. x000275470 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? HAMILTON. 287
The forms of our state constitutions must always give them
great weight in our affairs, and will make it too difficult to
blind them to the pursuit of a common interest, too easy to
oppose whatever they do not like, and to form partial com-
binations, subversive of the general one. There is a wide
difference between our situation and that of an empire un-
der one simple form of government, distributed into coun-
ties, provinces, or districts, which have no legislatures, but
merely magistratical bodies to execute the laws of a com-
mon sovereign. Here the danger is, that the sovereign will
have too much power, and oppress the parts of which it is
composed. In our case, that of ^n empire composed of con-
federative states, each with a government completely or-
ganized within itself, having all the means to draw its sub-
jects to a close dependence on itselfyhe danger is directly
tlm-reverse. It is, that the common sovereignVill not have
power sufficient to unite the different members together, and
direct the common forces to the interest and happiness of
the whole. --'
The leagues among the old Grecian republics are a proof
of this. They were continually at war with each other, and
for want of union fell a prey to their neighbours. They fre- > y,
quently held general councils, but their resolutions were no
farther observed, than as they suited the interests and in-
clinations of all the parties, and, at length, they sunk entirely
into contempt.
The Swiss cantons are another proof of the doctrine.
They have had wars with each other, which would have
been fatal to them, had not the different powers in their
neighbourhood been too jealous of one another, and too S'a'
equally matched, to suffer either to take advantage of their i
quarrels. That they have remained so long united at all,
is to be attributed to their weakness, to their poverty, and
to the cause just mentioned. These ties will not exist in
America. A little time hence, some of the states will be
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-20 04:05 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uva. x000275470 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 288
THE LIFE OF
I
'-
I
y.
';/<'
Lh
.
powerful empires; and we are so remote from other na-
tions, that we shall have all the leisure and opportunity we
can wish to cut each other's throats.
The Germanic corps might also be cited as an example
\(\ *"~ in favour of the position.
The Unjted Provinces may be thought to be one against
? ' it. But the family of the Stadtholders, whose authority is
interwoven with the whole government, has been a strong
link of union between them. Their physical necessities,
and the habits founded upon them, have contributed to it.
Each province is too inconsiderable by itself to undertake
any thing. An analysis of their present constitution would
show, that they have many ties which would not exist in
ours; and that they are by no means a proper model for us.
Our own experience should satisfy us. We have felt the
difficulty of drawing out the resources of the country, and
inducing the states to combine in equal exertions for the
common cause. The ill success of our last attempt is stri-
king. Some have done a great deal; others little, or scarce-
ly any thing. The disputes about boundaries, &c. testify
how nattering a prospect^we have of future tranquillity, if
f we do not frame in time/a confederacy capable of deciding
\ the differences, and compelling the obedience of the respect-
ive members. \
The confederation, too, gives the power of the purse too
entirely to the state legislatures. It should provide perpe-
tual funds in the disposal of congress, by a land tax, poll tax,
or the like. All imposts upon commerce ought to be laid
by congress, and appropriated to their use; for without cer-
tain revenues, a government can have no power; that pow-
er which holds the purse strings absolutely, must rule. This
seems to be a medium, which, without making congress al-
together independent, will tend to give reality to its autho-
rity.
Another defect in our system is, want of method and
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-20 04:05 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uva. x000275470 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? HAMILTON. 289
energy in the administration. This has partly resulted from
the other defect; but in a great degree from prejudice and
the want of a proper executive. Congress have kept the
power too much in their own hands, and have meddled
too much with details of every sort. Congress is properly
a deliberative corps, and it forgets itself when it attempts
to play the executive. It is impossible that a body, nume-
rous as it is, constantly fluctuating, can ever act with suffi-
cient decision, or with systemj Two thirds of the members,
one half the time, cannot know what has gone before them,
or what connexion the subject in hand has to what has been
transacted on former occasions. The members who have
been more permanent, will only give information that pro-
motes the side they espouse, in the present case, and will as
often mislead as enlighten. The variety of business must
distract, and the proneness of every assembly to debate,
must at all times delay.
y~ Lately, congress, convinced of these inconveniences, have
gone into the measure of appointing boards. But this is, in
my opinion, a bad plan. A single man, in each department
of the administration, would be greatly preferable. It would
give us a chance of more knowledge, more activity, more
responsibility, and, of course, more zeal and attention. --
Boards partake of a part of the inconveniences of larger as-
semblies ; -- their decisions are slower, their energy less,
their responsibility more diffused. They will not have the
same abilities and knowledge as an administration by single
men. Men of the first pretensions will not so readily en-
gage in them, because they will be less conspicuous, of less
importance, have less opportunity of distinguishing them-
selves. The members of boards will take less pains to in-
form themselves and arrive at eminence, because they have
fewer motives to do it. All these reasons conspire to give
a preference to the plan of vesting the great executive de-
partments of the state in the hands of individuals. As these
vol. I. 37
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-20 04:05 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uva. x000275470 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 290 THE LIFE OF
men will be, of course, at all times under the direction of
congress, we shall blend the advantages of a monarchy and
republic in one constitution. \
A question has been made, whether single men could be
found to undertake these offices. I think they could; be-
cause there would be then every thing to excite the ambi-
tion of candidates. But in order to this, congress, by their
manner of appointing them, and the line of duty marked
out, must show that they are in earnest in making these of-
fices, offices of real trust and importance.
I fear a little vanity has stood in the way of these arrange-
ments, as though they would lessen the importance of con-
gress, and leave them nothing to do. But they would have
precisely the same rights and powers as heretofore, happi-
ly disencumbered of the detail. They would have to in-
spect the conduct of their ministers, deliberate upon their
plans, originate others for the public good, -- only observ-
ing this rule, that they ought to consult their ministers, and
get all the information and advice they could from them, be-
fore they entered into any new measures, or made changes
in the old.
A third defect is, the fluctuating constitution of our army.
This has been a pregnant source of evil; -- all our military
misfortunes, three-fourths of our civil embarrassments, are
^__ to be ascribed to it. ) The General has so fully enumerated
the mischiefs, in a late letter to congress, that I could only
repeat what he has said, and will, therefore, refer you to
that letter.
The imperfect and unequal provision made for the army,
is a fourth defectiwhich you will find delineated in the same
letter. (Without a speedy change, the army must dissolve;
-- it is now a mob rather than an army, -- without cloth-
ing, without pay, without provision, without morals, with-
out discipline. We begin to hate the country for its neg-
lect of us; the country begins to hate us for our oppressions
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-20 04:05 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uva. x000275470 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? HAMILTON. 291
of them. Congress have long been jealous of us; we have
now lost all confidence in them, and give the worst con-
struction to all they do. Held together by the slenderest
ties, we are ripening for a dissolution.
i_The present mode of supplying the army by state purchases
is not one of the least considerable defects of our system.
It is too precarious a dependence, because the states will ne-
ver be sufficiently impressed with our necessities. Each will
make its own ease a primary object, the supply of the ar-
my a secondary one. The variety of channels through
which the business is transacted, will multiply the number
of persons employed, and the opportunities of embezzling
public money. From the popular spirit on which most of
the governments turn, the state agents will be men of less
character and ability; nor will there be so rigid a responsi-
bility among them as there might easily be among those in
the employ of the continent; of course not so much dili-
gence, care, or economy. Very little of the money raised
in the several states will go into the continental treasury,
on pretence that it is all exhausted in providing the quotas
of supplies, and the public will be without funds for the
other demands of government. The expense will be ulti-
mately much greater, and the advantage much smaller.
We actually feel the insufficiency of this plan, and have
reason to dread, under it, a ruinous extremity of want.
These are the principal defects in the present system that
now occur to me. There are many inferior ones in the
organization of particular departments, and many errors
of administration, which might be pointed out; but the
task would be troublesome and tedious, and if we had once
remedied those I have mentioned, the others would not be
attended with much difficulty.
I shall now propose the remedies which appear to me
applicable to our circumstances, and necessary to extri-
cate our affairs from their present deplorable situation.
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-20 04:05 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uva. x000275470 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 292 TUB LIFE OF
The first step must be to give congress powers compe-
tent to the public exigencies. This may happen in two
ways: one by resuming and exercising the discretionary
powers I suppose to have been originally vested in them
for the safety of the states, and resting their conduct on the
candour of their countrymen and the necessity of the con-
juncture; the other, by calling immediately a contention
of all the states, with full authority to conclude finally upon
a general confederation, stating to them beforehand expli-
citly the evils arising from a want of power in congress,
and the impossibility of supporting the contest on its pre-
sent footing, that the delegates may come possessed of
proper sentiments, as well as proper authority, to give effi-
cacy to the meeting. Their commission should include a
right of vesting congress with the whole or a proportion of
the unoccupied lands, to be employed for the purpose of
raising a revenue, reserving the jurisdiction to the states by
whom they are granted.
The first plan, I expect, will be thought too bold an ex-
pedient by the generality of congress; and, indeed, their
practice hitherto has so rivetted the opinion of their want
of power, that the success of this experiment may very
well be doubted.
I see no objection to the other mode that has any weight
in competition with the reasons for it. The convention
. j vv* should assemble the first of November next; the sooner
the better; our disorders are too violent to admit of a com-
mon or lingering remedy. The reasons for which I re-
quire them to be vested with plenipotentiary authority are,
that the business may suffer no delay in the execution, and
may in reality come to effect. A convention may agree
upon a confederation; the states, individually, hardly ever
will. We must have one, at all events, and a vigorous
one, if we mean to succeed in the contest and be happy
hereafter. As I said before, to engage the states to com-
:
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-20 04:05 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uva. x000275470 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? HAMIITON. 293
ply with this mode, congress ought to confess to them,
plainly and unanimously, the impracticability, of supporting
our affairs on the present footing, and without a solid co-
ercive union. (I ask that the convention should have a
power of vesting the whole or a part of the unoccupied
lands in congress, because it is necessary that body should
have some property, as a fund for the arrangements of
finance; and I know of no other kind that can be given
them. )
The confederation, in my opinion, should give congress aA
complete sovereignty; except as to that part of internal
police which relates to the rights of property and life
among individuals, and to raising money by internal taxes.
It is necessary that every thing belonging to this should be
regulated by the state legislatures. . Congress should have \
complete sovereignty in all that relates to war, peace, j
trade, finance; and to the management of foreign "affairs; I
the right of declaring war, of raising armies, officering, I
paying them, directing their motions in every respect; of
equipping fleets, and doing the same with them; of build-
ing fortifications, arsenals, magazines, &c. &c. ; of making
peace on such conditions as they think proper; of regulat-
ing trade, determining with what countries it shall be car-
ried on; granting indulgences; laying prohibitions on all
the articles of export or import; imposing duties, granting
bounties and premiums for raising, exporting, or importing;
and applying to their own use the product of these duties,
only giving credit to the states on whom they are raised
in the general account of revenues and expense; institut-
ing admiralty courts, &c. ; of coining money, establishing
banks on such terms, and with such privileges, as they
think proper; appropriating funds, and doing whatever
else relates to the operations of finance; transacting
every thing with foreign nations; making alliances, offen-
sive and defensive, treaties of commerce, &c. &c.
1
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-20 04:05 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uva. x000275470 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 294 THE LIFE OF
The confederation should provide certain perpetual reve-
nues, productive and easy of collection; a land tax, poll
tax, or the like, which, together with the duties on trade,
and the unlocated lands, would give congress a substantial
existence, and a stable foundation for their schemes of
finance. What more supplies were necessary, should be
occasionally demanded of the states, in the present mode of
quotas.
The second step I would recommend is, that congress
should instantly appoint the following great officers of
state: A Secretary for Foreign Affairs; a President of
; X. v1 ' War; a President of Marine; a Financier; a President of
(. v1,1 Trade; instead of this last, a Board of Trade may be pre-
ferable, as the regulations of trade are slow and guarded,
and require prudence and experience, (more than other
qualities,) for which boards are very well adapted.
Congress should choose for these offices, men of the first
abilities, property, and character, in the continent; and
such as have had the best opportunities of being acquainted
with the several branches. General Schuyler, whom you
mentioned, would make an excellent President of War;
General McDougal a very good President of Marine; Mr.
Robert Morris would have many things in his favour for
the department of Finance. He could, by his own per-
sonal influence, give great weight to the measures he should
adopt. I dare say, men equally capable may be found for
the other departments.
I know not if it would not be a good plan to let the Fi-
nancier be President of the Board of Trade; but he should
only have a casting voice in determining questions there.
There is a connexion between trade and finance, which
ought to make the director of one acquainted with the
other; but the financier should not direct the affairs of
trade, because, for the sake of acquiring reputation by in-
creasing the revenues, he might adopt measures that would
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-20 04:05 GMT / http://hdl.
In a letter of the twenty-fifth of September, addressed to
Miss Schuyler, he thus adverts to this affecting story:
"Arnold, hearing of the plot being detected, immediately
fled to the enemy. I went in pursuit of him, but was much
too late; and could hardly regret the disappointment, when
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-20 04:05 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uva. x000275470 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? HAMILTON. 275
on my return, I saw an amiable woman, frantic with dis-
tress for the loss of a husband she tenderly loved, -- a trai-
tor to his country and to his fame, -- a disgrace to his con-
nexions ; it was the most affecting scene I ever was witness
to. She, for a considerable time, entirely lost herself. The
General went up to see her, and she upbraided him with
being in a plot to murder her child. One moment she raved,
another she melted into tears. Sometimes she pressed her
infant to her bosom, and lamented its fate, occasioned by
the imprudence of its father, in a manner that would have
pierced insensibility itself. All the sweetness of beauty, all
the loveliness of innocence, all the tenderness of a wife, and
all the fondness of a mother, showed themselves in her ap-
pearance and conduct. We have every reason to believe,
that she was entirely unacquainted with the plan, and that
the first knowledge of it, was when Arnold went to tell her
he must banish himself from his country and from her for-
ever. She instantly fell into a convulsion, and he left her
in that situation.
"This morning she is more composed. I paid her a visit,
and endeavoured to soothe her by every method in my pow-
er; though you may imagine she is not easily to be consoled.
Added to her other distresses, she is very apprehensive the
resentments of her country will fall upon her, (who is only
unfortunate,) for the guilt of her husband.
"I have tried to persuade her that her fears are ill found-
ed; but she will not be convinced. She received us in bed,
with every circumstance that would interest our sympathy,
and her sufferings were so eloquent, that I wished myself
her brother, to have a right to become her defender; -- as
it is, I have entreated her to enable me to give her proofs
of my friendship. Could I forgive Arnold for sacrificing his
honour, reputation, and duty, I could not forgive him for
acting a part that must have forfeited the esteem of so fine
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-20 04:05 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uva. x000275470 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 276 THE LIFE OF
a woman. At present, she almost forgets his crime in his
misfortunes; and her horror at the guilt of the traitor, is lost
in her love of the man. But a virtuous mind cannot long
esteem a base one, and time will make her despise, if it can-
not make her hate. "
One circumstance in this melancholy scene dwelt deep-
ly on the mind of Hamilton. It is that to which, in the
beautiful tribute of an eloquent female,* to the memory
of Andre, she most feelingly alludes, -- the manner of
his death. On the day of his execution, Hamilton thus
writes. f
"Poor Andre suffers to-day;--every thing that is amiable
in virtue, in fortitude, in delicate sentiment, and accom-
plished manners, pleads for him; but hard-hearted policy
calls for a sacrifice. He must die . I send you my
account of Arnold's affair, and to justify myself to your
sentiments, I must inform you, that I urged a compliance
with Andre's request to be shot, and I do not think it
would have had an ill effect, but some people are only
sensible to motives of policy, and sometimes, from a nar-
row disposition, mistake it.
"When Andre's tale comes to be told, and present resent-
ment is over, -- the refusing him the privilege of choosing
the manner of his death will be branded with too much
obstinacy.
"It was proposed to me to suggest to him the idea of
an exchange for Arnold; but I knew I should have for-
feited his esteem by doing it, and therefore declined it.
As a man of honour, he could not but reject it; and I
would not for the world have proposed to him a thing
which must have placed me in the unamiable light of sup-
posing him capable of a meanness, or of not feeling my-
self the impropriety of the measure. I confess to you, I
* Miss Seward. f Tappan, Oct. 2, 1780.
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-20 04:05 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uva. x000275470 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? HAMILTON. 277
had the weakness to value the esteem of a dying man, be-
cause I reverenced his merit. "*
The eloquent an! feeling narrative contained in these
letters, which does so much honour to the sentiments of their
author, is a just tribute to the character of the captive, and
to the temper of the army.
Andre, educated amidst a circle of devoted relatives,
and habitually indulging every ardent impulse of his gene-
rous nature, had torn himself from their reluctant arms to
win honour in the field. Commended to the notice of Sir
Henry Clinton, he rose fast in his esteem, and was often
selected for those delicate duties which serve to mitigate
the miseries of war.
In the performance of these, his deportment often formed
a strong contrast with that of his less polished brethren;
and such was the impression on the minds of those Ameri-
cans who had been prisoners, that when the news of this
event arrived, great as was the rejoicing at the detection
of the plot and the capture of the spy, every bosom swelled
with regret to learn that that spy was Andre.
Shocked as Hamilton was with the danger of this con-
spiracy, and his indignation heightened by the belief that
it was intended to reach the person of Washington, his ge-
* The following note was addressed by Andre to General Washington, on
the day previous to his execution.
Tappan, October 1, 1780.
"Buoyed above the terror of death, by the consciousness of a life devoted
to honourable pursuits, and stained with no action that can give me remorse,
I trust that the request I make to your excellency, at this serious period, and
which is to soften my last moments, will not be rejected.
"Sympathy towards a soldier, will surely induce your excellency, and a
military tribunal, to adapt the mode of my death to the feelings of a man of
honour.
"Let me hope, sir, if aught in my character impresses you with esteem to-
wards me, if aught in my misfortunes marks me as the victim of policy, and
not of resentment, I shall experience the operation of these feelings in your
breast, by being informed that I am not to die on a gibbet. "
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-20 04:05 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uva. x000275470 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 278 THE LIFE OF
nerous feelings, nevertheless, seemed wholly to take posses-
sion of him, and during all the period of Andre's confine-
ment and trial, he exhausted every Aeans to alleviate his
sufferings, and to withdraw him from the bitterness of his
reflections.
As soon as he was brought in, addressing to a much loved
friend the unnecessary request, he said, "Major Jackson,
I have learned that Andre was very kind to you when you
were a prisoner, will you not visit him? " Thus awakening
the sympathies of the army, he turned their resentment
upon the traitor, to whose criminal arts the British officer
had unhappily lent himself. The conduct of Andre's cap-
tors was the theme of honest pride, and every soldier in the
camp participated in their triumph; but when the day of
his execution came, he was followed only by the brigade on
duty, and with the exception of those officers who sur-
rounded the scaffold to soothe its victim, not an officer or
soldier was to be seen as a spectator. All retired to their
tents, exhibiting that delicacy and sensibility which became
the soldiers of such a cause.
It is, indeed, impossible to trace the annals of the revo-
lution without remarking the kind temper of the Americans
towards their enemies, and the happy commingling of the
heroic with the milder virtues, both in the army and in the
people.
Habituated to all the comforts, indeed luxuries, which
render the condition of the American commonalty an ob-
ject of envy among those of less happy regions, and free as
the wilderness which surrounded them, the aggravated pri-
vations that followed the march of war, -- aggravated by
the insolent bearing of an enemy, who threatened to visit
on them the calamities which their own nation had expe-
rienced in a former age, and avowed the dispossession of
the inhabitants, and the disherison of their progeny, as the
reward promised to the subjugation of rebels, -- amid ra-
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-20 04:05 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uva. x000275470 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? HAMILTON. 279
pine and devastation, when even congress felt it necessary
to advise the people to erect places of refuge in the forest,
far from their dwellings, for their aged parents, their chil-
dren, and their wives, yet whenever the instruments of
these evils fell into their hands, they are seen nursing their
wounds, fostering them amid their sufferings, and winning
them by their kindnesses to a detestation of the cause in
whieh they had embarked. In vain are sought instances of
cruelty to the enemy. It would have been too great a vio-
lation of public sentiment, and would have doomed its per-
petrators to infamy.
This virtue of a humane people, was followed by its re-
ward. The enemy lost more by desertion than by the
sword, especially among the mercenaries of the continent;
and thus the seeds of those kind feelings were planted in the
midst of war, which have drawn within the bosom of our
country, and linked to her institutions, the oppressed of
every other.
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-20 04:05 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uva. x000275470 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? ? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-20 04:05 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uva. x000275470 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? CHAPTER XII.
[1780. ]
During the series of events which have been related in
the preceding chapter, the mind of Hamilton, roused to the
great political questions which engaged so strongly the
public attention, though oppressed with the various labours
of his situation, to which the letters of his friends frequently
advert, turned with eager aptitude to an examination of
the defects of the existing government, and the remedies
which might be applied.
Mere military movements had become of secondary in-
terest; temporary expedients for the financial embarrass-
ments were sought in vain; and while the public press
was engaged in the discussion of transient questions, he
was looking with intense anxiety to the adoption of some
great and effectual mean by which the distresses of the
country might be reached at their sources.
From his first entrance into the public service, he felt
the necessity of a more energetic system; and it was ob-
jected to him then, as it has been since, that he looked
with too fearful an apprehension upon a government merely
federative and advisory.
An attempt, the most flagitious, was made on this ground,
to produce a breach between him and the commander-in-
chief, which was detected, exposed, and defied with a lofty
tone of conscious purity. *
The same sense of the public dangers, influenced in com-
mon the minds of Washington and Hamilton; and while
* The instrument was Doctor Gordon, author of the History of the Ame-
rican War.
vol. I. 36
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-20 04:05 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uva. x000275470 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 282 THE LIFE OF
the former in his addresses to congress was enforcing his
apprehensions with all the solemnity which the dignity of
his station authorized, the other, by letters to his friends,
and by personal solicitation, sought, within a more limited
sphere, to urge attention to this great object of his just and
honest solicitude. In a letter to Isaac Sears, with whom
his intimacy had been formed in the early struggles of New-
York, he thus expresses himself:
"I was much obliged to you, my dear sir, for the letter
which you did me the favour to write me since your return
to Boston. I am sorry to find that the same spirit of indif-
ference to public affairs prevails. It is necessary we should
rouse, and begin to do our business in earnest, or we shall
play a losing game. It is impossible the contest can be
much longer supported on the present footing. We must
have a government with more power. We must have a
tax in kind. We must have a foreign loan. We must
have a bank, on the true principles of a bank. We must
have an administration distinct from congress, and in the
hands of single men under their orders. We must, above
all things, have an army for the war, and an establishment
that will interest the officers in the service.
"Congress are deliberating on our military affairs; but I
apprehend their resolutions will be tinctured with the old
spirit. We seem to be proof against experience. They
will, however, recommend an army for the war, at least as
a primary object. All those who love their country, ought to
exert their influence in the states where they reside to de-
termine them to take up this object with energy. The states
must sink under the burden of temporary enlistments, and
the enemy will conquer us by degrees during the intervals
of our weakness.
"Clinlon is now said to be making a considerable detach-
ment to the southward. My fears are high, my hopes low.
We are told here, fbere is to be a congress of the neutral
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-20 04:05 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uva. x000275470 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? HAMILTON. 283
powers at the Hague, for mediating of peace. God send
it may be true. We want it; but if the idea goes abroad,
ten to one if we do not fancy the thing done, and fall into a
profound sleep, till the cannon of the enemy awaken us
next campaign. -- This is our national character. -- I am,
with great regard, dear sir, your most obedient servant,
A. Hamilton. "
On these measures he seemed, at this time, perpetually to
descant. Many of his letters have been lost, others cannot
be obtained; but in all that are known, his mind appeared
intent on the accomplishment of what he early foresaw could
alone save the country, -- a re-organization of the govern-
ment.
A letter written at this period, to his friend Duane, con-
tains a comprehensive view of the subjects which engrossed
his thoughts, and will give a clear insight into the character
of his mind.
In this will be seen, how early and how deeply he looked
into the wants of the country; and with what enlarged ideas
he projected a form of government, by which congress
should have complete sovereignty in all that relates to war,
peace, trade, and finance, and to the management of foreign
affairs; reserving merely to the states, that part of internal
police which relates to the rights of property and life among
individuals, and to raising money by internal taxes, -- the
distribution of the powers of the government into separate
departments, -- recruiting the army on a permanent esta-
blishment,--and an extensive and comprehensive system for
drawing out the resources of the country, and rendering
them most effectually applicable to its necessities.
The admirable perspicuity of his style, the extraordinary
faculty which he showed in what he terms " a hastily writ-
ten production," and when, as he says, "he is merely skim-
ming the surface," of comprehending in a summary of his
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-20 04:05 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uva. x000275470 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 284 THE LIFE OF
thoughts every particular essential to the developement of
them; but what will be especially observed, the ripeness of
his views, and that keen insight into the nature and opera-
tion of political institutions, which have given to his opinions
such an authoritative influence, are here strongly manifested.
He not only suggests the adoption of many of the leading
measures which were soon after introduced, but points to a
convention of the states, for the creation of a federal
constitution; suggests the mode of enforcing its necessity
on the minds of the people, by "sensible and popular wri-
tings;" thus hinting at the idea which gave birth to the "Fe-
deralist," and unfolding some of those far-reaching views of
national polity, which are there more fully developed.
COLONEL HAMILTON TO THE HON. JAMES DUANE.
Liberty Pole, 1780.
DEAR SIR,
Agreeable to your request, and my promise, I sit down to
give you my ideas of the defects of our present system, and
the changes necessary to save us from ruin. They may,
perhaps, be the reveries of a projector, rather than the sober
views of a politician. You will judge of them, and make
what use you please of them.
The fundamental defect is a want of power in congress.
; It is hardly worth while to show in what this consists, as it
seems to be universally acknowledged; or to point out how
it has happened, as the only question is how to remedy i? )
It may{, however, be said, that it has originated from three
causes, -- an excess of the spirit of liberty, which has made
the particular states show a jealousy of all power not in
their own hands; and this jealousy has led them to exercise
aright of judging, in the last resort, of the measures recom-
mended by congress, and of acting according to their own
opinions of their propriety or necessity; -- a diffidence in
congress of their own powers, by which they have been
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-20 04:05 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uva. x000275470 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? HAMILTON. 285
timid and indecisive in their resolutions ; constantly making
concessions to the states, till they have scarcely left them-
selves the shadow of power; -- a want of sufficient means
at their disposal to answer the public exigencies, and of
vigour to draw forth those means, which have occasioned
them to depend on the states, individually, to fulfil their en-
gagements with the army; the consequence of which has
been to ruin their influence and credit with the army, to
establish its dependence on each state, separately, rather
than on them; that is, than on the whole collectively.
It may be pleaded that congress had never any definitive
powers granted them, and of course could exercise none,--
could do nothing more than recommend. The manner in
which congress was appointed would warrant, and the pub-
lic good required, that they should have considered them-
selves as vested with full power to preserve the republic
from harm.
They have done many of the highest acts of sovereignty,
which were always cheerfully submitted to; the declara-
tion of independence, the declaration of war, the levying
an army, creating a navy, emitting money, making alliances
with foreign powers, appointing a dictator, &c. &c. ; all
these were implications of a complete sovereignty, were
never disputed, and ought to have been a standard for the
whole conduct of administration. Undefined powers are
discretionary powers, limited only by the object for which
they were given; in the present case, the independence
and freedom of America. The confederation made no
difference; for as it has not been generally adopted, it had
no operation.
But, from what I recollect of it, congress have even de-
scended from the authority which the spirit of that act gives
them; while the particular states have no farther attended
to it, than as it suited their pretensions and convenience.
It would take too much time to enter into particular in-
'. :
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-20 04:05 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uva. x000275470 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 286 THE LIFE OF
stances; each of which, separately, might appear inconsi-
derable, but united are of serious import. I only mean to
remark, not to censure.
Butyhe confederation itself is defective, and requires to
be altered; it is neither fit for war, nor peace. The idea
of an uncontrollable sovereignty in each state, over its in-
ternal police, will defeat the other powers given to con-
gress, and make our union feeble and precarious. There
are instances, without number, where acts necessary for
the general good, and which rise out of the powers given
to congress, must interfere with the internal police of the
states; and there are as many instances in which the par-
ticular states, by arrangements of internal police, can ef-
fectually, though indirectly, counteract the arrangements
of congress. You have already had examples of this, for
which I refer you to your own memoryJ
The confederation gives the states, individually, too much
influence in the affairs of the army; they should have no-
thing to do with it.
The entire formation and disposal of our military forces
ought to belong to congress. It is an essential cement of
the union; and it ought to be the policy of congress to de-
stroy all ideas of state attachments in the army, and make
it look up wholly to them. For this purpose, all appoint-
ments, promotions, and provisions whatsoever, ought to be
made by them. It may be apprehended, that this may be
dangerous to liberty. But nothing appears more evident to
me, than that we run much greater risk of having a weak
and disunited federal government, than one which will be
able to usurp upon the rights of the people.
Already some of the lines of the army would obey their
states in opposition to congress, notwithstanding the pains
we have taken to preserve the unity of the army. If any
thing would hinder this, it would be the personal influence
of the General -- a melancholy and mortifying consideration.
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-20 04:05 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uva. x000275470 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? HAMILTON. 287
The forms of our state constitutions must always give them
great weight in our affairs, and will make it too difficult to
blind them to the pursuit of a common interest, too easy to
oppose whatever they do not like, and to form partial com-
binations, subversive of the general one. There is a wide
difference between our situation and that of an empire un-
der one simple form of government, distributed into coun-
ties, provinces, or districts, which have no legislatures, but
merely magistratical bodies to execute the laws of a com-
mon sovereign. Here the danger is, that the sovereign will
have too much power, and oppress the parts of which it is
composed. In our case, that of ^n empire composed of con-
federative states, each with a government completely or-
ganized within itself, having all the means to draw its sub-
jects to a close dependence on itselfyhe danger is directly
tlm-reverse. It is, that the common sovereignVill not have
power sufficient to unite the different members together, and
direct the common forces to the interest and happiness of
the whole. --'
The leagues among the old Grecian republics are a proof
of this. They were continually at war with each other, and
for want of union fell a prey to their neighbours. They fre- > y,
quently held general councils, but their resolutions were no
farther observed, than as they suited the interests and in-
clinations of all the parties, and, at length, they sunk entirely
into contempt.
The Swiss cantons are another proof of the doctrine.
They have had wars with each other, which would have
been fatal to them, had not the different powers in their
neighbourhood been too jealous of one another, and too S'a'
equally matched, to suffer either to take advantage of their i
quarrels. That they have remained so long united at all,
is to be attributed to their weakness, to their poverty, and
to the cause just mentioned. These ties will not exist in
America. A little time hence, some of the states will be
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-20 04:05 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uva. x000275470 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 288
THE LIFE OF
I
'-
I
y.
';/<'
Lh
.
powerful empires; and we are so remote from other na-
tions, that we shall have all the leisure and opportunity we
can wish to cut each other's throats.
The Germanic corps might also be cited as an example
\(\ *"~ in favour of the position.
The Unjted Provinces may be thought to be one against
? ' it. But the family of the Stadtholders, whose authority is
interwoven with the whole government, has been a strong
link of union between them. Their physical necessities,
and the habits founded upon them, have contributed to it.
Each province is too inconsiderable by itself to undertake
any thing. An analysis of their present constitution would
show, that they have many ties which would not exist in
ours; and that they are by no means a proper model for us.
Our own experience should satisfy us. We have felt the
difficulty of drawing out the resources of the country, and
inducing the states to combine in equal exertions for the
common cause. The ill success of our last attempt is stri-
king. Some have done a great deal; others little, or scarce-
ly any thing. The disputes about boundaries, &c. testify
how nattering a prospect^we have of future tranquillity, if
f we do not frame in time/a confederacy capable of deciding
\ the differences, and compelling the obedience of the respect-
ive members. \
The confederation, too, gives the power of the purse too
entirely to the state legislatures. It should provide perpe-
tual funds in the disposal of congress, by a land tax, poll tax,
or the like. All imposts upon commerce ought to be laid
by congress, and appropriated to their use; for without cer-
tain revenues, a government can have no power; that pow-
er which holds the purse strings absolutely, must rule. This
seems to be a medium, which, without making congress al-
together independent, will tend to give reality to its autho-
rity.
Another defect in our system is, want of method and
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-20 04:05 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uva. x000275470 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? HAMILTON. 289
energy in the administration. This has partly resulted from
the other defect; but in a great degree from prejudice and
the want of a proper executive. Congress have kept the
power too much in their own hands, and have meddled
too much with details of every sort. Congress is properly
a deliberative corps, and it forgets itself when it attempts
to play the executive. It is impossible that a body, nume-
rous as it is, constantly fluctuating, can ever act with suffi-
cient decision, or with systemj Two thirds of the members,
one half the time, cannot know what has gone before them,
or what connexion the subject in hand has to what has been
transacted on former occasions. The members who have
been more permanent, will only give information that pro-
motes the side they espouse, in the present case, and will as
often mislead as enlighten. The variety of business must
distract, and the proneness of every assembly to debate,
must at all times delay.
y~ Lately, congress, convinced of these inconveniences, have
gone into the measure of appointing boards. But this is, in
my opinion, a bad plan. A single man, in each department
of the administration, would be greatly preferable. It would
give us a chance of more knowledge, more activity, more
responsibility, and, of course, more zeal and attention. --
Boards partake of a part of the inconveniences of larger as-
semblies ; -- their decisions are slower, their energy less,
their responsibility more diffused. They will not have the
same abilities and knowledge as an administration by single
men. Men of the first pretensions will not so readily en-
gage in them, because they will be less conspicuous, of less
importance, have less opportunity of distinguishing them-
selves. The members of boards will take less pains to in-
form themselves and arrive at eminence, because they have
fewer motives to do it. All these reasons conspire to give
a preference to the plan of vesting the great executive de-
partments of the state in the hands of individuals. As these
vol. I. 37
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-20 04:05 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uva. x000275470 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 290 THE LIFE OF
men will be, of course, at all times under the direction of
congress, we shall blend the advantages of a monarchy and
republic in one constitution. \
A question has been made, whether single men could be
found to undertake these offices. I think they could; be-
cause there would be then every thing to excite the ambi-
tion of candidates. But in order to this, congress, by their
manner of appointing them, and the line of duty marked
out, must show that they are in earnest in making these of-
fices, offices of real trust and importance.
I fear a little vanity has stood in the way of these arrange-
ments, as though they would lessen the importance of con-
gress, and leave them nothing to do. But they would have
precisely the same rights and powers as heretofore, happi-
ly disencumbered of the detail. They would have to in-
spect the conduct of their ministers, deliberate upon their
plans, originate others for the public good, -- only observ-
ing this rule, that they ought to consult their ministers, and
get all the information and advice they could from them, be-
fore they entered into any new measures, or made changes
in the old.
A third defect is, the fluctuating constitution of our army.
This has been a pregnant source of evil; -- all our military
misfortunes, three-fourths of our civil embarrassments, are
^__ to be ascribed to it. ) The General has so fully enumerated
the mischiefs, in a late letter to congress, that I could only
repeat what he has said, and will, therefore, refer you to
that letter.
The imperfect and unequal provision made for the army,
is a fourth defectiwhich you will find delineated in the same
letter. (Without a speedy change, the army must dissolve;
-- it is now a mob rather than an army, -- without cloth-
ing, without pay, without provision, without morals, with-
out discipline. We begin to hate the country for its neg-
lect of us; the country begins to hate us for our oppressions
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-20 04:05 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uva. x000275470 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? HAMILTON. 291
of them. Congress have long been jealous of us; we have
now lost all confidence in them, and give the worst con-
struction to all they do. Held together by the slenderest
ties, we are ripening for a dissolution.
i_The present mode of supplying the army by state purchases
is not one of the least considerable defects of our system.
It is too precarious a dependence, because the states will ne-
ver be sufficiently impressed with our necessities. Each will
make its own ease a primary object, the supply of the ar-
my a secondary one. The variety of channels through
which the business is transacted, will multiply the number
of persons employed, and the opportunities of embezzling
public money. From the popular spirit on which most of
the governments turn, the state agents will be men of less
character and ability; nor will there be so rigid a responsi-
bility among them as there might easily be among those in
the employ of the continent; of course not so much dili-
gence, care, or economy. Very little of the money raised
in the several states will go into the continental treasury,
on pretence that it is all exhausted in providing the quotas
of supplies, and the public will be without funds for the
other demands of government. The expense will be ulti-
mately much greater, and the advantage much smaller.
We actually feel the insufficiency of this plan, and have
reason to dread, under it, a ruinous extremity of want.
These are the principal defects in the present system that
now occur to me. There are many inferior ones in the
organization of particular departments, and many errors
of administration, which might be pointed out; but the
task would be troublesome and tedious, and if we had once
remedied those I have mentioned, the others would not be
attended with much difficulty.
I shall now propose the remedies which appear to me
applicable to our circumstances, and necessary to extri-
cate our affairs from their present deplorable situation.
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-20 04:05 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uva. x000275470 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 292 TUB LIFE OF
The first step must be to give congress powers compe-
tent to the public exigencies. This may happen in two
ways: one by resuming and exercising the discretionary
powers I suppose to have been originally vested in them
for the safety of the states, and resting their conduct on the
candour of their countrymen and the necessity of the con-
juncture; the other, by calling immediately a contention
of all the states, with full authority to conclude finally upon
a general confederation, stating to them beforehand expli-
citly the evils arising from a want of power in congress,
and the impossibility of supporting the contest on its pre-
sent footing, that the delegates may come possessed of
proper sentiments, as well as proper authority, to give effi-
cacy to the meeting. Their commission should include a
right of vesting congress with the whole or a proportion of
the unoccupied lands, to be employed for the purpose of
raising a revenue, reserving the jurisdiction to the states by
whom they are granted.
The first plan, I expect, will be thought too bold an ex-
pedient by the generality of congress; and, indeed, their
practice hitherto has so rivetted the opinion of their want
of power, that the success of this experiment may very
well be doubted.
I see no objection to the other mode that has any weight
in competition with the reasons for it. The convention
. j vv* should assemble the first of November next; the sooner
the better; our disorders are too violent to admit of a com-
mon or lingering remedy. The reasons for which I re-
quire them to be vested with plenipotentiary authority are,
that the business may suffer no delay in the execution, and
may in reality come to effect. A convention may agree
upon a confederation; the states, individually, hardly ever
will. We must have one, at all events, and a vigorous
one, if we mean to succeed in the contest and be happy
hereafter. As I said before, to engage the states to com-
:
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-20 04:05 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uva. x000275470 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? HAMIITON. 293
ply with this mode, congress ought to confess to them,
plainly and unanimously, the impracticability, of supporting
our affairs on the present footing, and without a solid co-
ercive union. (I ask that the convention should have a
power of vesting the whole or a part of the unoccupied
lands in congress, because it is necessary that body should
have some property, as a fund for the arrangements of
finance; and I know of no other kind that can be given
them. )
The confederation, in my opinion, should give congress aA
complete sovereignty; except as to that part of internal
police which relates to the rights of property and life
among individuals, and to raising money by internal taxes.
It is necessary that every thing belonging to this should be
regulated by the state legislatures. . Congress should have \
complete sovereignty in all that relates to war, peace, j
trade, finance; and to the management of foreign "affairs; I
the right of declaring war, of raising armies, officering, I
paying them, directing their motions in every respect; of
equipping fleets, and doing the same with them; of build-
ing fortifications, arsenals, magazines, &c. &c. ; of making
peace on such conditions as they think proper; of regulat-
ing trade, determining with what countries it shall be car-
ried on; granting indulgences; laying prohibitions on all
the articles of export or import; imposing duties, granting
bounties and premiums for raising, exporting, or importing;
and applying to their own use the product of these duties,
only giving credit to the states on whom they are raised
in the general account of revenues and expense; institut-
ing admiralty courts, &c. ; of coining money, establishing
banks on such terms, and with such privileges, as they
think proper; appropriating funds, and doing whatever
else relates to the operations of finance; transacting
every thing with foreign nations; making alliances, offen-
sive and defensive, treaties of commerce, &c. &c.
1
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-20 04:05 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uva. x000275470 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 294 THE LIFE OF
The confederation should provide certain perpetual reve-
nues, productive and easy of collection; a land tax, poll
tax, or the like, which, together with the duties on trade,
and the unlocated lands, would give congress a substantial
existence, and a stable foundation for their schemes of
finance. What more supplies were necessary, should be
occasionally demanded of the states, in the present mode of
quotas.
The second step I would recommend is, that congress
should instantly appoint the following great officers of
state: A Secretary for Foreign Affairs; a President of
; X. v1 ' War; a President of Marine; a Financier; a President of
(. v1,1 Trade; instead of this last, a Board of Trade may be pre-
ferable, as the regulations of trade are slow and guarded,
and require prudence and experience, (more than other
qualities,) for which boards are very well adapted.
Congress should choose for these offices, men of the first
abilities, property, and character, in the continent; and
such as have had the best opportunities of being acquainted
with the several branches. General Schuyler, whom you
mentioned, would make an excellent President of War;
General McDougal a very good President of Marine; Mr.
Robert Morris would have many things in his favour for
the department of Finance. He could, by his own per-
sonal influence, give great weight to the measures he should
adopt. I dare say, men equally capable may be found for
the other departments.
I know not if it would not be a good plan to let the Fi-
nancier be President of the Board of Trade; but he should
only have a casting voice in determining questions there.
There is a connexion between trade and finance, which
ought to make the director of one acquainted with the
other; but the financier should not direct the affairs of
trade, because, for the sake of acquiring reputation by in-
creasing the revenues, he might adopt measures that would
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-20 04:05 GMT / http://hdl.
